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In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit

REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, <i>Appellant</i> ,	}	No. 14,990
vs. PAULA MARTIN, by and through Arthur H. Lewis, her Guardian Ad Litem, <i>Appellee</i> .		
REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, <i>Appellant</i> ,	}	No. 14,991
vs. VERLA MARTIN, <i>Appellee</i> .		
REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, <i>Appellant</i> ,	}	No. 14,992
vs. PAUL MARTIN, <i>Appellee</i> .		

**APPELLANT'S REPLY TO BRIEF
 IN ANSWER TO PETITION
 FOR REHEARING**

Rehearing en Banc on Appeal from Final Judgments of
 the District Court for the District of Oregon

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

In its Petition for Rehearing en Banc, appellant did not discuss all the questions presented by this

appeal (Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-8). In their Brief In Answer To Petition For Rehearing, appellees note this (pp. 2-3) and assume that the matters not discussed in the Petition for Rehearing en Banc are to be considered as settled. Such assumption is not warranted. A rehearing by a court is a fresh and complete consideration of the whole record of a case. If the order granting the petition for rehearing does not limit the subject matter of the rehearing, the attitude of the case is the same as if it had not previously been submitted.

United States v. Bentley & Sons Co. (D.C. Ohio, 1923) 293 Fed. 229

Pitek v. McGuire (1947) 51 N.M. 364, 184 P. (2d) 647

Conway, et al, v. Fabian, et al (1939) 108 Mont. 287, 89 P. (2d) 1022; cert. den. 308 U.S. 578, 84 L. Ed. 484

Kroeger v. Twin Buttes R. Co. (1912) 14 Ariz. 269, 127 Pac. 735

O'Brien, Manual of Federal Appellate Procedure (Third Edition, 1941) p. 223

Inasmuch as the order of this court granting the rehearing did not restrict the subject matter of the rehearing, each of the issues arising from the questions presented is before the court at this time (Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-8).

Those questions are as follows:

(1) Where a defendant performs with all possible care acts of a routine business character which have never caused injury and as to which he has no reason to believe that human beings are susceptible to injury, can he be held liable for negligence if such acts result in injury to a human being?

(2) Where according to all past experience it is not foreseeable that a human being is susceptible to injury from a certain course of action taken with all possible care, if injury results from such course of action can negligence be inferred against the source of the action through application of *res ipsa loquitur*?

(3) Did the plaintiffs below present any substantial evidence sufficient for submission to the jury that the claimed injuries were proximately caused by emanations of fluoride from the defendant's plant?

(4) Were the claims of Paul and Verla Martin barred by the statute of limitations?

If any of the foregoing questions is answered in the negative, the appropriate judgments should be reversed, with instructions to enter judgment for the appellant.

In addition, the following questions are presented with respect to the conduct of the cases below:

(5) Were the instructions to the Court below to the jury with respect to *res ipsa loquitur* reversible error?

(6) Was the failure of the Court below to give the instruction to the jury requested by appellant with regard to the statute of limitations applicable to the claims of appellees Paul and Verla Martin reversible error?

(7) Was the admission of evidence by the Court below with respect to damage to cattle by fluorine emanations reversible error?

(8) Was it reversible error to prevent, on a claim of privilege, the appellant from examining before trial two physicians of appellees Paul and Verla Martin, in view of the fact that they had waived any such privilege through testimony about their own physical condition?

However, it is not appellant's intention to discuss each such question in this brief. The law and facts relative to these questions have been discussed in detail in Appellant's Brief, Appellant's Reply Brief and the Petition for Rehearing en Banc. The following comments are submitted in reply to appellees' Brief In Answer To Petition For Rehearing with the intent of resolving some of the confusion created by appellees' Brief In Answer To Petition For Rehearing.

I. MISSTATEMENTS OF FACT CONTAINED IN APPELLEES' BRIEF IN ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING.

The following comments are submitted to correct the manifold number of misstatements and errors contained in appellees' brief:¹

¹ All references to "appellees' brief" herein are directed to "Brief In Answer To Petition For Rehearing."

A. On page 4 of their brief, appellees caution the court not to confuse “sodium fluoride” with “sodium aluminum fluoride.”

Throughout the trial appellees used the terms sodium fluoride and sodium aluminum fluoride interchangeably. Although the fluoride effluent from the plant is sodium aluminum fluoride, they introduced a sample of sodium fluoride in evidence (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit O-8). One of their experts testified concerning a lethal dose of sodium fluoride (R. 311).

For the practical purposes of this case, sodium aluminum fluoride and sodium fluoride were treated as the same throughout the time of the trial and up until appellees filed their last brief.

Appellees’ effort to distinguish the effects of the two fluorides as far as this case is concerned is absolutely unsupported by the record and contrary to their position at the time of trial. Their motive in attempting to differentiate between the type of fluorine to which they may have been exposed and the type of fluorine purposely added to drinking water is apparent, but the differentiation is without any basis in fact.

B. On page 5 of their brief, appellees represent to the court that there is no dispute as to the “contamination” of their farm. This statement is plainly not true.

The record is replete with testimony which, at the very least, would give rise to a "dispute" as to contamination (R. 1508, et seq).

Appellees have assumed, and attempted to prove, contamination from two statements in the pre-trial order. Their argument can be reduced very simply to this syllogism:

- (a) Fluorides contaminate;
 - (b) Fluorides settle on property;
- therefore, such property is contaminated.

Of course this deduction suffers the same defect as any other such argument. The premise does not consider amounts or degrees and, without a limiting amount set, the conclusion cannot be true.

The pleadings and record of this case stand in rebuttal to appellees' statement that their allegation of contamination is not disputed. The settling at various times of a small portion of the fluoride effluents emanating from appellant's plant upon appellees' ranchlands does not, of itself, constitute contamination.

C. Page 6 of appellees' brief contains the statement, "In November, 1950, they (appellees) moved away from their farm to avoid further exposure, *when they ascertained from physicians the cause of their illness.*"

(emphasis added) There is no evidence in the record to give support to this statement. In fact, the testimony of appellees' own witnesses indicates that the statement is not true, and that, in fact, appellees were able, only after much searching, to obtain a diagnosis of fluorosis *after* they had left their ranch.

Appellees consulted 16 doctors in their quest for a diagnosis of fluorosis. Of these, five who examined appellees testified for them at the trial, including a chiropractor and a dentist. The chiropractor saw the elder Martins prior to November, 1950, but he did not advise them that their complaints were caused by the ingestion of fluorides (R. 626, 629). The appellees' family doctor, who regularly attended them during the time they lived on their ranch, did not make a diagnosis of fluorosis until some three years after the Martins left the area (R. 326). This tardy diagnosis was admittedly based on certain laboratory data and literature submitted to the doctor by Mr. Martin (R. 326). The remainder of appellees' medical witnesses did not even see the Martins until some time after they had left their ranch (R. 292, 271). One of the doctors who was brought from London, England, to testify had never examined appellees until two days before the trial; almost five years after appellees left their ranch (R. 491).

Indeed, the record does not even suggest that appellees left their ranch in order to escape "exposure." Mr. Martin testified that they left in the winter of 1950-1951 for a two or three month stay in Palm Springs (R. 708). Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Martin vacationed in Mexico City before returning again to the ranch (R. 709).

A reading of the record would indicate that appellees probably left the ranch simply because they wished to spend the winter in a warmer climate. However, whatever may have been their reason, appellees have never suggested until now that it was a desire to leave the area of exposure after they had "ascertained the cause of their illness."

D. On page 5 and again on page 13 of their brief, appellees suggest that no evidence was introduced concerning a definite tolerance level of fluorides. By such statements appellees blithely ignore the scientific research and testimony relating thereto constituting a large portion of the record.

For experimental purposes, Edward J. Largent, an industrial chemist, intentionally ingested more than twice the amount of fluorine, over a period of four years, that appellees could possibly have ingested (R. 1097, et seq). Yet the ingestion of this amount of fluorine produced no ill effects (R. 1125).

Such experiments do not serve merely to establish “theoretical” data.

E. On page 8 of their brief, appellees suggest that, inasmuch as the formal order limiting the scope of examination on deposition of Drs. Hill and Proctor had not yet been signed at the time of their depositions, then appellant should not have restricted its examination. They further suggest that, if appellant had taken the depositions without restrictions, then after appellees had testified and thereby waived the privilege, appellant could introduce the deposition. Accordingly, because appellant could have cured the error, it has no standing to complain now.

This suggestion is made by appellees in spite of the fact that Judge East had granted appellees’ motion and limited the examination in a prior letter to the attorneys (Case 14,990, p. 73). Appellees’ proposition that a party is not bound by the court’s order until the same has been formalized and signed is a novel one indeed.

Appellees contend now that the error complained of is harmless error because appellant had a deposition that it could introduce in evidence. The folly of this contention is manifest. The practical effect of the error was sustained when appellant was forbidden to elicit from the deponents their diagnosis of the alleged ills.

F. On page 13 of their brief, appellees state that fluoride compounds from aluminum plant stacks have injured and killed many mammals. "Many instances of human injury are referred to in medical literature." Appellees failed to make this very interesting and important statement until now. During the trial they were completely silent about such literature. *Not one page of such literature is a part of the record of these cases*, the reason being, of course, that there is none.

Appellees' statement is directly contrary to the statement of their own witness, Dr. Hunter:

"* * * As far as I know there are no writings in the United States about fluorosis in the sense of men being hurt at all." (R. 585)

G. By lifting a portion of appellant's brief out of context, appellees, on page 13 of their brief, would lead the court to believe that appellant, the United States Public Health Service and the Oregon State Board of Health had been concerned about the possibility of injury to humans from the effluents emitted from appellant's stacks. However, a reading of the whole page from which appellees quoted shows that the surveys made by the United States Public Health Service and the Oregon State Board of Health concerned *in-plant* conditions. The results of each of these surveys showed

there was no possibility of injury to those employees working right inside the potrooms (R. 1555-1556). By telling only half the story, appellees would lead the court to believe that, as a result of these surveys, appellees knew, or should have known, of an alleged hazard to persons living miles from the plant!

H. Appellees have made a serious misrepresentation to the court on page 14 of their brief. They quote a portion of Judge East's decision in this case concerning the debate between experts and the difficulty in the establishment of a tolerance level for humans. They then state that Judge Boldt was "forced to the same conclusion" in *Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Company* and quote two sentences from his opinion. Judge Boldt was not forced to any conclusions regarding tolerance levels of humans. Judge Boldt was concerned only with possible injury to cattle in the *Arvidson* case, and the sentence immediately succeeding the portion quoted by appellees states unequivocally that the subject matter was cattle.

I. On page 16 of their brief, appellees attempt to place before this court evidence which was ruled inadmissible by the trial court, a ruling from which appellees have not appealed.

It is an agreed fact that the United States leased the plant to appellant in 1946 (R. 22, Case 14,990).

Appellees attempted to introduce this lease in evidence, and the court sustained an objection to its admission.² The reason the court rejected the exhibit when offered at trial is the same reason it is not proper to be considered now. There is no relationship *shown* between the possible casualty losses insured against by the indemnity agreement in the lease and the injuries alleged here. Appellees cannot look to the factual matter introduced in another case and mentioned in that opinion and rely on it as evidence in this case. In short, they have attempted to place in evidence an exhibit rejected by the trial court merely by referring to a decision in another case.

J. Page 17 of appellees' brief contains several misstatements of the record concerning appellant's opportunity to foresee that injuries, such as appellees allege, would occur. The suggestion is made that each of the illustrations presented concerns injuries sustained from emanations from aluminum plant stacks. The record shows that not one of these illustrations concerns injuries of the type claimed here.

The *Arvidson* case concerned alleged damage to cattle, and Judge Boldt was concerned with cattle and

² The ruling of the court on this point is set forth on page 1109 of the typed transcript. While this portion of the typed transcript was designated as part of the contents of record on appeal (Appellee's Designation of Contents of Record on Appeal, 5 (g)), the same is not contained in the printed Transcript of Record.

vegetation cases when he made his reference to other cases tried in the area. If appellees intend to suggest that cases such as theirs have arisen before in this area, or anywhere, then certainly the best reference to those cases is by name and citation. The other illustrations listed by appellees refer to experiments, meetings and literature concerning the possibility of injury to those working *within a plant*, not to persons living miles away from it (R. 1556).

The question of foreseeability was directly and dramatically answered by appellees' principal witness, Dr. Hunter, when he stated, "Well, this court has made it new, sir, and this court makes history" (R. 527).

II. THE ASSERTED BASES OF LIABILITY.

Appellees now urge (Appellees' Brief, p. 34) that these judgments should be affirmed because the fluorides escaping from appellant's plant made appellant liable because of:

- (1) a trespass;
- (2) implied negligence as a matter of law;
- (3) inferred negligence (*res ipsa loquitur*); and
- (4) a nuisance.

Simple analysis will demonstrate the confusion upon which these false contentions are based.

This confusion results from:

(1) Nonrecognition of the modern basis for classification of remedies available for asserted injury to the person;

(2) An attempt to apply remedies available for asserted injury to real property as remedies available for asserted injury to the person; and

(3) An attempt to rely in the appellate court upon bases of liability disclaimed by appellees in the trial court or which were expressly rejected by the trial court.

Tort liability for injury to the person is divided into three parts. Thus, a plaintiff must prove that:

(1) The defendant intended to interfere with plaintiff's interests;

(2) The defendant was negligent; or

(3) The defendant is liable without fault.

Prosser on Torts (Second Edition, 1955) p. 24

“* * * The fundamental basis of tort liability may first be divided into three parts—not because that number is traditional, but because every case in which such liability has been imposed has rested upon one of three, and only three, grounds for imposing it. These are:

“1. Intent of the defendant to interfere with the plaintiff's interests.

“2. Negligence.

“3. Strict liability, ‘without fault,’ where the defendant is held liable in the absence of any intent which the law finds wrongful, or any negligence, very often for reason of policy.”

Harper on Torts (1933) Sections 6 and 7.

Each of these bases of liability will be reviewed separately as they apply to these cases.

A. Intentional Harm.

As appellees note in their Brief In Answer To Petition For Rehearing (p. 10), one of the issues of fact in these cases was whether appellant “knowingly, wilfully or intentionally caused” appellees’ alleged personal injuries. Appellees have not asserted that the evidence in these actions supports their pre-trial contention that defendant “knowingly, wilfully or intentionally” caused appellees’ alleged personal injuries. Their failure to make such assertion can only be attributed to their recognition that the record does not contain any evidence to support such a contention. The trial court ruled against appellees on this point near the close of appellees’ case in chief in excluding proof in support of their claim for alleged punitive damages.³

³ The ruling of the court on this point is set forth on pages 1086-1091 of the typed transcript. While this portion of the typed transcript was designated as part of the contents of record on appeal (Appellee’s Designation of Contents of Record on Appeal, 5 (f)), the same is not contained in the printed Transcript of Record.

The court confirmed this fact later in the trial (R. 1158-1159). No further consideration need be given this matter as a possible basis for the liability asserted by appellees.

B. Liability Without Fault.

The suggestion to this court that the doctrine of liability without fault is applicable to the facts in these cases was first made in Brief of Appellees (p. 11). Appellant has already pointed out in Appellant's Reply Brief (pp. 1-6) and Petition for Rehearing en Banc (pp. 13-15) why this doctrine is not applicable to the cases at bar. The reasons for the nonapplicability of the doctrine are summarized briefly below:

1. No reference to the doctrine of liability without fault is contained in the contentions of the parties and the issues derived therefrom as set forth in the pre-trial orders.

2. The doctrine is not applicable where the risks giving rise to liability are not foreseeable by the defendant at the time the personal injuries are alleged to have been caused. Thus, a defendant is liable only to one "whose person * * * [he] should recognize as likely to be harmed."

3 *American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts (1938), Section 519, p. 41*

“Except as stated in §§ 521-4, one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land or chattels *the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed* by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting there-to from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm.” (Emphasis added)

There was no evidence introduced by appellees to show that appellant, or its officers, had any reason to believe that there was any particular danger to human beings involved in the operation of the plant. This is clear from the statement made by the court at the conclusion of the testimony of the next to the last witness called by appellees in their case in chief:⁴

“* * * And I am frank to say that from the evidence alone in this case this Court is not saying now that with the evidence before it that the officers of this corporation had any reason to believe that there was any particular danger to human beings involved in their actions.”

3. On at least three occasions the trial court indicated that the doctrine of strict liability was not applicable:

⁴The statement of the court on this point is set forth on pages 1089-1090 of the typed transcript. While this portion of the typed transcript was designated as part of the contents of record on appeal (Appellee's Designation of Contents of Record on Appeal, 5 (f)), the same is not contained in the printed Transcript of Record.

(a) in denying the appellant's motions for a directed verdict;

Martin v. Reynolds Metals Company, (D. Or., 1955)
135 F. Supp. 379, 380

(b) in denying appellees' request to submit the cases to the jury on the basis of this doctrine (R. 1893);⁵ and

(c) in denying the appellant's motions to set aside the verdicts of the jury returned in each case (Memorandum Opinion dated October 12, 1955, p. 2):

"The Court concluded that the so-called doctrine of absolute liability under the facts of the case was not applicable under the decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court."

C. Negligence.

As previously noted (*supra*, p. 13), appellees argue that appellant was negligent in operating the aluminum reduction plant and is liable because of:

- (1) "imputed or implied negligence" and
- (2) the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur*.

⁵ Appellees practically concede that the doctrine is not applicable when they state in their Brief In Answer To Petition For Rehearing (p. 31):

"In the opinion of Judge Denman is the statement that, 'We think that the doctrine of *Fletcher v. Rylands* also applies.' This statement is entirely correct under the Oregon law, though not strictly necessary to the decision, inasmuch as the trial court had not instructed the jury concerning strict liability but had instructed on the milder rule of *res ipsa loquitur*."

Appellant has already demonstrated the fallacy of the argument of appellees in the two briefs and the petition filed by it herein. Only two additional comments are necessary:

1. The court recognized that there was no evidence introduced by appellees to show that appellant, or its officers, had any reason to believe that there was any particular danger to human beings involved in the operation of the plant. For, as previously noted, at practically the close of appellees' case in chief, the court stated:⁶

“* * * And I am frank to say that from the evidence alone in this case this Court is not saying now that with the evidence before it that the officers of this corporation had any reason to believe that there was any particular danger to human beings involved in their actions.”

The remarks of appellees that appellant foresaw, or could have foreseen, injury to humans must, therefore, be disregarded. It is obvious, in view of the statement of the court set forth above, that appellant was not guilty of negligence.

2. In its Petition for Rehearing en Banc, appellant states (p. 4):

⁶ The statement of the court on this point is set forth on pages 1089-1090 of the typed transcript. While this portion of the typed transcript was designated as part of the contents of record on appeal (Appellee's Designation of Contents of Record on Appeal, 5(f)), the same is not contained in the printed Transcript of Record.

“This court has taken this evidence of four years of persistent effort and tremendous expense and relied on it as evidence of negligence by erroneously stating that appellant did nothing to improve its controls until 1950 and by finding ‘no showing’ that all of it could not have been done earlier.”

Seizing upon the words “persistent effort,” appellees misstate appellant’s position as follows (Appellees’ Brief, pp. 29-30):

“Appellant has a contention that its evidence showing ‘persistent effort’ (due care) to minimize the output of fluorides was not contradicted, and therefore *res ipsa loquitur* should not have been used to take the case to the jury.”

citing in support thereof the following statement of Professor Prosser in his *Handbook of the Law of Torts* (Second Edition, 1955) at pages 216-217:

“But if the defendant merely offers evidence of his own acts and precautions amounting to reasonable care, it is seldom that a verdict can be directed in his favor. The inference from the circumstances remains in the case to contradict his evidence. If he testifies that he used proper care to insulate his wires, to inspect his chandelier, to drive his bus, or to keep defunct mice and wandering insect life out of his bottled beverage, the fact that electricity escaped from the wires, that the chandelier fell, that the bus went into the ditch and the bug was in the bottle, with the background of common experience that such things do not usually happen if

proper care is used, may permit reasonable men to find that his witnesses are not to be believed, that the precautions described were not sufficient to conform to the standard required or were not faithfully carried out, and that the whole truth has not been told.”

Appellant has no quarrel with the substance of Professor Prosser’s statement. However, the statement is relevant only when the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur* is applicable to a case. Thus, if the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur* is not applicable, a motion for a directed verdict should be granted when plaintiff, as here, introduces no evidence of negligence on the part of defendant, or when, as here, the defendant’s uncontradicted evidence shows the defendant is not negligent.

On the other hand, if the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur* is applicable, which appellant does not concede, it cannot be contradicted or overthrown by the type of evidence cited by Professor Prosser. The type of evidence that will contradict or overthrow the doctrine is set forth by Professor Prosser in the paragraph preceding that quoted by appellees:

“* * * If the defendant proves definitely by uncontradicted evidence that the occurrence was caused by some outside agency over which he had no control, *that it was of a kind which commonly occurs without negligence on the part of anyone, or that it could not have been avoided by the exer-*

cise of all reasonable care, the inference of negligence is no longer permissible, and the verdict is directed for the defendant. The *res ipsa* case has been overthrown by showing that it is not a *res ipsa* case." (Emphasis added)

The following cases support the italicized portion of the above quotation:

Engelking v. Carlson (1939) 13 Cal. (2d) 216, 88 P. (2d) 695, 697

Oliver v. Union Transfer Co. (1934) 17 Tenn. App. 694, 71 S.W. (2d) 478, 480

Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal (1930) 341 Ill. 539, 173 N.E. 670, 672

Tavani v. Swift & Co. (1918) 262 Pa. 184, 105 Atl. 55, 56

Richards v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. (1912) 41 Utah 99, 123 Pac. 933, 937

Ryder v. Kinsey (1895) 62 Minn. 85, 64 N.W. 94, 95

The uncontradicted evidence in this case is that fluorides escape from all aluminum reduction plants and that this is the kind of occurrence "which commonly occurs without negligence on the part of anyone." This conclusion is supported by the references in the record to aluminum reduction plants throughout the United States and Europe and by the reference to the Troutdale plant in *Arvidson, et al, v. Reynolds Metals Com-*

pany (W.D. Wash., S.D., 1954) 125 F. Supp. 481; affirmed per curiam (CA 9, 1956) 236 F. (2d) 224; cert. denied (1957) _____ U.S. _____, 1 L. Ed. (2d) 323, where Judge Boldt, in denying damages for alleged injuries to cattle for the period 1948 to 1953, stated (pp. 482-483):

“* * * In both plants aluminum is produced by processes which *unavoidably* cause gases, fumes and airborne particulates to be formed, some part of which are discharged into the atmosphere from the plant stacks. The effluence contains fluorides in some form and amount * * *.

“* * * Whether the measures taken by defendant to minimize the escape of fluorides from its plants are the maximum possible consistent with practical operating requirements is yet to be determined, but apparently American industry has not yet developed anything better.” (Emphasis added)

The evidence is also uncontradicted that the escape of fluorides from the Troutdale plant was an occurrence which “could not have been avoided by the exercise of all reasonable care” for the following reasons:

(1) As noted, the manufacture of aluminum “unavoidably” causes fluorides to be formed.

(2) The fume control system installed by appellant before it commenced operating the Troutdale plant was “the then best developed washing

system," "it was the best available" being used by the industry, "at that time there was no better control system in any other aluminum plant in the United States" and there was no control system operating in any aluminum reduction plant with a higher operating efficiency (R. 440-441, 1160, 1278).

(3) The foregoing control system was replaced by a system which captured 90 per cent of the fluorides otherwise escaping. The details concerning the design and installation of this second system have already been discussed. No other aluminum plant in this country had or has such a system (R. 1530).

It follows, therefore, that the inference of negligence arising from the trial court's mistaken application of the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur* was not permissible in these cases because of appellant's uncontradicted evidence. Accordingly, it was incumbent upon the court to direct verdicts in favor of appellant.

D. Trespass.

If Professor Prosser's analysis is correct, namely, that recovery for injury to the person must rest upon proof of intent, negligence or liability without fault, what basis, if any, is there for appellees' recovering

upon their claims of "trespass" and "nuisance" (Appellees' Brief, p. 34)?

As for the claim of trespass, it should be remembered that the trial court did not submit these cases to the jury on that theory.

In asserting liability for trespass, appellees are obviously contending that a trespass to their persons has occurred.⁷ However, trespass to the person no longer exists as a cause of action. It has been replaced by such causes of action as battery, assault and false imprisonment, all of which involve intentional wrongs. *Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (Second Edition, 1955) pp. 27-28*

"* * * Modern law has almost completely abandoned the artificial classification of injuries as direct and indirect, and looks instead to the intent of the wrongdoer, or to his negligence. The first step was taken when the action on the case was extended to include injuries which were not intended but were merely negligent, and were inflicted indirectly. Because of the greater convenience of the action, it came to be used quite generally in all cases of negligence, while trespass remained as the remedy for the greater number of intentional wrongs. Terms such as battery, assault and false imprisonment, which were varieties of trespass, came to be associated with intent, and negligence emerged as a separate tort."

⁷ Obviously, any liability of appellant cannot be based upon a claimed trespass to real property (Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 11-12). Apparently, appellees recognize this in charging appellant with a form of trespass to the person, "assault with impunity" (Appellees' Brief, p. 27).

Appellees' claim of trespass to their persons must, therefore, fall under Professor Prosser's first classification of intentional harm. As previously shown (*supra*, p. 15), appellees failed to prove that appellant intended to cause the injuries which they pretended to have sustained. Accordingly, no basis exists for affirming the judgments on the basis of "trespass."

Undoubtedly, for the reasons set forth above, Judge Denman did not accept appellees' contention (Brief of Appellees, pp. 6-10) that appellant was liable to appellees for trespass.

E. Nuisance.

In the appellate court, appellees contended for the first time that these judgments should be affirmed because appellees claimed injuries resulted from a nuisance (Appellees' Brief, p. 34). No such contention appears in any of the pre-trial orders. The trial court recognized that appellees had disclaimed this theory as a basis for recovery (Memorandum Opinion dated October 12, 1955, p. 2):

" * * * Furthermore, the plaintiffs, through their counsel, disclaimed any nuisance theory."

Accordingly, the cases were not submitted to the jury on this theory.

Even if the cases had been submitted to the jury on this theory, the judgments would have to be reversed. A nuisance has been defined by the American Law Institute:

4 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts (1939) Section 822, p. 226

“The actor is liable in an action for damages for a non-trespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land if,

- “(a) the other has property rights and privileges in respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; and
- “(b) the invasion is substantial; and
- “(c) the actor’s conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; and
- “(d) the invasion is either
 - “(i) intentional and unreasonable; or
 - “(ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct.”

The foregoing definition has received the sanction of the Oregon Supreme Court.

Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows (1948)
184 Or. 336, 344, 348, 198 P. (2d) 847

Of course, the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of each of the elements present in the foregoing definition rests upon appellees.

The foregoing definition is consistent with Professor Prosser's categorizing of the three bases of liability for injury to the person. The burden of proof has not been satisfied here because of lack of proof of:

1. An intent to harm (*supra*, p. 15).
2. Negligence on the part of appellant (*supra*, p. 18).
3. Ultrahazardous conduct on the part of appellant (*supra*, p. 16).

It follows that the suggestion of appellees that these judgments may be affirmed on the proposition that a nuisance existed must be rejected as an absurdity.

CONCLUSION

These history-making cases were submitted by the trial court to the jury only on the basis of alleged negligence. In their efforts to have these judgments affirmed, appellees have suggested in their two briefs bases of liability which they failed to suggest to the trial court or which the trial court rejected as unfounded in fact or law. The result of these suggestions has been needless confusion as to a matter which, upon analysis, is simple. The cases having been submitted by the trial court to the jury only on the basis of negligence, these verdicts can be sustained only if

the evidence supports causes of action against appellant for negligence. No other basis of liability is before this court.

Meloon v. Davis (CCA 1, 1923) 292 Fed. 82, 87

Johnson v. Thompson (1950) 241 Mo. App. 1008,
236 S.W. (2d) 1, 7

Chickasaw Lumber Co. v. Blanke (Tex. Civ. App.,
1945) 185 S.W. (2d) 140

The record in these cases is a lengthy one, and some of the matters involved are somewhat complex. However, two conclusions are obvious and apparent to anyone reviewing the record:

(1) Appellees did not introduce any evidence tending to prove that appellant failed to use the greatest possible care in minimizing the emission of fluorides from the Troutdale plant, and the uncontradicted evidence shows that appellant did use the greatest possible care in this respect.

(2) Appellees did not introduce any evidence tending to prove that appellant had any reason to foresee that there was any particular risk of injury to persons residing near the plant by fluorides escaping from the plant, and the uncontradicted evidence is that such a risk was not foreseen.

Under the circumstances no basis existed for submitting these cases to the jury.

Kelley v. National Lead Co. (1948) 240 Mo. App.
47, 210 S.W. (2d) 728, 731-733, 734, 735

The statement of the principal expert witness for the appellees that "this court makes history" can be applied to this court as well as the trial court. The liability imposed upon lawful industry as a result of the trial court's misapplication of the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur* is unprecedented. The same is true with respect to Judge Denman's dictum applying the doctrine of *Fletcher v. Rylands*. Reversal of the judgments in question for the reasons stated herein and in the other briefs filed by appellant not only will remove from lawful industry this staggering burden but also will be consistent with the opinion of this court in the case of *Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Company*.

Respectfully submitted,

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In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit

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vs.
PAULA MARTIN, by and through
Arthur H. Lewis, her Guardian
Ad Litem, *Appellee*. } No. 14,990

REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, *Appellant*,
vs.
VERLA MARTIN, *Appellee*. } No. 14,991

REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, *Appellant*,
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**APPELLANT'S REPLY TO BRIEF
IN ANSWER TO PETITION
FOR REHEARING**

Rehearing en Banc on Appeal from Final Judgments of
the District Court for the District of Oregon

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

In its Petition for Rehearing en Banc, appellant did not discuss all the questions presented by this

appeal (Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-8). In their Brief In Answer To Petition For Rehearing, appellees note this (pp. 2-3) and assume that the matters not discussed in the Petition for Rehearing en Banc are to be considered as settled. Such assumption is not warranted. A rehearing by a court is a fresh and complete consideration of the whole record of a case. If the order granting the petition for rehearing does not limit the subject matter of the rehearing, the attitude of the case is the same as if it had not previously been submitted.

United States v. Bentley & Sons Co. (D.C. Ohio, 1923) 293 Fed. 229

Pitek v. McGuire (1947) 51 N.M. 364, 184 P. (2d) 647

Conway, et al, v. Fabian, et al (1939) 108 Mont. 287, 89 P. (2d) 1022; cert. den. 308 U.S. 578, 84 L. Ed. 484

Kroeger v. Twin Buttes R. Co. (1912) 14 Ariz. 269, 127 Pac. 735

O'Brien, Manual of Federal Appellate Procedure (Third Edition, 1941) p. 223

Inasmuch as the order of this court granting the rehearing did not restrict the subject matter of the rehearing, each of the issues arising from the questions presented is before the court at this time (Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-8).

Those questions are as follows:

(1) Where a defendant performs with all possible care acts of a routine business character which have never caused injury and as to which he has no reason to believe that human beings are susceptible to injury, can he be held liable for negligence if such acts result in injury to a human being?

(2) Where according to all past experience it is not foreseeable that a human being is susceptible to injury from a certain course of action taken with all possible care, if injury results from such course of action can negligence be inferred against the source of the action through application of *res ipsa loquitur*?

(3) Did the plaintiffs below present any substantial evidence sufficient for submission to the jury that the claimed injuries were proximately caused by emanations of fluoride from the defendant's plant?

(4) Were the claims of Paul and Verla Martin barred by the statute of limitations?

If any of the foregoing questions is answered in the negative, the appropriate judgments should be reversed, with instructions to enter judgment for the appellant.

In addition, the following questions are presented with respect to the conduct of the cases below:

(5) Were the instructions to the Court below to the jury with respect to *res ipsa loquitur* reversible error?

(6) Was the failure of the Court below to give the instruction to the jury requested by appellant with regard to the statute of limitations applicable to the claims of appellees Paul and Verla Martin reversible error?

(7) Was the admission of evidence by the Court below with respect to damage to cattle by fluorine emanations reversible error?

(8) Was it reversible error to prevent, on a claim of privilege, the appellant from examining before trial two physicians of appellees Paul and Verla Martin, in view of the fact that they had waived any such privilege through testimony about their own physical condition?

However, it is not appellant's intention to discuss each such question in this brief. The law and facts relative to these questions have been discussed in detail in Appellant's Brief, Appellant's Reply Brief and the Petition for Rehearing en Banc. The following comments are submitted in reply to appellees' Brief In Answer To Petition For Rehearing with the intent of resolving some of the confusion created by appellees' Brief In Answer To Petition For Rehearing.

I. MISSTATEMENTS OF FACT CONTAINED IN APPELLEES' BRIEF IN ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING.

The following comments are submitted to correct the manifold number of misstatements and errors contained in appellees' brief:¹

¹ All references to "appellees' brief" herein are directed to "Brief In Answer To Petition For Rehearing."

A. On page 4 of their brief, appellees caution the court not to confuse “sodium fluoride” with “sodium aluminum fluoride.”

Throughout the trial appellees used the terms sodium fluoride and sodium aluminum fluoride interchangeably. Although the fluoride effluent from the plant is sodium aluminum fluoride, they introduced a sample of sodium fluoride in evidence (Plaintiffs’ Exhibit O-8). One of their experts testified concerning a lethal dose of sodium fluoride (R. 311).

For the practical purposes of this case, sodium aluminum fluoride and sodium fluoride were treated as the same throughout the time of the trial and up until appellees filed their last brief.

Appellees’ effort to distinguish the effects of the two fluorides as far as this case is concerned is absolutely unsupported by the record and contrary to their position at the time of trial. Their motive in attempting to differentiate between the type of fluorine to which they may have been exposed and the type of fluorine purposely added to drinking water is apparent, but the differentiation is without any basis in fact.

B. On page 5 of their brief, appellees represent to the court that there is no dispute as to the “contamination” of their farm. This statement is plainly not true.

The record is replete with testimony which, at the very least, would give rise to a "dispute" as to contamination (R. 1508, et seq).

Appellees have assumed, and attempted to prove, contamination from two statements in the pre-trial order. Their argument can be reduced very simply to this syllogism:

- (a) Fluorides contaminate;
 - (b) Fluorides settle on property;
- therefore, such property is contaminated.

Of course this deduction suffers the same defect as any other such argument. The premise does not consider amounts or degrees and, without a limiting amount set, the conclusion cannot be true.

The pleadings and record of this case stand in rebuttal to appellees' statement that their allegation of contamination is not disputed. The settling at various times of a small portion of the fluoride effluents emanating from appellant's plant upon appellees' ranchlands does not, of itself, constitute contamination.

C. Page 6 of appellees' brief contains the statement, "In November, 1950, they (appellees) moved away from their farm to avoid further exposure, *when they ascertained from physicians the cause of their illness.*"

(emphasis added) There is no evidence in the record to give support to this statement. In fact, the testimony of appellees' own witnesses indicates that the statement is not true, and that, in fact, appellees were able, only after much searching, to obtain a diagnosis of fluorosis *after* they had left their ranch.

Appellees consulted 16 doctors in their quest for a diagnosis of fluorosis. Of these, five who examined appellees testified for them at the trial, including a chiropractor and a dentist. The chiropractor saw the elder Martins prior to November, 1950, but he did not advise them that their complaints were caused by the ingestion of fluorides (R. 626, 629). The appellees' family doctor, who regularly attended them during the time they lived on their ranch, did not make a diagnosis of fluorosis until some three years after the Martins left the area (R. 326). This tardy diagnosis was admittedly based on certain laboratory data and literature submitted to the doctor by Mr. Martin (R. 326). The remainder of appellees' medical witnesses did not even see the Martins until some time after they had left their ranch (R. 292, 271). One of the doctors who was brought from London, England, to testify had never examined appellees until two days before the trial; almost five years after appellees left their ranch (R. 491).

Indeed, the record does not even suggest that appellees left their ranch in order to escape "exposure." Mr. Martin testified that they left in the winter of 1950-1951 for a two or three month stay in Palm Springs (R. 708). Thereafter, Mr. and Mrs. Martin vacationed in Mexico City before returning again to the ranch (R. 709).

A reading of the record would indicate that appellees probably left the ranch simply because they wished to spend the winter in a warmer climate. However, whatever may have been their reason, appellees have never suggested until now that it was a desire to leave the area of exposure after they had "ascertained the cause of their illness."

D. On page 5 and again on page 13 of their brief, appellees suggest that no evidence was introduced concerning a definite tolerance level of fluorides. By such statements appellees blithely ignore the scientific research and testimony relating thereto constituting a large portion of the record.

For experimental purposes, Edward J. Largent, an industrial chemist, intentionally ingested more than twice the amount of fluorine, over a period of four years, that appellees could possibly have ingested (R. 1097, et seq). Yet the ingestion of this amount of fluorine produced no ill effects (R. 1125).

Such experiments do not serve merely to establish “theoretical” data.

E. On page 8 of their brief, appellees suggest that, inasmuch as the formal order limiting the scope of examination on deposition of Drs. Hill and Proctor had not yet been signed at the time of their depositions, then appellant should not have restricted its examination. They further suggest that, if appellant had taken the depositions without restrictions, then after appellees had testified and thereby waived the privilege, appellant could introduce the deposition. Accordingly, because appellant could have cured the error, it has no standing to complain now.

This suggestion is made by appellees in spite of the fact that Judge East had granted appellees’ motion and limited the examination in a prior letter to the attorneys (Case 14,990, p. 73). Appellees’ proposition that a party is not bound by the court’s order until the same has been formalized and signed is a novel one indeed.

Appellees contend now that the error complained of is harmless error because appellant had a deposition that it could introduce in evidence. The folly of this contention is manifest. The practical effect of the error was sustained when appellant was forbidden to elicit from the deponents their diagnosis of the alleged ills.

F. On page 13 of their brief, appellees state that fluoride compounds from aluminum plant stacks have injured and killed many mammals. "Many instances of human injury are referred to in medical literature." Appellees failed to make this very interesting and important statement until now. During the trial they were completely silent about such literature. *Not one page of such literature is a part of the record of these cases*, the reason being, of course, that there is none.

Appellees' statement is directly contrary to the statement of their own witness, Dr. Hunter:

"* * * As far as I know there are no writings in the United States about fluorosis in the sense of men being hurt at all." (R. 585)

G. By lifting a portion of appellant's brief out of context, appellees, on page 13 of their brief, would lead the court to believe that appellant, the United States Public Health Service and the Oregon State Board of Health had been concerned about the possibility of injury to humans from the effluents emitted from appellant's stacks. However, a reading of the whole page from which appellees quoted shows that the surveys made by the United States Public Health Service and the Oregon State Board of Health concerned *in-plant* conditions. The results of each of these surveys showed

there was no possibility of injury to those employees working right inside the potrooms (R. 1555-1556). By telling only half the story, appellees would lead the court to believe that, as a result of these surveys, appellees knew, or should have known, of an alleged hazard to persons living miles from the plant!

H. Appellees have made a serious misrepresentation to the court on page 14 of their brief. They quote a portion of Judge East's decision in this case concerning the debate between experts and the difficulty in the establishment of a tolerance level for humans. They then state that Judge Boldt was "forced to the same conclusion" in *Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Company* and quote two sentences from his opinion. Judge Boldt was not forced to any conclusions regarding tolerance levels of humans. Judge Boldt was concerned only with possible injury to cattle in the *Arvidson* case, and the sentence immediately succeeding the portion quoted by appellees states unequivocally that the subject matter was cattle.

I. On page 16 of their brief, appellees attempt to place before this court evidence which was ruled inadmissible by the trial court, a ruling from which appellees have not appealed.

It is an agreed fact that the United States leased the plant to appellant in 1946 (R. 22, Case 14,990).

Appellees attempted to introduce this lease in evidence, and the court sustained an objection to its admission.² The reason the court rejected the exhibit when offered at trial is the same reason it is not proper to be considered now. There is no relationship *shown* between the possible casualty losses insured against by the indemnity agreement in the lease and the injuries alleged here. Appellees cannot look to the factual matter introduced in another case and mentioned in that opinion and rely on it as evidence in this case. In short, they have attempted to place in evidence an exhibit rejected by the trial court merely by referring to a decision in another case.

J. Page 17 of appellees' brief contains several misstatements of the record concerning appellant's opportunity to foresee that injuries, such as appellees allege, would occur. The suggestion is made that each of the illustrations presented concerns injuries sustained from emanations from aluminum plant stacks. The record shows that not one of these illustrations concerns injuries of the type claimed here.

The *Arvidson* case concerned alleged damage to cattle, and Judge Boldt was concerned with cattle and

² The ruling of the court on this point is set forth on page 1109 of the typed transcript. While this portion of the typed transcript was designated as part of the contents of record on appeal (Appellee's Designation of Contents of Record on Appeal, 5 (g)), the same is not contained in the printed Transcript of Record.

vegetation cases when he made his reference to other cases tried in the area. If appellees intend to suggest that cases such as theirs have arisen before in this area, or anywhere, then certainly the best reference to those cases is by name and citation. The other illustrations listed by appellees refer to experiments, meetings and literature concerning the possibility of injury to those working *within a plant*, not to persons living miles away from it (R. 1556).

The question of foreseeability was directly and dramatically answered by appellees' principal witness, Dr. Hunter, when he stated, "Well, this court has made it new, sir, and this court makes history" (R. 527).

II. THE ASSERTED BASES OF LIABILITY.

Appellees now urge (Appellees' Brief, p. 34) that these judgments should be affirmed because the fluorides escaping from appellant's plant made appellant liable because of:

- (1) a trespass;
- (2) implied negligence as a matter of law;
- (3) inferred negligence (*res ipsa loquitur*); and
- (4) a nuisance.

Simple analysis will demonstrate the confusion upon which these false contentions are based.

This confusion results from:

(1) Nonrecognition of the modern basis for classification of remedies available for asserted injury to the person;

(2) An attempt to apply remedies available for asserted injury to real property as remedies available for asserted injury to the person; and

(3) An attempt to rely in the appellate court upon bases of liability disclaimed by appellees in the trial court or which were expressly rejected by the trial court.

Tort liability for injury to the person is divided into three parts. Thus, a plaintiff must prove that:

(1) The defendant intended to interfere with plaintiff's interests;

(2) The defendant was negligent; or

(3) The defendant is liable without fault.

Prosser on Torts (Second Edition, 1955) p. 24

“* * * The fundamental basis of tort liability may first be divided into three parts—not because that number is traditional, but because every case in which such liability has been imposed has rested upon one of three, and only three, grounds for imposing it. These are:

“1. Intent of the defendant to interfere with the plaintiff's interests.

“2. Negligence.

“3. Strict liability, ‘without fault,’ where the defendant is held liable in the absence of any intent which the law finds wrongful, or any negligence, very often for reason of policy.”

Harper on Torts (1933) Sections 6 and 7.

Each of these bases of liability will be reviewed separately as they apply to these cases.

A. Intentional Harm.

As appellees note in their Brief In Answer To Petition For Rehearing (p. 10), one of the issues of fact in these cases was whether appellant “knowingly, wilfully or intentionally caused” appellees’ alleged personal injuries. Appellees have not asserted that the evidence in these actions supports their pre-trial contention that defendant “knowingly, wilfully or intentionally” caused appellees’ alleged personal injuries. Their failure to make such assertion can only be attributed to their recognition that the record does not contain any evidence to support such a contention. The trial court ruled against appellees on this point near the close of appellees’ case in chief in excluding proof in support of their claim for alleged punitive damages.³

³ The ruling of the court on this point is set forth on pages 1086-1091 of the typed transcript. While this portion of the typed transcript was designated as part of the contents of record on appeal (Appellee’s Designation of Contents of Record on Appeal, 5 (f)), the same is not contained in the printed Transcript of Record.

The court confirmed this fact later in the trial (R. 1158-1159). No further consideration need be given this matter as a possible basis for the liability asserted by appellees.

B. Liability Without Fault.

The suggestion to this court that the doctrine of liability without fault is applicable to the facts in these cases was first made in Brief of Appellees (p. 11). Appellant has already pointed out in Appellant's Reply Brief (pp. 1-6) and Petition for Rehearing en Banc (pp. 13-15) why this doctrine is not applicable to the cases at bar. The reasons for the nonapplicability of the doctrine are summarized briefly below:

1. No reference to the doctrine of liability without fault is contained in the contentions of the parties and the issues derived therefrom as set forth in the pre-trial orders.

2. The doctrine is not applicable where the risks giving rise to liability are not foreseeable by the defendant at the time the personal injuries are alleged to have been caused. Thus, a defendant is liable only to one "whose person * * * [he] should recognize as likely to be harmed."

3 American Law Institute, *Restatement of the Law of Torts* (1938), Section 519, p. 41

“Except as stated in §§ 521-4, one who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land or chattels *the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed* by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting there-to from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm.” (Emphasis added)

There was no evidence introduced by appellees to show that appellant, or its officers, had any reason to believe that there was any particular danger to human beings involved in the operation of the plant. This is clear from the statement made by the court at the conclusion of the testimony of the next to the last witness called by appellees in their case in chief:⁴

“* * * And I am frank to say that from the evidence alone in this case this Court is not saying now that with the evidence before it that the officers of this corporation had any reason to believe that there was any particular danger to human beings involved in their actions.”

3. On at least three occasions the trial court indicated that the doctrine of strict liability was not applicable:

⁴ The statement of the court on this point is set forth on pages 1089-1090 of the typed transcript. While this portion of the typed transcript was designated as part of the contents of record on appeal (Appellee's Designation of Contents of Record on Appeal, 5 (f)), the same is not contained in the printed Transcript of Record.

(a) in denying the appellant's motions for a directed verdict;

Martin v. Reynolds Metals Company, (D. Or., 1955)
135 F. Supp. 379, 380

(b) in denying appellees' request to submit the cases to the jury on the basis of this doctrine (R. 1893);⁵ and

(c) in denying the appellant's motions to set aside the verdicts of the jury returned in each case (Memorandum Opinion dated October 12, 1955, p. 2):

"The Court concluded that the so-called doctrine of absolute liability under the facts of the case was not applicable under the decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court."

C. Negligence.

As previously noted (*supra*, p. 13), appellees argue that appellant was negligent in operating the aluminum reduction plant and is liable because of:

- (1) "imputed or implied negligence" and
- (2) the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur*.

⁵ Appellees practically concede that the doctrine is not applicable when they state in their Brief In Answer To Petition For Rehearing (p. 31):

"In the opinion of Judge Denman is the statement that, 'We think that the doctrine of *Fletcher v. Rylands* also applies.' This statement is entirely correct under the Oregon law, though not strictly necessary to the decision, inasmuch as the trial court had not instructed the jury concerning strict liability but had instructed on the milder rule of *res ipsa loquitur*."

Appellant has already demonstrated the fallacy of the argument of appellees in the two briefs and the petition filed by it herein. Only two additional comments are necessary:

1. The court recognized that there was no evidence introduced by appellees to show that appellant, or its officers, had any reason to believe that there was any particular danger to human beings involved in the operation of the plant. For, as previously noted, at practically the close of appellees' case in chief, the court stated:⁶

“* * * And I am frank to say that from the evidence alone in this case this Court is not saying now that with the evidence before it that the officers of this corporation had any reason to believe that there was any particular danger to human beings involved in their actions.”

The remarks of appellees that appellant foresaw, or could have foreseen, injury to humans must, therefore, be disregarded. It is obvious, in view of the statement of the court set forth above, that appellant was not guilty of negligence.

2. In its Petition for Rehearing en Banc, appellant states (p. 4):

⁶ The statement of the court on this point is set forth on pages 1089-1090 of the typed transcript. While this portion of the typed transcript was designated as part of the contents of record on appeal (Appellee's Designation of Contents of Record on Appeal, 5(f)), the same is not contained in the printed Transcript of Record.

“This court has taken this evidence of four years of persistent effort and tremendous expense and relied on it as evidence of negligence by erroneously stating that appellant did nothing to improve its controls until 1950 and by finding ‘no showing’ that all of it could not have been done earlier.”

Seizing upon the words “persistent effort,” appellees misstate appellant’s position as follows (Appellees’ Brief, pp. 29-30):

“Appellant has a contention that its evidence showing ‘persistent effort’ (due care) to minimize the output of fluorides was not contradicted, and therefore *res ipsa loquitur* should not have been used to take the case to the jury.”

citing in support thereof the following statement of Professor Prosser in his *Handbook of the Law of Torts* (Second Edition, 1955) at pages 216-217:

“But if the defendant merely offers evidence of his own acts and precautions amounting to reasonable care, it is seldom that a verdict can be directed in his favor. The inference from the circumstances remains in the case to contradict his evidence. If he testifies that he used proper care to insulate his wires, to inspect his chandelier, to drive his bus, or to keep defunct mice and wandering insect life out of his bottled beverage, the fact that electricity escaped from the wires, that the chandelier fell, that the bus went into the ditch and the bug was in the bottle, with the background of common experience that such things do not usually happen if

proper care is used, may permit reasonable men to find that his witnesses are not to be believed, that the precautions described were not sufficient to conform to the standard required or were not faithfully carried out, and that the whole truth has not been told.”

Appellant has no quarrel with the substance of Professor Prosser’s statement. However, the statement is relevant only when the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur* is applicable to a case. Thus, if the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur* is not applicable, a motion for a directed verdict should be granted when plaintiff, as here, introduces no evidence of negligence on the part of defendant, or when, as here, the defendant’s uncontradicted evidence shows the defendant is not negligent.

On the other hand, if the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur* is applicable, which appellant does not concede, it cannot be contradicted or overthrown by the type of evidence cited by Professor Prosser. The type of evidence that will contradict or overthrow the doctrine is set forth by Professor Prosser in the paragraph preceding that quoted by appellees:

“* * * If the defendant proves definitely by uncontradicted evidence that the occurrence was caused by some outside agency over which he had no control, *that it was of a kind which commonly occurs without negligence on the part of anyone, or that it could not have been avoided by the exer-*

cise of all reasonable care, the inference of negligence is no longer permissible, and the verdict is directed for the defendant. The *res ipsa* case has been overthrown by showing that it is not a *res ipsa* case.” (Emphasis added)

The following cases support the italicized portion of the above quotation:

Engelking v. Carlson (1939) 13 Cal. (2d) 216, 88 P. (2d) 695, 697

Oliver v. Union Transfer Co. (1934) 17 Tenn. App. 694, 71 S.W. (2d) 478, 480

Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal (1930) 341 Ill. 539, 173 N.E. 670, 672

Tavani v. Swift & Co. (1918) 262 Pa. 184, 105 Atl. 55, 56

Richards v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. (1912) 41 Utah 99, 123 Pac. 933, 937

Ryder v. Kinsey (1895) 62 Minn. 85, 64 N.W. 94, 95

The uncontradicted evidence in this case is that fluorides escape from all aluminum reduction plants and that this is the kind of occurrence “which commonly occurs without negligence on the part of anyone.” This conclusion is supported by the references in the record to aluminum reduction plants throughout the United States and Europe and by the reference to the Troutdale plant in *Arvidson, et al, v. Reynolds Metals Com-*

pany (W.D. Wash., S.D., 1954) 125 F. Supp. 481; affirmed per curiam (CA 9, 1956) 236 F. (2d) 224; cert. denied (1957) _____ U.S. _____, 1 L. Ed. (2d) 323, where Judge Boldt, in denying damages for alleged injuries to cattle for the period 1948 to 1953, stated (pp. 482-483):

“* * * In both plants aluminum is produced by processes which *unavoidably* cause gases, fumes and airborne particulates to be formed, some part of which are discharged into the atmosphere from the plant stacks. The effluence contains fluorides in some form and amount * * *.

“* * * Whether the measures taken by defendant to minimize the escape of fluorides from its plants are the maximum possible consistent with practical operating requirements is yet to be determined, but apparently American industry has not yet developed anything better.” (Emphasis added)

The evidence is also uncontradicted that the escape of fluorides from the Troutdale plant was an occurrence which “could not have been avoided by the exercise of all reasonable care” for the following reasons:

(1) As noted, the manufacture of aluminum “unavoidably” causes fluorides to be formed.

(2) The fume control system installed by appellant before it commenced operating the Troutdale plant was “the then best developed washing

system," "it was the best available" being used by the industry, "at that time there was no better control system in any other aluminum plant in the United States" and there was no control system operating in any aluminum reduction plant with a higher operating efficiency (R. 440-441, 1160, 1278).

(3) The foregoing control system was replaced by a system which captured 90 per cent of the fluorides otherwise escaping. The details concerning the design and installation of this second system have already been discussed. No other aluminum plant in this country had or has such a system (R. 1530).

It follows, therefore, that the inference of negligence arising from the trial court's mistaken application of the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur* was not permissible in these cases because of appellant's uncontradicted evidence. Accordingly, it was incumbent upon the court to direct verdicts in favor of appellant.

D. Trespass.

If Professor Prosser's analysis is correct, namely, that recovery for injury to the person must rest upon proof of intent, negligence or liability without fault, what basis, if any, is there for appellees' recovering

upon their claims of "trespass" and "nuisance" (Appellees' Brief, p. 34)?

As for the claim of trespass, it should be remembered that the trial court did not submit these cases to the jury on that theory.

In asserting liability for trespass, appellees are obviously contending that a trespass to their persons has occurred.⁷ However, trespass to the person no longer exists as a cause of action. It has been replaced by such causes of action as battery, assault and false imprisonment, all of which involve intentional wrongs. *Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (Second Edition, 1955) pp. 27-28*

"* * * Modern law has almost completely abandoned the artificial classification of injuries as direct and indirect, and looks instead to the intent of the wrongdoer, or to his negligence. The first step was taken when the action on the case was extended to include injuries which were not intended but were merely negligent, and were inflicted indirectly. Because of the greater convenience of the action, it came to be used quite generally in all cases of negligence, while trespass remained as the remedy for the greater number of intentional wrongs. Terms such as battery, assault and false imprisonment, which were varieties of trespass, came to be associated with intent, and negligence emerged as a separate tort."

⁷ Obviously, any liability of appellant cannot be based upon a claimed trespass to real property (Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 11-12). Apparently, appellees recognize this in charging appellant with a form of trespass to the person, "assault with impunity" (Appellees' Brief, p. 27).

Appellees' claim of trespass to their persons must, therefore, fall under Professor Prosser's first classification of intentional harm. As previously shown (*supra*, p. 15), appellees failed to prove that appellant intended to cause the injuries which they pretended to have sustained. Accordingly, no basis exists for affirming the judgments on the basis of "trespass."

Undoubtedly, for the reasons set forth above, Judge Denman did not accept appellees' contention (Brief of Appellees, pp. 6-10) that appellant was liable to appellees for trespass.

E. Nuisance.

In the appellate court, appellees contended for the first time that these judgments should be affirmed because appellees claimed injuries resulted from a nuisance (Appellees' Brief, p. 34). No such contention appears in any of the pre-trial orders. The trial court recognized that appellees had disclaimed this theory as a basis for recovery (Memorandum Opinion dated October 12, 1955, p. 2):

“* * * Furthermore, the plaintiffs, through their counsel, disclaimed any nuisance theory.”

Accordingly, the cases were not submitted to the jury on this theory.

Even if the cases had been submitted to the jury on this theory, the judgments would have to be reversed. A nuisance has been defined by the American Law Institute:

4 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts (1939) Section 822, p. 226

“The actor is liable in an action for damages for a non-trespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land if,

- “(a) the other has property rights and privileges in respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; and
- “(b) the invasion is substantial; and
- “(c) the actor’s conduct is a legal cause of the invasion; and
- “(d) the invasion is either
 - “(i) intentional and unreasonable; or
 - “(ii) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct.”

The foregoing definition has received the sanction of the Oregon Supreme Court.

Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows (1948)
184 Or. 336, 344, 348, 198 P. (2d) 847

Of course, the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of each of the elements present in the foregoing definition rests upon appellees.

The foregoing definition is consistent with Professor Prosser's categorizing of the three bases of liability for injury to the person. The burden of proof has not been satisfied here because of lack of proof of:

1. An intent to harm (supra, p. 15).
2. Negligence on the part of appellant (supra, p. 18).
3. Ultrahazardous conduct on the part of appellant (supra, p. 16).

It follows that the suggestion of appellees that these judgments may be affirmed on the proposition that a nuisance existed must be rejected as an absurdity.

CONCLUSION

These history-making cases were submitted by the trial court to the jury only on the basis of alleged negligence. In their efforts to have these judgments affirmed, appellees have suggested in their two briefs bases of liability which they failed to suggest to the trial court or which the trial court rejected as unfounded in fact or law. The result of these suggestions has been needless confusion as to a matter which, upon analysis, is simple. The cases having been submitted by the trial court to the jury only on the basis of negligence, these verdicts can be sustained only if

the evidence supports causes of action against appellant for negligence. No other basis of liability is before this court.

Meloon v. Davis (CCA 1, 1923) 292 Fed. 82, 87

Johnson v. Thompson (1950) 241 Mo. App. 1008,
236 S.W. (2d) 1, 7

Chickasaw Lumber Co. v. Blanke (Tex. Civ. App.,
1945) 185 S.W. (2d) 140

The record in these cases is a lengthy one, and some of the matters involved are somewhat complex. However, two conclusions are obvious and apparent to anyone reviewing the record:

(1) Appellees did not introduce any evidence tending to prove that appellant failed to use the greatest possible care in minimizing the emission of fluorides from the Troutdale plant, and the uncontradicted evidence shows that appellant did use the greatest possible care in this respect.

(2) Appellees did not introduce any evidence tending to prove that appellant had any reason to foresee that there was any particular risk of injury to persons residing near the plant by fluorides escaping from the plant, and the uncontradicted evidence is that such a risk was not foreseen.

Under the circumstances no basis existed for submitting these cases to the jury.

Kelley v. National Lead Co. (1948) 240 Mo. App.
47, 210 S.W. (2d) 728, 731-733, 734, 735

The statement of the principal expert witness for the appellees that "this court makes history" can be applied to this court as well as the trial court. The liability imposed upon lawful industry as a result of the trial court's misapplication of the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur* is unprecedented. The same is true with respect to Judge Denman's dictum applying the doctrine of *Fletcher v. Rylands*. Reversal of the judgments in question for the reasons stated herein and in the other briefs filed by appellant not only will remove from lawful industry this staggering burden but also will be consistent with the opinion of this court in the case of *Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Company*.

Respectfully submitted,

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Nos. 14990 - 14991 - 14992

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Ninth Circuit

REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, <i>Appellant</i> ,	}	No. 14990
vs. PAULA MARTIN, by and through Arthur H. Lewis, her guardian ad litem, <i>Appellee</i> .		
REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, <i>Appellant</i> ,	}	No. 14991
vs. VERLA MARTIN, <i>Appellee</i> .		
REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, <i>Appellant</i> ,	}	No. 14992
vs. PAUL MARTIN, <i>Appellee</i> .		

Petition for Rehearing en Banc

Appeal from Final Judgments of the District Court
for the District of Oregon

HONORABLE WILLIAM G. EAST, JUDGE

KING, MILLER, ANDERSON, NASH & YERKE
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In the
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REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, <i>Appellant</i> ,	}	No. 14990
vs.		
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PAUL MARTIN, <i>Appellee</i> .	}	

Petition for Rehearing en Banc

Appeal from Final Judgments of the District Court
for the District of Oregon

HONORABLE WILLIAM G. EAST, JUDGE

To the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and the Judges thereof

Comes now Reynolds Metals Company, a corporation, appellant in the above-entitled causes, and presents this, its petition for a rehearing en banc of the

above-entitled causes, and, in support thereof, respectfully shows:

I

The far-reaching effects on basic industry throughout the country of the unprecedented liability imposed in these cases makes rehearing by the entire court imperative.

The decision of this court in these cases has imposed on appellant a liability so unprecedented and so certain to produce the severest repercussions on the conduct of hitherto lawful industry everywhere that appellant deems it imperative to call to the attention of this court the manifest injustice which it feels has been done.

This court in effect ruled that the operation of an aluminum-reduction plant — an operation similar to any one of several other vital industrial processes in which fluorides escape, such as steel plants and fertilizer plants—rendered the operator absolutely liable for the assorted ailments of the surrounding population, even though the operator took every conceivable precaution against injuring anyone and in fact reduced the amount of fluorides escaping far beyond the point where they were ever capable of harming residents in the area near the plant. Those who wish to do so can interpret the decision as laying at the feet of these

fluoride-producing industries the sole responsibility for the indigestion, backaches, excess weight and other commonplace ailments of those who live near their plants, whether the plants are shown to endanger those persons or not. The burden which could be thus imposed on a lawful industry is staggering.

It is not as though appellant had simply gone ahead, indifferent to the problems of its neighbors. On the contrary, it has made its Troutdale plant an outstanding example of effective fume control. Before appellant took over in 1946, the plant had been operated for three years (1942-1945) without any fume controls at all. Even then there were no complaints of injury to residents. Still, because of a possible hazard to cattle feeding on the surrounding forage, appellant did not begin operation until it had installed in the plant the then best developed fume-control system. A few weeks later, in late 1946 or early 1947, the system was supplemented. Only months after that project was completed, in early 1948, a whole new system was designed, and units of the new system were put into operation progressively as each one was completed. The present system alone cost over \$2,000,000 to install, and in 1950 it cost over \$129,000 just to operate it. Each improvement had to be especially designed and constructed, for these systems were unique and there was no ready-made equipment available.

This court has taken this evidence of four years of persistent effort and tremendous expense and relied on it as evidence of negligence by erroneously stating that appellant did nothing to improve its controls until 1950 and by finding "no showing" that all of it could not have been done earlier. The court has inferred the existence of a "serious" toxic threat to *humans* from the simple fact that appellant ran tests to determine whether or not there was any problem with respect to *cattle* pastured in the area.

Appellant would have been far better off if it had been a laggard instead of a pioneer, if it had saved its efforts and done absolutely nothing about testing or fume control. As it stands now, appellant has been given the burden of showing that its efforts could not have been more intense; appellees have not been required to show that anything more *could* have been done. If appellant had done nothing at all, at least its own evidence of diligence could not have been used against it.

It is also ironic that the court should find the operation of an aluminum-reduction plant inherently dangerous in this case, where appellant proved that it had in fact succeeded in reducing fluorine emanations far beyond the point where they were dangerous to humans. There is no dispute that fluorine, like its chemical

cousin, iodine, is *not* toxic, unless it is ingested *in excessive concentrations*. Small concentrations are not only harmless, but beneficial. Over 15,000,000 Americans in at least 840 communities are drinking water to which fluorine has been added. The Oregon court has found that the introduction of one part of fluorine per million parts of water reduces dental decay among 12- to 14-year-old children 60 to 65 per cent, while doing no harm to anyone. The court cited cases in other jurisdictions unanimously reaching the same conclusions.

Baer v. City of Bend (1956) 206 Or. 221, 223-224, 292 P.2d 134, 135

It cited with approval the following findings of the Ohio court (206 Or. 224, 292 P.2d 135):

Kraus v. City of Cleveland (Ct. Com. Pleas, Ohio, 1953) 116 N.E. 2d 779, 792-793; aff'd (1955) 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N.E. 2d 609

“To further crystallize the question of the meaning of the word ‘toxicity’ as it relates to the use of fluorides certain other items of evidence established in this record should be noted. Millions of people in the United States have been drinking water containing natural fluorides for years and years, with no positive proof of any systematic toxic effect. The amounts of fluorine concentration in some of these localities runs 5, 8 to 14 times the amount intended

for use here as to optimum amount of 1 part per million. * * *

“The evidence discloses that only when fluoride content of water supply exceeds 5 or 6 parts per million will prolonged usage give rise to detectable osseous changes and then only in the most susceptible persons. (Heyroth.) The margin of safety is so wide that there is little danger of pathologic or toxic effects. * * *

“No evidence has ever been produced that drinking water containing one part per million has or will harm any living person or thing.”

One part per million equals one milligram per liter, and a liter is 1.0567 quarts. Therefore, every one of those 15,000,000 persons who drinks or ingests in any form a quart of water a day takes in a milligram of fluorine. This is the amount the courts have universally held harmless and beneficial.

The undisputed evidence was that the appellees could have been exposed, at the very greatest, to substantially less than one milligram of fluorine per day. This court has thus found to be “poisonous” an amount of fluorine which scientific and judicial opinion has unanimously found harmless heretofore.

The effect of this court’s decision is far more serious than that, however. In effect, it has said that it will not *consider* the concentrations of fluorine escaping; the

appellant is simply liable if its plant emits any fluorine at all. But aluminum simply cannot be produced without giving off *some* fluorides, and the same is true of many other vital industries. As this court has chosen to disregard efforts to reduce the emanations far beyond the danger point, the moral of its decision is clear: The aluminum industry has been judicially branded a permanent menace, whether or not it is one in fact.

Appellant conceives the impact of this decision to be so tremendous that it should be reconsidered to correct what are submitted to be serious errors of law contained therein.

It is impossible to reconcile the decision in the cases at bar with the recent decision of another division of this court as to the basis of liability of an operator of an aluminum-reduction plant for injuries resulting from such operations.

Albert A. Arvidson, et al, v. Reynolds Metals Company (W.D. Wash., S.D., 1954) 125 F. Supp. 481, affirmed per curiam (CA 9, 1956) 236 F.2d 224, cert. den. (1957) — U. S. —, 1 L.Ed.2d 323

Here another division of this court in effect rejected the doctrine of absolute liability and affirmed *per curiam* the opinion of the lower court which recognized the utility of the industry and weighed the *actual* risk involved. Judge Boldt said (p. 488):

“It should be clear from the findings of fact and comments thereon previously made herein that the view of the evidence taken by the court does not warrant a finding that the operation of defendant’s plants and resulting effluence therefrom constitutes an unreasonable interference with plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of their lands. The court is fully satisfied that the utility of defendant’s plant operations and their importance to the economy and security of the nation far outweigh any injury to plaintiffs shown by the evidence.”

It is respectfully submitted that the reasoning of that case cannot be reconciled with the wholly different approach taken by this court in these cases. Therefore, it is imperative that the entire bench be convened to put the conflict to rest, to weigh the social and economic consequences flowing from the position heretofore taken by this division in these cases, and to decide unequivocally what shall be the future of the aluminum industry in the area within the bounds of this circuit.

Appellant undertakes to suggest briefly what it considers the most vital errors of law embodied in the opinion of this court.

II

This court imposed upon appellant the burden of proving itself not negligent, and then misstated the evidence appellant introduced.

Throughout the history of the common law, it has been axiomatic that the plaintiff has the burden of proving the defendant negligent. This is the law both in Oregon and in the federal courts:

Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Chamberlain
(1933) 288 U.S. 333, 77 L. Ed. 819

Shewmaker v. Capital Transit Co. (C.A. D.C., 1944)
143 F.2d 142

Schweiger v. Solbeck (1951) 191 Or. 454, 230 P.2d
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Waller v. N. P. Ter. Co. of Oregon (1946) 178 Or.
274, 166 P.2d 488

Horn v. National Hospital Association (1942) 169
Or. 654, 131 P.2d 455

That means that the plaintiff must show some respect in which the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care. This court in its decision did not point to any evidence introduced by appellees to sustain this burden, and there is none in the record. This fatal omission was glossed over by thrusting the burden of proof on the appellant. The court said:

“Further supporting the contention of negligence is the fact that not until the summer of 1950,

did Metals Co. seek the additional control of the escape of the gases. It then expended upwards of \$2,000,000 by which it reduced the gas escape to all but 10% of the amount created. *There is no showing that this reduction of 90% of the poisons released could not have been done at a much earlier date.*" (Emphasis added)

Appellant moved for a directed verdict at the end of plaintiffs' evidence on the ground, among others, that no evidence of negligence had been introduced (R. 957-958). It appealed the denial of the motion (Appellant's Brief, p. 8). The case should have ended there, for it was then irrelevant what appellant could or could not prove; appellees had not made a *prima facie* case. What this court should have said was this: There is no showing by appellees that this reduction of 90 per cent of the fluorides released *could* have been done any earlier.

Furthermore, this court ignored the undisputed evidence. It stated that "not until the summer of 1950" did appellant do anything about supplementing the original controls. The record shows this: In September, 1946, appellant began to operate the Troutdale plant, with the original fume-control system installed. About the end of 1946, appellant began to supplement the system by the installation of the baffles described in Appel-

lant's Brief, p. 15. Installation was completed in the late summer or fall of 1947. Early in 1948, appellant began construction of the pilot plant of the present fume-control system. Although this system was not entirely finished until November, 1950, installation of the whole system was begun in 1949, and portions were put into operation progressively as they were constructed (Appellant's Brief, p. 16).

It must be remembered that each of these improvements had to be designed, tested and constructed wholly new, for there were no ready-made controls available. Under these circumstances, the continued attempt to find better controls was carried on at optimum speed. One set was hardly in operation before the next improvement was being designed. In a case involving the emission of fumes from a sulphuric-acid plant, the Missouri court has negatived any suggestion of negligence under these circumstances.

Kelley v. National Lead Co. (Mo. App., 1948) 210 S.W. 2d 728, 734, 735

“The question of whether defendant was guilty (sic) of negligence in failing to install a Cottrell Precipitator so as to prevent the escape of fumes and gases is not unlike that which arises where a defendant is called upon to answer for its nonobservance of a statutory duty to place a guard upon a dangerous machine. Such a duty is absolute whenever it is possible for the machine to be guarded; and if, in such a case, it appears that there was a guard or

safety device known and obtainable which would have served the purpose contemplated by the statute, the failure of the defendant to guard its machine with such device will in that event give rise to actionable negligence. *Simon v. St. Louis Brass Mfg. Co.*, 298 Mo. 70, 250 S.W. 74. On the other hand, if there is no such device known and obtainable, the defendant cannot be held guilty of negligence in failing to install it.

“* * * If a Cottrell Precipitator had been readily procurable on the market, defendant would no doubt have owed plaintiffs the duty of promptly installing one, but since such a device was not available on the market, defendant was not guilty of any breach of duty so as to have afforded plaintiffs a remedy by an action for negligence.”

Appellant is not unaware that these cases were submitted to the jury with the understanding that appellees would have the benefit of the inference raised by *res ipsa loquitur*. This court, however, did not decide on that basis. It did decide that, assuming the doctrine applied, the court's instruction was not a misstatement of the doctrine's effect. It failed entirely to consider whether the doctrine should have been applied at all, in the circumstances of these cases, to save appellees from being nonsuited (see Appellant's Brief, pp. 26-32).

Thus this court has held appellant liable for negligence although appellees have introduced no evidence to prove it and appellant's undisputed evidence points the other way.

III

This court has branded the making of aluminum an inherently dangerous activity in all circumstances, regardless of whether it is in fact dangerous.

In its application of the rule of *Fletcher v. Rylands*, this court has said in effect that the making of aluminum is an inherently dangerous activity, without regard to the amount of fluorides released. The rule would apparently apply even to a plant which emitted only one pound of fluoride per day. This result was reached despite the fact that the activity is dangerous only if the concentrations of fluoride given off are large enough to be toxic. If the concentrations are below the toxic level, there is no danger at all.

The making of aluminum does not fall within the definition of ultra-hazardous activity adopted by the Restatement and approved by the Oregon court.

Bedell v. Goulter (1953) 199 Or. 344, 353, 261 P.2d 842, 846

“§ 520. ‘DEFINITION OF ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIVITY.

“ ‘An activity is ultrahazardous if it

“ ‘(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and

“ ‘(b) is not a matter of common usage.’”

By the exercise of care, any risk to residents surrounding an aluminum plant *can* be eliminated. Appellant believes it *has* eliminated it. When the 1946 fume-control system was in operation, appellees were exposed to less fluorine than they might have consumed regularly by drinking fluoridated water. The later fume controls have reduced the escaping fluorides drastically beyond that point. There is no showing that any risk to the health of surrounding residents remains.

The situation is not analogous to the keeping of a wild beast. Appellant has tamed the fluorides and muzzled them to boot. Nor are cases involving blasting or the storage of water in point. There is no certain way of controlling an explosion or preventing underground percolation of water. But it is scientifically certain that if the concentrations of fluoride are sufficiently reduced, below the point where they can possibly be toxic, there is no risk remaining.

Whether an activity is ultrahazardous is a question of fact for the trial judge to determine.

3 Restatement of Torts, Section 520, Comment h,
p. 47

Luthringer v. Moore (1948) 31 Cal. 2d 489, 190
P.2d 1, 5

In this case, Judge East emphatically refused so to find, stating that appellant "is engaged in a perfectly

legal use of its property, conducting thereon a recognized industry, namely, an aluminum reduction plant.”

Martin v. Reynolds Metals Company (D. Or. 1955)
135 F. Supp. 379, 380

This court has overturned that determination on appeal. A finding of fact by a judge sitting without a jury may be overturned only if it is clearly erroneous.

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52 (a)

No circumstances appear in the record before this court which justify altering the course set by the *Arvidson* case and the finding of the trial judge in these cases.

IV

This court has emasculated federal discovery procedure in all personal injury cases by its decision that appellees did not waive their doctor-patient privilege.

Appellees Paul and Verla Martin answered, without objection, written interrogatories and questions on the taking of their depositions which revealed their physical condition and their consultations with numerous physicians relating thereto. This court has ruled that in neither case did appellees waive their privilege, because they did not “offer” themselves as witnesses; they remained appellant’s witnesses.

The striking fact is that of necessity this will be true in every personal injury action. By definition, the interrogatories are propounded by the defendant, and it will invariably be the defendant who wants to take the plaintiff's deposition. In effect, therefore, this court has ruled that a plaintiff in a personal injury action can never waive this privilege in the course of the normal discovery procedure preceding trial.

The court seems to recognize that the plaintiff may later waive the privilege by taking the witness stand in his own behalf and testifying to his injuries. Appellees Paul and Verla Martin did that in these cases (R. 673-674, 811), and of course they called several of their doctors to testify. But of what value is the waiver to the defendant at that late date? He is already in the midst of the trial, and the time for discovering what the physicians diagnosed is past. If waiver must wait until that time, the whole purpose of the federal discovery procedure has been defeated; the defendant has been prevented from ascertaining important, possibly crucial, information which would enable him to prepare his case, to narrow issues at trial, or to take a more realistic position in efforts to negotiate a settlement.

There is no principle of law which compels this unjust result. The privilege is designed to protect the patient's privacy by prohibiting public reference to his

physical condition. But this condition need no longer be kept secret when the patient himself has voluntarily made it public. The essence of the waiver is the voluntary disclosure, and this disclosure is just as complete and just as voluntary when the plaintiff is the defendant's witness as when he is his own. In the *Forrest* case, referred to in the court's opinion, the Oregon court held that the privilege is waived if the patient "of his own accord shall withdraw the privileged veil of privacy." (See Appellant's Brief, p. 68) It did not rely on the plaintiff's becoming her own witness at trial.

This point has been settled in a federal case indistinguishable from the cases at bar. There the plaintiff, in answering interrogatories, revealed a condition of mental disease. Later she objected when defendant sought the records of an institution in which she had been confined. The court held her privilege waived.

Munzer v. Swedish American Line (S.D. N.Y. 1940)
35 F. Supp. 493, 497, 498

"Plaintiff made no objection to any of the interrogatories. Her answers to the interrogatories were voluntary. Under Rule 33 she could have presented her objections to the Court within ten days after service of the interrogatories and raised the issue of 'privilege' by such objection. It has been generally recognized that 'privilege' as an objection applies to interrogatories under Rule 33, just as it may be the basis of an objection to questions on the examination of a party whose deposition is being taken under

Rule 26. * * * The scope of interrogatories under Rule 33 is as broad as the scope of examination by deposition, as provided in Rule 26(b), which permits an examination 'regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.' * * *

"I think that here the plaintiff has waived her privilege so far as it relates to communications with physicians concerning her mental condition. * * * Here it is entirely clear that plaintiff has many times over disclosed to the public through her answers to the interrogatories in this case the fact that she was at one time insane. The fact of her insanity is no longer a secret and she cannot now attempt to clothe communications regarding her prior mental conditions with the privilege granted by Section 352 of the New York Civil Practice Act."

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, In light of the vital importance to industry in general of the issues here presented, the serious errors of law which appellant believes to have been committed, and the essential conflict of the views expressed in these cases with views previously adopted by this court, appellant respectfully urges that this petition for rehearing en banc be granted and that upon further consideration the judgments below be reversed.

Appellant feels certain that this court shares the views of the Oregon court, which has said:

Malloy v. Marshall-Wells Hardware Co. (1918) 90 Or. 303, 334-335, 175 Pac. 659, 661

“the high office of the court ‘is never so dignified as when it sees its errors and corrects them’.”

Respectfully submitted,

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I, FREDRIC A. YERKE, JR., of counsel for the above-named appellant, do hereby certify that in my judgment the foregoing petition for a rehearing en banc of these causes is well founded, is presented in good faith, and is not interposed for the purpose of delay.

FREDRIC A. YERKE, JR.

Of Counsel for Appellant

United States
COURT OF APPEALS
for the Ninth Circuit

REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, Appellant,

vs.

PAULA MARTIN, By and Through Arthur H.
Lewis, Her Guardian Ad Litem, Appellee.

No. 14990

REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, Appellant,

vs.

VERLA MARTIN, Appellee.

No. 14991

REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, Appellant,

vs.

PAUL MARTIN, Appellee.

No. 14992

BRIEF IN ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

*Appeals from the Final Judgments of the District Court
for the District of Oregon.*

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FILED

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United States
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PAUL MARTIN, Appellee. } **No. 14992**

BRIEF IN ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

*Appeals from the Final Judgments of the District Court
for the District of Oregon.*

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Paul Martin, Verla Martin, and Paula Martin, by her guardian ad litem, each commenced a separate action in January, 1952, in the District Court for the District of

Oregon, to recover damages for personal injuries resulting from exposure to poisonous effluents from the Troutdale, Oregon, plant of Reynolds Metals Company. The actions were combined for trial and were tried August 25 to September 15, 1955, before Judge East and a jury. Trial resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff in each of the cases. Meantime, Paula Martin had married and become of age and is now Mrs. Yturbide.

Reynolds Metals Company appealed from each of the judgments. The appeals were consolidated, and the combined cases were argued before Judge Denman, Judge Pope and Judge Chambers. Decisions were announced in each case on April 24, 1957, affirming the judgments of the trial court in all respects. Opinions were written by Judge Denman. Judge Pope concurred. Judge Chambers dissented as to a minor question concerning a portion of an order entered before the trial limiting scope of a deposition in two of the cases, but concurred with the opinion of Judge Denman in affirming the trial court in all three cases.

Judges Pope and Chambers have granted a rehearing and have given the Appellees, the Martins, the opportunity of filing a brief in response to the Petition for Rehearing.

This brief will be devoted to the contentions raised in the petition. The non-applicability of the statute of limitations, involved in only two of the cases, has been covered in our previous brief, has been decided adversely to Appellant, and has not been mentioned in the Petition for Rehearing, granted for all three cases. We therefore

consider this legal issue settled and will not burden the Court with further argument.

Likewise, the admissability of evidence with respect to injuries to cattle by the fluoride emanations has been briefed, has been decided adversely to Appellant and not mentioned in the Petition for Rehearing. This matter of the relevancy of evidence we think will need no further attention here.

FACTUAL SUMMARY

We first submit a summary of the factual situation for the members of this Court who may not be familiar with all portions of the 2,018 page record.

In December, 1946, the Appellees, Paul Martin and Verla Martin, husband and wife, farmers and cattle raisers by occupation, having within the previous two years acquired a farm near Troutdale, Multnomah County, Oregon, commenced living on the farm with their then minor daughter, Paula Martin, now Mrs. Yturbide. This farm upon which they lived and worked lies along the south bank of the Columbia River at about the point where the river emerges from the Columbia Gorge. The westerly line of the farm is the Sandy River. A quarter of a mile or thereabouts west of the Sandy River, where it borders the farm, the Appellant, between September 23, 1946, and November 30, 1950, operated a large plant for the production of aluminum. During this time, in the production of aluminum by the process used by Appellant, huge quantities of fluorides (measured in tons per day) were given off and escaped from the plant and permeated the atmosphere. These fluorides, slightly heavier

than air, blew over and settled upon surrounding lands, mostly within the area within four miles from the plant. They settled upon (and were also absorbed by a stomatic process into) the vegetables and plants on the exposed lands. Persons and animals on these lands ingested the fluorides by inhalation, by drinking contaminated local waters, and by eating the plants impregnated with the fluorides.

The Martin farm was in the direction of the prevailing winds blowing up and down the Columbia Gorge and suffered more than the usual exposure to these fluorides. The concentrations of hydrofluoric acid over their farm were sufficient to etch the windows of their residence. The cattle on the farm were sickened and many of them died of these poisons.

The principal fluorides emitted from the plant and to which the Appellees were exposed were cryolite or sodium aluminum fluoride (not to be confused with sodium fluoride, sometimes used in quantities of one part per million or less in the public water supply to reduce decay of the teeth of children), hydrofluoric acid, calcium fluoride, iron fluoride and silicon tetrafluoride, all of varying degrees of toxicity, but all highly poisonous.

The output of these poisons from the plant of Appellant up until the month of November, 1950, when a fume control apparatus was put into operation, was tremendous in quantity. The fluorine content of the fluorides emitted, daily, January through December, 1947, was 2,845 pounds, and in January, 1950, 3,281 pounds (R. 425).

By the latter part of 1950, as a belatedly installed fume control system was placed in operation, the daily output of fluorides decreased. In March, 1950, the daily output was 3,988 pounds; by November, 1950, the daily output was down to 643 pounds (R. 434).

As to the contamination of the farm on which the Appellees lived there is no dispute. The Pre-Trial Orders recite as Agreed Facts that the fumes emanating from the plant into the atmosphere, in the form of gases, liquids and solids, became air borne and portions settled at various times upon the lands of the Appellees. (R. (27-8; 30; 30)*)

Of the toxic qualities of hydrofluoric acid, cryolite, calcium fluoride, iron fluoride and silicon tetrafluoride, agreed to be the principal effluents, there is also no doubt. Their toxic qualities were described by the physicians, chemists and other witnesses who testified at the trial. Appellant's brief on this appeal states (page 17) that these fluorides are poisonous in excessive amounts. The Petition for Rehearing refers (p. 3) to the hazard to cattle, and to extensive efforts and the expenditure of tremendous sums of money to eliminate the hazard. Again (pp. 4-5) the petition, by stating that fluorine is not toxic unless ingested in excessive concentrations, concedes their toxicity if ingested in amounts above a purely theoretical tolerance level. The petition describes the activity of Appellant (p. 13) as "dangerous only if

* References are to pages in the Transcript of Record, abbreviated to "R." in cases numbered 14990, 14991 and 14992 in the same order.

the concentrations of fluoride given off are large enough to be toxic.”

The Martins were rendered ill as the result of their exposure to these emanations from Appellant’s plant. In November, 1950, they moved away from their farm to avoid further exposure, when they ascertained from physicians the cause of their illness. These actions were then commenced to recover their damages for the injuries sustained during the period of exposure.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

I.

Proceedings Before Trial

In a statement of points on the appeal (R. 88-91; 60-63; 62-66) the Appellant claimed that the trial court was in error, in the case of Paul Martin and in the case of Verla Martin, in limiting, in a pre-trial deposition, the scope of the examination of two physicians who had attended these two plaintiffs, to exclude privileged communications.

This minor assignment of error, which has no reference to the case of Paula Martin Yturbide, will be disposed of at this point in our brief.

Early in 1952, shortly after the cases were commenced, the defendant served interrogatories upon the plaintiff, Paul Martin, and likewise upon the plaintiff, Verla Martin, under defendant’s rights under Rule 33, F.R.C.P. Also early in 1952, the defendant took the de-

position of each of these plaintiffs, under defendant's rights under Rule 26.

Two and one-half years later, with the case set for trial on August 25, 1955, the defendant, Appellant here, gave notice of taking the deposition of Dr. Hills and Dr. Proctor, in Baltimore, Maryland, on August 16, 1955 (R. 14 in cases 14991 and 14992). Each plaintiff objected to the taking of the depositions at the time and place indicated in the notice because of the expense involved in sending a lawyer to Baltimore. Each also moved for a ruling that the defendant be not permitted to examine Dr. Hills or Dr. Proctor concerning information acquired by him in attending plaintiff, which information was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the plaintiff (R. 15-19 in cases 14991 and 14992).

The objections and the motion to limit the scope of the depositions of these physicians came on to be heard before Judge East. The day before the time set in the notice for the taking of the depositions, Judge East wrote a letter to the attorneys (R. 73-5 in case 14990). He stated that he had found neither expressed nor implied waiver of the privilege created by Section 44.040, O.R.S., and that therefore objections to the questioning of the doctors, so far as relating to information acquired in attending the plaintiff, necessary to enable them to prescribe or act for the patient, would be sustained. Otherwise he permitted defendant to proceed with the depositions in Baltimore the following morning.

The deposition of Dr. Hills was actually taken by the Appellant at the time specified in the notice, before any

order was signed by Judge East, and in the absence of any attorneys representing the plaintiffs. The deposition is listed in the Pre-Trial Order as Exhibit No. 553 (R. 50).

The order limiting the scope of the inquiry to exclude the privileged communications was not actually signed by the judge until after the deposition of Dr. Hills had been taken (R. 83-4; 53; 55). Dr. Proctor apparently was not available for examination.

In the course of the trial both Paul Martin and Verla Martin testified concerning medical matters and thereby waived their statutory privilege. Appellant was in a position, if Appellant saw fit, to offer in evidence the deposition of Dr. Hills, or was in a position to present Dr. Hills or Dr. Proctor, or both, as witnesses in the case. Appellant did neither. This was not for lack of zeal, as Appellant did produce Dr. Machle, from Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, who had been employed by the plaintiffs and who had consulted with them concerning their illness.

Consequently, Appellant cannot complain of any error of the trial court with reference to privileged communications since Appellant had full opportunity to cure the error complained of by using the deposition taken or producing the witnesses after the privilege had been waived.

This point of the appeal is without legal merit in any event. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are what they are designated, rules of procedure, and not rules of substantive law.

The law with respect to privilege and conduct waiving privilege is to be administered by the federal courts in diversity cases in accordance with the law of the state, in this case Oregon law.

Appellant in the Petition for Rehearing quotes from *Munzer v. Swedish American Line* (S.D.N.Y. 1940), 35 F. Supp. 493. This case holds:

“On the question of privileged communications the Federal Courts follow the law of the state of the forum. *Federal Mining & Smelting Co. v. Dalo*, 9 Cir., 252 F. 356; *Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Durkee*, 2 Cir., 147 F. 99, 8 Ann. Cas. 790; *Thompson v. Smith*, 70 App. D.C. 65, 103 F. 2d 936, 123 A.L.R. 76; *Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. McAdoo*, 8 Cir., 106 F. 2d 618; *Adamos v. New York Life Ins. Co.*, D.C., 22 F. Supp. 162 affirmed, 3 Cir., 94 F. 2d 943.” (p. 496)

The Court then examined the law of the forum, New York, and determined that under the law of New York privilege is waived when “at the trial or *in an examination preparatory thereto*” a party entitled to assert a privilege expressly or impliedly waives it. The Court held that *under New York* law the privilege had been waived by the proceedings in an examination preparatory to trial.

Under the law of Oregon, which governs this situation, submission to examination before trial does not waive the privilege. Under the terms of the Oregon statute the privilege is waived only if a party offers himself as a witness.

The opinion of Judge Denman in this respect was completely correct.

II.**The Principal Issue of Directed Verdict**

In addition to the before-trial procedural question above discussed, the Appellant has presented by this appeal the broader question of whether or not the cases should have been permitted to go to the jury.

We think that preliminary to a discussion of this question this Court should have in mind the issues of fact and of law in the court below.

Issues of Fact and of Law in the Court Below

The parties stipulated just before the trial commenced as to many of the facts in the cases. They also stipulated that upon trial no proof would be required as to the matters of fact agreed upon. They further stipulated the issues, of fact and of law, and that the Pre-Trial Order superseded the pleadings (R. 63; 36; 37). Parenthetically more properly perhaps the recitation in the Pre-Trial Order should have been that the precise issues were set forth in the Pre-Trial Order rather than in the pleadings.

The issues of fact, so far as now material, were:

- (1) Did plaintiff sustain personal injury as a proximate result of absorption of the fluorides from defendant's plant?
- (2) If so, were such injuries
 - A. Caused by negligence of defendant in operating the plant; or
 - B. Knowingly, wilfully or intentionally caused; or
 - C. Caused by the trespass by defendant upon the person of plaintiff?

- (3) Were such injuries the result of plaintiff's own negligent conduct?
- (4) The amount of damages fairly to compensate for such injuries (R. 32; 34; 35).

Thus the now material issues were whether the injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendant in the operation of the plant, or were caused by trespass of the defendant upon the person of plaintiff.

The issues of law (aside from the application of the statute of limitations and from the right to recover punitive damages) were whether plaintiff might recover for "negligently caused personal injuries" or because of trespass upon the person of plaintiff (R. 33; 35; 36).

The Issue of Negligence

As we have shown, the issues stated in the Pre-Trial Order were whether a recovery might be had on a showing of negligence, or on a showing of trespass upon the person of plaintiff. The trial judge thoroughly considered the matter before the trial concluded, and wrote a clear, concise opinion, reported in 135 F. Supp. 379.

In this opinion Judge East indicated that the "doctrine of *Rylands v. Fletcher* or the strict liability and ultra hazardous condition theories of liability generally refer to trespass on property as distinguished from person" (p. 380).

The Oregon Supreme Court, said Judge East, had applied "the pure and simple rule of negligence with the test or measure of ordinary due care and gave plaintiff the benefit and evidentiary aid of the so-called doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur*" (p. 381).

The Judge found: "it is agreed by all the experts who appeared here that the majority of these compounds are toxic or poisonous, but the debate between the experts and the question the jury is going to have to determine, is at what point or quantity do these compounds become poisonous or are likely to become poisonous and harmful to humans" (p. 380).

Under the circumstances Judge East held that, "When the plaintiff proved the emanation of fluorine compounds from the plant of the defendant and the injury suffered by him as a result thereof, he made out a prima-facie case of negligence on the part of the defendant" (p. 382).

The opinion carefully points out that a prima facie case is made only when the compounds "did become deposited on plaintiffs' lands to such an extent that they did receive into their systems these compounds and did become poisoned thereby" (p. 382).

And, also in the instructions given to the jury, Judge East carefully limited the application of the rule of *res ipsa loquitur*. He instructed that an inference of negligence arose only when the fluoride compounds coming from defendant's plant were "of such quantity which would injure persons living and being in the vicinity of its plant, and particularly each of the plaintiffs (R. 1880).

Tolerance Level

The Appellant contends that as a *matter of law* the quantities of fluorides which its operation spewed forth and to which the Appellees thereby became exposed

were not sufficient to cause harm to the Appellees. This contention is reiterated throughout the Brief on Appeal and the Petition for Rehearing. It is expressed in numerous ways. The Appellant (Ptn. pp. 6-7) accuses this Court of having found to be poisonous an amount of fluorine which scientific and judicial opinion has unanimously found harmless heretofore, and of having chosen to disregard efforts to reduce the emanations "far beyond the danger point." This is said to be one of the "serious errors of law contained" in this Court's decision.

The question is, shall some theoretical point or measurement, supplied *ex cathedra* by the aluminum industry and its hirelings, be binding upon the courts to the exclusion of direct and positive proof to the contrary.

It has been demonstrated in numbers of cases, in Tennessee, Utah, Washington, Oregon, and elsewhere, that the fluoride compounds coming from the stacks of aluminum reduction plants (and other industrial plants producing fluorides) have injured, sickened and killed cattle and other mammals. It has been demonstrated that these effluents also have injured plants. In fact, some plants such as buckwheat are used as indicator plants to detect contamination. Many instances of human injury are referred to in the medical literature. For 30 years or thereabouts various experiments, under strict controls, have been made with human beings. The Appellant in its brief says (p. 19):

"A survey made by the United States Public Health Service in 1943 and 1944 had included appellant's plant at Longview, Washington, which was then operating without any fume control system. The Pub-

sufficient to harm the Appellees; and this Court, in the face of these facts and the findings of the jury, cannot say that as a matter of law the exposure to which the Appellant subjected the Appellees did not injure them.

Foreseeability

Just how necessary it may have been for Appellees to prove that Appellant should have foreseen the consequences of its acts, need not here be considered, for the simple and conclusive reason that, necessary or not, Appellees offered definite proof that Appellant, had any care been exercised, would have realized the probable results of its activities. In fact from the proof the conclusion is inescapable that Appellant was fully cognizant of these probable consequences.

In the first place, we learn from the Agreed Facts in the Pre-Trial Order that the United States of America, through R.F.C., leased the plant to Appellant in 1946 (R. 22; 25; 25). Next we learn from the Arvidson case (*Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Company*, 125 F. Supp. 481 at 483) that under the lease the Government had contractual obligations to the Appellant concerning claims for injuries caused by the fluoride emanations from this Troutdale plant, and for re-acquisition of the plant in the event operation thereof should be enjoined. In other words, the Appellant before leasing the plant actually anticipated and contracted concerning its liability for these and similar claims for injuries caused by the effluents resulting from its operation.

Appellant in 1946 was not a new-comer to the aluminum business. Its Longview, Washington, plant had then

been operating since April, 1941 (R. 1276). Judge Boldt stated in the Arvidson case (p. 483) that in a number of cases previously heard in his and other courts in the area judgments had been awarded for fluorine damage resulting from operation of the Troutdale and Longview plants.

Since 1931, in behalf of industry, the Kettering Laboratories had been conducting extensive experiments with the problem of fluorosis in humans, and Appellant was a financial supporter of this institution (R. 1003).

Mr. Zeh, Control Engineer, attended a "health injury" meeting at the Kettering project in March, 1947 (R. 1556).

The Appellant had a library containing medical literature dealing specifically with human injury due to ingestion of fluorides. In the Pre-Trial Order, Appellees have listed as Exhibits L-1 to L-27, inclusive, a portion of the available literature, both for humans and other mammals; and Appellant has listed as Exhibits 597 to 613, inclusive, other portions of such literature.

It is unnecessary to detail in this brief the numerous additional circumstances in the evidence leading to the inevitable conclusion that the Appellant was actually aware, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been aware, of the probable consequences of its acts.

The rule in Oregon, as set forth in *Shelton v. Lowell*, 196 Or. 430 (Appellant's Brief p. 24), is that, if under all the circumstances in the exercise of ordinary care a person can discern that his act will naturally and prob-

ably result in harm of some kind to another, liability follows even though the exact form of the injury is not necessarily foreseen.

The trial court did not neglect to refer to the element of foreseeability in his instructions to the jury. The instructions contained (R. 1875) a statement of the contention of the Appellees that Appellant "operating the reduction plant had full knowledge of the dangerous characteristics of fluoride compounds emanating from the plant and had full knowledge of *the likelihood of injury* to the persons" of the Appellees. Later the judge instructed (R. 1877) that the Appellant owed the duty to persons lawfully within the vicinity and within the area "reasonably, *likely or expected to be affected* by such operation, not to be negligent in the course of such operations to such parties or persons in the vicinity, thereof" (R. 1877).

This was followed by the further instruction that "the question of negligence, if any, must be determined according to the standard of ordinary care and caution in the light of what *should reasonably have been anticipated as reasonably likely to occur* under the existing circumstances at the time involved" (R. 1881).

The overwhelming proof in these cases leads to the conclusion that the Appellant knew or should have known of the dangers likely to result from its activities, if indeed not to the conclusion that the activities were carried on wantonly, recklessly and with a total disregard of the actually anticipated and expected consequences.

The instructions to the jury were more favorable in this respect than Appellant had any right to expect. The jury was instructed that Appellant was not an insurer against injury to persons residing in the vicinity of its plant (R. 1876), and was instructed that recovery for injuries to persons in the vicinity of the plant might be had only if such injuries were reasonably, likely or expected to result from the operation. The jury was not permitted to consider or assess any award by way of punitive or exemplary damages for any wilful, intentional or reckless conduct of the Appellant, even though it continued to belch forth its toxic compounds in ever increasing quantities throughout the entire period of the exposure of these Appellees.

The Degree of Care Exercised

The Appellant says (Ptn. p. 14) that, "By the exercise of care, any risk to residents surrounding an aluminum plant can be eliminated."

Then the Appellant says (Ptn. p. 14) that, "Appellant has tamed the fluorides and muzzled them to boot."

The difficulty for Appellant is that the fluorides were tamed and muzzled after, but not before, the harm had been done.

In spite of all of the protestations of Appellant concerning "four years of persistent effort and tremendous expense" (Ptn. p. 4) to tame and muzzle the fluorides, the record in this respect is entirely against Appellant. The writer of the petition apparently had not read the Agreed Facts of the Pre-Trial Orders. They recite that

before operation of the plant by Appellant ever commenced in September, 1946. Appellant installed in the roof vents some water pipes and spray heads; then that "about June 1, 1949, defendant commenced the construction of a gas, fume and particulate collecting system at said plant. The installation of this system was completed on or about November 3, 1950" (R. 26: 29: 29—See also R. 434).

The muzzling and the taming of the fluorides commenced actually in the latter months of the year 1950. This is shown by the record supplied by Mr. Zeh, Chief Chemist and Control Engineer, and for the benefit of the Court his record follows:

FLUORINE CONTENT OF FLUORIDES
ESCAPING IN POUNDS PER DAY

(The fluorine content is approximately half of the
weight of the fluorides.)

1947, January through December	2,845
1948, January through December	2,840
1949, January through December	2,640
1950, January	3,281
February	3,795
March	3,988
April	3,216
May	2,895
June	2,187
July	1,608
August	1,480
September	1,160
October	900
	(R. 424-6)
1950, December	643
	(R. 434)

Certainly from this record of emissions of poisons it cannot be said that the trial court was wrong in submitting to the jury, as a question of fact, whether the Appellant had used due care under the circumstances.

If there is any evidence to support the finding of the jury such finding is binding and conclusive on the courts. The governing Oregon law is stated thus in *Phillips v. Colfax Company*, 195 Or 285 (at 302):

“We have frequently and consistently defined the powers and limitations of this court when called upon to review alleged errors predicated upon a trial court’s refusal, as here, to grant motions of nonsuit or motions for a directed verdict in law actions. In *Fish v. Southern Pacific Co.*, 173 Or. 294, 301, 143 P2d 917, 145 P2d 991, we said:

“* * * In considering the propriety of these rulings, the motions must be regarded and having admitted the truth of plaintiff’s evidence, and of every inference of fact that may be drawn from the evidence. The evidence itself must be interpreted in the light most favorable to plaintiff. *McCall v. Inter Harbor Nav. Co.*, 154 Or 252, 59 P2d 697. Where the evidence conflicts, the court may not infringe upon the function of the jury by seeking to weigh or evaluate it, but is concerned only with the question of whether or not there was substantial evidence to carry the case to the jury and to support the verdict. *Ellenberger v. Fremont Land Co.*, 165 Or 375, 107 P2d 837; *Allister v. Knaupp*, 168 Or 630, 126 P2d 317.’”

The Oregon law is announced in *Ritchie v. Thomas*, 190 Or. 95, and *Gow v. Multnomah Hotel*, 191 Or 45, and Appellant (Brief p. 26) quotes happily therefrom. According to the quotations there must be reasonable evidence of negligence, but where the instrumentality

doing injury is shown to be under the control and management of the defendant, and the accident is such as, in the ordinary course of events, does not happen if those who have the management use ordinary care, the jury may infer that the accident arose from want of care on the part of the defendant.

Here we have an aluminum plant under the exclusive control and management of a defendant, which instrumentality by emitting harmful toxins injured plaintiff. The accident would not have happened if defendant had prevented the escape of the harmful effluent. The defendant knew, or should have anticipated or foreseen that the effluent if permitted to escape might cause harm, yet permitted it to escape. From this the jury might, and did, infer that defendant (Appellant) was careless.

On the assumption that the choice of theories of liability made by the trial judge was correct, that the cases should be governed by rules of negligence, rather than of trespass, the submission of the cases to the jury was entirely proper, and failure to have submitted the cases to the jury would have been entirely improper.

APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT FOR ANOTHER HEARING

We come now to consider more particularly the arguments presented by Appellant in the Petition for Re-hearing, except for the matter of privileged communications, which we have heretofore covered.

I.

"Far Reaching Effects" of the Decision in This Case

For a first point in the petition (pp. 2-8) the Appellant, after describing the decision of this Court as a "manifest injustice" imposing upon it an "unprecedented liability" certain to "produce the severest repercussions on the conduct of heretofore lawful industry," and after making some pointless comparisons between iodine and fluorine—we could as appropriately say that citric acid, lemon juice, may be imbibed without harm and therefore so could sulphuric acid—submits that there should be a rehearing to correct "what are submitted to be serious errors of law."

Upon analysis, the reference to the serious errors of law comes down to nothing more or less than a contention of a conflict between the decision in these cases and a decision in the case of *Arvidson v. Reynolds Metals Company*, 236 F. 2d 224.

Let us now consider this contention.

The *Arvidson* case, which has heretofore been referred to in this brief, was a combined case of a considerable number of farmers seeking damages and injunctive relief against Reynolds Metals Company, Appellant herein. Fumes from Appellant's Troutdale plant in Oregon, and its Longview plant in Washington, were alleged to have injured dairy cattle on the lands of the farmers and depreciated the market value of the farm land. The farmers' cases, involving farm lands in Washington scattered over a considerable area, were combined for trial and tried by Judge Boldt, sitting without a jury.

Judge Boldt, as the trier of the facts found for the defendant on the factual issues, finding (a) that defendant did not deposit any toxic quantity of fluorine compounds on the farmers' lands; (b) that the forage on the lands had no substantial fluorine content attributable to effluents from the defendant's plants; and (c) that plaintiffs' lands and cattle had sustained no fluorine damage with reasonable or any certainty (125 F. Supp. at 486).

In the Arvidson case a later time and a different set of conditions were involved, in that during the time concerned in the Arvidson case the fume control systems were largely in and operating, whereas in the present cases the fume control system at the Troutdale plant commenced operating only the last few weeks of the exposure period.

Also in the Arvidson case the farms were at varying distances from the plants, some as many as seven miles, and in varying directions, and not in the fall-out area, whereas in these cases the Appellees were only a short distance from the reduction plant, admittedly in the fall-out area, and in the direction of the prevailing winds, or as Appellant described it (Brief, p. 4) "upwind" from the plant.

Also in the Arvidson case the trier of facts did not find as a fact any deposition of fluorides on the lands of the farmers attributable to the operation of the aluminum reduction plants, whereas in the present case the deposition of fluorides on the Martin property during each of the years 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 was admit-

ted (R. 430) and the air borne contamination was one of the agreed facts of the cases (R. 28; 30; 30).

Also in the Arvidson case the trier of the facts found no damage to the cattle of the farmers and found no depreciation in the grazing quality or market value of their lands. In these cases the jury, as the trier of the facts, found substantial damage to each of the Appellees attributable to the effluents of Appellant.

On the appeal of the Arvidson case this Court was unable to say that the findings of fact made by the trier of the facts, Judge Boldt, were clearly erroneous. A finding of fact made by a judge sitting without a jury may be overturned only if it is clearly erroneous, Rule 52 (a) F.R.C.P.; Appellant's Ptn. Rehearing, p. 15. On this basis this Court affirmed the trial judgment in the Arvidson case.

By the same token, this Court, being unable to say that the findings of the jury were without any support by any of the evidence, should not overturn the verdicts of the jury.

Under Oregon law, which this Court applies in diversity cases, the verdict of the jury may not be set aside if there is any evidence to support it. Constitution of Oregon, Art. VII, Sec. 3, and see again *Phillips v. Colfax Company*, *supra*.

There is no inconsistency in this Court's affirming the Arvidson case and also affirming these cases, as in neither instance can or should this Court say that the trier of the facts was clearly wrong.

Judge Boldt in the Arvidson case discussed the law of Washington, which governed, and was of opinion that under Washington law the action of the farmer plaintiffs lay either in trespass on the case or nuisance.

In these cases the Court is considering Oregon law. The affirmance of the judgments as sustainable under Oregon law leads to no conflict whatever with any opinion of this Court in the Arvidson case.

We deem it unnecessary, in considering this first point of Appellant, to respond to the extraneous and irresponsible statements in the petition as to the social and economic consequences, or the severest repercussions, or the future of the aluminum industry, flowing from this Court's affirming a judgment requiring payment of a modest sum for the personal injuries Appellant tortiously caused.

This case is aptly described by Justice Frankfurter in *McAllister v. United States*, 348 U.S. 19, 75 S. Ct. 6, as "no more than an ordinary action for negligence, giving rise, as is frequently the case, to conflict in evaluation of the evidence."

II

Burden of Proof

The gist of this point in the Petition for Rehearing (Ptn. pp. 9-12) seems to be that an industrial plant may throw out poisons and injure people in the neighborhood *with impunity unless* a plaintiff injured by the effluent produces evidence that the poison producer could with reasonable effort have eliminated the escape of the

poisons. It is argued that Appellant made a reasonable effort to find and install better fume controls, and finally reduced the output of fluorides to all but ten percent of the amount created, and there was no "showing by appellees that this reduction of 90 per cent of the fluorides released *could* have been done any earlier" (Ptn. p. 10), and hence Appellees should have been non-suited.

This rule so urged by Appellant should be captioned ASSAULT WITH IMPUNITY. Under this rule so urged poisons could be spread about by an industrial concern to such extent as to kill the people in the neighborhood, with no civil liability because no claimant could come forward with proof that a more confining control apparatus to hold in the poisons was immediately available and not used.

Fortunately the ASSAULT WITH IMPUNITY Rule is not the law of Oregon. The least favorable rule for Appellees, and the most favorable for Appellant, is the rule of *res ipsa loquitur*, applied by the trial judge. The mere fact that the poison did escape and do damage is enough to permit the jury to infer that the maintainer of the poison producing instrumentality was careless. Due care requires that the poison be confined, not that only some reasonable effort to confine it be made.

As the late Judge Cardozo said in *McFarlane v. Niagara Falls*, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391, 57 A.L.R. 1:

"One who emits noxious fumes or gases day by day in the running of his factory may be liable to his neighbor though he has taken all available precautions. (Citing authorities) He is not to do such things at all, whether he is negligent or careful."

The Oregon law we will discuss under the heading of the next point of Appellant's Petition (pp. 13-15), which we have taken the liberty of recaptioning, as we dislike the reference to the work of this Court as branding.

III

Rylands v. Fletcher

The Supreme Court of Oregon has repeatedly held that one who invades his neighbor's lands—whether with toxic compounds, noxious fumes, sewage waters, pick and shovel or ax, or howsoever—is liable as a trespasser for the damage thereby occasioned. This rule is supported by the following cases:

- Mendenhall v. Water Co., 27 Or. 38;
- Allen v. Dunlap, 24 Or. 229;
- Bishop v. Baisley, 28 Or. 119;
- Chapman v. Dean, 58 Or. 475;
- Kesterson v. California-Oregon Power Co., 114 Or. 22;
- Matthews v. Chambers Power Co., 81 Or. 251;
- Roots v. Boring Junction Lumber Co., 50 Or. 298;
- Huber v. Portland Gas & Coke Company, 128 Or. 363;
- Brown v. Gessler, 191 Or. 503;
- Bedell v. Goulter, 199 Or. 344.

The United States District Court for Oregon has announced the same rule:

- Ure v. United States, 93 Fed. Supp. 779;
- Cartwright v. Southern Pacific Co., 206 F. 234;
- Thorup v. Reynolds Metals Co., Civil No. 5884.

The Oregon Supreme Court has also said that when one invades his neighbor's lands with damage-causing illuminating gas, or with over-flowing waters negligence

on the part of the invader will be imputed as a matter of law.

Sharkey v. Portland Gas Co., 74 Or. 327;
Mallett v. Taylor, 78 Or. 208.

The Supreme Court of Oregon has also said that one who invades his neighbor's lands with water from a bursting water tank is presumed to have been careless, and is prima facie liable for the damage occasioned under the rule of *res ipsa loquitur*. The plaintiff is not required to give direct evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant, inasmuch as proof of the manner in which the accident occurred is in itself, under this rule of *res ipsa loquitur*, a prima facie showing of negligence; when plaintiff proves the accident and the injuries suffered as a result thereof, he makes out a prima facie case and it is a question for the jury with all the evidence before it whether the preponderance of such evidence is in favor of plaintiff.

Suko v. Northwestern Ice Co., 166 Or. 557 (at 566 and at 568).

In the trial of these cases the trial judge chose to submit the cases on the third (and most favorable to Appellant) of these alternative rules of liability. The jury found the Appellant careless, in permitting effluents to escape, found injury to each Appellee by the escaping effluents, and awarded a modest amount in favor of each Appellee for the injuries sustained.

Appellant has a contention that its evidence showing "persistent effort" (due care) to minimize the output of fluorides was not contradicted, and therefore *res ipsa*

loquitur should not have been used to take the case to the jury. In Prosser, *Law of Torts*, Second Edition, page 216, we find this statement of the law:

“But if the defendant merely offers evidence of his own acts and precautions amounting to reasonable care, it is seldom that a verdict can be directed in his favor. The inference from the circumstances remains in the case to contradict his evidence. If he testifies that he used proper care to insulate his wires, to inspect his chandelier, to drive his bus, or to keep defunct mice and wandering insect life out of his bottled beverage, the fact that electricity escaped from the wires, that the chandelier fell, that the bus went into the ditch and the bug was in the bottle, with the background of common experience that such things do not usually happen if proper care is used, may permit reasonable men to find that his witnesses are not to be believed, that the precautions described were not sufficient to conform to the standard required or were not faithfully carried out, and that the whole truth has not been told.”

In *Ure v. United States*, 93 F. Supp. 779, at 788, applying the Oregon law, Judge Fee said:

“the person who is in the exclusive management and control of such a dangerous instrumentality is liable on mere proof of damage occurring as a result of the operation thereof, unless perchance he can establish the injury was caused by Act of God, by the act of a third person or by act of the plaintiff himself. This technical device for fixing liability is commonly called *res ipsa loquitur*.”

In *Bartlett v. Grasselli Chemical Co.* (W. Va.), 115 S.E. 451, the Court said:

“The furnaces and business working the injury are located and conducted upon the defendant’s own land. It is clearly within its powers to abate the nuisance, by an alteration of its furnaces or methods

of operation, or by cessation of the operations working the injury. . . .”

The fluorine compounds escaped from the reduction plant, just as the electricity escaped from the wires, the chandelier fell, the bus went into the ditch, the bug was in the bottle, and all of the “persistent efforts” of Appellant to prevent the escape cannot erase the inference of carelessness. Besides all this, the evidence showed that during the four year period the Appellant voluntarily put forth increasing, rather than diminishing quantities of the fluorides, thus further showing negligence. The failure to suspend or cease operations until the fume controls were installed and operating was further evidence of negligence.

Neither on the law, nor on the facts, should the cases have been withdrawn from the jury.

In the opinion of Judge Denman is the statement that, “We think that the doctrine of *Fletcher v. Rylands* also applies.” This statement is entirely correct under the Oregon law, though not strictly necessary to the decision, inasmuch as the trial court had not instructed the jury concerning strict liability but had instructed on the milder rule of *res ipsa loquitur*.

It may not be inappropriate to direct attention to some of the cases from jurisdictions other than Oregon.

In *McFarlane v. Niagara Falls*, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391, 57 A.L.R. 1 (1928), the court said:

“Nuisance as a concept of law has more meanings than one. The primary meaning does not involve the element of negligence as one of its essen-

tial factors. *Heeg v. Licht*, 80 N.Y. 579, 36 Am. Rep. 654. One acts sometimes at one's peril. In such circumstances the duty to desist is absolute whenever conduct, if persisted in, brings damage to another."

Kelly v. National Lead Co. (Mo. App. 1948), 210 S.W. 2d 738, holds:

"It is well recognized that for one to permit fumes and gases to escape from his premises and be deposited on the premises of another to his injury and damage, may constitute an actionable wrong in the maintenance of a nuisance. . . . The doctrine is not limited to any particular character of industry and it has been expressly held that the emission of fumes and gases from a sulphuric acid plant may constitute a nuisance, although the business itself is not unlawful, nor is the plant a nuisance per se."

The case of *Ingmundson v. Midland Continental R. R.* (1919), 42 N.D. 455, 173 N.W. 752, 6 A.L.R. 714, holds that the owner of land possesses the right to enjoy the same free from the pollution of air thereupon, for violation of which right an action in the nature of trespass to realty may be maintained.

The recent case of *Gotreaux v. Gary*, La., 1957, 94 So. 2d 293, imposes the rule of strict liability when during airplane spraying operations spray was carried upon plaintiff's cotton crop, damaging it.

We find nothing in the law anywhere remotely tending to sustain the position contended for by the Appellant in the Petition for Rehearing.

CONCLUSION

The facts, most of them agreed upon in advance of trial, the remainder admitted during the course of the trial or proved by the weight of satisfactory and convincing evidence, are that the Appellant, in the course of the operation of an industrial plant, belched forth a continuous stream of poisonous effluent, in gaseous, liquid and solid form, with which Appellant invaded the adjacent farm lands whereon the Appellees lived, and by which it injured and impaired the health and well-being of the Appellees.

This invasion of the farm lands, the home of the Appellees, by the Appellant with its toxic compounds is admitted by Appellant, and avoidance of liability for the consequences is sought on the basis of two contentions, one factual and the other legal.

The factual contention has been that the toxic compounds did no harm in the amounts to which Appellees were exposed, did not present a "risk to the health of surrounding residents" (Ptn. p. 14). This factual issue was determined against the Appellant by the verdicts of the jury. And in spite of the assertions of Appellant on this appeal, the amount of any particular poison or combination of poisons which an individual can tolerate, a tolerance level, is a question of fact and not a question of law.

The legal contention which Appellant poses is that the Appellant should not be held liable for this admitted invasion with these toxic compounds, because, even when due care is used, these compounds necessarily escape as an incident of operating an aluminum reduction plant,

and, consequently, it is only when less than due care is used in minimizing the escape that liability attaches for ensuing damage to the neighbors or their property.

This monstrous doctrine has no support in law.

As we have shown, when toxic compounds likely to injure if permitted to escape, are allowed to escape and settle in the neighborhood to the injury of a neighbor, either:

1. The person permitting the escape of the toxins is liable, irrespective of fault, as a trespasser;
2. The person permitting the escape is liable for negligence, which is implied as a matter of law;
3. The person permitting the escape is liable for negligence, which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, but with an inference of negligence, sufficient by itself to support a finding of negligence, aiding the injured neighbor asserting the negligence.

On any of these rules, or on the well recognized and oft repeated rule that no one may maintain a nuisance to the annoyance or hurt of his neighbor, the judgments in these cases are sustained and should be affirmed.

The decision of this Court, previously rendered, is sound, and fully in accord with the law and the facts, and should be reaffirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE

Due service of the foregoing Brief in Answer to Petition for Rehearing by receipt of three certified copies thereof is hereby admitted this 11th day of September, 1957.

.....
Of Attorneys for Appellant

No. 15,045

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Ninth Circuit

LOUIS L. MAIDEN,

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vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee.

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vs.

LOUIS L. MAIDEN,

Appellee.

Brief of Appellee United States of America

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California
Southern Division

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
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I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Findings of Fact of the Trial Court set forth the factual data upon which the Conclusions of Law and the

Judgment below are based. In summary, on December 22, 1952, Appellant signed written shipping articles as boatswain's mate aboard the SS LOMA VICTORY, a vessel of United States registry, owned and operated by Appellee United States of America. The SS LOMA VICTORY left San Francisco on or about January 2, 1953, on a voyage to Saigon, Indo China. The vessel, in addition to other cargo, carried a deckload of airplanes. The weather during the days after the vessel left San Francisco was extremely rough, necessitating inspections of the deck areas at least twice daily. Appellant was making an inspection of the SS LOMA VICTORY's deck cargo and gear at about 4:00 P.M. on January 9, 1953, and while he was inspecting the anchor windlass at the bow of the vessel, a heavy sea broke over the bow of the ship, striking Appellant and throwing him against the windlass, causing serious personal injuries.

On the basis of this accident Appellant filed suit against Appellee alleging the negligence of vessel personnel and the unseaworthiness of the vessel. In addition, there was a cause of action for maintenance payments allegedly due Appellant.

Upon conclusion of the trial below the Court, sitting in Admiralty, determined that there had been no negligence on the part of the vessel personnel nor had there been any unseaworthiness which was the proximate cause of Appellant's accident and that in fact Appellant had been negligent to a marked degree, which negligence was the proximate and controlling cause of his injuries, in that he proceeded out on deck in violation of orders, failed to notify the bridge of the vessel of his action and needlessly proceeded to a fully exposed position with his back to any possible oncoming sea. The Court further found that the wave which broke over the bow of the vessel at the time of the

accident was unexpected by anyone aboard the vessel. The Court further adjudged and decreed that maintenance payments be made by Appellee to Appellant for all past maintenance and in addition decreed future maintenance for a period of one year from and after August 3, 1955, in a lump sum, without prejudice to Appellant's rights to seek further maintenance as and when it became due.

Appellant has appealed from the judgment denying him general damages on the basis of alleged negligence and unseaworthiness, on the ground that the findings of the Trial Court were erroneous to the extent that a reversal of the judgment is indicated. Appellee United States of America also appealed the judgment on the ground that the Trial Court erred in holding that Appellant was entitled to recover past and future maintenance.

II.

APPELLEE ABANDONS ITS APPEAL FROM THE MAINTENANCE JUDGMENT.

Appellee United States of America hereby abandons and withdraws its appeal from the judgment of the Trial Court holding that maintenance was due Appellee in this case. Although the Trial Court found that Appellant was negligent himself to a marked degree, which was the proximate cause of his injuries, a review of the applicable case law indicates that on the basis of the evidence produced at the trial below, such negligence of the Appellant was not of sufficient gravity to defeat his claims for maintenance payments. Appellee therefore at this time abandons its appeal from the judgment below and urges that the entire judgment be affirmed by this Court.

III.

THERE WAS NO UNSEAWORTHINESS OF THE VESSEL WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED APPELLANT'S INJURIES.

Appellant contends that the cracking of cement which had been placed around the hawse pipes of the anchor chain on the forepeak of the SS LOMA VICTORY created an unseaworthy condition which caused Appellant to assume a hazardous position during stormy weather, thereby resulting in his accident. Upon the vessel's departure from San Francisco, the vessel's carpenter placed wooden blocks around the two anchor chains at the point where they passed through the hawse pipes leading from the forepeak of the vessel down into the anchor chain lockers below. This cementing was required in order to keep sea water from moving down the hawse pipes into the chain locker. From time to time during the succeeding days of the voyage, this cement cracked, which necessitated further cementing.

A. It Was Necessary to Inspect the Cement on the Forepeak Regardless of Whether or Not it Was Cracking.

Appellant contends that the cracking of the cement itself necessitated inspections on the forepeak of the vessel, even during heavy weather. The Court below on the basis of the evidence at the trial properly found that it was necessary to inspect the hawse pipe cement during heavy weather regardless of whether or not it was cracking or washed away. Appellant himself admitted in his direct testimony that he was injured while inspecting the cement rather than while repairing it (Tr. p. 136). The ship's carpenter, Anthony Surrell, testified that it was good seamanship to inspect the cement (Tr. p. 55). He also testified that he inspected the cement daily, including the day of the accident (Tr. pp. 66, 68). Captain Jack H. Healy, the only maritime expert who testified at the trial, stated as follows:

“Q. Captain, is it necessary to inspect the cement up in the hawsepipe from time to time while you are at sea, particularly during heavy weather?”

A. Yes, a person should make sure that no water is going down into the chain locker.

Q. Is that true, Captain, whether that cement is breaking up, has broken up, or not? Are those inspections necessary, in your opinion, during heavy weather?

A. Yes.

Q. And as good seamanship on any ship in which you commanded, you would want that done on occasion even though you had no specific word that the cement was cracked or broken?

A. Yes, correct.” (Tr. p. 539)

B. The Vessel Was Not at Fault Because of the Cementing Job.

Appellant’s Brief urges that the cementing job performed aboard the vessel was unsatisfactory and thereby constituted an unseaworthy condition. Although, as the Trial Court correctly determined, the cementing of the hawse pipes was not the proximate cause of Appellant’s injuries, the job was a good one, as was testified to by Chief Officer William L. Murray (Tr. p. 494) and by ship’s carpenter Surrell (Tr. p. 53). The heavy seas encountered actually caused the cracking of the cement. The Libelant claims that defective plugs or wedges placed below caused the cement to crack. Captain Murray (Tr. p. 488) and carpenter Surrell (Tr. pp. 44, 45) both testified that it was normal practice to use wooden plugs or wedges below the concrete in order to hold it in place while drying.

C. It Would Not Be Proper to Lash the Anchor Chains Together.

Appellant also argues that the failure to lash the anchor chains together was also a causative factor in connection with the breaking of the cement. The testimony on this

point was quite clear. Captain Healy, as a maritime expert, testified that anchor chains had never been lashed together on any ship upon which he had served and that it would be a bad practice, in view of the tendency of the anchor chains to foul up if it became necessary to lower anchors under emergency conditions or upon arrival at port (Tr. p. 640). Ship's carpenter Surrell also testified that some mates on vessels on which he had served did not approve of the practice of tying anchor chains together (Tr. p. 23). He also testified that it might be dangerous to tie the anchor chains together (Tr. p. 61) and it might take more time to get the anchors down when necessary (Tr. p. 64). Appellant admitted that he had never discussed with anyone in authority aboard the vessel the possibility of tying the anchor chains together (Tr. p. 313) and Chief Officer Murray had also never discussed with any of the officers or other vessel personnel the possibility that the anchor chains might be tied together (Tr. p. 488).

D. No Catwalk or Lifeline Was Required or Even Advisable on the Forecastle Head.

Appellant's Brief urges that there should have been a lifeline or catwalk upon the forecastle head of the SS LOMA VICTORY, and its absence constituted vessel unseaworthiness. Appellant further argues that the accident might have been avoided if such lifelines or catwalks had been rigged on the forecastle head of the vessel. The evidence clearly shows that there had never been a catwalk or lifeline rigged on the forecastle head of the SS LOMA VICTORY during its voyage from San Francisco. Appellant further argues that certain catwalks on decks other than the forepeak deck were washed away and not replaced. However, the undisputed evidence showed that no catwalks or lifelines need be

rigged on the forecastle head of vessels such as the SS LOMA VICTORY. Appellant himself testified that there had been a line on the lower deck to the forecastle head but not on the forecastle head itself (Tr. p. 133). In accordance with the testimony of Second Officer Michael Mehallo, there never had been a need for catwalks even on the other decks of the vessel, in view of the fact that there was sufficient free area around the airplanes lashed to the deck to constitute a safe walkway and that catwalks are required only to provide passage over deckloads which take up the entire deck space (Tr. p. 443). Captain Healy testified that in his experience no lifelines or catwalks are required on the forecastle heads of vessels (Tr. p. 546). In fact, Appellant also testified on cross-examination that there was a solid railing approximately four feet high around the edge of the entire forepeak area along the sides of the ship (Tr. p. 172).

IV.

THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE OF THE VESSEL PERSONNEL WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED APPELLANT'S INJURIES.

Appellant in his brief argues that Appellee's personnel were negligent in a number of particulars, which proximately caused Appellant's injuries. A thorough review of the trial transcript and exhibits indicates quite clearly that there was no negligence of the vessel personnel in connection with Appellant's injuries. These various claims of negligence will be discussed below.

A. The Ship Was Proceeding at Reduced Speed and Just Making Headway.

All during the afternoon of January 9, 1953, and up until after the accident occurred, the evidence shows that the vessel was proceeding under reduced speed. The Deck

Log Book of the SS LOMA VICTORY (R's. Exh. B) shows that the engine speed was 50 R.P.M., or 50 revolutions per minute. Appellant himself in his testimony stated that the vessel was just making steerage way (Tr. p. 327) and was proceeding at reduced speed (Tr. p. 328). Mr. Alfred L. Manning, Jr., an ordinary seaman aboard the SS LOMA VICTORY, testified that the vessel was proceeding at reduced speed prior to Appellant's injury (Tr. p. 28). Chief Officer Murray also knew that the vessel was proceeding under reduced speed (Tr. p. 497).

This reduced speed was barely sufficient for the vessel to maintain headway or steerage way. Captain Healy testified that a vessel must maintain headway or otherwise it would wallow in the sea, with a considerable expectation of serious trouble (Tr. p. 542). Good seamanship dictated that the vessel should not be allowed to wallow.

B. The Wave Which Broke Over the Bow Was Unexpected.

The evidence reveals that the wave which struck Appellant was the first wave that had come over the bow during the period just prior to and during his inspection. The deck log of the vessel (R's. Exh. B) indicates that seas had come over the bow at certain times during the period between noon and 4:00 P.M. on the day of Appellant's injury but that the force of the wind had been reducing during the afternoon. For example, the wind at 2:00 P.M. had a force of 8. The wind at 3:00 P.M. had a force of 7. The wind at 4:00 P.M. had reduced to 6-7 in force. This wind force tends to confirm the trial testimony that there were no seas coming over the bow just prior to 4:00 P.M. and up until the time Appellant was injured. Mr. Simeon Sarte, an able bodied seaman aboard the LOMA VICTORY, testified that while he went forward with Appellant during the course of the inspection, he noticed light sprays on the decks (Tr.

p. 100) but that the first wave coming over the decks was at the time the accident occurred (Tr. p. 109). Mr. Manning also testified that there were no green seas coming over the deck prior to the accident (Tr. p. 29). Appellant himself confirmed in his testimony that there had been no waves up on the deck of the vessel prior to the wave that struck him (Tr. p. 149). Second Officer Mehallo, who was on the bridge at the time of the accident, also testified that there were no seas coming over the decks of the vessel until the wave he observed at the time of Appellant's accident (Tr. pp. 397 and 398).

The above testimony shows that the sea which struck Appellant was not expected by anyone aboard the vessel.

C. The Vessel Was Not Speeded Up Prior to the Accident.

Appellant's Brief attempts to establish, at considerable length, that the vessel had been speeded up shortly before Appellant was injured. This attempt is based upon a great deal of conjecture, surmise and speculation on the part of Appellant's proctor. In order to attempt to show such a situation, Appellant's proctor has alleged a change in the time the heavy sea crashed over the bow of the vessel from 4:17 P.M. on January 9, 1953, to 4:21 P.M. on that day. Counsel has also been required to speculate regarding various reasons why the time of the accident was not in accordance with the testimony of the witnesses and also not in accordance with the vessel's log books. The most significant fact in this connection is that Second Officer Michael Mehallo, who was in charge on the bridge of the vessel during the 4:00 P.M. to 8:00 P.M. watch, testified without any possibility of doubt that he did not increase the speed of the SS LOMA VICTORY at any time during his watch up to and including the time that the heavy sea came over the bow and injured Appellant. On cross-examination, Mr. Me-

hallo was asked by Appellant's proctor direct questions as to whether he speeded up the vessel prior to the accident, as follows :

"Q. Mr. Mehallo, as a matter of fact, you speeded up the vessel to 55 revolutions immediately before this accident happened, didn't you?

A. No, sir, I never speeded the vessel up at no time when I took over the watch.

Q. Now, you are perfectly clear on that?

A. Perfectly clear." (Tr. p. 462)

The complete sequence of events as far as the movements of the vessel were concerned is fully set forth in the testimony of the various witnesses and in the log books and other documentary evidence produced at the trial. The vessel had been proceeding at 50 R.P.M. ever since 12:40 P.M. on the day of the accident, as indicated in the deck log of the vessel (R.'s Exh. B). This speed was maintained up until 4:17 P.M. or 1617, when the heavy sea came over the bow and struck Appellant. Second Officer Mehallo actually saw the wave come over the bow and fixed the time by looking at his watch, as shown in his testimony on cross-examination during the trial below, as follows :

"Q. Now, then, continuing this, you said, '1618 decreased speed to 50 r.p.m. Sent Mr. Russell, the third mate, to give assistance to the boatswain.'

I want to ask you this question, fairly and simply: Your position is that this accident happened, therefore, between 1617 and 1618, is that correct?

A. It happened at 1617, when I looked at my watch.

Q. Do you remember looking at your watch?

Q. I always do. It is a force of habit of mine from long-time experience that any incident happens on the bridge, as a mate, we have to log it. The instant anything happens whatsoever, I always have a habit of looking at my wrist watch. I have been doing that for 11 or 12 years.

Q. Then I take it that the reduction of speed down to 40 was to permit the ship to slow down and get a search party or a rescue party out, is that it?

A. That is correct." (Tr. p. 470)

Appellant's proctor made a number of efforts during the trial to establish other and different times for the accident, by quoting the Report of Personal Injury which stated that the accident occurred at 1620 (Tr. p. 459) and because of Mr. Mehallo's direct testimony before the log itself arrived for admission into evidence that the accident happened at approximately 1610 (Tr. p. 401). Mr. Mehallo testified at length that the log entry itself stated the exact time that the wave came over the bow and that the log entry was the most accurate time of the accident (Tr. pp. 445, 452 and 483).

Regardless of any specific time for the accident, it remains clear that neither Mr. Mehallo nor anyone else increased the speed of the vessel just prior to the accident. Chief Officer Murray testified that he did not speed the ship or order it speeded up (Tr. p. 496). Even the Appellant himself testified that he did not notice any change in speed up to and including the time of his accident (Tr. p. 328).

The further movements and speeds of the vessel after the accident form a logical and believable sequence of events that would normally follow the breaking of the wave over the bow of the SS LOMA VICTORY. The log shows that the wave struck at 1617. At 1618, one minute thereafter, the vessel's engine speed was reduced to 40 R.P.M. This was in accordance with the log book and also is shown in the testimony of Second Officer Mehallo, as follows:

"A. As I was just telling the third mate, 'Thanks for everything,' as he was going down, I happened to look out one of the portholes and a big freak wave came over and hit the bow and came all the way over the bow, and at that time I saw a dark object in the green sea,

and I thought something had broke loose forward. So the third mate was still by the passageway there, and I says to him, I says, 'Mister,'—well, I have forgotten the name now, anyway the third mate, I says to him, 'Oh, Mister,' I says, 'wait a while. There is something broke loose forward.' So when the green sea and the water came down the decks, I noticed the man struggling up on the anchor windlass trying to get loose and I knew it was a human body. Right away I told the third mate, 'You better take somebody and go up on the bow and give assistance.' In the meantime, I grabbed the telephone and slowed the vessel down and then I called the master. I didn't alter course; I didn't think it was necessary at the time because there were no more seas hit the bow." (Tr. pp. 398 and 399)

It developed that the vessel could not make steerage way at 40 R.P.M. during a test period of four minutes. It was then necessary at 1621 to increase the speed to 55 R.P.M. for steerage way, as shown in the log (R.'s Exh. B). At 1625 the vessel was able to reduce its engine speed to 30 R.P.M. on changed courses while the vessel's officers determined to request permission to divert the vessel immediately to Pearl Harbor, so that Libellant could obtain further medical care, as testified to by Chief Officer Murray (Tr. pp. 517 and 518) and in accordance with the vessel's log. Permission to divert was later granted by the Honolulu governmental authorities and the vessel proceeded as fast as possible to Pearl Harbor.

The only witness who even intimated that the vessel might have speeded up just prior to the accident was Mr. Simeon Sarte. The jarring of the vessel which Sarte noticed might well have been caused by the force of the tremendous wave that came over the bow, a natural force of wind and wave, not having anything to do with the revolutions per minute

of the vessel's engines. In any event, Mr. Sarte's belief is not supported by Appellant himself, by other witnesses or by the official records outlined in the vessel's deck log, as shown above. Furthermore, the Trial Judge in his determination of the case on the negligence issues in effect determined either that Mr. Sarte's testimony was not inconsistent with the substantial testimony that the vessel was not speeded up just prior to the accident or if His Honor did find an inconsistency, he determined that Mr. Sarte's testimony in that respect was not credible.

D. There Was No Notice to the Bridge That Appellant Was Going or Did Go Out on Deck.

Although it was customary and necessary to conduct certain inspections on the deck of the SS LOMA VICTORY even during heavy weather, the Chief Mate had ordered on the morning of the accident that no one was to go out on deck for general or ordinary work, as testified to by Appellant himself (Tr. p. 318). The evidence further shows that Chief Officer Murray had accompanied previous inspection parties when they went out on deck when the weather was particularly bad (Tr. p. 492). The Appellant himself testified that during the inspection on the morning of the accident, the Chief Mate had been in command of the party (Tr. p. 135). Chief Officer Murray confirmed that he accompanied the morning inspection party (Tr. p. 493).

During the afternoon, Chief Officer Murray met with the Appellant and made arrangements for both of them to go out to make the afternoon inspection at approximately 4:00 P.M. that day, as shown in the following testimony of Chief Officer Murray:

"Q. When were these inspections usually made?

A. Eight in the morning, sir, and 1600 in the afternoon.

Q. And who was present during the course of those inspections?

A. The boatswain and carpenter, Sergeant Myers was along, and myself, and sometimes an able seaman—pretty near always we had an able seaman with us.

Q. Would that be one of the seamen from that watch, sir?

A. That is correct, sir.

Q. And you were present at those inspections?

A. I never failed to be in those particular ones on account of the weather, sir.

Q. On account of the weather?

A. On account of the weather conditions. I didn't want a man to go where I didn't want to go." (Tr. pp. 492-493)

* * * * *

"Q. Captain, did you see Mr. Maiden, the boatswain, at any time during the afternoon of January 9 regarding anything about inspection?

A. Yes, I saw him.

Q. When and where and what—

A. I saw him in his room, and I saw him in the mess room, somewhere between the hours of 3:00 and 3:30.

Q. What did you say and what did he say?

A. To my recollection, it was we would go out at 4:00 o'clock or 1600, to make the regular inspection." (Tr. p. 494)

The Appellant confirmed that he and the Chief Officer arranged for the 4:00 P.M. inspection on the day of the injury. His testimony on direct examination was quite significant in this respect in that he started to say that the Chief Officer told him that "we" should make an inspection but later corrected that testimony to say that Appellant should make the inspection. This testimony of Appellant is stated below:

“A. I was in the crew’s mess at the time, and Mr. Murray, the chief mate, came in there and I got up out of my chair and he said, ‘Boatswain, I think we should make a—’ He says, ‘I want you to make an inspection tour before it gets dark’. He says, ‘We are expecting bad weather.’” (Tr. p. 146)

After the Chief Mate left the Appellant, the Appellant, without going to his own quarters or checking with the Chief Mate proceeded with the afternoon inspection. Chief Officer Murray testified that Appellant had never done that before (Tr. p. 498). Appellant himself admitted that he at no time communicated with the officers and crew members on duty on the bridge of the vessel to advise them that he was going out on deck. The Appellant himself testified that he did not signal the bridge, look at the bridge or communicate with the bridge in any way prior to or during his inspection (Tr. pp. 330, 335). Chief Officer Murray did not know Appellant was out on deck or going out on deck alone (Tr. p. 531). Second Officer Mehallo, in charge on the bridge, knew of the orders that no one was to go out on deck without notification to the bridge (Tr. p. 391). He had no report concerning Appellant’s trip out on the deck (Tr. p. 394).

E. Visual Inspection Did Not Reveal Appellant on the Deck.

Second Officer Mehallo testified that he made visual inspection from the bridge of the vessel which, unfortunately, did not reveal Appellant or those with him because of the limitations of vision (Tr. pp. 394, 395 and 396). Mr. Mehallo stated that men could be out on the decks of the vessel and be unobserved. The visual inspections revealed only spray on the decks of the vessel up until the time the sea came over the bow. The limitation of vision was caused by the vessel’s masts and gear (Tr. p. 396), the deckload of air-

planes (Tr. p. 396), and the No. 1 masthouse, since a crew-member could not be observed from the bridge while standing just forward of the masthouse, as testified to by Mr. Sarte (Tr. p. 107), the Appellant himself (Tr. pp. 309 and 315) and Chief Officer Murray (Tr. p. 525). There was further testimony that a man could not be seen from the bridge while inspecting the anchor windlass from a position forward of the windlass, because of the height of the windlass up off the forepeak deck. This was testified to by Appellant himself (Tr. p. 333) and by Captain Healy (Tr. p. 594).

Appellant's Brief urges that extra lookouts or an inspection from the starboard wing of the bridge would have revealed Appellant at work. However, Chief Officer Murray testified that because of the weather conditions then being experienced by the vessel, visibility was better from inside the wheelhouse than from an exposed position out on the starboard wing of the bridge (Tr. p. 511).

F. The Proximate Cause of Appellant's Accident Was His Own Action.

The finding of the Trial Court that Appellant himself was negligent to a marked degree, which negligence was the proximate and controlling cause of his injuries, is well supported in the evidence, as discussed in the preceding sections of this Brief, in that Appellant proceeded out on deck in violation of orders, failed to notify the bridge of his action, and in addition proceeded to a point forward of the anchor windlass in a fully exposed condition with his back to any oncoming sea. Appellant could have inspected the anchor windlass from a safe position aft of the windlass, as testified to by Mr. Surrell (Tr. p. 80) and by Captain Healy (Tr. p. 546). If he had done so, the oncoming sea would have broken itself before reaching Appellant.

G. The Vessel's Personnel Were Not Negligent in Their Handling of the Vessel Even if They Had Known Appellant Was on the Forepeak.

Even if Appellant had notified the bridge that he was going out to inspect the decks of the vessel and the forepeak area and if he had been under constant observation from the bridge during all times that he might have been visible from the bridge and if thereafter the very same wave struck Appellant, there would have been no negligence of the vessel's personnel which proximately caused Appellant's injuries. As shown above, the testimony at the trial included the information that the vessel was operating at reduced speed, just making headway up to and including the time of the accident. The testimony further shows that no green seas had come over the decks of the vessel during and just prior to the inspection that afternoon. The sea which struck Appellant was unexpected by anyone aboard the vessel and on that basis was unavoidable as a practical matter. The wave itself was an Act of God, not brought about by any actions or inactions by the vessel personnel.

For these reasons, the Appellant has failed to make out a case of vessel liability for negligence even if all interested parties knew he was on the deck and in fact had observed him up until the time the wave came over the bow, which was not the case.

V.

THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED UNLESS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.

It is now well established that the Federal Appellate Courts accept as true the findings of Trial Courts in Admiralty actions unless the reviewing court finds them to be clearly erroneous. Furthermore, the Appellate Court is not now required to try an Admiralty appeal *de novo*, but will

apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), 28 U.S.C.A., page 13.

Earlier authority in Admiralty cases held that on appeal the matter could be tried anew by the Appellate Court. See 4 Benedict on Admiralty, Sixth Edition, Sections 571 and 572, and cases there cited. The United States Supreme Court in *McAllister v. United States* (1954), 348 U.S. 19, 75 S.C. 6, 99 L. Ed 20, firmly established that on appeal, an Admiralty judgment should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. The Court in the *McAllister* case stated as follows at page 20:

“In reviewing a judgment of a trial court, sitting without a jury in admiralty, the Court of Appeals may not set aside the judgment below unless it is clearly erroneous. No greater scope of review is exercised by the appellate tribunals in admiralty cases than they exercise under rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”

This doctrine was affirmed in this circuit in *Amerocean Steamship Company, Inc. v. Copp* (CA 9-1957), 245 Fed. 2nd 291. In the *Copp* case, the court in ruling on the findings of the Trial Court stated as follows at page 293:

“These findings must be accepted as true unless this Court finds them clearly erroneous. We are not required longer to try the matter de novo.”

In the *City of Long Beach v. American President Lines* (CA 9-1955), 223 Fed. 2d 853, this Court also affirmed the doctrine that trial de novo was no longer available in Admiralty cases. The Court stated as follows at page 855:

“The ghost of trial de novo in this intermediate appellate court has been laid at rest with finality in *McAllister v. U. S.*, 348 U.S. 19 * * *”

In *Benton v. United Towing Co.* (CA 9-1955), 224 Fed. 2d 558, Libelant claimed that his injury was caused by the

unseaworthiness of the Respondent's vessel and the negligence of the Respondent in failing to maintain the vessel's seaworthiness. The lower court held the barge was seaworthy and that there was no negligence of the Respondent. This court affirmed the decree of the District Court stating in part as follows at page 558:

"Benton contends that this court should try this proceeding de novo and this although all the testimony was by witnesses heard by the trial court. Whatever may have been the rule heretofore, the contention that an admiralty appeal requires a trial de novo has been finally disposed of by the Supreme Court's holding in *McAllister v. United States*, * * *"

The rule that findings will not be disturbed is particularly applicable in a case in which all of the witnesses testified orally, as was true in the instant case. This court has held on a number of occasions that where all of the testimony is oral, a decree below will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence to support it.

Stockton Sand & Crushed Rock Co. v. Bundensen
(CCA 9-1945), 148 Fed. 2d 159;

Larsson v. Coastwise Line (CA 9-1950), 181 Fed.
2d 6.

A careful review of the argument in Appellant's Brief relative to the findings indicates that there was only one insignificant error in the findings of the Trial Court. That error involved Finding No. 10, which states that the engine's speed was increased to 55 R.P.M. at 4:20 P.M. whereas the record indicates that this change occurred at 4:21 P.M. This difference of one minute has absolutely no effect upon the chain of events involved in Appellant's injury, since the record is clear that the accident occurred at 4:17 P.M., when the vessel's speed was 50 R.P.M., that the vessel's speed was

reduced to 40 R.P.M. at 4:18 P.M., that the vessel could not maintain steerage way and thereafter the vessel's speed was increased to 55 R.P.M., so that the vessel would not wallow. The fact that Finding No. 10 states that the increase of speed occurred at 4:20 P.M. rather than 4:21 P.M. is of no significance and should surely be within the de minimis rule, which is well established by applicable legal authorities and needs no citation here.

VI.

THE FINDINGS ARE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

The findings are fully supported by the evidence. Appellant's Brief (pp. 34 to 45) attempts to show that the findings are erroneous. Although, as shown above, the judgment below should be affirmed on the basis that the findings are not clearly erroneous, the fact is that the findings are fully supported in almost every respect by the evidence at the trial. Appellant's Brief as to the findings re-argues the alleged problems as to the cement used around the anchor chains, the failure to lash the anchor chains together and the absence of catwalks or lifelines. These observations in the brief are no doubt directed to the finding that no unseaworthiness of the vessel was the proximate cause of Appellant's injuries. However, the evidence below clearly showed that it was necessary to inspect the hawse pipes during heavy weather, whether or not the cement was known to have cracked under the stress of weather (Tr. p. 539). For this reason, the argument concerning the allegations of unseaworthiness of the vessel did not impress the Trial Court and, in fact, could not be the proximate cause of Appellant's injuries. It has already been shown that no catwalks are installed on a vessel's forepeak, so the arguments in Appellant's Brief regarding the presence or absence of catwalks or lifelines need not concern this Court.

The Trial Court's Finding No. 11 (Clerk's Trans. pp. 37 and 38) that Libelant proceeded to a point forward of the anchor windlass in a fully exposed position, with his back to any incoming sea, whereas he could have inspected the anchor windlass from a safe position aft of the windlass, is fully justified by the trial testimony as indicated in Section IV. F. of this brief. However, it is not necessary for an affirmance of this appeal to determine this alleged issue one way or the other. The ultimate fact is that there was no negligence or unseaworthiness attributable to Appellee which caused Appellant's injuries.

Appellant's Brief's further attack on Finding No. 11 to the effect that Appellant proceeded out on deck in violation of orders and failed to notify the bridge of his action, resolves itself into a mere play on words. The evidence shows that the Chief Officer planned to go out with Appellant and others at about 4:00 P.M., but that Appellant went out without the Chief Officer and in this respect violated orders. The uncontradicted evidence is that Appellant failed to notify the bridge of his action, which he took without advising the Chief Mate. Although the bridge knew that an inspection party was to proceed out on the deck, the bridge did not receive any specific advices when the party actually left, simply because Appellant went out on the bridge without advising the Chief Officer and contrary to orders. For that reason, the Bridge did not know that Appellant was out on the deck.

Libelant's Brief argues that Finding No. 8 is not justified. This finding states that visual inspections from the bridge did not reveal the Appellant on the decks of the vessel, because of limitations of vision. As shown in Section IV. E. of this brief, this finding is fully supported by the evidence, in that vision was partially obscured by the vessel's masts

and gear, the deckload of planes, the No. 1 masthouse, the anchor windlass itself and spray sweeping over the decks of the vessel.

Appellant's Brief also argues that Finding No. 9, which states that the wave which broke over the bow was unexpected, is error. The record is replete with support of this finding, in that the vessel was proceeding at reduced speed, and no waves had been coming over the bow during this period, as outlined in Section IV. B. of this brief above. The attempt by Appellant to change the time of the accident, in order to show that the vessel was speeded up prior thereto, is wholly negated by the sum total of the evidence as outlined in Section IV. C. of this brief above.

VII.

THE APPLICABLE AUTHORITIES CONFIRM THE CORRECTNESS OF THE JUDGMENT BELOW.

No court has yet held that a vessel owner becomes liable when an unexpected wave washes over the decks of the vessel, as long as the vessel is proceeding prudently and every normal precaution was taken to insure that an injury would not occur while crew members were out on the decks.

In *Gibbons v. United States* (DC Pa-1954), 124 Fed. Supp. 900, the master ordered Chief Mate Gibbons to go aft to see why the vessel was taking water into the steering room. The vessel was in a hurricane at the time. Gibbons and the boatswain proceeded on the main deck to the vessel's stern. At that time, the wind velocity was as high as 70 or 80 miles per hour and heavy seas from 12 to 25 feet high were coming over the stern about every 15 seconds. The boatswain attempted to tighten the leaky hatch cover involved and Gibbons inspected an oil drum attached to the rail. A few seconds later the next sea washed the deck. Both men jumped behind a ventilator. Gibbons was struck by the oil drum as it was hurled in the air, causing his

injuries. He later recovered, but subsequently died of a heart attack totally unrelated to this injury.

The Court held that Libelant had failed to make out a case of liability against the vessel either on the theory of negligence or unseaworthiness. As to negligence, the Court found that Gibbons could have observed the leaky condition by the use of an interior route through the ship's shaft alley. For that reason there was no negligent order for Gibbons to expose himself needlessly. In the instant case, Appellant was actually out on deck in violation of orders, both as to being accompanied by Chief Mate Murray and as to prior notification to the bridge. Also, Appellant could have inspected the anchor windlass from a position aft of it, thereby avoiding peril to which he voluntarily subjected himself by stepping out forward of the windlass with his back to any possible oncoming seas and in a position where he could not be seen from the bridge.

The Court in the *Gibbons* case also found that even if the position of the hatch cover was unseaworthy, it was not the cause of Gibbon's injuries. The Trial Court in the instant case also properly found that the cement in the hawse pipes had to be inspected whether broken or not. Under such circumstances, the cement's actual condition was immaterial as regards the inspection itself.

The cases which do find liability because of injuries resulting from heavy seas washing the decks of vessels involve factual situations wherein the vessel was proceeding at an excessive speed or in which the vessel was pitching and rolling heavily, resulting in heavy seas sweeping the decks prior to an accident. The cases of *United States v. Boykin* (CCA 5-1931), 49 Fed. 2d 762, and *Brett v. J. M. Carras, Inc.* (DC Pa-1952), 1952 AMC 1509, affirmed 203 Fed. 2d 451, are not applicable, since in the instant case the SS LOMA VICTORY was not proceeding at an excessive speed

nor were mountainous seas crashing over the decks of the vessel just prior to the accident.

In the instant case the vessel was proceeding at as slow a speed as possible at all times Appellant was inspecting the decks. In the *Boykin* case, the wind was blowing at 80 to 85 miles per hour and in the *Brett* case the vessel was pitching and rolling heavily, and heavy and mountainous seas coming from all directions were sweeping the forward decks of the vessel.

This Court should not reverse a well-considered judgment in favor of Appellee on the negligence and unseaworthiness issues when the evidence clearly shows that the vessel personnel took all conceivable precautions to protect the vessel crew members but one of them proceeded to a place of danger contrary to orders and without the knowledge of those in authority aboard the vessel.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above reasons, Appellant United States of America hereby abandons its appeal from the maintenance judgment ordered below and urges that this Court affirm the entire judgment.

Dated, San Francisco, California, January 23, 1958.

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No. 15,045

United States Court of Appeals
For the Ninth Circuit

LOUIS L. MAIDEN,

Appellant,

VS.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellant,

VS.

LOUIS L. MAIDEN,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California,
Southern Division.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT,
LOUIS L. MAIDEN.

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LOUIS L. MAIDEN,

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California,
Southern Division.

**BRIEF OF APPELLANT,
LOUIS L. MAIDEN.**

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.

The appellant,¹ a seaman appeals from the judg-

¹There are cross-appeals herein. Libellant below, is aggrieved by the failure to find in his behalf for the claimed negligence of respondent below, and for the breach of the traditional seaworthiness warranty. Respondent's cross-appeal questions the propriety of the maintenance award. Thus there are two "appellants". However, in this brief, libellant below will be referred to as the appellant.

ment below, which grants him maintenance for injuries sustained aboard appellee's vessel, but denies him the damages which he seeks because of appellee's negligence and the breach of its warranty of seaworthiness of the vessel, its appurtenances and its crew (Cl. Tr. 43-44),² upon Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made by the Court below (Cl. Tr. 35-42.)

JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT.

The jurisdiction of the District Court is granted pursuant to the provisions of the Jones Act, 46 USC Section 688, under 46 USC Section 1241(a), Public Law 17, 78th Congress, under the General Maritime Law, Civil and Maritime, and under the provisions of 28 USC, Section 1331.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.

The jurisdiction of this Court is granted by the provisions of Title 28 USCA 1291, which gives to this Court jurisdiction of all appeals from final decrees of District Courts of the United States.

QUESTION PRESENTED.

Whether, under Admiralty Rule 46 $\frac{1}{2}$, the Trial Court's findings are so clearly erroneous as to leave

²Reference is to Clerk's Transcript.

this Court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

STATEMENT.

Appellant, the boatswain on appellee's vessel, the S/S LOMA VICTORY, was injured at sea on January 9, 1953. Since then, he has been, and still is, permanently disabled from sailing again.³ This appeal does not present any substantial conflict of testimony. Indeed the credible evidence below is such as to obviate the need for any resolution of conflicting testimony, * * * for there is no real conflict. Hence, within the ambit of the *McAllister* case,⁴ the cumulative significance of the weight of all the evidence is such as to permit this Court to find that as to the appellant, the judgment below is so clearly erroneous as to leave this Court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. That is so even though, arguendo, there may be some slight evidence to support the judgment.

Based upon the following factors, or upon any combination of them, or indeed upon any one of them, the appellant is entitled to a reversal of the judgment below.

I. Appellant was an experienced and careful seaman.

³He is at this very moment still being treated for his injuries at the United States Public Health Service Hospital, i.e., Marine Hospital, San Francisco. See also Findings of Fact Nos. 14-20 (Cl. Tr. 39-40) and Conclusions of Law Nos. 2, 7 and 8 (Cl. Tr. 41).

⁴*McAllister v. United States*, 348 U.S. 19.

II. The weather was extremely rough from the beginning of the voyage, and for 8 continuous days thereafter.

III. From the very first day of sailing and up to the time when appellant was injured, the cement and concrete at the hawsepipe on the starboard side of the windlass broke frequently.

A. The defective "plugs" or "wedges" and the absence of good "plugs" or "wedges" caused the cement and concrete to break.

B. The failure to "lash" or "trice" the anchor chains, also caused the cement and concrete to break.

C. The absence of catwalks and lifelines at the forecastle head added to the danger which confronted appellant.

IV. Work parties were compelled to inspect the windlass and defective cement and concrete base at the starboard hawsepipe at least twice daily.

A. Only an emergency warranted an inspection on the deck on day of accident.

B. It was necessary to examine the starboard hawsepipe by viewing the front of the windlass.

C. On the day of the accident, appellant was ordered to check the cracked cement and concrete at the starboard hawsepipe of the windlass.

1. The chief mate did not accompany appellant on inspection tour; this was consistent with prior practice on other tours of inspection.

2. The officers' "bridge" was not always notified of work parties on deck; nor was it

the duty of appellant or any other unlicensed seaman to do so.

V. The ship's officers knew that appellant and others were to make an inspection at time of accident.

A. Officers on the bridge failed to observe the work party; if the watch officer had looked, appellant would have been plainly visible at his work.

1. A stand-by lookout on the starboard wing of the bridge would have seen appellant at work; the captain had refused to authorize a lookout there.

B. The bridge officer ordered the vessel to increase speed at 4:21 P.M. on January 9, 1953, while appellant was inspecting the broken cement, thus causing a sudden wave to break over the bow which injured appellant.

1. The deck log entry that the accident happened at "1617", i.e., at 4:17 P.M. on January 9th is wrong.

VI. Second Mate Mehallo was not a credible witness.

VII. Appellant is permanently disabled; he will probably never sail again.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE.

I. APPELLANT WAS AN EXPERIENCED AND CAREFUL SEAMAN.

Appellant has sailed in the deck department since 1922, in all ratings, both licensed and unlicensed. (R.

129, lines 13-24; 164-167).⁵ As boatswain on this vessel he had the complete confidence of the chief mate, his immediate superior (R. 509, lines 7-22), and always “went out of his way to do everything possible” (R. 498, lines 1-20). Murray, the chief mate put it this way:

“Q. Now, Captain, do you know of any reason why Mr. Maiden went out on the deck as he did before meeting you to make that inspection, if you know?

A. I take it that Mr. Maiden was a very fine sailorman and went out of his way to do everything he possibly could for me. He was efficient and naturally—possibly he wanted to take a little of the work off my shoulders at that time. Mr. Maiden, I will say, was first-class sailor, and he undoubtedly, repetition, as I say, he wanted to help me all he could. He knew the conditions on deck and that didn’t warrant a lot of safety.” (R. 498, lines 1 to 17.)

Appellee’s expert conceded that appellant was not negligent in the manner in which he performed the inspection at the time he was injured. He also agreed that if the planes at the No. 2 hatch needed attention because of defective lashings, it was normal for appellant to go forward by using the starboard ladder to reach the foredeck, if he was under orders to attend the broken cement (R. 560, line 4 to R. 561, line 1). He also conceded that complete care and safety of equipment and appurtenances of the vessel itself required appellant to examine the hawsepape from in

⁵Reference is to Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal.

front of the windlass (Ex. 2 and 15)⁶ as well as from its after end (Ex. 3) (R. 559, line 23 to 561, line 9).

II. THE WEATHER WAS EXTREMELY ROUGH FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE VOYAGE AND FOR 8 CONTINUOUS DAYS THEREAFTER.

The deck log (Appellee's Ex. B) shows that extremely heavy weather was encountered after the vessel left San Francisco on January 2, 1953. Log entries beginning with January 1, 1953, and down to January 9, when the accident occurred, contain such entries as for example: "heavy sea" (p. 31)⁷; "very high and rough sea"; "commence taking green seas" (p. 37); "vessel laboring in confused sea" (p. 41); and finally on January 7 to 9 inclusive, the weather was even worse than on the earlier days (pp. 49-53).

The weather was so bad and treacherous, with most of the force wind and pitching of the vessel being on the starboard side (R. 420, line 1 to 421, line 15) * * * the side on which appellant was injured, * * * so as to cause an order to be issued that no one was to go on deck except by permission of the chief mate or the captain (R. 318, lines 1-13). The second mate stated that on January 9, 1953, there were rough seas, gale winds and mountainous swells (R. 392, lines 7-11). Surrell, the ship's carpenter stated that on the day appellant was hurt the captain had told him (Surrell)

⁶Unless otherwise stated, reference to exhibits is to appellant's (libellant's) exhibits.

⁷The deck log (Appellee's Ex. B) is numbered in pencil at the bottom of each page.

not to go onto the forepeak of the ship because the weather was so rough and the vessel was taking seas (R. 71, line 21 to 72, line 13). He had not gone on deck for 3 days prior to and including the day of the accident.

The vessel had to be "hove to" in order to permit the necessary repairs. This was because the weather was so bad the first day out of port, when the cement at the starboard hawsepipe first broke (R. 140, lines 1-25; 141, lines 1-5).

III. FROM THE VERY FIRST DAY OF SAILING AND UP TO THE TIME WHEN APPELLANT WAS INJURED, THE CEMENT AND CONCRETE AT THE HAWSEPIPE ON THE STARBOARD SIDE OF THE WINDLASS BROKE FREQUENTLY.

The first evidence of the break-up of the cement and concrete (Ex. 1) was about one to one and a half hours after the vessel left San Francisco. The repairs were made under the supervision of the chief mate, who, as the cement breakage continued, ordered the carpenter to use the makeshift of stuffing rags around the opening through which the chains extend into the chain locker, to prevent the entry of water therein (R. 40, line 11 to 43, line 21). Although the chief mate acknowledged that the carpenter did a good job under the circumstances (R. 486, line 19 to 487, line 7), he admitted that a good grade of cement would have withstood the weather. He further stated that the four or five available sacks of cement were of inferior quality and did not harden properly (R. 503, lines 3-17).

In normal weather, as the vessel rolls, there is a certain amount of sway of the chains leading into the chain locker through the hawsepipes. To reduce the sway, concrete or cement is poured onto blocks of wood, sometimes called "plugs" (Ex. 12), which encircle the chains. The result is that the chains are held "pretty tight," thus preventing any undue friction of the chains against the cement. Since one of the wooden blocks was defective, the starboard chain rubbed against the cement to such an extent that because of the extremely rough weather the cement cracked and the defective "plug" fell into the chain locker, thereby subjecting the cement to further friction, resulting in a constant break-up of the concrete (R. 43, line 22 to 47, line 15).⁸ Under these circumstances, the failure to take the customary precaution of lashing or tricing the chains together resulted in more friction of chain against concrete, thus creating a constant condition of broken cement, requiring the daily check-up of the starboard windlass (R. 311, lines 21-24).⁹

A. The defective "plugs" or "wedges" and the absence of good "plugs" or "wedges" aboard the vessel caused the cement and concrete to break.

Appellee's witness, Captain Murray, who has been going to sea for 53 years, 30 of which he has sailed as Master (R. 484, line 11 to 485, line 13), virtually made out the appellant's case. Murray was corrob-

⁸This matter is more fully discussed in Section III-A of this brief, *infra*.

⁹This matter is also dealt with in Section III-B of this brief, *infra*.

rated by appellant's expert witness Captain Healy, who himself has been going to sea since 1918 (R. 533-534). Captain Murray admitted that the reason for the trouble at the hawsepipe was because "we didn't have some of the gear we would like to have used" (R. 522, line 20). The following colloquy took place between him and appellee's proctor:

"Q. * * * I ask you this question, Captain, in regard to the cementing of the hawsepipes: In your experience during rough weather at sea is it necessary and proper to inspect the hawsepipes and their cement on occasions whether they are cracked out or cracking out or not? Isn't it usual to inspect the hawsepipes at sea in heavy weather, in any event?

A. This is one of the few times in my life that we had the condition we had at this particular time. The majority of steamship companies have proper * * * This particular ship being an N S A ¹⁰ vessel and many operators have had her, and naturally we didn't have the gear we would like to have used." (R. 522, lines 6-20).

Even though he stated that inspections at the bow would normally be required (R. 523, lines 1-18) he was emphatic that the "wedges" were worn and needed special attention. He also stated "but if we had had proper cement we wouldn't have had any trouble at all" (R. 522, lines 22-25).

Appellee's expert, Captain Healy, explained the necessity of good "plugs" or "wedges" around the

¹⁰National Shipping Authority.

chains at the hawsepipes, to eliminate the likelihood of the cement cracking at sea (R. 537, line 14 to 539, line 14). He corroborated Captain Murray's testimony as to the effect of defective plugs, as follows:

“Q. Well, I don't know if you were here in court, but you must have heard that one of the plugs had fallen through and into the chain locker? You heard that?

A. Well, in an uneven hole, anything gets sideways, it will fall through.

Q. And if the plug falls through—if the plug falls through—

A. (Interposing) The damage is done” (R. 557, lines 12-18).

“Q. That's right. In other words, it was essential, among other things, to have kept the cement in good order, isn't that right?

A. To the best of their ability, yes.” (R. 558, lines 4-7).

Surrell, the ship's carpenter who had sailed as boatswain on other vessels (R. 50, line 7), said that he had only had one set of plugs aboard the vessel. When one of the plugs broke he had no other to use as a replacement. Thereupon, on orders of the chief mate, he constantly had to stuff the resultant opening with burlap, but to no avail; that the cement, having a tendency to break in a heavy sea, had broken on both sides, but more on the starboard side; that when the concrete first broke, the chief mate told him to stuff the opening with rags for they had no extra plug available; that although he had sailed for a long time in many ratings, including that of boatswain, he had

never before used rags for such a purpose (R. 53, line 21 to 58, line 24).

Captain Murray sought to justify the insufficient makeshift of gunnysacks and rags because the plugs had been "washed out." He stated that in such circumstances it would have been good practice to tie the anchor chains together to eliminate the destruction of the cement caused by the constant friction of the chains against the cement (R. 486, line 3 to 489, line 2).¹¹ The worn and defective plug was ascribed by Murray as another reason why the concrete did not harden, thus causing it to break (R. 504, lines 8-16).

B. The failure to "lash" or "trice" the anchor chains, also caused the cement or concrete to break.

Murray admitted that tricing (tying together) the chains would have eliminated their constant sway which would have avoided the wear upon the casement where the cement is applied, thus eliminating the breakdown of the cement (R. 504, lines 17-23; 505, lines 1-5). Tricing the chains is no danger to safety of navigation (R. 505, line 6 to 506, line 24). It could have been done when the concrete broke on the first day after the vessel left San Francisco. It could certainly have been done the day before the accident, for on January 8th several seamen had been in the anchor chain locker (into which the chains hang) to see if it was affected by the entry of the seas which

¹¹The failure to tie the chains together and its consequences are discussed in Section III-B of this brief, *infra*.

had washed into the hawsepipes by reason of the cracked concrete (R. 506, line 25 to 508, line 12).

When the defective plug fell into the chain locker, the chief mate again told the carpenter to apply the cement, thus ignoring the latter's earlier suggestion to "lash" the chains when the cement had broken for the first time about one day after the vessel left San Francisco (8 days before the accident). The carpenter illustrated with Ex. 11 how he had successfully triced the anchor chains on other vessels (R. 47, line 16 to 49, line 8).

The chief mate did not order the appellant to tie the anchor chains although he too had many times triced anchor chains on other vessels to avoid the breaking of concrete at the hawsepipes, without the slightest risk to safety of navigation (R. 142, line 16 to 145, line 6).

Appellee's expert, Captain Healy, conceded that if the chains had been triced their side-to-side movement would have been arrested, thus eliminating the likelihood of the constant break-up of the concrete or cement (R. 556, line 8 to 557, line 2).

C. The absence of catwalks and lifelines at the forecastle head added to the danger which confronted appellant.

The deck log shows that on January 2nd, when the vessel left San Francisco, "all precautions were taken for safety of crew. Catwalks, stairs, life lines, *both fore and aft*, for the safety of crew" (Emphasis supplied) (Res. Ex. B, page 33). When the heavy seas were encountered, the catwalks were washed

away (Res. Ex. B, entry of January 5th, at page 41). Mehallo, the second mate, admitted that the official printed instructions *in front of the deck log*, require official entry as to any rigging and unrigging of life lines and catwalks (R. 464, lines 17-25). But there is no entry after January 2nd, and up to the time libelant was injured that any of these life preserving appurtenances were ever restored, * * * for none of these precautions were in fact ever again undertaken.

Mehallo at first denied that there had been any catwalk on the vessel (R. 422, lines 20-22). However, following a recess at the trial below, he changed his testimony, and referring to appellee's proctor, stated, "Well, he told me there was a catwalk and it was washed away" (R. 443, line 15 to 444, line 2).¹²

The appellant stated that the forward catwalk had washed away and had not been replaced, and that there was no safety line at the forecastle head (R. 133, lines 3-15; 174, lines 3-10). Though there was an insufficient chain rail (R. 173, lines 2-17), he had no right to order a lifeline, for only the chief mate is authorized to do so (R. 174, line 24 to 175, line 5).

¹²In referring to this matter, appellant does not even remotely intend thereby to impugn the motives of appellee's proctor.

IV. WORK PARTIES WERE REQUIRED TO INSPECT THE WIND-LASS AND DEFECTIVE CONCRETE BASE AT THE STARBOARD HAWSEPIPES AT LEAST TWICE DAILY.¹³

The chief mate stated that the twice-daily inspections had been so well known to all, that the Army sergeant who always accompanied the ship's personnel on these inspection tours, knew the exact time and place of the commencement of these inspections. Thus, on the day when appellant was injured, the sergeant, without having been told when the inspection was to start, but being aware that the afternoon inspection commenced at 4:00 P.M., was waiting at the No. 5 hatch at that hour on January 9th (R. 514, line 21 to 515, line 6).

A. Only an emergency warranted an inspection on the deck on the day of the accident.

The chief mate admitted that the broken concrete was of "chief concern" on January 7, 8 and 9, and therefore inspections at the hawsepipes on the day when appellant was hurt was an emergent situation (R. 502, lines 5-17).

"Q. And the need to send a crew of men out forward at the forecandle head in such rough, inclement head (sic) was really one of an emergency situation which was in existence at the forecandle head and because the water was being admitted into the chain locker, isn't that right?

A. That is correct." (R. 502, lines 12-17).

¹³This point is developed more fully in Section V of the brief, *infra*.

Thus, except for the broken concrete, Murray would not have sent anyone out on deck because of the extremely bad weather (R. 532, lines 17-24).

Appellee's expert conceded that it is important to examine for broken concrete at the hawsepipes in order to avoid the admission of water into the chain locker. Otherwise, it could cause much damage to stores, water tanks and other equipment situated there. It would also make the bow "heavy at the head." (R. 548, line 10 to 555, line 4). Therefore it was necessary, in these circumstances, to send men out for inspection or repairs (R. 556, lines 1-7).

The second mate likewise had been concerned about the deck cargo on his morning watch on January 9th, and he had sent his "standby" man to check the cargo. However, unlike the disregard for appellant's safety which resulted in the latter's injury, Mehallo said "But I make sure he (the standby man on Mehallo's watch) is in a safe position to do that before I send him" (R. 392, line 7 to 393, line 16).

B. It was necessary to examine the starboard hawsepipe by viewing the front of the windlass.

Appellee imputes negligence to appellant because he examined the hawsepipes for broken concrete in front of, rather than from the rear of, the windlass. The inspection could have been done from the aft end of the windlass, but with considerable difficulty and less effectively.

Surrell, the carpenter stated that in order to inspect for broken concrete from the aft end of the windlass it would have been necessary to crawl over consider-

able machinery (R. 81, line 4 to 82, line 4; Ex. 3). It was more desirable to examine forward of the windlass because there are fewer mechanical impediments to a fuller view of the hawsepipe casement section, as well as of the chain hooks of the "devil's claws" which are also there (R. 82, line 22 to 84, line 16; Ex. 2).

Appellant explained his reasons for the inspections at the bow portion of the vessel when the accident occurred (R. 134, line 5 to 138, line 17; Ex. 15). Though it was somewhat more of a risk, he felt that as a good seaman, he ought to examine the other appurtenances at the bow, in addition to the inspection of the defects at the hawsepipes (R. 312, line 7 to 313, line 18; 330, line 7 to 331, line 11).

Appellee's expert, at first maintaining that the inspection should have been made by examining the rear end of the hawsepipe, conceded that it was perfectly proper for appellant to have conducted the examination as he did (R. 561, line 2 to 563, line 14). He conceded the point as follows:

"Q. Well, let me ask you very frankly Captain Healy, if you were doing it yourself and you wanted to make perfectly sure that the things that had given so much trouble for days and days were all secured, you would also go around the forward part of it as shown in Libelant's Exhibit 15, wouldn't you?

A. Let me study this picture a minute.

Q. Yes, sir.

A. *In all fairness, I suppose if a person wanted to be perfectly sure, he could walk around*

the fore part and take a look at it." (R. 563, lines 4-14) (Emphasis supplied).

- C.** On the day of the accident, appellant was ordered to check the broken cement and concrete at the starboard hawsepipe of the windlass.

The chief mate stated that he told appellant to make the inspection at 4:00 P.M. on January 9th. Because it was getting dark and the crew's dinner was to be served at 5:00 P.M. the inspection had to be completed before that time (R. 515, lines 13-22).

The second mate stated that sundown was at 1632 (4:32 P.M.) and that the inspection which took at least 20 minutes had to be completed before sundown (R. 462, line 14 to 463, line 13).

An ordinary seaman who was present in the crew's mess room when these instructions were issued, stated that although he did not overhear all of the conversation between the chief mate and the appellant, he heard enough to recall that the chief mate did not ask appellant to meet the former in appellant's quarters before the inspection tour was to begin (R. 25, line 16 to 26, line 11; 34, lines 7-10).

Sarte, the able bodied seaman was on the 4-8 watch. He testified that on January 9th, at about 3:40 P.M. appellant directed him to accompany the latter on the inspection tour. He and appellant met the Army sergeant at 4:00 P.M. at the No. 5 hatch located on the aft end of the vessel, and worked forward to the windlass (R. 91, line 17 to 97, line 11).

Appellant told about the chief mate's orders to him to conduct the inspection on the day he was injured

“before it gets dark.” He was not told to notify the officer on the bridge of the inspection tour, nor was he asked to wait in his room to be joined by the chief mate. The inspection started a few minutes after 4:00 P.M., but immediately before that time he had stopped at the chief mate’s room, but the latter was not there.¹⁴ (R. 145, line 7 to 148, line 15; 322, lines 10-18; 323, lines 14-19).

The second mate corroborated appellant that the practice was for the chief mate to notify the officer on the bridge when an inspection was to be made, in order to slow down the vessel, and that it is not the duty of an unlicensed seaman to do so (R. 454, line 1 to 455, line 4.)

1. The chief mate did not accompany appellant on inspection tour; this was consistent with prior practice on other tours of inspection.

The chief mate admitted that he did not always accompany others on the inspection trips, although he did so about 90% of the time (R. 508, line 20 to 509, line 22). This was consistent with appellant’s testimony in that respect, who also added that when the chief mate was busy¹⁵ he went out without him (R. 138, line 22 to 139, line 19). The chief mate told appellant that he had to relieve the third mate on the bridge before 4 P.M. (which he did). Appellant could have inferred that he was to proceed with the

¹⁴The chief mate at that time was busy on the bridge relieving the third mate who had to attend a sick seaman in the latter’s quarters. See Section V of this brief, *infra*.

¹⁵See footnote No. 14, *supra*.

inspection without waiting for the chief mate (R. 494, lines 12-18).

Manning, one of the ordinary seamen, testified that 3 hours before the accident occurred, he and an A.B. inspected the topping lift chain at the aft end of the vessel, and according to practice, the chief mate was not with them (R. 26, line 16 to 31, line 2).

2. The officer's bridge was not always notified of work parties on deck; it was not the duty of appellant or any other unlicensed seaman to do so.

When Ordinary Seaman Manning and an A.B. did the work described just immediately above, the watch officer on the bridge was not notified (R. 28, lines 4-9).

The appellant testified that from the very first cargo inspection which took place on the first sailing day, and thereafter, the chief mate, and not he, was to notify the bridge of the work party on deck (R. 134, line 20 to 135, line 16). The second mate corroborated appellant (R. 454, line 1 to 455, line 4). The former also testified that he did not know whether Russell the third mate, whom he had relieved shortly before 4:00 P.M. on January 9th had been notified by the chief mate of the inspection party due to go out at 4:00 P.M. that day¹⁶ (R. 453, lines 14-21). However, Mehallo, the second mate, said he knew nothing about the inspection trip (R. 405, line 2 to 406, line 3).

¹⁶Russell was actually so notified by the chief mate. See Section V of this brief, *infra*.

V. THE SHIP'S OFFICERS KNEW THAT APPELLANT AND OTHERS WERE TO MAKE THE INSPECTION AT TIME OF ACCIDENT.

The chief mate relieved Russell, the third mate on the bridge at about 3:45 P.M. on January 9th, to permit the latter to attend an ailing seaman in the latter's forecandle (R. 494, lines 7-22). At that time he told Russell that there would be an inspection at 4:00 P.M. on the day of the accident. An entry to that effect was logged by Russell which he initialled (Resp. Ex. B, p. 61, entry at "1500"), although by mistake it was recorded as 1500 (3:00 P.M.) instead of 1600 (4:00 P.M.) (R. 500, lines 1-8; 501, lines 1-25; Resp. Ex. B, p. 61). This notice was in keeping with prior practice (R. 509, lines 7-22), and the third mate may have forgotten to report it to the second mate who relieved him at 4:00 P.M. (R. 510, lines 11-22). Such notice to the bridge was consistent with similar notifications between at least January 6th and 9th. Because these daily inspections were at fixed times, and the chief mate was aware of them, the appellant did not specifically tell the chief mate about them on dates prior to January 9th (R. 317, lines 3-25). The chief mate corroborated appellant on this point (R. 492, line 6 to 494, line 6).

The second mate, who testified that he was unaware of the inspection, claimed he was not told about it by either the chief mate or the third mate (R. 394, lines 2-22). However, even if that was so, he failed to see the log entry when he reviewed the work of the prior watch with the third mate (Resp. Ex. B, p.

61 in pencil at bottom of page) when he took over the watch from Third Mate Russell.¹⁷

- A. Officers on the bridge failed to observe the work party; if the watch officer had looked, appellant would have been plainly visible at his work.**

Second Mate Mehallo, the officer on the bridge when the accident occurred, had made a routine inspection of the vessel from the *port* wing of the bridge, and saw no one on the deck. He did *not* make an observation from the *starboard* wing—the side of the vessel on which appellant and the others were then working (R. 394, line 23 to 395, line 17). The deck cargo did not obscure his clear view of the forward deck or of the forecastle head (R. 395, line 23 to 396, line 17). Nor did the booms which were “collared” obstruct his view from any portion of the vessel and he had a *perfect view* of the fore-castle head (R. 469, lines 16-19). In agreeing that Exs. 5, 6, 7 and 8 were fair representations of the clear and unobstructed views which he had of the forward portion of the ship, including the fore-castle head on the day of the accident, he said as to the fore-castle area, “It was clean and bare up there” except for the machinery on the fore-castle head (R. 401, lines 5-8; 448, line 22 to 450, line 1). He did

¹⁷Since the log entry erroneously stated the inspection at 1500 (3 P.M.) instead of 1600 (4 P.M.) it may also be that the second mate may have seen it and may then have been under the mistaken belief that the inspection had been completed by the time he took over the watch at 4 P.M.; or he may have seen the entry in his “routine” review (R. 415, lines 6-9) of the prior watch with the third mate and may have been told that it was really a 4 P.M. inspection, which he then promptly must have forgotten.

say that if a seaman, while working at the windlass, is bent over, he could not be seen from the bridge (R. 402, line 13 to 403, line 2).

The chief mate's testimony was in substantial agreement with that of the second mate (R. 511, line 7 to 513, line 8; Exs. 2 and 7). He specifically confirmed the fact that neither the planes on deck, nor the "collared" booms, in any way impeded the view of the forecastle head from the bridge (R. 513, line 15, R. 514, line 16). Testifying with reference to the log entries, he showed that at the time of the accident "visibility was good" (R. 515, line 23 to 516, line 4).

Surrell, the ship's carpenter testified that from his room in the crew's quarters which is on a lower deck from the bridge (Ex. 20), he was in a position to, and did see, the work party just before appellant was hurt (R. 73, line 4 to 75, line 7).

Appellant stated that the windlass machinery, being four and one-half feet high, could be seen from the bridge (See Ex. 2—the two uppermost circular port-holes (windows) shown in background of photograph; see also Ex. 15; see particularly Ex. 5, taken from starboard port-hole of the bridge showing starboard side of forward deck and forecastle head, and Ex. 6, taken from the port port-hole of the bridge showing port side of forward deck and forecastle head) but also conceded that he might have been obscured from the bridge, if he had been bending forward. He denies that he crouched forward as he examined the hawsepipes, although he conceded that he simply

“could have had my head bent down” (R. 332, line 3 to 333, line 23).

Ex. 20 shows the measurements and the dimensions of the block diagram of the engineer’s drawing of the main deck of the vessel, and also the area in which appellant was injured. The measurements were stipulated at R. 581 to 584. (See also the markings on Ex. 20, which reflects some of these measurements). The physical measurements (reviewed hereafter) are such as to establish the clear visibility of appellant anywhere forward of the bridge including the place where the accident occurred.

1. A stand-by lookout at the starboard wing of the bridge would have seen appellant at work; the captain had refused to authorize a lookout there.

The second mate admitted that he should have had a lookout on the bridge, but that the captain had not authorized one. If he had had such a lookout he would have seen the appellant and the work party. The following is the testimony in this regard:

“Q. I am speaking of the standby and lookout which generally is required when you are going along in pretty bad weather up on the bridge along with the man on the wheel. Don’t you know about that?

A. *The Master had no orders to that extent.*

Q. And that is the reason you didn’t have one; is that correct?

A. No.

Q. *So if the Master had given the order, you would have abided by what is good seamanship by having an extra man?*

A. *That is right.*

Q. Now if you had had that extra man, in addition to your having made the observation on the port side, he would then have been able to brace himself and get over on the starboard and take a look, wouldn't he?

A. *That is right he could.*

Q. And you know now, of course, that the accident happened to Mr. Maiden on the starboard side of the forecandle head?

A. That's right." (R. 422, lines 1-19) (Emphasis supplied.)

B. The bridge officer ordered the vessel to increase speed at 4:21 P.M. on January 9, 1953, while appellant was inspecting the broken cement, thus causing a sudden wave to break over the bow which injured appellant.

The accident happened at 4:21 P.M. (1621) on January 9th. At that moment the engine log (Resp. Ex. C—"Date Jan. 9-10-53" shown in pencil as page 20, the entries between 4 to 8 P.M.), shows that the engine's revolutions per minute, i.e. r.p.m.'s were increased from 40 to 55. The r.p.m.'s had been 50 at 4:10 P.M. (1610) and continued at that rate to 4:18 P.M. (1618) when they were reduced to 40 r.p.m.'s. Three minutes later, at 4:21 P.M. (1621) the r.p.m.'s were increased to 55. The next change occurred four minutes after the accident occurred. This change took place at 4:25 P.M. (1625) when the r.p.m.'s were reduced from 55 to 30.

Melquist, the second engineer (he had previously sailed many times as chief engineer—R. 574, lines 9-20), testified that at 4:10 P.M. the r.p.m.'s were at

50 (R. 576, line 1) at 4:18 P.M. the r.p.m.'s were reduced to 40 (R. 576, lines 8-9); at 4:21 P.M. the r.p.m.'s were increased to 55 (R. 576, lines 5-6); at 4:25 P.M. the r.p.m.'s were brought down to 30 (R. 576, lines 10-14). The reduction from 55 to 30 r.p.m.'s at 4:25 P.M. was four minutes after the accident occurred at 4:21 P.M.—at which time the r.p.m.'s were increased from 40 to 55. Melquist's testimony was as follows:

“Q. What, if anything, occurred with respect to the speed of the vessel and the revolutions following the change of speed to 55 r.p.m.'s? What happened after that?”

A. Well, we maintained a speed of 55 r.p.m.'s, we picked it up at 4:21 *and four minutes later we received a call from the bridge to slow it down, that there was an accident, which was done.*” (R. 576, lines 22-25; 577, lines 1-3). (Emphasis supplied).

He again emphasized, “*I was told to slow her down to 30 r.p.m.'s due to an accident on deck*” (R. 576, lines 11-12). Except in an emergency in the engine room, a change in the speed of the vessel is made by the engine department only upon orders from the bridge (R. 577, lines 15-25). The reduced speed at 30 r.p.m.'s continued from 4:25 P.M. to the end of his watch at 8 P.M. (R. 579, lines 1-7).

Sarte, the A.B. who was with appellant at the time of the accident, testified without contradiction, that the speed of the vessel increased a moment before the wave struck appellant. Sarte, of Philippine extraction, has a language difficulty (R. 97, lines 12-25; 98,

lines 1-5). Yet, *he made it perfectly plain that the vessel, proceeding at reduced speed while the inspection took place, suddenly increased speed just before appellant was hurt.* This is how he stated the matter:

“Q. All right. Then did you stop at that mast house locker to do any work?

A. Well, while I was checking the dogs of the mast house locker, Mr. Maiden he checked himself the anchor chain locker. While I was checking the—*while I was checking the dogs of the mast house locker I feel the ship is moving fast, so the big wave hit * * ** So the big wave hit the bow and washed the deck. So I turn around and I see Mr. Maiden hanging on the windlass upside down.” (R. 98, line 20 to 99, line 8). (Emphasis supplied).

He emphasized the increase in the speed just before appellant was struck by stating:

“Q. Was the ship at that moment (i.e. when appellant was struck) faster than it was before you got to that point?

A. *No; while we are securing the ship she is moving slow because spray—to avoid spray so much* (R. 99, lines 12-15). (Emphasis supplied).

Q. *Did it move faster at that moment than it had been going before you got to that place?*

A. *Yes.*” (R. 99, lines 22-24). (Emphasis supplied).

On further examination by appellee, Sarte was more emphatic on the point. This is the exact colloquy in the record:

“Q. *And could you actually tell if the vessel’s speed changed on any given occasion when either you were aboard the ship or down on the deck?*

A. *I just feel the ship speed—moving speed because somewhat like—I feel it move fast.*

The Witness. *You can feel the movement of the boat.”* (R. 110, lines 8-17). (Emphasis supplied).

As a seaman of 12 years’ experience at the time the accident occurred (R. 89, line 21 to 91, line 5) he knew the difference between the sway of a vessel as a result of heavy weather or as the result of the action of a wave, and the way in which a vessel reacts as its speed is increased. His testimony on cross-examination was as follows:

“Q. *Never in your experience has a wave shook the ship?*

A. *Well, this move just up and down; you can feel it steady up and steady down; not that the bow is swinging like that, you know, and the same balance.*

Mr. Darwin. *May the record indicate a swinging motion of the witness’ right hand horizontally?*

The Court. *Let the record so show.”* (R. 111, lines 4-10). (Emphasis supplied).

Thus, despite his language difficulty which to some extent limited Sarte in his ability to more fully express himself, he did, nevertheless, graphically depict the action of the vessel when its speed was increased, and its consequent result in causing appellant’s injuries.

The chief mate stated that when he was on the bridge shortly before the accident the vessel was proceeding at reduced speed because of the heavy weather (R. 496, line 21 to 497, line 19). That is consistent with Sarte's testimony, who said there was only a slight spray when the inspection started at 4 P.M. It is also consistent with his testimony of the increase of the vessel's speed a moment before appellant was injured (R. 100, lines 11-16; 108, lines 17-25).

Appellant's testimony corroborated the facts above reviewed, as to the testimony of the chief mate, the second engineer, and the able-bodied seaman who accompanied appellant to the forecandle head where he was injured. He too said that when the inspection started at 4 P.M. and up to the time of the accident there were only sprays and no "green" seas (R. 149, lines 3-9). When he started the inspection, the vessel was at reduced speed and continued the same way until just before he was injured (R. 327, lines 10-17; 328, lines 2-21).

1. The deck log entry that the accident happened at "1617", i.e., at 4:17 P.M. on January 9th is wrong.

Reversal of the judgment below does *not* depend upon a resolution of any conflicting evidence, for, in essence, there is no conflict in the credible evidence. Nonetheless, it is well to analyze the testimony of one of appellee's witnesses, to demonstrate the worthlessness of his testimony.¹⁸

¹⁸See also Section VI of this brief, *infra*.

Mehallo was on the witness stand for direct and part of the cross-examination on a Friday afternoon. At that time he said, first on direct examination, that the wave, which he maintained was the cause of the accident, came over the bow "About ten minutes after 4:00 o'clock (i.e. 1610), I would say approximately" (R. 401, lines 24-25). On cross-examination that same afternoon, he said the same thing (R. 412, lines 4-5). Yet, during the intervening week end he changed his mind, for when he returned for further cross-examination on Monday morning (R. 457, line 1) and at the inadvertent prompting of appellee's proctor that the log shows the accident at 1617 (R. 461, lines 14-15), he then said that the time of the accident was 1617 (R. 461, line 24). He did so, obviously, to have it fit the engine log entry of January 9th (Resp. Ex. C at page 20), that at 1618 the revolutions were at 40—to imply that speed was reduced *before* the accident. It served his purpose to say so. Notwithstanding all the excitement that must have attended the discovery of the accident, he makes the incredible claim that the speed of the vessel could be reduced in only *one* minute! The fact is, that the accident happened at 1621 when the revolutions were *increased* to 55, as shown by the engine log, and that it took about *four minutes* during the excitement which ensued Mehallo's discovery of the accident, to slow the vessel down to 30 revolutions at 1625. It is at 1625 that Second Engineer Melquist testified *that he received a call to reduce the revolutions down to 30 r.p.m.'s because, as he was told by the bridge, an accident had occurred*

shortly before. (This matter has been discussed in another section of this brief.)

Further obvious inconsistencies in Mehallo's testimony as to the time of the accident are as follows: He testified that he made out the official "Personal Injury Report" on the day of the accident when the incident was fresh in his mind, and that it is correct, because "my mind was fresh at that time, and now it is two and one-half years. I don't recall it too well" (R. 459, lines 5-7). Significantly enough, when the matter was fresh in his mind he did state the correct time of the accident (i.e. he was only off by 1 minute), for on the official Personal Injury Report which is part of the ship's log he stated that the accident occurred at 1620 (see report attached to page 59 of Resp. Ex. B). He testified that he was *careful* when he made out that official report, and that he was not hurried or rushed at that time (R. 459, line 2 to 461, line 9).

It was only after all the officers "got together" and talked over the accident, that *he* made out the *self-serving log entry* which states the accident to have occurred at 1617. The log entry was made by Mehallo after 8:00 P.M., *almost four hours after the accident occurred*, with a sufficient opportunity to "tailor" the facts to suit his apparent need to cover up the fact that he ordered the speed increase at 4:21 P.M. (R. 461, line 25 to 462, line 6; 483, line 14 to 484, line 4).

VI. SECOND MATE MEHALLO WAS NOT A
CREDIBLE WITNESS.

It has already been stated that the official "Report of Personal Injury" is attached to the deck log (Resp. Ex. B at page 59), and as such is the official record of the time, place and circumstances of the accident.¹⁹ Item 6 on this report states:

"6. Injury sustained: (a) Date: 1/9/53 (b) Hour: 1620 (c) To whom first reported: 3rd Mate and 2nd Mate witnessed injury (d) When: 1620." (Emphasis supplied).

By an analysis of the evidence, independent of Mehallo's testimony, it has been demonstrated that the accident happened at 1621 (4:21 P.M.) on January 9th,²⁰ and differs by only one minute from the time of accident contained in the official accident report above referred to. Yet, Mehallo, as already shown, logged the accident at 1617.

Mehallo was an incredible witness for the following additional reasons, among other things:

1. He said appellant signed on the vessel with him in April, 1952 (R. 407, lines 13-22). That is not so, for appellant signed on in December, 1952 (Cl. Tr. 35, "Findings of Fact" No. 3).

2. He admitted that he at one time wrote that he did *not* witness the accident, which he then changed

¹⁹This matter has been discussed for other purposes, under Section V-B-1 of this brief, supra.

²⁰See Sections V-B and V-B-1 of this brief, supra.

by writing that he *did* see the accident (R. 474, lines 4-18).²¹

3. He said the engine was operating at *55 to 60* r.p.m.'s "on the governor" when he took over the watch at 4 P.M. on the day of the accident (R. 417, lines 6-24; 419, lines 3-12). But, the official engine log shows 50 r.p.m.'s between 12:40 P.M. (1240) and 4:18 P.M. (1618) (Resp. Ex. C at p. 20).

4. He said the accident happened 4 days after the vessel left San Francisco (R. 419, lines 21-25). The record, however, shows that it occurred on the 9th day after leaving port (Official "Personal Inquiry Report" at page 59 of Resp. Ex. B).

5. The vessel's officers charged him with failure to make official entries into the log books (R. 518, lines 17-24). In fact, he even refused to sign a statement of his own injuries, because he claimed the captain had included "certain statements there which I did not make", such as "Mr. Mehallo who was on the watch at the time failed to enter this in the bridge log" (R. 475, line 22 to 477, line 9).

6. He admitted that he was in error when he testified on direct examination as to the whereabouts of Sarte, the A.B. and the Army Sergeant at the time of the accident. He admitted the error when he was shown that his version of the accident was squarely in conflict with the testimony of Sarte and with the latter's written statement given on the day of the acci-

²¹He tried to explain it away by claiming that he made a "mistake" (R. 474, line 18).

dent (R. 411, line 4 to 413, line 4; 414, line 14 to 415, line 4; Ex. 18).

VII. APPELLANT IS PERMANENTLY DISABLED; HE WILL PROBABLY NEVER SAIL AGAIN.

Appellant's testimony as to his injuries (R. 151, line 16 to 156, line 25; 162, line 21 to 164, line 12; 335-343), his frequent in-patient hospitalizations at the Marine Hospital (R. 157, line 4 to 158, line 4; see also footnote No. 3) and the Findings of Fact Nos. 14-20, incl.; Conclusions of Law Nos. 2, 7 and 8 of the Court below (Cl. Tr. 38-41) is conclusive of the fact that the appellant will probably never sail again. In fact, the U. S. Coast Guard has revoked his seaman's papers because of his disability following his injuries on January 9, 1953 (R. 162, lines 7-20), and he is thus deprived of earning approximately \$6,000 a year (R. 158, lines 12-15).

ARGUMENT.

In the *McAllister* case, *supra*,²² the Supreme Court has limited judicial review of a judgment in an admiralty case to a consideration of the matters which a reviewing court considers upon a review of a judgment under Rule 52 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court stated (348 U.S. at p. 20):

“A finding is clearly erroneous when ‘although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court

²²Cited in footnote 4.

on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed * * * * *

The instant case is one which requires a reversal, for this Court must inevitably reach the firm conclusion that, based upon a consideration of the entire evidence, a mistake has been committed by the trial court.

A recapitulation of the evidence shows:

(a) Appellant, *an experienced seaman* was not remiss in going upon the forecastle head to check (as had been done previously), and to assist in the repair, if it would have been necessary, the defective concrete at the starboard hawsepipe. Appellee's expert agreed that care required that appellant should have observed not only the hawsepipes, but also the rest of the equipment at the bow at the time of his injury. That the weather was extraordinarily rough from the day the vessel left port to the day (9 days later) when appellant was injured is undisputed. In these circumstances, it was negligent and also a breach of the warranty of seaworthiness²³ to have permitted the conditions to exist at the forecastle head which placed appellant's safety in jeopardy.

²³The libel (Cl. Tr. 4-10), combined the statement of claim for negligence with the unseaworthiness count. A suit under the *Jones Act for negligence* and under the *General Maritime Law for unseaworthiness* will lie, as one statement of claim. The Courts have held that there is but a *single wrongful invasion* of a single primary right and that, in essence, the causes of action are separate or independent, requiring no election of remedies. *Williams v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co.*, 227 Fed. 2d 791 (CA 9, 1955), cert. den. 76 S.Ct. 348; *Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp.*, 193 Fed. 2d 498 (CA 5th, 1952). See, also, *Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips*, 274 U.S. 316.

(b) *The broken concrete:* The frequency of damage to the concrete at the windlass was avoidable, if appellee had used ordinary care. The first break occurred on the first day out of San Francisco. One or two days after the first break, it again required repairs. It was suggested to the chief mate that the chains, as they hung in the chain locker (Ex. 11), be lashed or triced, but he refused to do so. He admitted, and appellee's expert agreed, that if the chains had been triced, they would not have "swayed" as much and consequently would not have rubbed against the cement. Unnecessary friction would thus have been avoided, and another cause of the breakup of the concrete would have been eliminated. The concrete at the starboard side of the windlass broke badly and continued to break. Another reason for the destruction of the concrete was the defective "plug" (Lib. Ex. 12) which ultimately broke and fell into the chain locker. The plug provides the base for the pouring of the cement, to permit it to harden. When the plug fell into the chain locker, an ineffective makeshift of rags and gunnysacks had to be used, for there was no other plug aboard the vessel. The ship's carpenter said that in his long experience as a carpenter and as a bos'n on other vessels, he had never before had to use rags as a support for the concrete. Repairs were again required on January 7th and 8th and on the morning of January 9th.

(c) The cement was of *inferior quality* and that is another reason why it cracked so frequently. Not only were the wedges, i.e., "plugs", defective, but in ad-

dition, the chief mate, who was in complete charge of the operation of the vessel (subject only to the direction of the captain), said that if the vessel had carried the proper cement "we wouldn't have had any trouble at all" (R. 522, lines 22-25).

(d) *The failure to lash or trice the chains:* In view of the defective cement and the broken "plugs", good seamanship required that the chains be lashed or triced. The chief mate admitted it to be a good technique, with no danger to safety of navigation. While appellee's expert was less enthusiastic about this procedure, he did admit it would have lessened the friction of chains against concrete, which would have avoided its breakage. It was therefore negligence for the chief mate to ignore the carpenter's suggestion to lash the chains eight or nine days before the accident occurred.

(e) *The absence of catwalks or lifelines:* At the outset, lifelines and catwalks were erected as required by the official Coast Guard regulations. When the ravages of the weather destroyed them, no effort at restoration was made. The catwalk and safety line at the forecastle head which had been destroyed was never replaced. Had they been reconstructed, the appellant's serious injuries might very well have been avoided—another element of appellee's disregard for appellant's safety.

(f) *The "emergency" requiring the constant inspection of the windlass:* The weather was such from the beginning of the voyage, and particularly during the last 3 days preceding appellant's accident, as to re-

quire the standing order of the captain that no one was to go on deck except upon his or the chief mate's orders. Since the broken concrete (which could have been avoided by having good instead of defective cement available, or by having proper "plugs", or by tricing the chains), was the "chief concern" of the chief mate, inspections were ordered by him twice daily, to meet this "emergency". Except for the trouble at the windlass, the chief mate would not have sent anyone on deck on January 9th. In these circumstances, even the appellee's expert conceded that the emergent necessity brought appellant to the position of danger—which appellee could have prevented from becoming an "emergency."

(g) *Viewing the hawsepipes from in front instead of from the rear of the windlass:* It was proper, indeed unavoidable, that appellant should inspect the condition of the concrete, fore instead of aft of the windlass. In essence, there was no other way to do the job, and appellee's expert admitted that he would have done it the same way "if a person wanted to be perfectly sure" of the conditions at the hawsepipe. In view of this summary, and the analysis of the evidence under Section IV-B, *supra*, the trial court's finding (Finding of Fact No. 11, Cl. Tr. 37-38) that libellant "* * * proceeded to a point forward of the anchor windlass in a fully exposed position, with his back to an oncoming sea * * *" and that such inspection should have been made aft of the windlass, is error. To recognize such error, this Court is not confronted with the need to resolve any conflict

in testimony—for there is no conflict. The agreement of all the witnesses on this point, and the physical facts, require a contrary finding.

(h) *The chief mate's order to appellant to make the inspection at 4 P.M. on January 9th:* The court below found (Finding of Fact No. 11, Cl. Tr. 37-38) that appellant himself “was negligent to a marked degree, which negligence was the proximate and controlling cause of his injuries, in that he proceeded out on deck in violation of orders, failed to notify the bridge of his action * * *”. Here too, the court had no basis for such a finding because *all* of the evidence is to the contrary.

1. Had appellant “proceeded out on deck in violation of orders”? Sections IV-C and IV-C-1 of the brief, *supra*, show, among other things there reviewed that the chief mate ordered appellant to do the work “before it gets dark” and before 5 P.M. when the crew was to have its dinner; that appellant was not asked to wait in his room for the chief mate for the latter said he would have to relieve the third mate on the bridge some time before 4 P.M.; that notwithstanding, appellant did go to the chief mate’s quarters to look for him on his way to the inspection, but the latter was then on the bridge relieving the third mate.

2. Had appellant “failed to notify the bridge of his action * * *”? The second mate established that it was the practice for the chief mate and not the unlicensed crew members to notify the bridge when a work party is due to go on deck. Furthermore,

as shown in Sections IV-C-1 and IV-C-2, *supra*, the chief mate did not always accompany the work parties. In fact, that same afternoon, two other men had done an emergency repair job without him, and the bridge was not notified. In any event, as has already been stated, it was not always the practice to notify the "bridge" of work to be done on deck.

3. Moreover, the court below wholly overlooked the evidence that the officers on the bridge had *actual knowledge* that appellant was out on the deck! In Section V, *supra*, the evidence is fully analyzed, and it shows, among other things, that not only did the chief mate *tell* the third mate of the 4 P.M. work party, but the latter actually entered it in the log and initialed the entry, although he erroneously logged the matter as 1500 (3 P.M.) instead of 1600 (4 P.M.).

(i) *Failure of the "bridge" to see appellant on the forecastle head:* In Section V and in its subsections, the analysis of the evidence fully negates Findings of Fact Nos. 7 and 8 (Cl. Tr. 36-37). A summary of the analysis of the testimony shows, among other things:

1. The ship's officers knew that appellant and others were to make the inspection at the time of the accident. The chief mate had told the third mate about it at 3:45 P.M. The latter entered it in the log. The second mate who then took over the watch must have seen the entry for he reviewed all the entries with the third mate as to the prior watch.

2. The officers on the bridge failed to observe the work party. If the watch officer had looked, the appellant would have been plainly visible at his work.

3. The captain's refusal to authorize a stand-by lookout at the starboard wing of the bridge, in accordance with customary practice in stormy and rough weather, was another reason why appellant was not seen.

4. The photographs in evidence (particularly Exs. 5, 6 and 7) show that the forecastle head is clearly visible. The chief mate said it was clearly visible from the bridge and that neither the planes on deck nor the weather impeded visibility; that anyone on the bridge could see what was going on, at the forward deck and on the foc'sle head; that, notwithstanding the "spray" from the sea, the visibility was good.

5. The second mate admitted that the bow was visible from the bridge portholes, which are shown on Ex. 8; that he had a clear view of the foc'sle head with no obstruction there (only the ship's machinery is on the foc'sle head); he did see appellant as the heavy sea, which injured appellant, hit the bow, for visibility was good; therefore if he had looked *before* appellant was injured, he would have seen him there and he would not have ordered the increase of the vessel's speed at 4:21 P.M.; that in bad weather it is customary to have an additional man on standby on the starboard wing of the bridge, but that the reason there was not one there was that the Master did not authorize an extra man; that if there had been a man there, he would have observed the starboard foc'sle head and appellant could then have been seen at work.

6. The deck diagram (Ex. 20). It was stipulated at the trial as follows:

(a) The length of the forward deck between the break of the midships house (where the bridge is located) to the ladder leading from the deck to the foc'sle head, is 111 feet.

(b) The length of the foc'sle head from the point at which the forward ladder leads to it and the furthestmost forward portion of the bow is 92 feet.

(c) The height of the eye level above the main deck (where the planes were located) as one stands looking out of the portholes on the bridge is 27 feet 6 inches.

(d) The height of the foc'sle head above the main deck is 8 feet 6 inches.

(e) The difference in the height between the bridge and the foc'sle head is 19 feet.

The deck diagram with some of the above referred to lines and dimensions drawn on it, shows that the line of vision (as one stands on the bridge and looks towards the bow), clears the mast house locker on the foc'sle head and the windless, so that appellant, when he was forward of the windless, could have been seen as he was working along the 92 foot length of the foc'sle head. Despite the planes which were lashed to the No. 2 and No. 3 hatches, the appellant, and the two others with him, should have been seen somewhere along the 111 foot length of the deck forward of the bridge, but certainly could have been seen on the foc'sle head. Based on the above measurements, i.e. item (a), 111 feet plus item (b), 92 feet, there is a distance of 203 feet of space on which the work party

was engaged in its work forward of the bridge. Ex. 2 is a photograph taken from in front of the windlass, looking toward the bridge. The bridge and its port-holes are seen. Certainly, as the chief mate admitted, the officers on the bridge should have seen appellant at the position from which the photographer had taken the photograph shown in Ex. 2.

The second mate stated that he inspected only from the port wing of the bridge. He also stated that before the accident he looked all over the vessel and could see clearly. The booms did not obstruct his view and he had a "perfect view" of the fore-castle head. In the light of the foregoing review, his failure to see appellant and others, forward of the bridge, *if he had actually looked*—is incredible.

(j) *The order by the officer on the bridge to increase the speed of the vessel:* The court below in [Finding of Fact No. 9 (Cl. Tr. 37)] found that "the wave which broke over the bow was unexpected * * *" This too, is error. Again no resolution of conflict in testimony is required to demonstrate the error.²⁴ The physical facts, the uncontradicted testimony analyzed, supra, at Section V-B and V-B-1, the presumptions which the uncontradicted evidence support,²⁵ the reasonable inferences which the uncontradicted evidence justify upon a balance of the

²⁴Although Section VI, supra, is a discussion of the incredibility of second mate Mehallo as a witness, a finding that the vessel did increase its speed is justified by the record, notwithstanding such testimony.

²⁵*U.S. v. Agioi Victores*, 227 F. 2d 571 (CA 9, 1956), at page 574.

probabilities,²⁶ and the lack of any substantial evidence to support this finding²⁷ requires a reversal of this and other findings of fact and conclusions of law by which appellant is aggrieved.

The uncontroverted credible testimony of the second engineer, of the A.B. who was at the bow when the accident occurred, of the chief mate's concession that the vessel before the accident was proceeding at "reduced" speed, all of which was corroborated by appellant's testimony that just before he was injured the vessel suddenly increased its speed, the engine log entries, the accident report made out by the second mate on the day of the accident (he was "off" by only one minute when he wrote that the accident occurred at 1620 (4:20 P.M.) instead of at 4:21 P.M. when it actually happened), are further support that the accident occurred at 4:21 P.M., when the engine log shows that the engine's revolutions were increased from 40 to 55 r.p.m.'s.

The analysis of the testimony in section V-B-1, supra, is also conclusive on the point that the self-serving log entry prepared by the second mate, does not reflect the exact time when the accident occurred.

Finding of Fact No. 10 (Cl. Tr. 37) is not borne out by the evidence " * * * At 4:18 P.M. approximately one minute after the wave struck libelant, the vessel's engine speed was further reduced to 40 r.p.m.'s."

²⁶*Griffeth v. Utah Power & Light Co.*, 226 F. 2d 661 (CA 9, 1955)—footnote in dissenting opinion at page 679.

²⁷*Peterson v. U.S.*, 224 F. 2d 748 (CA 9, 1955).

As already shown in Section 5-B and 5-B-1, the accident occurred at 4:21 P.M. and not at 4:17.²⁸ The probabilities are that the decrease of the engine r.p.m.'s from 50 to 40 at 4:18 P.M.—3 minutes before the accident, was in order to slow down the vessel while appellant and others were probably seen by someone on the bridge at that time, and that the increase from 40 to 50 r.p.m.'s at 4:21 P.M. causing the wave to break over the bow was due to the neglect or oversight of the bridge, after appellant may have been seen at work.

Finding of Fact No. 10 continues: “* * * at 4:20 P.M. the engine’s speed was increased to 55 r.p.m.” There is *no support anywhere in the record for such a finding*, for this change occurred at 4:21 P.M.²⁹ The balance of the factual findings by the court below in Finding No. 10, is likewise erroneous, because it is based on the erroneous premises of the court below, as shown above.

Findings of Fact Nos. 12 and 13 (Cl. Tr. 38), are likewise in error, since they follow the premises already shown to be wrong in the court’s previous findings. So also with Conclusions of Law Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 (Cl. Tr. 41).

²⁸As shown hereafter, appellee is liable on the one hand for Jones Act (46 USC 688) negligence. On the other hand, it is also liable for the breach of the warranty of seaworthiness of the vessel, its equipment, and personnel, even if, arguendo, the wave struck at 4:17 P.M. and caused appellant’s injuries (see footnote No. 29, *infra*).

²⁹While the difference of one minute would normally be *de minimis*, in this instance it is a crucial error, because one element of the appellee’s liability is the exact time at which the increase of speed took place, causing the wave to break over the bow.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.

The appellee and the officers of its vessel were obliged to use reasonable care for the safety of appellant and to provide him with *safe appurtenances* as well as a *safe* place in which to work. This duty was breached and, by such violation, the appellee was negligent and its vessel, its appurtenances and its personnel were unseaworthy in that:

1. Soon after the vessel left San Francisco on January 2, to the moment on January 9th when appellant was injured, the weather was rough and the conditions of the sea were extremely bad. Consequently, but principally because of inferior cement and the defective plugs, the concrete at the starboard hawsepipe of the windlass repeatedly cracked and broke down. The failure to lash or trice the chains leading into the chain locker was another cause for the constant breakdown of the concrete. When the appellant was, in these circumstances, ordered to the bow of the vessel to attend the windlass, he was unnecessarily placed in a position of hazard.

2. If the officers on the bridge had looked, or if under the circumstances of the extremely stormy weather the usual practice of providing an additional stand-by lookout on the wings of the bridge had been followed, the appellant and others would have been seen at work, the vessel would not have been speeded up, and the accident would have been avoided.

3. The failure of the vessel to provide the adequate lifesaving devices of a lifeline or a catwalk at the place of work (the evidence is clear that these safeguards had been available when the vessel left port,

but had been washed away and destroyed at sea, and were never replaced), is another reason to sustain appellant's claim.

4. The admission by the chief mate that except for the "emergency" which the appellee itself caused in creating the defective condition at the windlass, the work party would not have been sent forward on the day when appellant was injured (in view of an earlier order by the captain that no work be done on deck that day). This is another ground to afford appellant redress.

5. In addition to the foregoing acts of negligence and unseaworthy conditions of the vessel and its officers, the increase in the speed of the vessel at 4:21 P.M. while appellant and others were on the fore-castle head was a disregard for his safety, for he had gone forward to attend the necessary work, upon the lawful command of an officer. The ship's officers knew or had reason to know, that appellant and others were due to perform the work at the windlass, at the time when the accident took place.

6. Appellant was not contributorily negligent in any respect by reason of his failure to notify the bridge. The prior practice for such notice, if any was required, was a duty assumed by the chief mate, who, in any event, did so notify the third mate. The evidence is also clear that the chief mate, himself, apparently did not notify the bridge when he and a work party went out to make repairs at the windlass following the accident, for there is no log entry to that effect. Therefore, there is no implication of negligence in appellants' failure to notify the bridge.

Nor can appellant be charged with negligent exposure to danger by checking the broken concrete fore, instead of aft of the windlass, since the photographs in evidence, the deck diagram (Ex. 20) and the testimony make it abundantly clear that it was proper to make the inspection in front of the windlass. Without conceding the point of any possible contributory negligence, but only for the sake of discussion, the law in Admiralty is that, even if appellant was guilty of contributory negligence, then he would be chargeable only to the extent that his negligence contributed to his injury.³⁰

7. Appellant is entitled to recover even if, for the sake of discussion, it is assumed that the vessel's speed was not increased at the time of the accident, because any one, any number, or all of the matters just stated as acts of negligence and/or unseaworthiness of the vessel, its appurtenances or its crew, warrants a recovery.

(a) Any of the above elements of appellee's fault, either alone or in combination, justifies a finding in appellant's favor, for unseaworthiness of the vessel, its equipment or its personnel.³¹

(b) The record also overwhelmingly establishes appellee's negligence. The Jones Act (46 U.S.C. Sec. 688) has had engrafted upon it, the Federal Employers' Liability Act as a part of

³⁰Appellant's negligence, if any, does not affect his right to recover for the appellee's breach of the traditional warranty of seaworthiness since appellee's liability in that regard is "a species of liability without fault". *The Osceola*, 189 U.S. 158; *Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co.*, 321 U.S. 96.

³¹See footnote No. 30, *supra*.

the maritime law applicable herein (45 U.S.C. Sec. 51, as amended in 1939). Section 1 of the latter Act provides for liability “*in whole or in part* from the negligence of any of the officers, agents or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its * * * appliances, machinery * * * or other equipment” (Emphasis supplied).

Appellant’s injuries were caused by the *whole* series of appellee’s negligent acts above reviewed. Certainly, his present physical state was caused at the very least *in part*, by any, some, or all of those negligent acts.

The question therefore before this Court, simply stated, is whether under Admiralty Rule 46½, and under the *McAllister* case, *supra*, the record is such that the findings of the trial court should be set aside as “clearly erroneous”. Although, *arguendo*, there may be some slight evidence to support the judgment, a review of all of the evidence must logically bring this Court to the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

McAllister case, *supra*;

States Steamship Co. v. Permanente Steamship Co., 231 F. 2d 82 at page 85 (C.A. 9, 1956);

U.S. ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 219 F. 2d 77, at page 82 (C.A. 2, 1955).

The record is replete with credible evidence, including a virtual confession by the chief mate, supported by the credible testimony of all of the

witnesses, all of which was corroborated by the documentary proof, that the presumptions are such as to sustain appellant's position. The learned Court below failed to give appropriate weight to these presumptions.

U.S. v. Agioi Victores, 227 F. 2d 571, at page 574 (C.A. 9, 1955).

While it can not be gainsaid, as this Court has so well stated the matter in *City of Long Beach v. American President Lines*, 223 F. 2d 853 at page 855 that:

“The ghost of trial de novo in this intermediate appellate court has been laid at rest with finality in *McAllister v. U.S.*, 348 U.S. 19 * * *”

it is still necessary for this Court to consider the theories of liability urged by appellant and the conflict, if any, in the evidence. In *Pure Oil v. Union Barge Line*, 227 F. 2d 868 (C.A. 6, 1955), a collision case, tried in Admiralty, the court there considered and fully discussed the theories of liability of both sides, and found no impediment to a reversal of the lower court, at the same time acknowledging the limits established by the *McAllister* case.

This Court will still examine the record for the balance of the probabilities, to find the reasonable inferences which the totality of the credible evidence will justify.

McAllister case, *supra*, at page 22;

Griffeth v. Utah Power & Light Co., 226 F. 2d 661 (footnote on page 679 of the dissenting opinion).

The Supreme Court in *McAllister*, at page 22 said:

“Of course no one can say with certainty that the Chinese were the carriers of the polio virus and that they communicated it to the petitioner. But upon balance of the probabilities it seems a reasonable inference for the District Court to make from the facts proved * * *”.


In the instant case, even if it can not be said to be so with absolute certainty, the *balance of all of the probabilities* is such, as to lead to the reasonable inferences which sustain the appellants' cause.

CONCLUSION.

It is respectfully submitted that the portions of the judgment below, from which appellant has appealed, should be reversed.

Dated, San Francisco, California,
June 4, 1957.

JAY A. DARWIN,
Proctor for Appellant,
Louis L. Maiden.



No. 15057

United States
Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

See Vol. 3036

MOIST COLD REFRIGERATOR CO., INC., a
Corporation,

Appellant,

vs.

LOU JOHNSON CO., INC., a Corporation;
MEIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC., a Cor-
poration; ADMIRAL CORPORATION, a
Corporation, and AMANA REFRIGERA-
TION, INC., a Corporation,

Appellees.

Transcript of Record

In Four Volumes

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Volume I

(Pages 1 to 408)

PAUL P. O'BRIEN, CLERK

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon

No. 15057

United States
Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

MOIST COLD REFRIGERATOR CO., INC., a
Corporation,

Appellant,

vs.

LOU JOHNSON CO., INC., a Corporation;
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[Clerk's Note: When deemed likely to be of an important nature, errors or doubtful matters appearing in the original certified record are printed literally in italic; and, likewise, cancelled matter appearing in the original certified record is printed and cancelled herein accordingly. When possible, an omission from the text is indicated by printing in italic the two words between which the omission seems to occur.]

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In the United States District Court
For the District of Oregon

Civil Action No. 6016

MOIST COLD REFRIGERATOR CO., INC., an
Oregon Corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LOU JOHNSON CO., INC., an Oregon Corpo-
ration, and MEIER & FRANK COMPANY,
INC., an Oregon Corporation,

Defendants.

COMPLAINT

Suit for Infringement of United States Letters
Patent RE. 23,058

Plaintiff, Moist Cold Refrigerator Co., Inc.,
complaining of defendants, alleges:

I.

This is an action for infringement by defendants
of Letters Patent owned by plaintiff and arises
under the Patent Laws of the United States.

II.

Plaintiff, Moist Cold Refrigerator Co., Inc., an
Oregon corporation, is the owner of Reissue Letters
Patent No. 23,058, dated December 14, 1948.

III.

Defendant, Lou Johnson Co., Inc., an Oregon
corporation, since prior to the date of said patent
has infringed and is infringing the same by selling

and using household refrigerators embodying the inventions of said patent, and particularly those refrigerators identified by the following manufacturer's designations, Model FR-9, Model FR-9-A and Model FR-9-S of Amana Refrigeration, Inc.; Model No. 1090 and Model No. 1390 of Admiral Corporation.

IV.

Defendant, Meier & Frank Company, Inc., an Oregon corporation, has subsequent to the date of said patent infringed and is infringing same by selling and using household refrigerators embodying the inventions of said patent, and particularly those refrigerators identified by the following manufacturer's designations, Model FR-9 and Model FR-9-A of Amana Refrigeration, Inc.; Model No. 1090 and Model No. 1390 of Admiral Corporation.

V.

Both defendants Lou Johnson Co., Inc., and Meier & Frank Company, Inc., have been notified of the infringement complained above by notices in writing.

VI.

Letters Patent RE. No. 23,058 was duly reissued to Refrigeration Patents Corporation, a New York corporation, and was duly assigned by mesne assignments to the plaintiff, said assignments being duly recorded in the United States Patent Office, and plaintiff is now the owner of the entire right to sue and recover damages for all past infringements thereof.

VII.

The aforesaid infringement by defendants has been within the District of Oregon, and plaintiff has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to whether Amana Refrigeration, Inc., and Admiral Corporation, or either of them, has manufactured, used or sold within said District such household refrigerators nor whether either of said manufacturer-suppliers has an established place of business within said District. Plaintiff invites either or both of said manufacturer-suppliers to join as party or parties defendant in this action, and to submit for adjudication herein any and all models of household refrigerators which they desire.

Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment against the named defendants and against any additional party or parties defendant in an amount equal to ten per cent (10%) of the manufacturer's sale price for each and every infringing household refrigerator manufactured, used or sold by them with interest thereon, and that the damages when ascertained be trebled by reason of the willful character of said infringement together with an assessment of costs in favor of plaintiff including a reasonable attorney fee.

Plaintiff demands trial by jury of the issues in this action.

MOIST COLD

REFRIGERATOR CO., INC.,

By BUCKHORN AND
CHEATHAM,

/s/ O. E. CHEATHAM,

Of Counsel for Plaintiff.

[Endorsed]: Filed April 23, 1951.

[Title of District Court and Cause.]

INTERVENER'S ANSWER

Admiral Corporation, a Delaware Corporation, having its principal place of business at Chicago, Illinois, as intervener herein, for its answer to the complaint:

1. Admits the allegations of paragraph 1 that this action arises under the Patent Laws of the United States but has no information as to plaintiff's title to said patent in suit and, therefore, leaves plaintiff to its proof.

2. Has no knowledge of the allegation of paragraph 2, and therefore leaves plaintiff to its proof.

3. Denies the allegations of paragraph 3 with respect to defendant's infringement of said patent by the sale and use of household refrigerators, Model No. 1090 and Model No. 1390, manufactured by Ad-

miral Corporation. Intervener has no knowledge of the remaining allegations of paragraph 3.

4. Denies the allegations of paragraph 4 with respect to defendant's infringement of said patent by the sale and use of household refrigerators, Model No. 1090 and Model No. 1390, manufactured by Admiral Corporation. Intervener has no knowledge of the remaining allegations of paragraph 4.

5. Admits the allegations of Paragraph 5.

6. Admits that reissue patent Re. 23,058 was issued, as alleged in Paragraph 6, but denies that it was duly and lawfully issued. Intervener has no information as to plaintiff's title to said patent, and, therefore, leaves plaintiff to its proof.

7. Denies the allegation of Paragraph 7 with respect to infringement but admits that it has no established place of business within the district of Oregon, and alleges it has a regular, established place of business in Chicago, Illinois.

8. Answering further, intervener avers that no household refrigerator, including Model No. 1090 and/or Model No. 1390, manufactured, used or sold by it infringes any claim of said Letters Patent Re. 23,058; and that the claims of said Letters Patent are so limited in terms and in light of the prior art and by virtue of limitations and interpretations necessarily placed upon them during the prosecution of the applications therefor in the Patent Office as to

render them ineffective in scope to cover any refrigerator manufactured, used or sold by intervener, and plaintiff is estopped by the proceedings of the Patent Office in connection with the prosecution of the applications for said Letters Patent to assert that any household refrigerator manufactured, used, or sold by intervener constitutes an infringement of any of the claims thereof.

9. Intervener, upon information and belief, avers that said Letters Patent Re. 23,058 and the claims thereof are invalid and of no force and effect in law on the following grounds:

(a) The alleged invention, set forth and claimed therein, and all substantial and material parts thereof, were described in patents, granted, filed or published, prior to the alleged invention thereof by Bronaugh and Potter, or more than two years prior to the filing date of the application for the original Letters Patent on which the said Reissue is based, said patents including the following, among others:

United States Letters Patent

Number and Patentee:	Date
697,029—Wm. F. Singer	April 8, 1902
1,324,868—Fred W. Wolf	December 16, 1919
1,371,235—George A. Gase	March 15, 1921
1,422,886—P. R. Owens	July 18, 1922
1,439,051—August P. Anderson. .	December 19, 1922

1,515,165—Earl P. Oswald	November 11, 1924
1,541,797—French E. Dennison	June 16, 1925
1,601,445—G. Hilger	September 28, 1926
Re. 17,078—Ransom W. Davenport . . .	Sept. 11, 1928
1,706,891—A. J. Kusel, et al.	March 26, 1929
1,726,344—Ransom W. Davenport . .	August 27, 1929
1,731,711—Ransom W. Davenport . . .	Oct. 15, 1929
1,749,484—Chas. G. Juneau & Walter C. Marshall	March 4, 1930
1,769,118—Ransom W. Davenport . . .	July 1, 1930
1,776,235—L. U. Larkin	September 16, 1930
1,798,951—Carl Georg Munters	March 31, 1931
1,985,252—C. F. Henney	December 25, 1934

(b) The subject matter described and claimed in said Letters Patent Re. 23,058, was, in all essential features old and well known prior to the alleged invention thereof by said Bronaugh and Potter, and did not involve any patentable invention whatsoever, but only mere mechanical skill in the selection and adaptation of elements, materials and devices well known in the art.

(c) Said Letters Patent is not in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as required by the statutes of the United States to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which they appertain or with which they are most nearly connected to make, employ or use the same.

(d) The claims of said Letters Patent are vague, indefinite and ambiguous and do not point out and distinctly claim the parts or alleged improvements

claimed as the patentees' alleged invention as required by law.

(e) Said Letters Patent, and particularly the claims thereof are not properly based on or supported by the disclosures of the application as originally filed in the Patent Office on February 16, 1931, which application resulted in Patent No. 2,056,165, dated October 6, 1936.

(f) The claims of said Letters Patent Re. 23,058 are functional and seek to cover a mere result or effect, and said claims are invalid for the same reason that the original claims were held invalid in the case of Refrigeration Patents Corp. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 159 F. (2d) 972 (C.C.A. 7) (cert. den. 331 U. S. 834, rehearing denied 332 U. S. 803), and do not cure or overcome the defects on which the original claims were held invalid by the Court of Appeals.

(g) The things disclosed and claimed in said Letters Patent Re. 23,058 constitute mere aggregation of old, well-known elements and mechanisms, and devices having no mutual or necessary co-operation, interaction or interrelation.

(h) Said Letters Patent Re. 23,058 are invalid and void for the reason that the alleged errors in the original Letters Patent No. 2,056,165 did not arise through inadvertence, accident or mistake and without any fraudulent or deceptive intention. The reissue patent and the proceedings thereon in the Patent Office clearly establish that there was no proper showing by the patentees such as to author-

ize a reissue under the statute, even if said patentees were otherwise entitled to reissue, which they were not. This is not a case authorized by the Reissue statute, in view of the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the aforesaid Stewart-Warner case and the facts disclosed by the file histories of said reissue patent and original patent.

(i) The patentees of Patent Re. 23,058 did not, with due diligence, seek a reissue, and said patent and the claims thereof are, therefore, invalid.

(j) No disclosure or description was made, by the patentees in the application for original patent 2,056,165, of the character of the original claims held invalid, or of the reissue claims, until more than two years after plaintiff's predecessor had manufactured and publicly sold in the United States, refrigerators embodying the alleged invention purported to be covered by claims of the character of those held invalid and those of the reissue, which devices were therefore in the public domain and not subject to patent appropriation by said applicants, and the claims of said reissue patent are, therefore, invalid.

(k) The claims in reissue patent 23,058 in suit are invalid because they are based upon a disclosure or claims first presented more than two years after refrigerators embodying said alleged invention were built and sold publicly in the United States, as was held in connection with claim 11 of original Patent 2,056,165 in *General Electric Co. v. Refrigeration Patents Corp.*, 71 U.S.P.Q. 236.

(1) Plaintiff's predecessor misrepresented to the Examiner of the Patent Office, in connection with the application for reissue of the patent in suit, the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Stewart-Warner case and the law applicable as to invalidity of claims for a result or an effect, which has uniformly obtained in the Supreme and other Courts ever since 1853, and on such and other misrepresentations induced the Examiner to improperly and wrongfully allow said reissue, and also failed to disclose to the Examiner the adverse holding of the Court in the said General Electric case with respect to Claim 11 of the original patent, the subject matter on which it attempted to obtain the reissue patent, having been first disclosed in the original application more than two years after plaintiff's predecessor had publicly manufactured and sold refrigerators in the United States embodying the alleged invention attempted to be secured by said reissue. Prior to filing this suit and since, the plaintiff and/or its alleged predecessors, through their agents and representatives and those in active concert or participation with them, have extensively carried on, throughout the United States, propaganda or a program attempting to try the reissue patent in suit, through the mail and press, and particularly to sell the public that the patent in suit and the claims thereof are valid, all in advance of the trial of this case. As a part of its avowed plan to assert the patent in suit, it entered into an arrangement or agreement in the State of

New York, transcending the rules of champerty and maintenance and in violation of the Statute and laws of the State of New York for the purpose of asserting claims for damages under the patent in suit against the industry, including this defendant. Therefore, plaintiff is guilty of such practice and unclean hands in connection with the subject matter of this suit, as to disentitle it to any relief under said reissue patent against this defendant.

(m) Intervener avers that in the interval between the date of issue of original Letters Patent No. 2,056,165 and the date of application for reissue thereof, and while the filing of said application was being unreasonably delayed following the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit holding said original patent invalid and void in the aforesaid Stewart-Warner case, this intervener and the public acquired intervening adverse rights against each and all of the asserted claims of invention made by the claims of said Letters Patent Re. 23,058; wherefore, intervener and the public are free to make, use and sell the alleged infringing devices.

(n) Intervener avers on information and belief that plaintiff, Moist Cold Refrigerator Co., Inc., is successor in interest to Refrigeration Patents Corporation, plaintiff in the case of Refrigeration Patents Corp. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 159 F. (2d) 972 and, as successor in interest, is estopped to assert said reissue patent Re. 23,058 against intervener, inasmuch as intervener is the successor to the entire refrigerator business of said Stewart-

Warner Corporation, the defendant in said litigation.

Wherefore, Intervener Prays:

(a) That the complaint be dismissed.

(b) That this Court decree that United States Letters Patent Re. 23,058 is invalid and void.

(c) That this Court decree that United States Letters Patent Re. 23,058 have not been infringed by intervener.

(d) That this Court grant preliminary and final injunction enjoining and restraining plaintiff, and the officers, agents, employees, associates or representatives of Moist Cold Refrigerator Co., Inc., or anyone in its behalf, from further asserting, contending, claiming or alleging that said Letters Patent Re. 23,058, or any claim or claims thereof, have been or are now being infringed by intervener.

(e) That intervener have judgment for its costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee, and for such other and further relief as this Court may deem proper.

ADMIRAL CORPORATION,

By /s/ W. E. RAMSEY,

Its Attorney.

Of Counsel:

/s/ FRANK H. URIELL,

/s/ CHAS. L. BYRON,

/s/ GORDON F. HOOK.

[Endorsed]: Filed October 29, 1951.

[Title of District Court and Cause.]

INTERVENOR'S ANSWER

Amana Refrigeration, Inc., an Iowa Corporation, having its principal place of business at Amana, Iowa, as intervenor herein, for its answer to the complaint:

1. Admits the allegations of paragraph 1 that this action arises under the Patent Laws of the United States, but has no information as to plaintiff's title to said patent in suit and, therefore, leaves plaintiff to its proof.

2. Has no knowledge of the allegation of paragraph 2, and therefore leaves plaintiff to its proof.

3. Denies the allegation of paragraph 3 with respect to defendant's infringement of said patent by the sale and use of household refrigerators, Model No. FR-9, Model FR-9-A, and Model FR-9-S, manufactured by Amana Refrigeration, Inc. Intervenor has no knowledge of the remaining allegations of paragraph 3.

4. Denies the allegations of paragraph 4 with respect to defendant's infringement of said patent by the sale and use of household refrigerators, Model No. FR-9, Model FR-9-A, and Model FR-9-S, manufactured by Amana Refrigeration, Inc. Intervenor has no knowledge of the remaining allegations of paragraph 4.

5. Admits the allegations of Paragraph 5.

6. Admits that reissue patent Re. 23,058 was issued, as alleged in Paragraph 6, but denies that it was duly and lawfully issued. Intervener has no information as to plaintiff's title to said patent, and, therefore, leaves plaintiff to its proof.

7. Denies the allegation of paragraph 7 with respect to infringement, but admits that it has no established place of business within the district of Oregon.

8. Answering further, intervener avers that no household refrigerators including Model No. FR-9, Model FR-9-A, and/or Model FR-9-S manufactured, used or sold by it infringes any claim of said Letters Patent Re. 23,058; and that the claims of said Letters Patent are so limited in terms and in light of the prior art and by virtue of limitations and interpretations necessarily placed upon them during the prosecution of the application therefor in the Patent Office as to render them ineffective in scope to cover any refrigerator manufactured, used or sold by intervener, and plaintiff is estopped by the proceedings of the Patent Office in connection with the prosecution of the applications for said Letters Patent to assert that any household refrigerator manufactured, used, or sold by intervener constitutes an infringement of any of the claims thereof.

9. Intervener, upon information and belief, avers that said Letters Patent Re. 23,058 and the claims thereof are invalid on the following grounds:

(a) The alleged invention, set forth and claimed therein, and all substantial and material parts thereof, were described in patents, granted, filed or published, prior to the alleged invention thereof by Bronaugh and Potter, or more than two years prior to the filing date of the application for the original Letters Patent on which said Reissue is based, said patents including the following, among others:

United States Letters Patent

Number and Patentee:	Date
697,029—Wm. F. Singer	April 8, 1902
1,324,868—Fred W. Wolf	December 16, 1919
1,371,235—George A. Gase	March 15, 1921
1,422,886—P. R. Owens	July 18, 1922
1,439,051—August P. Anderson	December 19, 1922
1,515,165—Earl P. Oswald	November 11, 1924
1,541,797—French E. Dennison	June 16, 1925
1,601,445—G. Hilger	September 28, 1926
Re. 17,078—Ransom W. Davenport	Sept. 11, 1928
1,706,891—A. J. Kusel, et al.	March 26, 1929
1,726,344—Ransom W. Davenport	August 27, 1929
1,731,711—Ransom W. Davenport	Oct. 15, 1929
1,749,484—Chas. G. Juneau & Walter C. Marshall	March 4, 1930
1,769,118—Ransom W. Davenport	July 1, 1930
1,776,235—L. U. Larkin	September 16, 1930
1,798,951—Carl Georg Munters	March 31, 1931
1,985,252—C. F. Henney	December 25, 1934

(b) The subject matter described and claimed in said Letters Patent Re. 23,058, was, in all essential features old and well known prior to the al-

leged invention thereof by said Bronaugh and Potter, and did not involve any patentable invention whatsoever, but only mere mechanical skill in the selection and adaptation of elements, materials and devices well known in the art.

(c) Said Letters Patent is not in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as required by the statutes of the United States to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which they appertain or with which they are most nearly connected to make, employ or use the same.

(d) The claims of said Letters Patent are vague, indefinite and ambiguous and do not point out and distinctly claim the parts or alleged improvements claimed as the patentee's alleged invention as required by law.

(e) Said Letters Patent, and particularly the claims thereof are not properly based on or supported by the disclosures of the application as originally filed in the Patent Office on February 16, 1931, which application resulted in Patent No. 2,056,165, dated October 6, 1936.

(f) The claims of said Letters Patent Re. 23,058 are functional and seek to cover a mere result or effect, and are, therefore, invalid. Said claims are invalid for the same reasons that the original claims were held invalid in the case of *Refrigeration Patents Corp. v. Stewart-Warner Corp.*, 159 F. (2) 972 (C.C.A. 7), (cert. den. 331 U.S. 834, rehearing denied 332 U. S. 803), and do not cure or overcome

the defects on which the original claims were held invalid by the Court of Appeals.

(g) The things disclosed and claimed in said Letters Patent Re. 23,058 constitute mere aggregation of old, well-known elements and mechanisms, and devices having no mutual or necessary cooperation, interaction or interrelation.

(h) Said Letters Patent Re. 23,058 are invalid and void for the reason that the alleged errors in the original Letters Patent No. 2,056,165 did not arise through inadvertence, accident or mistake and without any fraudulent or deceptive intention. The reissue patent and the proceedings thereon in the Patent Office clearly establish that there was no proper showing by the patentees such as to authorize a reissue under the statute, even if said patentees were otherwise entitled to reissue, which they were not. This is not a case authorized by the Re-issue State, in view of the opinion of the Court of Appeals in the aforesaid Stewart-Warner case and the facts disclosed by the file histories of said reissue patent and original patent.

(i) The patentees of Patent Re. 23,058 did not, with due diligence, seek a reissue, and said patent and the claims thereof are, therefore, invalid.

(j) No disclosure or description was made, by the patentees, in the application for original patent 2,056,165, of the character of the original claims held invalid, or of the reissue claims, until more than two years after plaintiff's predecessor had

manufactured and publicly sold in the United States, refrigerators embodying the alleged invention purported to be covered by claims of the character of those held invalid and those of the reissue, which devices were therefore in the public domain and not subject to patent appropriation by said applicants, and the claims of said reissue patent are, therefore, invalid.

(k) The claims in reissue patent 23,058 in suit are invalid because they are based upon a disclosure or claims first presented more than two years after refrigerators embodying said alleged invention were built and sold publicly in the United States, as was held in connection with claim 11 of original Patent 2,056,165 in *General Electric Co. v. Refrigeration Patents Corp.*, 71 U.S.P.Q. 236.

(1) Plaintiff's predecessor misrepresented to the Examiner of the Patent Office, in connection with the application for reissue of the patent in suit, the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Stewart-Warner case and the law applicable as to invalidity of claims for a result or an effect, which has uniformly obtained in the Supreme and other Courts ever since 1853, and on such and other misrepresentations induced the Examiner to improperly and wrongfully allow said reissue, and also failed to disclose to the Examiner the adverse holding of the Court in the said *General Electric* case with respect to Claim 11 of the original patent, the subject matter on which it attempted to obtain the reissue pat-

ent having been first disclosed in the original application more than two years after plaintiff's predecessors had publicly manufactured and sold refrigerators in the United States embodying the alleged invention attempted to be secured by said reissue. Prior to filing this suit and since, the plaintiff and/or its alleged predecessors, through their agents and representatives and those in active concert or participation with them, have extensively carried on, throughout the United States, propaganda or a program attempting to try the reissue patent in suit, through the mail and press, and particularly to sell the public that the patent in suit and the claims thereof are valid, all in advance of the trial of this case. As a part of its avowed plan to assert the patent in suit, it entered into an arrangement or agreement in the State of New York, transcending the rules of champerty and maintenance and in violation of the statute and laws of the State of New York for the purpose of asserting claims for damages under the patent in suit against the industry, including this defendant. Therefore, plaintiff is guilty of such practice and unclean hands in connection with the subject-matter of this suit, as to disentitle it to any relief under said reissue patent against this defendant.

(m) Intervener avers, that in the interval between the date of issue of original Letters Patent No. 2,056,165 and the date of application for reissue thereof, and while the filing of said application was being unreasonably delayed following the

decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit holding said original patent invalid and void in the aforesaid Stewart-Warner case, this intervener and the public acquired intervening adverse rights against each and all of the claims of said Letters Patent Re. 23,058; wherefore, intervener and the public are free to make, use and sell the alleged infringing devices.

Wherefore, Intervener Prays:

- (a) That the complaint be dismissed.
- (b) That this Court decree that United States Letters Patent Re. 23,058 is invalid and void.
- (c) That this Court decree that United States Letters Patent Re. 23,058 have not been infringed by intervener.
- (d) That this Court grant preliminary and final injunctions enjoining and restraining plaintiff, and the officers, agents, employees, associates or representatives of Moist Cold Refrigerator Co., Inc., or anyone in its behalf, from further asserting, contending, claiming or alleging that said Letters Patent Re. 23,058, or any claim or claims thereof, have been or are now being infringed by intervener.
- (e) That intervener have judgment for its costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee, and for such other and further relief as this Court may deem proper.

AMANA REFRIGERATION,
INC.,

By /s/ CLARENCE J. LOFTUS,
Its Attorney.

Of Counsel:

/s/ W. E. RAMSEY,
CLARENCE J. LOFTUS,
WILLIAM E. LUCAS,
BEAHL T. PERRINE.

[Endorsed]: Filed October 29, 1951.

[Title of District Court and Cause.]

ORDER

On the motion of the three defendants, Lou Johnson Co., Inc., Meier & Frank Company, Inc., and Admiral Corporation, to amend their answers herein by striking paragraph 9(n) therefrom, it is

Ordered that the answers of defendants, Lou Johnson Co., Inc., Meier & Frank Company, Inc., and Admiral Corporation, be and the same are hereby amended by striking paragraph 9(n) therefrom.

Dated April 18th, 1955.

/s/ GUS J. SOLOMON,
United States District Judge.

[Endorsed]: Filed April 18, 1955.

[Title of District Court and Cause.]

ORDER TO AMEND COMPLAINT

Pursuant to the verbal order of this Court on October 17, 1955, during a pretrial conference attended by Orme E. Cheatham, of counsel for plaintiff, and W. Elmer Ramsey and J. Pierre Kolisch, of counsel for defendants, upon motion of plaintiff, it is hereby

Ordered that the original complaint in this proceeding be amended as follows:

In the third line of the next to the last paragraph, strike out the words "Ten Dollars (\$10.00)" and substitute therefor—Ten Per Cent (10%) of the manufacturer's sales price.

October 24th, 1955.

/s/ GUS J. SOLOMON,

Judge, U. S. District Court.

[Endorsed]: Filed October 24, 1955.

[Title of District Court and Cause.]

ORDER

On the motion of each defendant herein, namely, Lou Johnson Co., Inc., Meier & Frank Company, Inc., Admiral Corporation and Amana Refrigeration

tion, Inc., for leave of Court to amend their answers herein by adding to the list of United States patents noted therein the following:

United States Patent Reissue No. 21,040, originally issued to J. Loyal Gibson under date of March 16, 1937, original Patent No. 2,073,741, filed September 30, 1930, and reissued April 4, 1939.

United States Patent No. 1,909,875, issued to Ivar Lundgaard May 16, 1933.

Plaintiff was notified of said patents by the service of said motion on the 29th day of September, 1955.

It is Ordered that the answers of said defendants, Lou Johnson Co., Inc., Meier & Frank Company, Inc., Admiral Corporation and Amana Refrigeration, Inc., be and the same are hereby amended by adding thereto the foregoing United States patents.

October 24th, 1955.

/s/ GUS J. SOLOMON,
Judge, United States
District Court.

[Endorsed]: Filed October 24, 1955.

In the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon

Civil Action No. 6016

MOIST COLD REFRIGERATOR CO., INC., an
Oregon Corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LOU JOHNSON CO., INC., an Oregon Corpora-
tion, and MEIER & FRANK COMPANY,
INC., an Oregon Corporation,

Defendants,

and

ADMIRAL CORPORATION, a Delaware Corpo-
ration, and AMANA REFRIGERATION,
INC., an Iowa Corporation,

Defendants-Intervenors.

SUPPLEMENTAL AND AMENDED COM-
PLAINT FILED PURSUANT TO LEAVE
GRANTED AT PRE-TRIAL CONFER-
ENCE BY THE COURT

(Suit for Infringement of United States
Letters Patent Re. 23,058)

Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges
all of the allegations of the complaint in para-
graphs I, II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII thereof and
adds the following thereto based upon information

presently at hand and proceedings heretofore had herein.

VIII.

Each of the above-identified Defendants-Intervenors has, since the date of said reissue patent and prior to its expiration, infringed the same by making, using and selling household refrigerators embodying the inventions of said patent and particularly those identified by the following designations: Amana Models FR-9; FR-9-A and FR-9-S; and Admiral Models No. 958, No. 759, No. 959, No. 1090, No. 1390, No. 1191, No. 1192, No. 1192-W, No. 1292-W, No. 11 C 15, No. 12 C 15, No. 12 C 15A and No. 1292, which infringements were committed after notice thereof was duly given by Plaintiff to each of said Defendants-Intervenors.

IX.

Each of said Defendants-Intervenors have become and now are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.

Wherefore, plaintiff demands judgment against each of the above-identified Defendants and Defendants-Intervenors in an amount equal to 10% of the gross amounts received by it for each and every infringing household refrigerator manufactured, used or sold, and with interest thereon, and that the damages when assessed by the jury be trebled by the Court by reason of the wilful character of said infringement, particularly by Admiral Corporation.

and that the costs and disbursements herein including reasonable attorneys fees be awarded plaintiff.

MOIST COLD

REFRIGERATOR CO., INC.,

By /s/ ORME E. CHEATHAM,

Its Attorneys.

Receipt of copy acknowledged.

[Endorsed]: Filed November 15, 1955.

[Title of District Court and Cause.]

AMENDED ANSWER

Defendants and defendants-interveners herein answer plaintiff's supplemental and amended complaint as follows:

1. Deny the allegations of paragraph VIII except that they have made, used and sold the designated models of refrigerators.

2. Admit the allegations of paragraph IX.

Pursuant to leave granted by the Court at a pre-trial conference, defendants and defendants-interveners incorporate by reference herein all of the allegations of their answers in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9(a)-(m), inclusive, and 9(o) and (p) of the answers of Lou Johnson and Meier & Frank Company heretofore filed herein and add the following:

10. Letters Patent Re. 23,058 and the claims thereof are invalid and of no force and effect in law because:

(a) The claims of said patent define an inoperative device.

(b) The claims of said reissue patent enlarge the scope of the claims of the original patent and were not applied for within two years from the grant of the original patent. (To be added only to the answers of Admiral and Amana.)

Wherefore, defendants and defendants-interven-ers pray that:

1. The complaint and supplemental and amended complaint be dismissed.

2. U. S. Letters Patent Re. 23,058 be adjudged invalid and void.

3. This Court grant a final injunction enjoining plaintiff, its officers, agents, employees, associates or representatives, or anyone in its behalf, from further asserting or contending, claiming or alleging that Letters Patent Re. 23,058 or any claim or claims thereof have been or are now infringed by defendants and defendants-interven-ers.

4. Defendants and defendants-interven-ers have judgment for their costs, reasonable attorneys' fees, and for such other relief as the Court may deem proper.

LOU JOHNSON CO., INC.,
MEIER & FRANK COMPANY,
INC.,

ADMIRAL CORPORATION,
and,
AMANA REFRIGERATION,
INC.,

By /s/ W. E. RAMSEY,
Their Attorney.

Of Counsel:

/s/ CHAS. L. BYRON,

/s/ WILLIAM E. LUCAS.

[Endorsed]: Filed November 14, 1955.

[Title of District Court and Cause.]

FINAL PRETRIAL ORDER

This matter came on for pretrial conference on the 17th day of October, 1955, before the undersigned judge of the above-entitled court, following the issuance of the mandate on March 7, 1955, of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to this Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of said Court of Appeals decided November 24, 1954, on the issues of fact, or mixed law and fact, remaining for trial herein on the record and proceedings heretofore had, including the complaint and answers respectively of the parties hereto. Plaintiff appeared by its attorney, Orme E. Cheatham, and the Defendants appeared by their attorneys, W. Elmer Ramsey and J. Pierre Kolisch.

It is hereby agreed by counsel for the Plaintiff and the Defendants that the following facts are correct:

Agreed Statement of Facts

1. Plaintiff, Moist Cold Refrigerator Co., Inc., is an Oregon corporation whose agent for service is B. C. Buck, 714 N. W. Glisan Street, Portland, Oregon.

2. Defendant, Lou Johnson Co., Inc., is an Oregon corporation having a regular and established place of business at 1506 N. W. Irving Street, Portland, Oregon.

3. Defendant, Meier & Frank Company, Inc., is an Oregon corporation having a regular and established place of business at 621 S. W. 5th Avenue, Portland, Oregon.

4. Defendant, Admiral Corporation, is a Delaware corporation having a regular and established place of business at 3800 Cortland Street, Chicago, Illinois.

5. Defendant, Amana Refrigeration, Inc., is an Iowa corporation having a regular and established place of business at Amana, Iowa.

6. Defendants, Admiral Corporation and Amana Refrigeration, Inc., are interveners in this action and were made party defendants by an Order dated October 29, 1951. The defendants, Admiral and Amana, are in full control of the defense of this action.

7. This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter of the action.

8. The accused structures are refrigerator Models Nos. 759, 958, 959, 1090, 1191, 1192, 1192W, 1292, 1292W, 1390, 11C15, 12C15, and 12C15A, manufactured by or for Admiral Corporation, and refrigerator Models FR-9, FR-9-A and FR-9-S, manufactured by or for Amana Refrigeration, Inc.

9. The application for patent which matured into original patent No. 2,056,165 was executed by patentees January 29, 1931, and said application was filed in the United States Patent Office February 16, 1931. Following proceedings in said Patent Office, said application was allowed and issued as United States Patent No. 2,056,165 on October 6, 1936.

10. On August 12, 1943, Refrigeration Patents Corporation sued Stewart-Warner Corporation in the District Court for the District of Northern Illinois, Eastern Division, Refrigeration Patents Corporation then being the assignee of all right, title and interest in said United States Patent 2,056,165. This case was tried to a jury and the jury's verdict was returned in favor of Plaintiff on November 22, 1944. From this verdict in favor of Plaintiff, Defendant Stewart-Warner Corporation filed its appeal, which was heard by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and its opinion was reported in 159 F. (2d) 972, holding claims 10, 11, 12, 14, 16 and 18 of said original patent invalid.

which were the only claims in issue in that case. This opinion was handed down February 4, 1947, and a rehearing was denied by the Court March 20, 1947. Defendants contend that the only material or relevant fact is that original United States Letters Patent 2,056,165 was held invalid by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on February 4, 1947.

11. On June 2, 1947, Plaintiff, Refrigeration Patents Corporation, petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court from the holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The petition was denied (331 U. S. 834) and thereafter a petition for rehearing was denied on October 20, 1947 (332 U. S. 803).

12. Prior to the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Refrigeration Patents Corporation v. Stewart-Warner Corporation, and on October 8, 1945, General Electric Company filed suit for declaratory judgment on said patent 2,056,165 in the District Court of the Western District of New York against Refrigeration Patents Corporation, and on August 8, 1946, motion for summary judgment was denied (71 U.S.P.Q. 8). On a petition for rehearing, summary judgment was rendered December 2, 1946, in favor of Plaintiff, General Electric Company (71 U.S.P.Q. 326) holding claim 11 invalid, which was the only claim in issue in that case. Appeal was had to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from said

summary judgment on March 26, 1947, and while awaiting consideration of said appeal and on December 26, 1947, General Electric Company v. Refrigeration Patents Corporation appeal was dismissed by consent of the parties on stipulation. Defendants contend that the only material or relevant facts are that claim 11 of original United States Letters Patent 2,056,165 was held invalid, and Plaintiff consented to dismissal of its appeal.

13. The patentees and their assignee prepared an application for reissue, which was signed by applicant Lewis J. Bronaugh on May 27, 1948, and by applicant Thomas I. Potter on June 1, 1948, which application for reissue was filed in the United States Patent Office on June 18, 1948. Said application contained eleven claims, and in the accompanying oath soliciting the reissue patent, applicants stated that the claims in the original patent had "become ineffective by reason of a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit." The applicants further contended "that such insufficiency which renders said patent so inoperative has arisen without any fraudulent or deceptive intention on their part." No substantial change was made in the body of the specification.

14. On November 12, 1948, the claims presented with the reissues application were cancelled, and the present claims now included in the reissue patent No. 23,058 were submitted, together with a supplemental oath. And thereafter on December 14, 1948, said reissue patent 23,058 was issued. The reissued

patent was granted for the balance of the life of the original patent, which terminated on October 6, 1953.

15. In the proceedings had before the United States Patent Office in connection with the application for Re. 23,058, neither Plaintiff nor its predecessors called to the attention of the Patent Office the decision in said General Electric case involving original patent 2,056,165.

16. The Defendants in this proceeding moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 (FRCP) on a number of issues of law, which motion was treated as a motion for trial of segregated issues of law under Rule 42b (FRCP). Pursuant to a pretrial order dated December 17, 1951, the Court held a full trial of the following contentions of Defendants:

1. That the reissue patent 23,058 in suit was not authorized by law. The original patent was adjudged invalid because functional in *Refrigeration Patents Corporation vs. Stewart-Warner Corporation*, 159 F. (2d) 972 (CCA 7). The patentees deliberately and skillfully drafted and included claims in the original patent to cover any means which anyone might ever discover to produce the same result; therefore, the granting of a reissue patent on the theory of inadvertence, accident, or mistake in describing the invention was not authorized under R.S. 4916 (35 U.S.C. 64).

2. That the reissue patent in suit, its file history, and the original patent and its history, establish that there is no improper showing of inadvertence, accident, or mistake, as is required by the statute as an indispensable prerequisite to granting reissue, and that, therefore, the reissue patent in suit is invalid in law and improperly granted.

3. That the original patent 2,056,165, by virtue of failure on the part of the patentees to file a disclaimer after final adjudication by the Court in *Refrigeration Patents Corporation vs. Stewart-Warner Corporation* 159 F. (2d) 972 (CCA 7), holding claims 10, 11, 12, 14, 16 and 18 of said patent invalid, become void in its entirety and, accordingly, the surrender of said void original patent was ineffective in law to establish a basis on which a valid reissue could be granted to said patentees, and said reissue patent 23,058 in suit is therefore invalid.

4. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in *Refrigeration Patents Corporation vs. Stewart-Warner Corporation*, 159 F. (2d) 972, held, claims 10, 11, 12, 14, 16 and 18 of the original patent invalid in law on the ground that they were functional and for a result only. Defendants allege that each and all of the claims of the reissue patent in suit are invalid in law, as they are functional and contrary to law, attempt to cover a result, and that said reissue

does not cure or overcome the defects or grounds of invalidity on which said original claims were held invalid in law.

5. That the claims in said reissue patent 23,058 in suit are based upon disclosures made in said original application, after the patentees in original patent 2,056,165 had built and sold refrigerators for over two years, and said newly claimed structure was thus in the public domain and not subject to patent appropriation by applicants.

6. That the patentees in original patent 2,056,165 permitted the application which matured into said original patent to be abandoned by failure to prosecute, and did not make a sufficient showing to support their contention that said delay was unavoidable so as to permit revival thereof.

7. That the claims in reissue patent 23,058 in suit are invalid because they are based upon a delayed filing of claims made more than two years after refrigerators embodying said invention were first built and sold, and that the effect of said delayed filing of claims is the same as making a new application and is subject to statutory bar, as was held in connection with claim 11 of original patent 2,056,165 in *General Electric Company vs. Refrigeration Patents Corporation* (71 U.S.P.Q. 236).

8. That following the decision of the Court in *General Electric Company vs. Refrigeration Patents Corporation* granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, which was appealed by patentees to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (600 O.G. 664), and filing of consent decree of dismissal therein given on December 26, 1947 (608 O.G. 9), Plaintiff, or its predecessors in interest, failed to:

(a) Disclaim said claim 11 in due time, or at all;

(b) Call to the attention of the Patent Office upon application for reissue patent 23,058 said *General Electric Company vs. Refrigeration Patents Corporation* litigation and said adverse holding with regard to claim 11 of the original patent, and this failure to advise the Patent Office constituted fraud, which vitiated said reissue patent.

9. That the patentees of original patent 2,056,165 were under a duty to disclaim within a reasonable time after denial of a writ of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court. In *Refrigeration Patents Corporation vs. Stewart-Warner Corporation* 159 F. (2d) 972, certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court June 2, 1947 (331 U. S. 834), and a petition for rehearing of said petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the United States

Supreme Court on October 20, 1947 (332 U. S. 803), and that patentees' actions between June 2, 1947, and June 18, 1948, were not a diligent exercise of said duty, and that said failure to observe said duty renders the claims of said re-issue patent 23,058 invalid.

17. The District Court, in an oral opinion dated March 4, 1953, followed by a written opinion included findings of fact and conclusions of law dated March 21, 1953, ruled as follows with respect to the above issues, except that no ruling was made as to Defendants' contentions Nos. 3, 6, 8a and 9 for the reason that they were expressly abandoned by the defendants during the course of the trial.

(a) Defendants' contentions Nos. 1 and 2 were allowed, thus holding the reissue patent invalid.

(b) Defendants' contention No. 4 was overruled for the reason that the Court found it could not pass upon the matter without the aid of expert testimony.

(c) Defendants' contentions Nos. 5 and 7 were not granted because the Court found that an issue of fact was raised which could not be determined without additional evidence.

(d) Defendants' contention No. 8b was expressly overruled because the Court found as a fact that the file wrapper of the original patent No. 2,056,165 showed that the General Electric litigation was called to the attention of the Patent Office by

the Clerk of the Court in which the litigation was pending.

(e) The precise wording of the District Court's finding of fact with respect to the abandoned contentions is as follows:

“All other contentions of the Defendants as set forth in the pretrial order, being numbered 3, 6, 8(a) and 9, were expressly abandoned by the Defendants and the intervenors and are therefore not considered here.”

18. Plaintiff filed notice of appeal from the decision of the District Court on March 24, 1953. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court and remanded the cause to the District Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion. The Supreme Court then refused to grant Defendants' petition for certiorari, and on March 7, 1955, the mandate of the Court of Appeals was forwarded to this Court.

19. All of the elements claimed in the United States Letters Patent Reissue 23,058 are old in the art.

20. The period for which recovery may be had in this proceeding commences with the date of the reissue patent and terminates on the expiration date of the original patent, specifically from December 15, 1948, to October 5, 1953.

21. After the issuance of Reissue No. 23,058 to T. Irving Potter and Lewis J. Bronaugh and during

the life thereof, the defendant, Lou Johnson Co., Inc., sold to the defendant, Meier & Frank Company, Inc., devices manufactured by Admiral Corporation and devices manufactured by Amana Refrigeration, Inc., alleged in the complaint to infringe the patent in suit.

22. After the issuance of Reissue No. 23,058 to T. Irving Potter and Lewis J. Bronaugh and during the life thereof, the defendant, Meier & Frank Company, Inc., sold to the public devices manufactured by Admiral Corporation and devices manufactured by Amana Refrigeration, Inc., which it in turn had purchased from Lou Johnson Co., Inc., being the same devices described in item 22 hereof.

23. Admiral Corporation has agreed to indemnify and save harmless from loss, damage or liability by reason of a finding of infringement in this action, Lou Johnson Co., Inc., and Meier & Frank Company, Inc., so far as refrigerators manufactured by it are concerned, and Amana Refrigeration, Inc., has agreed to indemnify and save harmless from loss, damage or liability by reason of a finding of infringement in this action, Lou Johnson Co., Inc., and Meier & Frank Company, Inc., so far as refrigerators manufactured by it are concerned.

Contentions of Plaintiff

1. The accused refrigerators of Admiral Corporation and of Amana Refrigeration, Inc., infringe Reissue Patent No. 23,058.

2. Reissue Patent No. 23,058 is in all respects valid and for the first time disclosed in the household refrigerator art a substantial innovation in the form of a novel combination of old elements which solved problems of long standing in a fundamental way, which combination was not obvious to those skilled in the art who attempted and failed to achieve such long sought results prior to said patent.

3. Defendants' contention No. 1-1 cannot be raised at this time since the District Court has already specifically found for Plaintiff on this issue in the original trial of segregated issues, and Defendants did not appeal that ruling; also the issue is immaterial since the Clerk of the Court in which a patent case is heard is required by law to advise the Patent Office concerning the decision of the Court, and the Clerk did so in this instance.

4. Defendants' contention No. 1m cannot be revived after express abandonment of this contention in the original trial of segregated issues.

5. Defendants' contention No. 1n cannot be revived after expense abandonment of this contention in the original trial of segregated issues.

6. Defendants' contention No. 5 cannot be raised as an issue at this time, the Defendants having admitted the fact for the purpose of trial and having permitted the Court to hold a full trial of segregated issues on basis of admitted ownership of the patent in suit by Plaintiff.

7. Defendants' contention No. 6a cannot be raised at this time because of the express finding for Plaintiff of this issue in the trial of segregated issue, from which Defendants did not appeal.

8. The defect in the claims which were held invalid in Refrigeration Patents Corporation vs. Stewart-Warner Corporation, 159 F. (2d) 972, (C.C.A. 7), has been corrected by the reissue patent and the claims therein are not subject to the objections of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

9. The claims in the reissue patent are valid in law as complying with the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Faulkner vs. Gibbs, 338 U. S. 267, which modifies and explains the Court's decision in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Corporation vs. Walker 329 U. S. 1.

10. The claims in the reissue Letters Patent 23,058 are based upon adequate disclosure made in the original application as filed, the same being adequately supported by the drawing as filed with the Patent Office. The present claims are distinguished from the claims which were held invalid in Muncie Gear Works, Inc., et al., vs. Outboard Manufacturing Co., 315 U. S. 759 which established the late claiming doctrine. In the Muncie Gear case it was impossible to ascertain from either the drawing or the specification as originally filed the features to which the claims presented for the first time more than two years subsequent to the public use and sale of the apparatus in question were directed.

Also the expansion of the specification made in the original application by the third amendment filed September 15, 1933, was valid under the doctrine of inherency.

11. The patentees in original patent 2,056,165 were the victims of improper conduct upon the part of their nonlawyer patent solicitor in permitting the original application to be abandoned by failure to prosecute and that as soon as his prejudicial conduct was made apparent the patentees took timely steps to revive the application. A question of fact is involved which requires a full trial on the merits, and a question of law is involved in that the decision of the Commissioner of Patents in holding the delay unavoidable is not subject to judicial review unless it be apparent that the action of the Commissioner of Patents was capricious and arbitrary, the burden of the proving of which is upon the Defendants.

12. Plaintiff has never agreed with the holding of the District Court of the Western District of New York in *General Electric vs. Refrigeration Patents Corporation*, 71 U.S.P.Q. 236, and contends that the decision of the Court was based upon an erroneous interpretation of the affidavit of Mr. Potter which was filed in the Patent Office in connection with the petition to revive.

13. The claims in the reissue patent are narrower than the claims in the original patent, hence there is a factual question as to whether the two-year delay in filing claim 11 in the original patent is of

any bearing upon the validity of claims 1 to 4 of the reissue patent. The narrowed scope of claims 1 to 4 of the reissue patent as compared with the scope of claim 11 of the original patent eliminates application of the doctrine of the Muncie Gear case.

14. The Patent Office had before it the notices of the Clerk of the Court of the Western District of New York concerning General Electric Company vs. Refrigeration Patents Corporation at the time the reissue patent application was filed. There can be no fraud charged against the patentees merely because they did not discuss this decision in the reissue application since this was a matter of public record and was of necessity before the Examiner at the time the reissue was prosecuted. There was no necessity for discussing the General Electric decision since the sole problem of patentees was to correct the claims of the invention in compliance with the Halliburton decision of the United States Supreme Court.

15. Plaintiff made a timely application for reissue patent after denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court on January 2, 1947, and denial of a petition for rehearing on October 20, 1947, and said reissue patent 23,058 was issued in accordance with the law.

16. Each and every one of Defendants' contentions is contrary to the fact, except as distinguished above.

17. The accused structures either directly infringe the claims of the reissue patent, or the differences are mere subterfuges to avoid literal infringement, or the accused structures are combinations of elements combined in substantially the same manner as the combination of the reissue patent and achieve substantially the same result in substantially the same manner of operation.

18. There is no basis in law or fact for any charge of unclean hands.

19. Functional statements in claims are sanctioned by the third paragraph of Section 112 of the Patent Act of July 19, 1952, which is expressly applicable to previously issued patents, and Defendants' contention 1i is no longer available as a defense.

20. There is no basis in law or fact for a defense based upon Defendants' contention 1k.

21. The application for reissue was diligently made.

22. Contentions 2d and 2g of Defendants are not valid defenses since the mere making of a portion of a combination in two parts instead of the one part called for in the patent does not avoid infringement.

23. Contentions of Defendants such as 2h do not constitute valid defenses since the mere addition of immaterial elements does not avoid infringement.

24. Contentions of Defendants in all of paragraph 2 are not valid defenses since immaterial changes, or improvements on the patented structures, do not avoid infringement.

25. That the burden of proof as to invalidity in suit rests heavily upon the defendants and must be sustained by proof beyond any reasonable doubt, being the same standards as set in a criminal case.

26. The mere existence of all elements of the patented combination in other combinations old in the art but not in the patented combination, does not amount to anticipation.

27. That since 1951 and the decision in *Hotchkiss vs. Greenwood*, 52 U. S. 248, 267, the decided cases show that patentable inventions may be divided into two groups—a small group where, as here, the invention satisfies a long-felt want, and a larger group where it does not; and when the facts show such a long-felt want every change, no matter how simple, which meets the need is clearly demonstrated to be beyond ordinary skill, it being absurd to assert that a thing was obvious when history proves it was not.

28. That Admiral Corporation is estopped to assert that the invention of Reissue 23,058 and its original No. 2,056,165 is not a true patentable combination as was held in the case of *Refrigeration Patents Corp. vs. Stewart-Warner Corp.* by the District Court after a full trial, which holding was not reversed by the Court of Appeals in its opinion

reported at 159 Fed. 2d 972, inasmuch as Admiral Corporation is the successor to the entire refrigerator business of said Stewart-Warner Corp., and the Plaintiff is the successor to the entire right, title and interest of said Refrigeration Patents Corp.

29. That none of the Defendants has acquired any intervening right, even if any of them made substantial preparation prior to December 14, 1948, to infringe Reissue 23,058, which fact is denied, for the reason that said reissue is a narrowed reissue or contains no claim broader in scope than other claims of original patent 2,056,165, which claims were infringed by the structures of each of the Defendants of which complaint is herein made.

30. That Plaintiff had a perfect right, under the laws of the State of New York, to acquire from its predecessor the entire right, title and interest in and to Reissue No. 23,058, and to offer, as it did, to license others including intervenors herein prior to the bringing of this suit, and that Plaintiff is not thereby guilty of unclean hands as contended by Defendants.

31. The changes which the Defendants have achieved in the accused structures are so contrived as to suggest deliberate camouflaging of the essential characteristics in order to misdirect attention.

32. If any contentions of Defendants are considered pure issues of law, Defendants are estopped to raise them at this time after having a full trial of segregated issues of law.

33. If the Defendants present any evidence sufficient to support either of contentions 5 and 7 of the Defendants in the pretrial order of the trial of segregated issues of law, only claims 3 and 4 of Re. 23,058 would be affected thereby as they generally correspond to claim 11 of the original patent.

34. Plaintiff objects to Defendants' Exhibits 110, 111, 119a, 119b and 119c on the basis that neither the Lundgaard nor the Gibson patents comprise statutory bars to the grant of the patent in suit.

35. Plaintiff objects to Defendants' Exhibit 118 on the basis that Potter's later patent is not relevant to any issue or contention in this suit.

36. Defendants jointly, as well as severally, have infringed by making or selling, or both, or using, refrigerators as accused herein.

37. The infringement by Admiral Corporation was willful and deliberate and done with full knowledge and intent to appropriate the property of the patent in suit without compensation.

38. A just and firm measure of Plaintiff's damages is ten per cent of the manufacturers' sales prices of the accused refrigerators for each unit sold by any and all of the defendants, and that in the case of sales by Admiral Corporation said sum should be trebled by reason of that Defendant's willful infringement as the successor to Stewart-Warner Corporation.

39. That costs and attorney's fees should be awarded Plaintiff herein.

DEFENDANT'S CONTENTIONS

1. Reissue patent No. 23,058 is invalid because:

a. By reason of the state of the prior art existing at the time of the alleged invention by the patentees of the matter disclosed in the patent, said matter was not an invention and did not require the use of any exercise of the inventive faculty for its production, was obvious to and involved only the mechanical or ordinary skill of those versed in the art to which said matters pertain, and was not patentable.

b. L. J. Bronaugh and T. I. Potter were neither the original, or first, or joint, or any inventors or discoverers of any alleged invention defined by its claims of said letters patent.

c. The alleged invention was known to others before the alleged invention thereof by said patentees.

d. The alleged invention was in public use or on sale in this country more than two years prior to the date of application for said original patent.

e. The specification of said letters patent is not in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as required by the statutes of the United States to enable any person skilled in the art of science to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same.

f. The claims of said letters patent are vague, indefinite, and ambiguous and do not point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the patentees regarded as their alleged invention, as is required by statute.

g. The claims in said reissue letters patent define either a different invention than that disclosed in said original patent 2,056,165, or else the claims in said reissue patent define an inoperative device.

h. The claims of said reissue patent enlarge the scope of the claims of the original patent and were not applied for within two years from the grant of the original patent.

i. The claims of said letters patent are functional and attempt to cover a mere result or effect and are therefore invalid for the same reasons that the claims in the original patent 2,056,165 were held invalid in the case of Refrigeration Patents Corp. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 159 F. 2d. 972.

j. The alleged invention set forth and claimed in said letters patent in suit and all substantial material parts thereof had been shown, described, and patented prior to the alleged invention thereof by said patentees or more than two years prior to the filing date of the application for the original letters patent in the following United States letters patents:

No. and Patentee:	Date
1,439,051—August P. Anderson	Dec. 19, 1922
Re. 21,941—J. Lowell Gibson	Nov. 11, 1941
1,776,235—Lester U. Larkin	Sept. 16, 1930
1,731,711—Ransom W. Davenport.	Oct. 15, 1929
1,726,344—Ransom W. Davenport.	Aug. 27, 1929
1,769,118—Ransom W. Davenport.	July 1, 1930

No. and Patentee:	Date
1,324,868—Fred W. Wolf	Dec. 16, 1919
1,909,875—Ivar Lundgaard	May 16, 1933
1,371,235—George A. Case, et al.	Mar. 15, 1921

k. The claims in said letters patent are based on a delayed filing of claims made more than two years after refrigerators embodying the alleged invention were first made and sold. The structures claimed in the reissue patent were in the public domain and not subject to patent appropriation by anyone.

l. Following the decision in *General Electric Co. v. Refrigeration Patents Corp.* holding claim 11 of original patent 2,056,165 invalid, the patentees failed, during the prosecution of the application for said reissue patent, to call to the attention of the Patent Office the adverse and unreversed court decision concerning said claim of the original patent.

m. The patentees of original patent 2,056,165, after denial of certiorari in the case of *Refrigeration Patents Corp. v. Stewart-Warner Corp.*, were not diligent and failed to apply within a reasonable time for a reissue thereof.

n. The original application for patent No. 2,056,165 was abandoned by the patentees and was improperly revived in the Patent Office and was therefore not legally issued and therefore could not be legally reissued.

o. Each of the claims constitutes a mere aggregation of old well-known elements, mechanisms and

devices having no mutual or necessary co-operation, interaction or interrelation, and they did not define a combination producing a new and surprising result.

2. Defendants have not infringed reissue patent 23,058 because:

a. All of the claims call for a cooling refrigerant expander having "heat conducting surfaces within said cooling compartment and constructed and arranged to maintain its heat conducting surfaces at a temperature above 32°F. while withdrawing heat from said compartment." Any expanders having heat conducting surfaces in the accused structures neither lie within said cooling compartment nor are they maintained at a temperature above 32°F.

b. The claims of the patent also call for a refrigerator having "a dry cold surface for preserving foods in frozen condition." This is defined in the specification as one where any evaporation "will be deposited as snow rather than as ice, due to the low temperature prevailing in the compartment 13. In other words there is no objectionable frosting in the cold storage compartment." Any exposed surface in the freezing compartment of the accused refrigerators accumulates frost.

c. The claims of the patent also call for "a freezing refrigerant expander having heat conducting surfaces within said freezing compartment and constructed and arranged to maintain its heat conducting surfaces at a temperature well below 32°F.

while withdrawing heat from said compartment." Any freezing refrigerant expanders in the accused refrigerators do not have a heat conducting surface lying within the freezing compartment.

d. The claims of the patent also call for "a single liquefying unit associated with said expanders and constructed and arranged to condense refrigerant expanded by heat extracted by said expanders from both said compartments." The accused structures have two liquefying units each one of which is associated with a separate and distinct volatile refrigerant. The volatile refrigerant for the cooling compartment is separate from the volatile refrigerant for the freezing compartment.

e. Claims 3 and 4 are not infringed for the additional reasons that the thermostat which controls the on-off cycles of the primary liquefying unit is not responsive to the temperatures in the cooling compartment, but is located adjacent and is responsive to the temperatures in the freezing compartment in the accused structures, and it is the flow of heat into the freezing compartment rather than into the cooling compartment that controls the on-off operation of the refrigerator mechanism.

f. Claims 1 and 3 of the patent call for "air in said cooling compartment having a substantially stable temperature of about 40° F. and having a humidity whose relative value is at least 100% at 32° F." In any of the accused structures, there are neither stable temperatures nor stable humidities.

g. All of said claims call for a volatile refrigerant in said expanders, which volatile refrigerant circulating through said expanders is the sole heat extracting medium. In the accused structures there are two separate and distinct volatile refrigerants, each flowing through its separate and distinct circuit and each circuit includes an expander arranged therein.

h. All of the claims of the patent in suit call for a thermostat responsive to compartment temperatures. In any of the accused devices, thermostatic controls lie outside of the compartments and respond to liner temperatures and not to compartment temperatures.

i. Claims 3 and 4 provide that "the thermal insulation around said cooling compartment offering less resistance to flow of heat thereto from the outside atmosphere than does the thermal insulation of the freezing compartment to insure starting of said liquefying unit by heat flow into said cooling compartment during an off cycle of said liquefying unit before the temperature in said freezing compartment approaches a non-freezing value." In any of the accused structures, starting of the primary liquefying unit is insured not by heat flow into the cooling compartment, but by heat flow toward the freezing compartment.

3. Even if the claims in suit were construed so broadly as to be readable upon the accused structures as a matter of language, there is no infringe-

ment because the construction, function or operating principles, and purported result which flows from the patent claims, are different from those of the accused structures.

4. The claims of said reissue patent are so limited in terms, and in the light of the prior art, and by virtue of limitations and interpretations necessarily placed upon them during the prosecution of the applications for the original patent and the reissue thereof while said applications were in the Patent Office, as to render them ineffective in scope to cover any refrigerator manufactured, used or sold by any of the Defendants herein, and Plaintiff is estopped by the proceedings of the Patent Office in connection with the prosecution of the applications, and either of them, to assert that any household refrigerator manufactured, used or sold by the Defendants herein constitutes an infringement of any of the claims thereof.

5. Defendants and each of them have no knowledge as to the ownership of United States Patent No. Re. 23,058, granted to L. J. Bronaugh and Thomas I. Potter, and dated December 14, 1948, said patent being a purported reissue of original patent No. 2,056,165, dated October 6, 1936, and have put Plaintiff on proof as to its title.

6. The complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff has unclean hands and is not entitled to any relief in a court of equity because:

a. The patentees of said reissue patent and Plaintiff's predecessor deliberately concealed and misled the Patent Office in connection with the application for reissue of said patent by failing to inform the Patent Office concerning the decision in the case of *General Electric Co. v. Refrigeration Patents Corp.*

b. Plaintiff entered into an agreement in New York State with respect to proposed patent litigation, like the present suit, that violates Section 275 of the Penal Law of the State of New York, which provides:

“No person or co-partnership, engaged directly or indirectly in the businesses of collection and adjustment of claims, and no corporation or association, directly or indirectly, itself or by or through its officers, agents or employees, shall solicit, buy or take an assignment of, or be in any manner interested in buying or taking an assignment of bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, book debt, or other thing in action, or any claim or demand, with the intent and for the purpose of bringing an action or proceeding thereon; provided however, that bills receivable, notes receivable, bills of exchange, judgments or other things in action may be solicited, bought, or assignment thereof taken, from any executor, administrator, assignee for the benefit of creditors, trustee or receiver in bankruptcy, or any other person or persons in

charge of the administration, settlement or compromise of any estate, through court actions, proceedings or otherwise. Nothing herein contained shall affect any assignment heretofore or hereafter taken by any moneyed corporation authorized to do business in the state of New York or its nominee pursuant to a subrogation agreement or a salvage operation, or by any corporation organized for religious, benevolent or charitable purposes.

“Any corporation or association violating the provisions of this section shall be liable to a fine of not more than five thousand dollars; any person or co-partnership, violating the provisions of this section, and any officer, trustee, director, agent or employee of any person, co-partnership, corporation or association violating this section who, directly or indirectly, engages or assists in such violation, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Formerly §276, amended L. 1934, c. 534, §2; renumbered 275 and amended L. 1939, c. 822, §13, L. 1940, c. 198, §2; L. 1941, c. 549, eff. April 19, 1941.”

7. Prior to December 14, 1948, the issue date of the reissue patent in suit, Defendants herein made substantial preparation for the manufacture, use and sale of the accused refrigerators, and did manufacture, use, buy and sell said accused refrigerators, and did make substantial investment and did substantial business, all before the grant of said reissue, and the said defendants are entitled to continue the use of, or to sell to others to be used or

sold, and to continue the manufacture, use and sale of said accused refrigerators during the term of said reissue patent.

8. Costs and attorney's fees should be awarded to Defendants herein.

Issues

1. Was the alleged invention of the United States Letters Patent Reissue No. 23,058 known or used by others in this country or patented or described in a printed publication in this country before the invention thereof by the patentees?

2. Was the alleged invention of the United States Letters Patent Reissue No. 23,058 described in a printed publication in this country or in public use or on sale in this country more than two years prior to the date of the application for original patent No. 2,056,165 or the insertion of new claims therein?

3. Was the alleged invention of Reissue Patent No. 23,058 described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another, filed in the United States before the date of the alleged invention of said reissue patent?

4. If there is any difference between the subject matter of reissue No. 23,058 and the prior art, is this difference one which would not have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art?

5. Are the admittedly old elements in Reissue No. 23,058 assembled in such a manner as to produce a patentable combination?

6. Is Reissue No. 23,058 valid?
7. If Reissue No. 23,058 is valid, do any of the accused structures infringe any of its claims?
8. If said Reissue No. 23,058 is valid and the accused structures infringe any of its claims, how much, if anything, is the Plaintiff entitled to recover from Defendants for infringement of said patent?
9. Have the Defendants acquired intervening rights permitting them to use and sell accused refrigerators manufactured prior to December 14, 1948, and to manufacture, use, buy and sell during the term of said reissue patent accused refrigerators for which they made substantial preparation for manufacture, use and sale prior to December 14, 1948?
10. Is Plaintiff guilty of unclean hands?
11. Is the Plaintiff, or any of the Defendants, entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees?

Statutes Involved

Title 35 USC, particularly sections numbered 4(a), (b), (d), (g), 102, 103, 112 (third paragraph), 251, 252, 261, 271(a), (b), 281, 282, 284, 285, 293.

Jury Trial

Timely demand was made by Plaintiff for trial by jury.

Order

It is now ordered by the Court as follows:

1. That at the trial none of the parties shall be entitled to object to the introduction into evidence of the whole or of any part of any copy of any United States patent, or foreign patent, or publication on the ground that the same has not been certified or authenticated or that the original has not been offered, and the dates appearing thereon shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be accepted as correct dates.

2. Plaintiff shall not be precluded by its pretrial specification of documentary exhibits or by this order from offering in support of its affirmative case with respect to Reissue Patent No. 23,058, and Defendants shall not be precluded by any similar specification of documents from offering in support of their case against said patent any further evidence, documentary or otherwise, should the materiality or relevancy thereof be disclosed by later events or should such evidence not be available to the party desiring to offer it at the time of said specification, provided reasonable notice is given and a showing is made which is satisfactory to this Court as consistence with the bona fide execution of this order.

3. The parties agreeing to the above, this order shall not be amended, except by consent of all parties or to prevent injustice, and this order shall

supersede all pleadings for purposes of the trial which is hereby set to begin November 14, 1955.

Dated at Portland, Oregon, this 14th day of November, 1955.

/s/ GUS J. SOLOMON,

Judge, United States District
Court.

We approve the foregoing pre-trial order:

/s/ ORME E. CHEATHAM,

/s/ JOHN B. CUNNINGHAM,

Of Attorneys for the Plaintiff.

/s/ CHAS. L. BYRON,

/s/ W. E. RAMSEY,

Of Attorneys for Defendants.

/s/ WILLIAM E. LUCAS.

[Endorsed]: Filed November 14th, 1955.

[Title of District Court and Cause.]

MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT

Now comes defendants and move that a directed verdict be entered for defendants on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiff's testimony and the documentary evidence establish that the Bronaugh and Potter patent is invalid because:

(a) It is anticipated by Anderson patent No. 1,439,051;

(b) There is no invention over the Anderson patent or Anderson in view of Larkin patent No. 1,776,235;

(c) It is for an aggregation of old elements which produce no new or different result not heretofore produced by them;

(d) The specification of the patent in suit does not meet the requirements of Title 35, U.S.C. Section 112 in that "fins," or a "finned coil," or any other structure for producing a moist cold condition in the cooling compartment is not even mentioned in the specification and, accordingly, the specification does not "contain a written description of the invention * * * in such full, clear, concise and exact terms * * *" as is demanded by the statute;

(e) The claims in suit do not particularly point out and distinctly claim the alleged invention as required by the same Section of the Statute;

(f) Claims covering a non-frosting coil in the cooling chamber and also claims covering differential insulation were submitted to the Patent Office for the first time more than two years after refrigerators embodying said structures were first put on public sale and sold in this country.

2. Plaintiff's testimony and the documentary evidence fail to establish that the accused refrigerators infringe the claims of the Bronaugh and Potter patent because:

(a) All of the claims are for a series type refrigerating circuit and the accused refrigerators have two separate and distinct circuits comprising a primary and a secondary, the primary having its own circulating refrigerant and the secondary having its own separate and distinct refrigerant which never commingle;

(b) All of the claims call for a cooling refrigerant expander having "heat conducting surfaces within said cooling compartment" and a freezing refrigerant expander having "heat conducting surfaces within said freezing compartment"; any expanders in the accused refrigerators are outside the cooling compartment and freezing compartment, respectively;

(c) All of the claims call for a cooling refrigerant expander constructed and arranged to maintain its heat conducting surfaces at a temperature above 32° F. and the accused refrigerators do not have such expanders where such a temperature is maintained;

(d) All of the claims call for a volatile refrigerant circulating through both the cooling and freezing expanders, the volatile refrigerant being the sole heat extracting medium; and the accused refrigerators have two separate and distinct refrigerants thus having no single refrigerant constituting the sole heat extracting medium;

(e) All of the claims call for a single liquefying unit associated with said expanders and constructed

and arranged to condense refrigerant expanded by heat extracted from both said compartments, and the accused refrigerators have two liquefying units or condensers, one in each of the two separate and distinct circuits;

(f) Claims 3 and 4 call for a thermostat responsive to the temperature in said cooling compartment and the thermal insulation around said cooling compartment offering less resistance to flow of heat thereto from the outside atmosphere than does the thermal insulation of the freezing compartment; and there is no proof that the accused Admiral refrigerator has any differences in insulation about the cooling compartment and the freezing compartment, respectively; also, the accused refrigerators do not have a thermostat responsive to the temperature in the cooling compartment which causes the actuation of the liquefying unit in the primary circuit:

(g) The accused refrigerators are of the cold wall type and all of the claims of the patent in suit are for the so-called finned coil type.

Defendants request the Court to instruct the jury accordingly.

/s/ W. E. RAMSEY,

Of Attorneys for Defendants.

[Endorsed]: Filed November 25th, 1955.

[Title of District Court and Cause.]

SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
TO THE JURY

We, the jury, duly impanelled, make the following answers to the following special interrogatories:

I.

Regarding the Question of Validity of Bronaugh and Potter Reissue Patent No. 23058

A. Does the claimed combination of elements (parts) in the Bronaugh and Potter reissue patent produce some new and different function, one that has unusual or surprising consequences?

Answer: Yes.

B. Did Bronaugh and Potter make any invention over the Anderson patent?

Answer: Yes.

C. Did Bronaugh and Potter make any invention over what is shown in the Anderson patent plus the Larkin patent?

Answer: Yes.

D. Do you find the following claims to be vague, indefinite, or ambiguous?

(1) Claim No. 1. Answer: No.

(2) Claim No. 2. Answer: No.

(3) Claim No. 3. Answer: No.

(4) Claim No. 4. Answer: No.

II.

Regarding the Question of Infringement

A. Do defendants' refrigerators have a cooling refrigerant expander (coil with or without extended surfaces) having surfaces within the cooling compartment?

Answer: Yes.

B. Do defendants' refrigerators have only a single liquefying unit associated with refrigerant expanders (coils with or without extended surfaces) and constructed and arranged to condense the refrigerant expanded by heat extracted from both the compartments?

Answer: Yes.

/s/ FRANCES DUYCK,
Foreman.

[Endorsed]: Filed December 2, 1955.

[Title of District Court and Cause.]

VERDICT

We, the jury, find our verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Moist Cold Refrigerator Co., Inc., and against the defendants, and assess plaintiff's damages against the Admiral Corporation at \$2,093,180.00, and assess damages against the Amana Refrigeration, Inc., at \$45,575.00.

Dated this 2nd day of December, 1955.

/s/ FRANCIS DUYCK,
Foreman.

[Endorsed]: Filed December 2nd, 1955.

[Title of District Court and Cause.]

DEFENDANT'S MOTION NOTWITHSTAND-
ING THE VERDICT

Come now defendants and move that a judgment be entered for the defendants notwithstanding the verdict on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiff's testimony, defendants' testimony, the documentary evidence and physical exhibits establish that the Bronaugh and Potter patent Re. 23,058 is invalid because:

(a) It is anticipated by Anderson patent No. 1,439,051;

(b) There is no invention over the Anderson patent or Anderson in view of Larkin patent No. 1,776,235 and the other prior art of record;

(c) It is for an aggregation of old elements which produce no new or different result not heretofore produced by them;

(d) The specification of the patent in suit does not meet the requirements of Title 35, U.S.C. Section 112 in that "fins," or a "finned coil," or any other structure for producing a moist cold condition in the cooling compartment is not even mentioned in the specification and, accordingly, the specification does not "contain a written description of the invention * * * in such full, clear, concise and exact terms * * *" as is demanded by the statute;

(e) The claims in suit do not particularly point out and distinctly claim the alleged invention as required by the same Section of the Statute;

(f) The claims of Re. 23,058 are all invalid for the same reasons that the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (159 F. 2d 972) held invalid all of the claims in suit of the original Bronaugh and Potter patent 2,056,165;

(g) Claims covering a non-frosting coil in the cooling chamber and also claims covering differential insulation were submitted to the Patent Office for the first time more than two years after refrigerators embodying said structures were first put on public sale and sold in this country.

2. Plaintiff's testimony, defendants' testimony,

the documentary evidence and the physical exhibits establish that the accused refrigerators do not infringe the claims of the Bronaugh and Potter patent because:

(a) All of the claims are for a series type refrigerating circuit and the accused refrigerators have two separate and distinct circuits comprising a primary and a secondary, the primary having its own circulating refrigerant and the secondary having its own separate and distinct refrigerant which never commingle;

(b) All of the claims call for a cooling refrigerant expander having "heat conducting surfaces within said cooling compartment" and a freezing refrigerant expander having "heat conducting surfaces within said freezing compartment"; any expanders in the accused refrigerators are outside the cooling compartment and freezing compartment, respectively;

(c) All of the claims call for a cooling refrigerant expander constructed and arranged to maintain its heat conducting surfaces at a temperature above 32° F. and the accused refrigerators do not have such expanders where such a temperature is maintained;

(d) All of the claims call for a volatile refrigerant circulating through both the cooling and freezing expanders, the volatile refrigerant being the sole heat extracting medium; and the accused refrigerators have two separate and distinct refrigerants;

erants, thus having no single refrigerant constituting the sole heat extracting medium;

(e) All of the claims call for a single liquefying unit associated with said expanders and constructed and arranged to condense refrigerant expanded by heat extracted from both said compartments, and the accused refrigerators have two liquefying units or condensers, one in each of the two separate and distinct circuits;

(f) Claims 3 and 4 call for a thermostat responsive to the temperature in said cooling compartment. The accused refrigerators do not have a thermostat responsive to the temperature in the cooling compartment but responsive to the temperature of the liner of the freezing compartment;

(g) The accused refrigerators are of the cold wall type and all of the claims of the patent in suit are for the so-called finned coil type.

3. Even if the Bronaugh and Potter patent in suit were valid and infringed, the verdict of \$2,138,775.00, of which \$2,093,180 is against Admiral and \$45,575.00 is against Amana, is grossly excessive and contrary to the evidence.

Defendants request the Court to enter a judgment for defendants accordingly.

/s/ J. PIERRE KOLISCH,

Of Attorneys for Defendants.

Service of copy acknowledged.

[Endorsed]: Filed December 5th, 1955.

United States District Court

District of Oregon

Civil No. 6016

MOIST COLD REFRIGERATOR CO., INC., an
Oregon Corporation,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LOU JOHNSON CO., INC., an Oregon Corpora-
tion, and MEIER & FRANK COMPANY,
INC., an Oregon Corporation,

Defendants;

and

ADMIRAL CORPORATION, a Delaware Corpora-
tion, and AMANA REFRIGERATION, INC.,
an Iowa Corporation,

Defendants-Intervenors.

JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS
AND ORDER GRANTING NEW TRIAL

Defendants' motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, came on regularly to be heard on December 5, 1955, at 2:00 o'clock p.m. At the conclusion of such hearing, the Court was of the opinion and found that the motion for a directed verdict made by the defendants at the close of all the evidence in the case should have been granted, for the reason that it clearly appeared that the patent in suit, namely, U. S. Letters Patent Re. 23,058, is invalid and that even if valid, none of

the accused refrigerators of the defendants infringe such letters patent, all as is more fully set forth in the Court's opinion dated December 5, 1955, on file herein.

The Court now Orders that the special interrogatories and the general verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant Admiral Corporation in the sum of \$2,093,180.00 and against Amana Refrigeration, Inc., in the sum of \$45,575.00, returned December 2, 1955, be and the same are hereby set aside; and

It is further Ordered that the defendants have judgment in their favor against the plaintiff; and

The Court on its own initiative, and pursuant to Rule 59(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Orders that in the event that the judgment of this Court in favor of the defendants be reversed on appeal, then the verdict of the jury in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants and the special interrogatories, returned December 2, 1955, shall be set aside, and a new trial granted on the following grounds:

(1) The verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.

(2) The damages awarded plaintiff are excessive.

Each party shall bear its own costs.

Dated and entered this 8th day of December, 1955.

/s/ GUS J. SOLOMON,

United States District Judge.

[Endorsed]: Filed December 8th, 1955.

[Title of District Court and Cause.]

OPINION OF THE COURT ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT AND
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITH-
STANDING THE VERDICT

I do not believe any useful purpose will be served to delay my decision on the motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

I am of the opinion that the motions must be granted. I am also of the opinion that even assuming validity and infringement there is no rational basis for the amount of the verdicts that were rendered against defendants Admiral Corporation and Amana Refrigeration, Inc., or either of them.

Both before and during the trial I informed counsel that I wanted to submit this case to the jury because it had been pending for a long time. It had already been to the Court of Appeals once, and the expenses incurred by both sides were great. In addition to numerous depositions of witnesses residing in the East and South, there were a number of lay and expert witnesses from various parts of the United States, and out-of-town counsel were here for many weeks even before the trial.

At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case in chief I seriously considered directing a verdict in favor of the defendants because from the testimony and the exhibits, particularly the prior art patents, it did not appear to me that the plaintiff's patented

device had met the rigid standards of invention laid down in *Berkeley Pump Co. vs. Jacuzzi Bros.*, 214 F. 2d 785 (C.C.A. 9th, 1954); *Kwikset Locks vs. Hillgren*, 210 F. 2d 483 (C.C.A. 9th, 1954); and in numerous other decisions from our own Circuit as well as from the United States Supreme Court, involving the “assembling (of) old elements, the previous functional operations of which are not changed by their arrangement and inclusion in the device.”

The patent in suit involves improvement in a household refrigerator. Each element in the alleged combination was old in the art. They consist of a cabinet, a cooling compartment, a freezing compartment, thermal insulation, a cooling refrigerant expander, a freezing refrigerant expander, volatile refrigerant, a single liquefying unit, and a thermostat. All of these elements, when combined together—and I am not using the word “combined” as a word of art—acted as they had acted in the past, and the end result did not exceed the sum of its parts. Or, stated differently, the old elements making up the device did not perform an additional and different function than they performed out of it.

I was also of the opinion that the alleged combination of the patent in suit “did not perform some new and different function—one that has unusual or surprising consequences.”

The patent in suit consisted of a household refrigerator having a separate freezing compartment and a separate cooling compartment operated by a

single liquefying unit with the cooling compartment having a humid temperature, or moist cold, and with a non-frosting coil in the cooling compartment.

I, therefore, came to the conclusion that even if Anderson or some other prior art patent had not fully anticipated the patent in suit in every material part, it was nevertheless invalid because it did not meet the standards of invention as laid down in the decisions to which I have already referred.

I was also concerned about the fact that although it was conceded that the validity of the patent in suit is dependent upon the existence of a fin coil or other extended surface coil, such a coil was not disclosed in the specification. Plaintiff's expert testified that by looking at the drawing he could tell that a fin coil or a brine tank was described. He, therefore, contended that a failure to disclose the fin coil in the specification did not invalidate the patent. However, it appeared to me that the requirements of 35 U.S.C.A., §112, had not been met.

I likewise was in doubt as to whether the claims were sufficiently definite to satisfy the statute. In spite of such conclusions and doubts, I denied defendants' motion for a directed verdict at the end of plaintiff's case in chief.

Thereafter, Mr. Glenn Muffly, defendants' refrigeration and patent expert, testified at great length concerning the validity of plaintiff's patent in suit and also concerning infringement. The only information elicited from Mr. Muffly on cross-examination was that he regarded the Anderson

patent as the closest to the patent in suit. Thereafter, Mr. Parker, plaintiff's expert, again resumed the stand and contradicted the testimony of Mr. Muffly with respect to certain conclusions about which he had testified.

When all of the evidence was in, the defendants again moved for a directed verdict on the same grounds which they had previously urged. Again, I seriously considered granting the motion because by that time it had appeared that, in addition to the patent being invalid, it had not been infringed.

There was no dispute about the structure of the accused devices. They were cold wall refrigerators as distinguished from the fin-type refrigerator which is exemplified in the patent in suit. Likewise, all of the claims of the patent in suit call for a single liquefying unit; in the accused structures there were two liquefying units, each of which had its own volatile refrigerant flowing through a separate and distinct circuit.

Parenthetically, I might add that during the argument to the jury plaintiff's counsel stated that the use of a primary and secondary circuit in the accused structures was an improvement over the structure described in the patent in suit. I wondered at the time how he could establish identity of structure with this admission.

Although plaintiff's counsel denied that the doctrine of equivalents was applicable, the only basis I could discover upon which the jury might find identity of structure was in that doctrine. The jury, in answer to the special interrogatories, found them

to be identical, a finding which in my opinion was proper only if the patent in suit was a pioneer one.

In spite of my added doubts concerning infringement, I decided to submit the whole case to the jury in the hope that another trial could be avoided. If I directed a verdict in favor of the defendants and the Court of Appeals held that I should have submitted it to the jury, then all of the time, trouble and expense incurred in this trial would have been wasted; but if I permitted the jury to make a determination and the jury found in favor of the plaintiff, I could then set aside the verdict and the appellate court would merely be presented with the questions of validity and infringement and could reinstate the verdict if they thought that I had erred. Unfortunately, the verdict of the jury does not make this possible. As I stated previously, there is no rational basis for the amount of damages fixed by the jury.

Even if this patent is valid and infringed, it was a minor improvement in a crowded field, and in my view a royalty of 3 per cent on the selling price or 5 per cent on the manufacturer's price is completely out of line. In addition to a few licensing agreements, none of which showed such a high rate, the only other evidence was the testimony of Mr. Parker based upon a hypothetical question, which assumed that the patent in suit was a pioneer patent or one that had made a long stride in the refrigeration art.

An examination of the file wrappers of the original patent, as well as the patent in suit, clearly showed that this was not the case.

I appreciate the fact that the jury made specific findings, which are contrary to those expressed in this opinion. In spite of my strong attachment to the right of trial by jury, I cannot avoid the responsibility which is mine merely because a jury found to the contrary.

Judge Bone, in *Berkeley Pump Co. vs. Jacuzzi Bros.*, 214 F. 2d 785, beginning at Page 791, clearly sets out the obligation of a trial judge in cases in which "the jury has departed from the relevant legal criteria by which either a jury or a judge must be guided in their or his fact-finding function."

I think that this jury listened carefully to the evidence and tried to render an honest and intelligent opinion. In spite of the attempts of plaintiff's counsel to inject prejudice into the case, I think he was unsuccessful, and I think that the action which I took during the trial and in my instructions to dissipate any such feeling was successful. However, I think that the fault lies in the manner in which the case was presented by the defendants.

At no time was the jury adequately informed of defendants' contentions. The jury, after listening to defendants' opening statement, must have come to the conclusion that the defendants were trying to withhold information from them. The witnesses were examined by defendants' counsel not with the view of convincing a jury, but solely for the purpose of appealing to the court. It was a highly technical presentation, and the closing argument of counsel for the defendants can only be characterized as fantastic. I did not understand the "frost, defrost"

argument which took up a large portion of time consumed by the defendants, and I am sure that the jury did not have the vaguest idea of what counsel was talking about.

However, I cannot permit a judgment on liability or a judgment on damages to stand where there is no basis therefor. Neither the good intentions of juries nor the ineptness of lawyers is an adequate substitute for evidence.

As an equitable defense, the defendants have raised the question of unclean hands. It may very well be that the manner in which this case is being financed is a violation of New York law. I am also concerned about the scores of people who, according to Mr. Potter, are now contributing and who over a period of years have contributed over a million dollars to him and his companies in connection with the prosecution of this patent and this litigation. However, I do not believe that these facts justify a holding of unclean hands.

I merely add that it was primarily because of these people that I did not direct a verdict earlier.

Counsel for the defendants may submit an order in accordance with this oral opinion, which will be transcribed and included in the file of this case and in any transcript that is sent to the Court of Appeals so that the Court of Appeals will know the reasons which motivated me to enter a judgment in favor of the defendants.

[Endorsed]: Filed December 8th, 1955.

[Title of District Court and Cause.]

NOTICE OF APPEAL

To Lou Johnson Co., Inc., and Meier & Frank Company, Inc.. Defendants, and Admiral Corporation and Amana Refrigeration, Inc., Defendant-Intervenors, and Messrs. W. Elmer Ramsey, William E. Lucas, Charles L. Byron and J. Pierre Kolisch, Their Attorneys:

Notice Is Hereby Given that Moist Cold Refrigerator Co., Inc., plaintiff above named, hereby appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from each and every part of that certain Judgment in Favor of Defendants and Order Granting New Trial, entered in this action on the 8th day of December, 1955, and from the whole thereof.

Dated: December 12th, 1955.

/s/ ORME E. CHEATHAM,

/s/ HUGH L. BIGGS,

Of Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Service of copy acknowledged.

[Endorsed]: Filed December 12th, 1955.

[Title of District Court and Cause.]

STATEMENT OF POINTS ON WHICH APPELLANT INTENDS TO RELY ON APPEAL

Comes now Plaintiff-Appellant, Moist Cold Refrigerator Co., Inc., and makes the following concise statement of points upon which it intends to rely for appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from the judgment in favor of defendants and order granting new trial made and entered herein:

1. The Court erred in entering judgment in favor of the defendants notwithstanding the general verdicts of the jury in favor of the plaintiff.

2. The Court erred in entering judgment notwithstanding each and every one of the special verdicts or answers of the jury to special interrogatories propounded by the Court and numbered 1A, B, C and D and 11A and B.

3. The Court erred in finding that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.

4. The Court erred in holding that the combination of the patent in suit had not met the "rigid standards of invention" laid down by the Ninth Circuit or by the Supreme Court of the United States.

5. The Court erred in holding that all of the elements of the combinations claimed in the four

claims of the patent in suit did not perform additional or different functions in the combination to get a new and patentable unitary result as shown by the evidence herein.

6. The Court erred in finding that the combination of each of the four claims of the patent in suit failed to achieve a new and different function having unusual and unobvious consequences and solving a problem which had long plagued the industry as shown by the evidence herein.

7. The Court erred in holding that it was "conceded" that the validity of the patent in suit depended upon the existence of a fin coil or other extended surface coil, no such concession having been made anywhere in the record.

8. The Court erred in finding that such a coil was not disclosed in the specifications of the patent in suit and in failing to find that the evidence supported the fact that such disclosure was sufficient in the original specification as filed.

9. The Court erred in finding, if it did so find, that the claims were not sufficiently definite to satisfy the patent statute.

10. The Court erred in finding that there was no dispute about the structure of the accused devices and in failing to find that there was such dispute of fact with respect to the purported distinction between the "cold wall refrigerators" and "fin-type refrigerators"; the existence of a single liquefying unit in the accused devices; the mode of operation

and result of defendants' separate and distinct secondary system, all as supported by the evidence in the case, including admissions of the defendants' expert witness.

11. The Court erred in holding, if it did so hold, that the use of primary and secondary refrigerant circuits in the accused devices, being an improvement over the structure disclosed in the patent in suit, established that the accused devices did not infringe any one or more of the claims in suit, and in failing to hold that the existence of such circuit or circuits was immaterial with respect to any issue of infringement all as supported by the evidence in the case.

12. The Court erred in holding that plaintiff's counsel denied the applicability of any doctrine of equivalence and in failing to hold that, as shown by the record, plaintiff's counsel contended that said doctrine was unnecessary and made no concession with respect to its applicability.

13. The Court erred in holding that the claims of the patent in suit were not entitled to any range of equivalency and in failing to hold to the contrary.

14. The Court erred in holding that the patent in suit was not "a pioneer one" or one that had made a long stride in the refrigeration art.

15. The Court erred in finding that there was no rational basis for the amount of the verdicts rendered by the jury, and that the damages awarded by the jury was excessive.

16. The Court erred in holding that the verdicts of the jury did not make possible a reinstatement of those verdicts by the Appellate Court should that Court find the evidence ample to support any one or more of said verdicts, including the amount of the damages found by the jury, as well as the issues of validity and infringement.

17. The Court erred in finding that plaintiff's counsel had attempted to inject prejudice into the case.

18. The Court erred in finding that defendants' counsel failed adequately to inform the jury of defendants' contentions and that defendants' counsel were inept in their handling of the defense of this case.

19. The Court erred in finding, if it did so find, that the manner in which this case is being financed is a violation of the New York law.

20. The Court erred in entering judgment against the plaintiff in that there was sufficient evidence to establish the validity and patentability of the four claims in suit.

21. The Court erred in entering judgment against the plaintiff in that there was sufficient evidence to prove that both of the defendants had infringed the four claims in suit.

22. The Court erred in entering judgment against the plaintiff in that there was sufficient evidence to support the amount of the damages

found by the jury as a reasonable royalty for the use of the invention of the patent in suit.

23. The Court erred in entering judgment which ordered a new trial on the Court's own initiative and pursuant to Rule 59(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the event of a reversal on appeal, and in failing to order that in such event no new trial is necessary.

24. The Court erred in refusing to admit evidence of wilful or joint infringement by Defendant Admiral, which evidence was offered at the trial as shown by the record of excluded evidence appearing at transcript pages 1101-1199.

25. The Court erred in excluding all of the testimony and exhibits of which a record was made at transcript pages 1101-1199.

BUCKHORN & CHEATHAM,

By /s/ KENNETH S. KLARQUIST,

Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant.

Dated: February 15th, 1956.

Affidavit of mail attached.

[Endorsed]: Filed February 15th, 1956.

United States District Court
District of Oregon
Civil No. 6016

MOIST COLD REFRIGERATOR CO., INC., an
Oregon Corporation. Plaintiff,

vs.

LOU JOHNSON CO., INC., an Oregon Corpora-
tion, and MEIER & FRANK COMPANY,
INC., an Oregon Corporation,
Defendants.

and

ADMIRAL CORPORATION, a Delaware Corpo-
ration, and AMANA REFRIGERATION,
INC., an Iowa Corporation,

Defendants-Intervenors.

Portland, Oregon

November 14th, 1955—10:00 A.M.

Before: Honorable Gus J. Solomon,

District Judge, and a jury duly empaneled
and sworn.

Appearances:

JOHN B. CUNNINGHAM,
ORME E. CHEATHAM,
ROBERT F. MAGUIRE,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

W. ELMER RAMSEY,
CHARLES L. BYRON,
J. PIERRE KOLISCH,
Attorneys for Defendants.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

The Court: Are the parties ready in the case of Moist Cold Refrigerator Co., Inc., Plaintiff, vs Admiral Corporation and Amana Refrigeration, Inc.?

Mr. Cunningham: Ready, your Honor.

Mr. Ramsey: We are ready, your Honor.

The Court: Call the jury.

(Thereupon, the jury, with two alternate jurors, was duly empaneled and sworn.)

(The jury having been duly empaneled and sworn, the trial in the above cause was adjourned for the noon recess.)

(At 2:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day, November 14, 1955, trial herein was resumed.)

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, you may proceed.

(Thereupon, Mr. Cunningham made an opening statement on behalf of plaintiff, during the course of which the following proceedings were had:)

Mr. Cunningham: * * * There is one thing I would like to do, your Honor. I wonder if I might borrow from my friends on the other side certain charts that they have marked in pre-trial?

The Court: If it is admitted in evidence, you can use [2*] it. Indicate the charts you want.

*Page numbering appearing at top of page of original Reporter's Transcript of Record.

Mr. Cunningham: I would be very glad to offer it. I believe they are marked Exhibits 114-A and 114-B and 114-C and 114-D.

The Court: Any question about the admissibility of the item of the charts? Mr. Cunningham, do you object to the admission of these by the defendant?

Mr. Cunningham: No, sir. I am offering them now. I may offer them, may I not?

The Court: All right. You can offer defendants' exhibits. Any objection?

Mr. Cunningham: I just have this one over here.

Mr. Ramsey: No objection, your Honor.

The Court: The defendants have no objection to the admission of their own charts in evidence. 114-A, 114-B, 114-C and 114-D are admitted.

Mr. Cunningham: It might help you to, as in introduction, visualize what we have to offer, and these first two boxes, refrigerators—the shiny ones are the accused structures. Do I have to offer these now, sir? I would be glad to.

The Court: Is there any objection to the admission in evidence of any of the physical exhibits such as the refrigerators and the works of the refrigerators?

Mr. Ramsey: None whatsoever.

The Court: All of them are admitted and Mr. Bishop will [3] subsequently take the numbers, but in the meantime refer to any one you want.

* * *

(At 2:30 o'clock p.m., the afternoon recess was taken, after which the following proceedings were had:)

The Court: Mr. Ramsey, you may proceed.

(Thereupon, Mr. Ramsey proceeded with opening statement on behalf of defendants, during the course of which the following proceedings were had:)

Mr. Ramsey: * * * Might I interrupt just a moment?

We have not offered the rest of this series, 114-E to 114-R, and I ask that they be admitted.

The Court: Is there any objection?

Mr. Cunningham: No objection, your Honor.

The Court: They may be admitted, -E to -R, inclusive, 114.

(Documents previously marked Defendants' Exhibits 114-E to 114-R, inclusive, were thereupon received in evidence.) [4]

(Thereupon, Mr. Ramsey continued with the opening statement on behalf of defendants, and at 3:00 p.m. concluded said opening statement.)

The Court: Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, by agreement of the parties the testimony will not commence until tomorrow morning, so you will have the rest of the afternoon free.

The most important thing in this case will be the testimony and the exhibits, so wait until you hear the testimony before you make up your minds.

There will be these issues that the attorneys brought out. First, is the patent valid, and, secondly, have Amana and Admiral infringed the patents of

the plaintiff even if they are valid. Those are the two issues to keep in mind. You are excused until 9:45 tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 3:10 p.m., the trial in the above-entitled cause was adjourned to Tuesday, November 15, 1955, at 9:45 a.m.) [5]

Tuesday, November 15, 1955

(At 9:45 o'clock a.m., proceedings herein were resumed, pursuant to adjournment, as follows:)

The Court: Mr. Cunningham.

Mr. Cunningham: If your Honor please, I would like to make some formal offers before our first witness, and, Mr. Cheatham, if you will help me get the exhibits and hand them to the Clerk.

I offer in evidence what has heretofore been marked Exhibit 1, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, the original patent, soft copy; Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, a soft copy of the Reissue Patent in Suit, and I ask that Mr. Cheatham hand your Honor a soft copy for your own use.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 17, being a certified copy of the title documents of the Patent in Suit showing title in the plaintiff Moist Cold, and I have to ask the assistance of the Clerk on these because these are from the files in this case. Some of them go back to the beginning of the case, 1951.

I ask that Plaintiff's Exhibits 4-A to 4-D be produced, and I offer them in evidence.

The Court: Is there any objection?

Mr. Ramsey: I am not quite certain. As far as 1, 2 and 17 are concerned, there are no objections. [6]

Mr. Cunningham: Maybe it will assist everybody if I identify these exhibits as they go in.

The Court: No, that is not necessary. Which ones do you want now, 4-A, -B, -C and -D?

Mr. Cunningham: That is correct, your Honor.

The Court: Do you want the interrogatories?

Mr. Cunningham: The interrogatories to Meier & Frank, to Lou Johnson, Admiral and Amana, respectively.

The Court: Do you want all of the interrogatories, or do you want——

Mr. Cunningham: All of them, your Honor.

The Court: You want the interrogatories or the answers to the interrogatories?

Mr. Cunningham: I want the interrogatories now, your Honor.

The Court: Do you want the interrogatories but not the answers to the interrogatories?

Mr. Cunningham: I do want the answers, sir. They are about to follow. I had not completed it.

The Court: The interrogatories will not go in unless the answers go in.

Mr. Cunningham: I offer the answers, which are Exhibits 4-AA, 4-BB, 4-CC, 4-DD, and I point out that there is an insert as to 4-CC, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14, and an insert as to 4-DD of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, [7] 10 and 11. I ask that those be produced, and I offer them now in evidence.

Mr. Ramsey: The numbers are meaningless because they do not appear on their list. They do not appear on their list of exhibits.

The Court: They are on the list now.

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, I will be glad to identify each and every one.

The Court: This should be done outside the court sessions. We are busy now. They are identified, Mr. Ramsey. Talk to Mr. Kolisch.

Mr. Ramsey: I was looking at his list and it has AA, BB, CC, DD. Now he talking about some insert numbers.

Mr. Cunningham: Look at the following page. I have had copies of it, and you have had copies of it for a week.

Mr. Ramsey: I am sorry; we didn't see on the next page.

The Court: The next two pages.

Mr. Ramsey: We have no objection.

The Court: Very well.

Mr. Cunningham: I ask that Plaintiff's Exhibits 5-A, -B, -C, -D and -E be produced. I offer them under those respective numbers.

The Court: 5-A, -B, -C, -D and -E.

Mr. Kolisch: No objection.

The Court: All right; they may be admitted. [8]

(Requests for Admission of Facts and Genuineness of Documents, dated March 7, 1955, received in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 5-A;

(General Answer dated April 5, 1955, received in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 5-B;

(Answer by Admiral, dated May 16, 1955, received in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 5-C;

(Answer by Amana, dated May 16, 1955, received in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 5-D; and

(Request for Admission dated August 16, 1955, received in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 5-E.)

Mr. Cunningham: Now, if your Honor please, I ask Mr. Lewis J. Bronaugh of Portland, Oregon, to take the stand. [9]

LEWIS J. BRONAUGH

a witness produced in behalf of Plaintiff, having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

Direct Examination

By Mr. Cunningham:

Q. What is your name?

A. My name is Lewis J. Bronaugh, L-e-w-i-s B-r-o-n-a-u-g-h. I reside at 742 Southwest Vista Avenue, Portland, Oregon.

Q. Mr. Bronaugh, what is your occupation?

A. I am an attorney-at-law.

Q. What is your present association?

A. I am a Deputy District Attorney for Multnomah County.

Q. Mr. Bronaugh, what was your occupation during the years 1928 through 1932?

A. From approximately December 1, 1928, until the end of 1931, December, I was President of the

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Potter Refrigerator Corporation, Portland, Oregon.

Q. Did you ever have any connection with the Potter Refrigerator Sales Corporation as distinguished from Potter Refrigerator Corporation?

A. I think the answer to that should be No. When I first associated myself with T. Irving Potter, the Potter Sales Corporation was in existence, but I think it would be proper to say that I had no connection with—I was not employed by the Potter Refrigerator Sales Corporation.

Q. Whom did you interview at the time you became employed [10] by the Potter Refrigerator Corporation?

A. I first contacted Mr. Irving R. Halsey.

Q. Who was he?

A. I believe he was the head of the Potter Refrigerator Sales Corporation, but my interview with him had nothing to do with that corporation. It had to do with the syndicate sales work, so-called, being carried on by Mr. Potter.

Q. Did you subsequently meet Mr. Potter?

A. Yes, almost—I think probably the first time I was ever in their office.

Q. Can you place the date more accurately than just 1928?

A. I believe it was in August.

Q. Whom did you regard as your employer at that time?

A. T. Irving Potter.

Q. Where was the office of Mr. Potter at that time?

A. In Suite 912, Public Service Building, here in Portland, Oregon.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Q. Would you tell us a little bit about the general setup at the Potter Refrigerator Sales? Did they have any plant?

A. The main room was a large room, a large corner room which was 912. It was a display room containing various refrigerator cabinets and compressor units. Off to the left was Mr. Halsey's office, and off of it to the right was Mr. Potter's office. It was a three-room suite.

Q. At the time of your employment in 1928 was there any [11] factory where refrigeration equipment was being produced?

A. Mr. Potter had then, and had had for some time previously, space in the Fouch Electric Company plant down on North Ninth Street, which he used.

Q. Was that here in Portland?

A. That was here in Portland.

Q. What was the business of that company and Mr. Potter at that time, generally?

A. He was engaged in development of refrigeration equipment, design, engineering, manufacture.

Q. How long would you say he had been engaged in that activity?

A. To the best of my knowledge, it was commenced here in Portland in 1927.

Q. What type of refrigerating equipment was he interested in developing in 1928?

A. He was primarily concerned with the development of an oscillating reciprocating type of com-

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

pressor differing from the conventional types in that there were no—it contained no valves. It was a ported job and operated with a——

The Court: Is that involved in this patent?

Mr. Cunningham: No, your Honor.

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, we are going to have all we can do to try this case without trying a lot of other things. I think we ought to start getting down to business. [12]

Mr. Cunningham: If your Honor please, it is not—the compressor is not involved in the patent, if that is the way I understood your question. Now, of course, how this invention was born and the background and setting is, I think, very much a part of the case.

The Court: But it does not involve the question of how much space they have in the Public Service Building. This case is going to take a long time. It is going to take a lot longer if we get off the main issues of the case. Go ahead.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): How long did your employment by Mr. Potter continue?

A. From approximately August, 1928, until the end of 1931.

Q. Had you had any experience in the refrigeration business before you joined the Potter organization? A. No.

Q. Did you during your employment there have charge of the shop, the manufacturing end of the business, until December, 1931?

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

A. I did from approximately December 1, 1928 until the end of 1931.

Q. During all of that period were you the president of the company?

A. That is right. Qualify that: I was President of the Potter Refrigerator Corporation from the time it was incorporated, [13] which, I believe, was in February or March of 1929. My function, however, from December 1st was the same as it was after the corporation was incorporated.

Q. Just for the record, I note that the date of formation of the Potter Refrigerator Corporation was February 23, 1929, and that it continued until it was dissolved in 1935.

Did you also participate in the sales of refrigerator equipment to customers of Potter Refrigerator Corporation?

A. To some degree. We had a sales organization both retail and wholesale, and I occasionally entered into some transactions which were considerably involved, particularly in commercial equipment, in the closing of the transactions.

Q. Mr. Bronaugh, will you tell us a little more fully what your duties were as President of the Potter Refrigerator Corporation?

A. That would cover a pretty broad scope. I would say the usual duties of the head of a business of that type. It was primarily development work. Our sales were somewhat secondary and incidental, merely to prove out or primarily to prove out the

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

new types of equipment that we were building. I had general charge of all of the operation from design through production through sales. [14]

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Now, Mr. Bronaugh, are you familiar with the type of electric refrigerator for household use which was available on the market prior to the development work that you mentioned went on by Potter?

A. I think I was very thoroughly familiar with them; I had to be.

Q. Will you describe, please, generally, the conventional-type of household refrigerator prior to the Potter development?

A. At that time the conventional refrigerator was little more than a glorified icebox in that it had a mechanical device substituted for the cake of ice which performed the same function; that is, absorbed the heat within the box and removed it thereby lowering the temperature. There were various types but they were basically alike. The chilling units varied somewhat from coils to brine tanks, to what was known as the boiler-type which contained the float valve. But, basically, they were the same and the function, the performance so far as results were concerned, were very closely alike.

Q. Will you mention some of the names of the well-known household refrigerator manufacturers?

A. Yes; General Electric, Frigidaire, Kelvinator, Copeland.

Q. And were there any others?

A. There were a good many others.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Q. Now, were such refrigerators of conventional types adapted to preserve frozen foods similar to the Birds Eye frozen foods? [15]

A. In no respect whatsoever.

Q. May I have the answer, please?

A. In no respect whatsoever.

Q. Well, will you just explain the basis for that answer, Mr. Bronaugh?

A. Because they could not maintain a low enough temperature even when the compressor was in its operating cycle. The temperature inside the chilling unit was not low enough for frozen food preservation. Of course, in the operative period of the compressor the chilling unit warmed up until it did well if it kept ice cubes; it certainly was not a low enough temperature to preserve frozen foods. The space was inadequate, also.

Q. Now, Mr. Bronaugh, are you one of the two patentees of reissue patent 23,058? A. I am.

Q. Now, was the refrigerator of that patent adapted to preserve such frozen foods for any length of time?

A. I would say almost an indefinite period of time. I would say as well adapted as a cold storage plant in which those foods are kept.

Q. Now, returning to this conventional type of refrigerator that you were describing, was there any common characteristic in those boxes as to the formation of frost on the evaporator?

A. They all formed frost on the evaporator because of the [16] temperature being well below 32

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

degrees Fahrenheit the moisture in the air in the box and the moisture contained in the food products that were placed in the box being picked up by the air circulating over the evaporator precipitated onto the evaporator and formed a coating of frost which continued to build up until the unit was shut down long enough to permit that frost to melt off.

Q. What effect did the collection of frost on these conventional old-type evaporators have on the food stored in the refrigerator?

A. Well, most of the moisture that collected on there in the form of frost came out of the food-stuffs with the result of dehydration and drying out of the foods placed in the refrigerator.

Q. Did this accumulation of frost on the evaporator in the conventional refrigerator necessitate any interruption of the operation of the apparatus for the purpose of getting rid of the frost?

A. Yes. The apparatus had to be shut down periodically for varying lengths of time to melt off that frost because the build-up of that frost blanket resulted in a progressive decrease in the efficiency of the mechanism.

You might compare it with piling blankets on top of a steam radiator in a heating plant. If you put enough blankets on there you certainly wouldn't heat the room. If [17] you get enough frost on the evaporator in the refrigerator you are not going to cool the box.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Q. Can you give us some estimate of the frequency with which it was necessary to defrost the ordinary refrigerator?

A. That was a very variable thing, depending on the type of chilling unit, the temperature at which it operated, and the type of use of the box, the number of times the door was opened and closed, the amount of moist food products put into the box. In other words, the more moisture that you introduce into the box the faster the accumulation of frost on the evaporator.

Q. And was that true of all of the types of conventional refrigerators that you knew of prior to the advent on the market of the refrigerator of Patent No. 23,058?

A. It was, except for the Potter refrigerator.

Q. By that you mean that until the Potter refrigerator came along there was no such equipment—household equipment on the market that you knew of?

A. The Potter refrigerator was the first self-defrosting refrigerator marketed in America, to the best of my knowledge.

Q. Do you know of any such refrigerator in any other country in the world?

A. I never had heard of one.

Q. Now, what is the disadvantage from the standpoint of the user of the conventional-type refrigerator in having to defrost [18] the evaporator periodically?

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

A. It's more a matter of inconvenience than anything else so far as the defrosting operation is concerned. The real detriment, of course, was the dehydration, the drying-out, of the foodstuffs.

Q. Well, what effect, Mr. Bronaugh, did the defrosting operation have on the temperature of the food that had been placed in the refrigerator for preservation?

A. I think very little if the defrosting operation was conducted with reasonable frequency. If you permitted it to build up to too thick a blanket—and I have seen this actually occur—even with the compressor running constantly you could not reduce the temperature in the box to the desired degree.

Q. What can you say with respect to the process of defrosting as habitually carried out by users, housewives?

Mr. Ramsey: If the Court please, I have not objected to the form of questions, but it seems that that is going a bit too far, as to what you can say about this, and is this so, and they are leading.

The Court: Is this man an expert? Is he claiming he is an expert?

Mr. Cunningham: Why, yes, your Honor.

The Court: Well, he hasn't been qualified by the lawyer.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, he is, shall we say, an expert on [19] his own patent. Your Honor, he is one of the patentees. May I ask him whether he knows?

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

The Court: Are you a mechanical engineer, or what kind of an engineer are you?

The Witness: I am not an engineer at all, your Honor, I am not a licensed engineer. I have worked with mechanics all my life.

The Court: Then you are not trying to qualify him as an expert?

Mr. Cunningham: Yes, I am; for the fact expert on his patent.

May I ask a few preliminary questions?

The Court: All right, go ahead.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): What formal education do you have, Mr. Bronaugh?

A. Well, the usual primary preparatory school and two years of college?

Q. What college did you—

A. Plus my law degree. Amherst, Massachusetts.

Q. You stated that you have always been interested in things mechanical. Can you name any other work that you did or development work you did on things other than household refrigerator other than as shown by the patent in suit?

A. From the time I was a schoolboy I worked with internal combustion motors. [20]

Q. Now, in connection with your development work on household refrigerators did you make any effort and were you successful in such effort in observing the ordinary use of household refrigerators in the kitchen by the housewife?

A. I observed them very closely in actual usage and most certainly in our constant experiments

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

work in our own plant.

Q. Do you feel that you know how this defrosting operation was habitually carried out by housewives in Portland, Oregon?

A. Very definitely.

Mr. Cunningham: May I have an answer to my question, your Honor?

The Court: Well, I know how they defrost household refrigerators, too, but that doesn't qualify me as an expert, does it?

Mr. Cunningham: I beg your Honor's pardon, I couldn't hear.

The Court: Merely because this man knows how housewives defrost their refrigerators doesn't make him an expert, because I have watched that many times myself.

Mr. Maguire: I think perhaps we are a little at sea on the inquiry. I think the inquiry started as to what time it took and what effect it took on defrosting and the amount of ice, and the question was whether he had observed and knew what the practice of housewives was in the time and interval in defrosting. [21]

The Court: Well, a man doesn't have to be qualified as an expert for that purpose.

Mr. Maguire: Well, your Honor, that isn't it. It isn't a question of whether he is qualified as an expert on that question, it's a question of whether the testimony is competent, what he saw and observed.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

The Court: That is perfectly all right. Mr. Cunningham indicated and the witness has testified as to other matters which involve matters for an expert, I thought, and I was just trying to find out whether he was claiming that Mr. Bronaugh is an expert, and Mr. Cunningham indicated that he was an expert on his own invention.

All right, go ahead.

Mr. Ramsey: May I just add one comment? On direct this witness was asked whether he had any experience in the field of refrigeration before he was employed by Potter, and he said, "No."

The Court: But I think that, as I pointed out you don't have to be an expert, you merely have to observe what happens to household refrigerator when you turn the juice on. Go ahead.

Mr. Cunningham: May we have the question read, your Honor?

The Court: You will have to ask the question over again; it's a long time back.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, I will attempt to ask the question. [22] I have forgotten the exact phraseology; that's the reason I asked to have it read.

Q. Can you state, Mr. Bronaugh, what the effect was on the temperature of the food in this defrosting operation as it was habitually carried out by the very normal and able housewives of Portland?

A. The temperature of the box would rise and, I think, in most cases would become room temperature. In other words, to accomplish the defrosting

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

operation the air inside the box had to be warmed up sufficiently to melt off that frost and if the frost blanket had been accumulating for two or three weeks it took a very considerable period of time to do it. It could be accelerated, of course, if they put trays of boiling water inside of the chilling unit. That was true of the coil type. It had very little effect on the brine tank or boiler type. About the only way that those could be defrosted was by prolonged shutdown and an opening of the doors of the refrigerator.

It was customary for housewives to take the food-stuffs out of the refrigerator during the defrosting process.

Q. Do you know whether it has any deleterious effect on frozen foods to allow them to thaw?

A. They cannot be refrozen and restored to their former condition.

Q. By "condition" you mean they cannot safely be restored—— [23]

A. They cannot be restored to their former condition by freezing.

Q. Now, Mr. Bronaugh, I show you and I offer in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 16-A the chart that is mounted on this easel.

Can that be moved nearer the witness and nearer the jury?

Mr. Ramsey: No objection.

The Witness: May I leave the chair for the purpose of——

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Mr. Cunningham: Maybe if you move it farther back it would be better.

The Court: Move it into the center.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Now, Mr. Bronaugh, will you, in your own words, and with the aid of a pointer if we have one in the room, explain in general the operation of this construction and what that drawing shows to the jury?

A. If I understand your question, Mr. Cunningham, you want me to describe the refrigerator diagrammatically shown by this drawing?

Q. Yes. And may I ask you first: Is that a drawing of the refrigerator of your patent in suit?

A. It is.

Q. Will you please go ahead?

A. The box itself would appear in general as any other refrigerator. It would be made up of a metal covering, wood [24] covering, whatever it might be. The major difference in appearance is the fact that there was an upper and lower door. The roughed-in material shown in this drawing (indicating) is insulation. Note that there is a uniform thickness of insulation around the upper compartment which was the fresh foods compartment and heavier insulation around the lower compartment which was the freezer and frozen storage compartment.

In the fresh foods compartment there was a finned coil back of a baffle plate, the coil consisting of a single line of copper tubing extending through aluminum fins that were extruded for the cooling

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

so as to provide a very tight fit and a good metallic contact for purposes of heat transmission. The temperature control, we happened to use what was known as a time-o-stat which was affected by the temperature of the box actuating a mercury switch which turned the compressor unit down here (indicating) on and off.

In the cold storage compartment and freezing compartment this was a brine tank, these were ice cube tray inserts, and this was an open space with flanges to permit the insertion of a shelf (indicating).

Down here (indicating) is the compressor unit, the machine; the pump does the work. Running from the receiver is a fluid line containing a refrigerant leading up to and through the coiling in the brine tank and then on up and into the tubing in the finned coil in the refrigeration [25] compartment and then returning through the line down the back of the refrigerator to the pump, the refrigerant circulating by the suction action of the pump. In normal operation this compartment operated at 40 degrees (indicating). This freezer compartment—I am speaking of Fahrenheit—this freezer compartment operated at minus 10 Fahrenheit, 10 degrees below zero. This compartment (indicating) operated at 10 degrees above zero. I say they “operated” at that—we ran tests, of course, under actual operating conditions and under conditions of our normal experimentation with recording thermometers recording the temperature day after day, and they oper-

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

ated very closely to those temperatures as shown by the charts on the mounts.

There was no frost on the fins of this coil (indicating), never under any circumstances. There was no dehydration of foodstuffs. The atmosphere in this compartment had 100 per cent saturation. It contained all the moisture that the air could contain at the temperature existing so that there was absolutely no dehydration of foodstuffs; there couldn't be. [26]

We put fresh foods in here, both lettuce and spinach, and saw it coming back up to a fresh condition again because there was more moisture in the air in there than there was outside in the air in which this stuff had been lying in the market.

The temperature in the freezer being approximately minus 10 degrees, there was no adhesion of the ice trays. One of the things that intrigued people was, when they first saw this, was the fact that you could flip an ice cube tray in and out with your finger. It could not adhere. This compartment would keep frozen food for an indefinite time, the temperature being approximately that at which it is kept in the markets.

Any further questions?

Q. I do not recall.

A. I tried to give a general picture of what it is.

Q. It is very hard to remember each and every detail, is it not?

A. I remember the details, but how far to go into details is—

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Q. I wonder if you did mention anything about insulation of these compartments, how that co-operated with the whole combination?

A. In our designing and building of this unit, of course, this was the result of a long, long period of experimentation, [27] a great deal of work that went on before and the building of experimental jobs, some of them very crude, and we learned as we went along. Then when it came to building the finished article, of course, there is a matter of heat inflow into the box that you have to take out because of the differential between the inside and the outside temperature of the room. That inflow is calculated from B.T.U., British thermal unit tables that are used in refrigeration engineering, and you could tell very closely with a given temperature differential, say 40 inside and 70 outside, the rate of heat flow through into that, so you built your insulation in an insulating wall around that to retard that heat flow and keep out as much of it as you could within reason.

Now, the temperature, we may say in here was 40 and the average temperature outside was 70 or 75. We computed the amount of insulation we needed for, say, a heat barrier within practical limits, and, as I recall, we used two inches of insulation in the upper compartment. Now, because there was a greater differential at minus 10 and plus 10 and this same 70 and 75 degrees outside——

Q. Referring now to the lower compartment?

A. That is right: you have a much more rapid

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

flow of heat from outside into that so you have to build a thicker heat barrier or use thicker insulation to proportionately retard [28] that heat flow.

If you have a differential, say, of 75 or 80 degrees you are going to have a very rapid heat flow through this hot air trying to spill into that low temperature and you have to build a heavy wall, and then, as I recall, in this we used four inches of insulation only two inches here because we have very little differential, only about 40 degrees, between the upper compartment and the lower compartment.

Q. Is that, Mr. Bronaugh, back of this center partition which seems to be labeled, 33, what we know—anyhow, the dividing wall between the upper and lower compartments, is that exposed to the ambient temperature of the room?

A. Not at all. The only heat flow you have would be from the approximate 40-degree area to the approximate zero area.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Maguire: May I make a suggestion. I notice in both the questions and answers they say "here" or "there," but for the record it will not get what particular portion is being referred to.

The Court: Thank you, Mr. Maguire, for your suggestion.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): What is designated by the numeral 23, I believe it is here?

A. 23 appears to be the designation of the copper tubing [29] that runs around through the brine tank

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

to reduce the temperature of that brine to the approximate minus 10 degrees Fahrenheit that I mentioned before.

I might add there by way of explanation, the refrigerating mechanism does not generate cold; it absorbs heat.

Q. I think there may be an error there, Mr. Bronaugh. 23 is described in the patent as an expansion valve.

A. Well, diagrammatically you cannot tell what it is.

Q. Will you tell us, assuming that is an expansion valve, will you tell us what the function of the expansion valve was?

A. The expansion valve is a variable restriction orifice. In the machine we have methyl chloride. Methyl chloride boils normally at minus 10 degrees. That is, it will vaporize at 10 degrees below zero at atmospheric pressure. The only way you can keep it liquefied is to keep it under pressure because temperature and pressure invariably go hand in hand. They never depart from a fixed relationship. In order to keep a liquid that will boil in minus 10 degrees in liquid form, you have got to raise the pressure up to the, let us say, 75 pounds per square inch instead of 15 pounds atmospheric pressure. This is not an exact. I am simply using it for purposes of illustration. [30]

Now, to permit that liquid to absorb heat we convert it into a gas, and it is the absorption of heat

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

by that liquid that does gasify it. The liquid passes through the copper tubing up here from there—this happens to be Figure 23 to illustrate it—to a restricted opening. Now, that can be merely a very small orifice. You could have a quarter-inch tubing leading to a fitting that had a hole in it, let us say, ten-thousandths of an inch in diameter, and that would permit the liquid to flow through but at a very slow rate because of the minute size of the opening, and the minute that liquid passed through into the lower pressure on the other side of that restriction orifice it gasifies because it absorbs heat in the air.

The expansion valve is just a restriction orifice but an adjustable one so that you can vary the size of it. It works like the needle valve in the carburetor of your automobile, and by turning that needle valve in or out you can enlarge or diminish the opening and permit a greater or lesser amount of gasoline to pass through. The expansion valve in the refrigerator does the same.

Q. How about the capillary tube, is that another example? A. Yes.

Q. Does that perform virtually the same function as the expansion valve?

A. Yes, any means of restricting the exit of the liquid [31] from the high-pressure area to a low-pressure area would be termed, I think, an expansion valve. At least, the function, the result would be the same.

Q. Mr. Bronaugh, in explanation of our former

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

mistake on the numbers, I notice that 22 refers to the tubing. A. Copper tubing.

Q. And No. 23, which does look as though it is on the tubing, refers to the expansion valve.

Can you tell us just the path of the refrigerator, and, adopting Mr. Maguire's suggestion, I think you might use the reference numerals appearing on Exhibit 16-A, starting with the compressor, let us say, and making a complete circuit?

A. I will start with the electric motor which is designated here as 16. It is connected to the compressor by a belt running around the fan wheel of the compressor, and this compressor is just a pump to create a suction. As the pistons work up and down in there they are pulling on the suction line pulling the gas out that is created by the conversion of this liquid refrigerant due to the absorption of heat within the refrigerator, and there is a—I should have started probably at the end—here is a steel tank known as the receiver which is the tank containing the liquid refrigerant under pressure so that it is kept in a liquefied form. This tubing line is shown here as No. 24. [32]

Q. Are there arrows there pointing—

A. The flow of that liquid is up through that tubing.

Q. Is that shown by the arrows?

A. Shown by the arrows, but that tubing extends on into this brine tank.

Q. Through the expansion valve?

A. Through the expansion valve.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Q. And into the tubing in the brine tank?

A. Into the tubing in the brine tank, the tubing 22 shown as coiling around these various openings.

Q. What is a brine tank?

A. A brine tank is any metallic tank containing what is termed a brine which is merely water to which something has been added so that it will not freeze at the temperature at which you are operating. When you put your antifreeze in your automobile radiator you are to some sense creating a brine tank because you have injected something that will keep it from freezing. In here we use an alcohol sufficient alcohol in the water in that brine tank so that it would not freeze at the temperatures at which we operate.

Q. Now, sir, where does that refrigerant flow from the brine tank 19 through—

A. In our tubing 22 on up through a tubing line—I cannot trace the designations—

Q. The photostat has been overenlarged, I am afraid. That [33] is all right; can you see the point to which it should go there?

A. It is shown here as this dotted line coming up—coming on up through the food compartment and into the coil in the fresh foods compartment.

Q. Can you tell us a little bit about that coil which is designated Figure 25, I believe, in Fig. 2 and 25 in Fig. 1?

A. That coil consisted of single rows of copper

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

tubing in that form. There are 1, 2, 3, 4 single lines just like that ruler when laid on there of the copper tubing extended similarly.

Q. I notice that is partly in solid and partly in dotted lines. Could you explain to the jury why that is so in Fig. 1?

A. I don't know that I could. I do not know whether I understand the question.

Q. Maybe I can help you a little. Is there something in front of—

Mr. Byron: May it please the Court, I suggest—

The Court: That objection is sustained.

Mr. Byron: Who is the witness here?

The Court: Yes, bring another witness to explain, Mr. Cunningham.

The Witness: I failed to understand the import of Mr. Cunningham's question. There is a baffle plate in front [34] of that coil. I referred to that a while ago.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): The baffle plate is at 28?

A. The reason for the baffle plate is, in the first place, to cover up the coil and give the box a better appearance and also to accelerate the circulation of air.

Q. Is that baffle plate shown more clearly in Fig. 2?

A. The baffle plate is shown here as 28 with the drip connection 29 down at the low end. It would slope a little bit down at the low end to the piece of

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

copper tubing to prevent the drip of moisture that collected in the drip trough at the bottom of this baffle plate, the moisture that came down off of the coil, and that in turn was caught within a milk bottle or some container.

Q. Is that milk bottle designated as No. 30, Fig. 1? A. Yes; very, very little of it.

Q. Now, is the finned coil 25 shown in Fig. 2 at right angles to that as shown in Fig. 1—

Mr. Byron: May it please the Court, this witness—we object to that. We are willing to be kindly about an examination, but we do not believe that any attorney on a direct examination should ask leading questions, especially of a man who has knowledge, who is supposed to know about his own device.

Mr. Cunningham: I withdraw the question, your Honor.

The Court: Very well. [35]

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): What can you say about the structure of the coil 25?

The Witness: I believe, Mr. Cunningham, I described it earlier in my testimony as a finned coil and described the construction of it, the fact that the copper tubing ran through aluminum fins that were extruded so as to provide a very tight fit around the copper tubing, and then there was a good metallic contact and a good heat-transmission unit.

Q. Is this device that you have characterized a finned coil, is that shown and designated by 25 in both figures? A. Yes.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Q. Now we have the refrigerant up to the finned coil. Can you complete the circuit for us?

A. The refrigerant continues on up through what is termed the liquid line, through the finned coil, and connected, I would say, to the exit side or end of that finned coil is a larger tubing. This liquid line carrying liquid is a very small tubing, quarter-inch. The line coming off, which has to handle gas, is larger.

Q. You are referring now, are you not, to the upper right-hand corner of Fig. 1?

A. Yes, I am trying to find some numerical designation that I can use, but I don't see anything to describe it. I will trace it on the chart. The line comes out of the top of the [36] finned coil and extends on down through the box into the compressor compartment and then to the compressor itself.

Q. This is where we came in, isn't it, Mr. Bronaugh, in this cycle?

A. I believe so.

Q. Mr. Bronaugh, while you are on your feet, will you cast your eyes in the direction of the refrigerators—

The Court: Well, I think we will take our morning recess now until 11:00 o'clock. You are now excused for about 12 minutes, members of the jury.

(Thereupon the jury retired for the morning recess.)

The Court: I will say to you, Mr. Cunningham, that in spite of the fact that you did not qualify Mr. Bronaugh as an expert he did testify as an ex-

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

pert for a considerable length of time not only on refrigeration but on the effect on frozen food. He has definitely stated that you cannot refreeze any food that has once been permitted to thaw out. That may be true or it may not be true, but I do not think that Mr. Bronaugh is in a position to make those statements. I did not stop him because there was no objection to it, but in spite of his lack of qualifications he is testifying to a lot of things about which he cannot possibly testify as an expert. I call that to your attention. We will recess until 11:00 o'clock. [37]

(Morning recess taken.)

(Thereupon, at 11:00 a.m., the jury returned to the jury box and the following proceedings were had:)

The Court: Mr. Bronaugh, Mr. Cunningham wanted you to look at that refrigerator.

Mr. Cunningham: May I ask him a question first, your Honor?

The Court: Proceed.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Mr. Bronaugh, we neglected to ask you about this little device, 31 What is that?

A. I described that, I believe, in my testimony Mr. Cunningham, as a time-o-stat temperature control.

Q. I merely wanted to identify it.

What part does that play in the operation of your combination?

A. That device consists of what is known as a

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

bimetal coil. A bimetal coil is a strip of metal, two pieces of metal of different heat relationships that are adhered together and then coiled up, and the temperature of the air on that coil causes it to try either to tighten up or open up, and as it tightens up it closes, and as it tries to open up, due to warming, turns the other way, and that turning action actuates a mercury tube connected to the electrical circuit, the mercury in that tube forming the contact and closing [38] the circuit just as though you pushed a switch in the wall. When the tube is tipped down, the mercury is in contact with the two poles connected to that tube and closes the electrical circuit and causes the compressor to operate. When, due to the warming up and the tendency of this bimetal coil to open up, the tube is tipped the other way, the mercury is tipped down in the other end, and the circuit is broken just as if you pushed the "off" switch in a wall switch, and you break the circuit and close down the compressor.

Q. Mr. Bronaugh, if you will take a walk with me and tell me whether or not you see any refrigerators that are old friends in this room——

A. The refrigerator against the wall behind the third coat rack is the refrigerator that was built from this drawing that I have just described.

The Court: Take the refrigerator out. Could you do that?

Mr. Cunningham: I do not think that is the function of Counsel, your Honor.

The Court: I was going to say that during the noon hour we are going to have all of those re-

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

refrigerators moved on this side of the wall (indicating) and these benches removed, and it might be easier. Can you delay the question until that time?

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, I merely want to identify [39] what he has already testified about, and it is Plaintiff's Exhibit 11-A, and I offer it in evidence.

Mr. Ramsey: No objection.

The Court: I think all of the refrigerators have been admitted in evidence. It is already in evidence.

Mr. Cunningham: That is not my recollection, your Honor.

Mr. Kolisch: Yes, it was admitted yesterday, your Honor.

The Court: Mr. Bishop has called my attention to the fact that they are all in.

Mr. Cunningham: This does not have to be removed, and by "this" I mean 11-B.

The Court: Does not have to be removed?

Mr. Cunningham: Moved.

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, I said this afternoon we are going to have all of those others moved on this side so they will all be on one side, and then the jury can see it without having to leave the jury box.

Mr. Cunningham: Yes, your Honor, that would be very helpful, but can I now refer to 11-B and ask Mr. Bronaugh if he recognizes that?

The Court: Certainly; go ahead.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Will you answer the question, Mr. Bronaugh? [40]

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

The Witness: This refrigerator was built by the Potter Refrigerator Corporation here in Portland, Oregon, in 1931.

Q. Did you have anything to do with the building of it?

A. Everything except the actual physical structure. It represented, you might say, the finished result of a long period of experimentation, many crude models built before we built this metal covering in order to have a piece of merchandise that could be sold to the housewife for use in the home, and it incorporated the ideas that we had been working toward.

Q. Does that embody all of the features of the patent in suit, and I direct your attention to the empty lower cabinet.

A. That does embody all of the features of the patent in suit.

Q. How about the compressor motor? How about the compressor, the motor?

A. There is nothing in the compressor compartments. There would normally, of course, have to be a compressor that was shown in the drawing. The rest of it is here, the brine tank we were discussing, then the cold storage compartment, and this is the fresh foods compartment.

Q. Referring to the upper compartment now?

A. Referring to the upper compartment.

Q. The brine tank is in the lower? [41]

A. The brine tank is in the lower compartment.

Q. Go ahead.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

A. This is the baffle plate that we were talking about, in front of the coil.

Q. At the rear of the upper compartment?

A. At the rear of the upper compartment. Behind that is a finned coil. The fins are not visible from the jury box, but they are there and show about three-quarters of an inch of their length projecting above the baffle. In the upper right-hand corner, the upper compartment, is the time-o-stat temperature control that we were discussing. The tubing lines, of course, are concealed. They run through the back wall of the cabinet, and the expansion valve that we were talking about is also located in the back wall of the cabinet with a plate on the rear wall to permit access to the expansion valve for adjustment.

Q. Would you take a look at the first refrigerator and tell me if that does not correspond in all respects? By that I mean Exhibit 11-A.

A. I know that refrigerator thoroughly without walking over there, Mr. Cunningham. I know exactly what it is because I built it.

Q. Do you find the same elements?

A. The same elements. The only difference you will find between that refrigerator and this one is that this is, has [42] a tin-copper brine tank where that had a galvanized metal. This has only three openings. for trays, where that one had five or seven. The only difference between that is in the trim around the doors which in that is wood and in this is some Bakelite material or something for better

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

appearance and durability. Otherwise they are the same. This is a little bit more finished product. That was the first metal-covered box we built.

Q. By "that" you mean 11-A?

A. 11-A, the first metal-covered box to incorporate this invention that we built in Portland, and these were built shortly after that first one.

Q. Mr. Bronaugh, did you at any time become familiar with a patent to a Mr. Anderson, No. 1,439,051?

A. Yes, I did.

Mr. Cunningham: I offer in evidence Plaintiff's Exhibit 16-B, a chart of the drawing of the Anderson patent.

The Court: Is there any objection to the Anderson patent?

Mr. Ramsey: No objection.

The Court: It is admitted.

(Chart of Anderson Patent previously marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 16-B for Identification was received in evidence.)

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Can you see that chart from the [43] witness stand?

A. Yes, sir. You need not turn it quite so much if that is turned a little bit too far for the jurors.

Q. Are there three compartments shown in this diagram?

A. Yes, there are: The compressor compartment in the lower left portion of the cabinet, a freezer compartment in the lower right section of the cabinet, and a fresh foods compartment in the upper portion of the cabinet.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Mr. Ramsey: If the Court please, may I object—is he now talking and testifying as an expert, a patent expert?

Mr. Cunningham: He is explaining, your Honor, a patent with which he is familiar, for the aid of the Court and the jury, in his own language and with the devices made under the patent with which he is familiar.

The Court: I think you had better have Mr. Parker do that. You have Mr. Parker. He is an expert, an admitted expert, and I think he ought to do it.

Mr. Cunningham: This is not expert testimony, your Honor. This is the testimony as to what this man's experience has been with this Anderson patent. It is fact testimony. I submit, your Honor, that always is admissible.

The Court: He is explaining the fact.

Mr. Cunningham: No, your Honor.

The Court: I am ruling that it is not admissible, Mr. [44] Cunningham, and he is not going to testify to it.

Mr. Cunningham: That is, he cannot explain what he knows about the Anderson device from his experience and its background for his invention, your Honor? It shows what the invention was. There could be nothing more vital.

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, I ruled [45] already.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Mr. Bronaugh, you testified, I believe, that you were the patentee, joint

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

inventor, of the patent in suit, Reissue No. 23,058 and of this original Patent No. 2,056,165. What can you say with respect to the combined efforts of yourself and Mr. Potter in connection with the invention of these patents? Did you co-invent?

Mr. Ramsey: I object, if the Court please, to the question of "co-invent." It is terrifically leading and it invades the province of the Court and jury.

The Court: Well, is that in issue here? Have you put in issue the question of whether Mr. Bronaugh was a co-inventor?

Mr. Ramsey: It goes more to the question of form. We have no objection as to his testifying what he did, how he did it, with whom he worked: but not saying "in what connection are you a co-inventor."

Mr. Cunningham: It is in issue, your Honor.

The Court: All right. Well, he is objecting to the form of the question and not to the information sought to be elicited. You can tell what you did in connection with the development of this patent.

The Witness: Mr. Potter and I worked very closely together on everything we were doing from the very beginning. We had a common habit of thinking out loud and thinking with a pencil. Neither one of us could think very well without it, and whenever we sat down across the desk from each other we each had a [46] piece of paper and we just automatically sketched out our ideas for purposes of illustration. We would bat them back and forth, tear them apart, disagree, and finally

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

decide, "Well, we will do this or we won't do that this is worth trying or it isn't." We very seldom discarded anything without trying it. We did that constantly, repeatedly, and continuously throughout my association with him, and everything that we did, I would say, represented our joint efforts and largely resulted from the uninhibited joint discussion that we indulged in.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Do you know whether any of these pencil drawings were preserved?

A. I doubt very much if they were. I have always been a great user of File 13, that round filing cabinet on the floor, and that's where most of them were deposited once they served their purpose.

Mr. Cunningham: Now, we have some exhibits for your Honor. It may take a little time to get some of these out. I think it will speed the examination if we call for the exhibits under Mr. Bronaugh's name. Mr. Cheatham has it here.

The Court: All right. Who has them?

Mr. Cunningham: Mr. Cheatham has them.

The Court: Who has the exhibits?

Mr. Cunningham: While we are waiting for that, your Honor, do you recall, Mr. Bronaugh, the very first effort to build [47] anything along the lines to try out your ideas, yours and Mr. Potter's as resulting in this patented device?

A. Yes, I do.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Q. What was the very first thing that you now recall?

A. The sessions with a pencil and a piece of paper.

Q. And what was the first physical thing that you had in your possession to try out any of your ideas?

A. That would be impossible for me to say; it's a long time ago.

Q. I am merely asking what your present recollection is.

A. As I recall, the first attempt we made to physically create what we had been creating on paper with a pencil to incorporate the ideas that we were working with was to take an old icebox and shove a slab of Fir-Tex insulating material vertically so as to divide the compartment in the icebox: the, oh, ice cubicle had been taken out of it so that it was just one big opening; we shoved a slab of Fir-Tex in it vertically so as to divide it vertically into two compartments, and in one of those we rigged up some coiling for the fresh foods compartment and in the other, a brine tank, or it might well have been one of the Potter-type evaporators that we were using in our household cabinets. But, anyway, something in there, one or the other, to provide the low temperature that we wanted to obtain on that side. And we connected a compressor and started it in operation and took tests and readings [48] of temperatures, watched it, made changes and adjustments.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

In connection with that we also explored the so called cold wall idea in which the fresh foods compartment and the freezer compartment were both cooled by brine tanks in the fresh foods compartment, the brine tank forming the wall of the compartment and being of such large area that it did not have to operate at a very low temperature in order to produce an approximate 40 degrees temperature in that compartment. It was being used—that principle was being used by other makers—at least one other maker—of household refrigeration. We thought it was worth exploring.

We tried it out and shortly discarded it because of the condensation of moisture on those walls dripping down on the bottom of the box was always wet, we didn't think it was a desirable condition so we abandoned that and developed—devoted our entire efforts from there on to the finned coil concept of cooling that fresh foods compartment.

After we had run tests for a very considerable period of time, a good many months, I had a refrigerator built, an unfinished wooden box with an upper compartment for the fresh foods which we installed a fin coil into and a lower compartment consisting of a brine tank and a companion open storage space adjoining, with insulation in general as I explained it from the drawing of this box a while ago, proportioned in relation to the relative heat inflow to the [49] fresh foods compartment and the cold storage and freezer compartment.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

We ran that for a long time up in our experimental room, and later down on the main floor, the rear of the main floor of the factory building we were operating. That was not self-contained. The compressor set on the floor beside it. It was purely an experimental phase of our operation. We weren't concerned with appearance or anything. We ran that for a long time and took constant readings of temperatures, we inserted foodstuffs, we checked the freezing of the freezer compartment, the cold storage ability of the cold storage compartment using frozen foods, steaks, and chops, and things that were then produced by Swift & Company and frozen chickens, to see what the box would do, how well it would do the things we were aiming at.

We put fresh foods in the fresh food compartment, we put in celery, lettuce, on the open shelves with no protection, no covering. We would take cup custards and put them in to see how much shrinkage and discoloration we would get. We satisfied ourselves we had literally no dehydration of foodstuffs at all.

We found that the temperatures we were aiming at were very constant in relationship. On the circular charts of the recording thermometers the ink line would be almost a constant, with hardly any waiver at all right on the [50] temperature at which we set the box to operate.

That same was true in the cold storage compart-

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

ment. There was very little variation there. We were satisfied by that time that we had what we were shooting at.

Q. Mr. Bronaugh, I show you some tracings and photostats. May I handle them, because I have to get the identification off them.

The Court: What numbers are they?

Mr. Cunningham: Sorry, your Honor.

Mr. Cheatham: What numbers are they?

Mr. Cunningham: Oh, I would like and would prefer to give them to you in order, if I may, your Honor, and I think I can. They have been marked Plaintiff's Exhibits 3-UU. That is two U'S, not a W.

The Court: Two U's?

Mr. Cunningham: 3-VV, 3-YY. Before that should go 3-WW.

The Court: Well, I will tell you. Are you offering them?

Mr. Cunningham: I am, your Honor.

The Court: Show them to whoever is going to take a look at them. Mr. Kolisch, take a look at them.

Come over here, Mr. Kolisch, and take a look at them.

Mr. Cunningham: 3-YY and 3-ZZ, 3-AAA, 3-BBB, 3-CCC, and 3-DDD.

The Court: Are they advertisements? [51]

Mr. Cunningham: No, your Honor.

The Court: Oh, I thought I saw one of them.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Mr. Kolisch: No objection to Exhibit 3-AA—
-AAA, 3-BBB, 3-CCC, 3-DDD.

The Court: Is that all you are asking for are those four exhibits?

Mr. Cunningham: No, your Honor; there are some others. Are there only four?

Mr. Kolisch: 3 double——

The Court: 3-VV. There are two U's, he said. Double V.

Mr. Kolisch: 3-UU, 3-VV, 3-WW, 3-YY, 3-ZZ. No objections.

The Court: They are admitted, Mr. Cunningham.

(The documents, having been previously marked for identification, were received in evidence as follows: Potter Deposition Exhibit 7—Plaintiff's Exhibit 80 in S.W. case, as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-UU; Potter Deposition Exhibit 8—Plaintiff's Exhibit 75 in S.W. case, as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-VV; Potter Deposition Exhibit 9—Plaintiff's Exhibit 76 in S.W. case, as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-WW; Potter Deposition Exhibit 10—Plaintiff's Exhibit 77 in S.W. case, as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-YY; and Potter [52] Deposition Exhibit 11—Plaintiff's Exhibit 78 in S.W. case, as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-ZZ.)

Mr. Cunningham: Now, would you hand them to the witness, please?

(Whereupon the bailiff handed the aforementioned exhibits to the witness.)

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): I believe, Mr. Bronaugh, you are now being handed the drawings and tracings about which I will make inquiry, and I think you will find the number that I will refer to clearly marked on the drawings. Can you find 6-LL?

The Witness: What is your exhibit number, Mr. Cunningham?

Mr. Cunningham: 6-LL. There are so many exhibit numbers on those it will be confusing.

The Witness: If you will refer to them under the numbers in which they were just admitted, I believe I could find them.

Mr. Cunningham: Oh. 3-VV. Mr. Cheatham has corrected me.

The Court: There isn't any 3-BB; it's 3-BBB.

Mr. Cheatham: V as in "violent."

Mr. Cunningham: V as in "very."

The Witness: I have it, Mr. Cunningham.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Will you also at the same time locate 3-WW? [53]

A. I have that also.

Mr. Cunningham: Now, is it my understanding, your Honor, that all of my exhibits have been received in evidence?

The Court: That's right.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Are those drawings of the refrigerator cabinet exemplifying the cabinet of Reissue Patent 23,058?

The Court: I want to make this clear, that only the exhibits which you just offered here are admitted, not all of your exhibits.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Mr. Cunningham: I meant only to identify them on the record.

The Witness: Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-VV is a blueprint constituting a working drawing from which that refrigerator cabinet—I don't know—recall your exhibit number.

Mr. Maguire: 11-B.

The Witness: That cabinet, Plaintiff's Exhibit 11-B, was constructed. Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-WW is a detailed drawing primarily of the door construction, but having also details of wall construction and insulation incorporated in that same cabinet.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Can you tell us the date of those drawings, both of them?

A. Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-VV is dated July 26, 1931. The same date appears on Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-WW.

Q. Can you tell us by whom they were made, Mr. Bronaugh? [54]

A. I cannot tell you from—by whom they were made from reference to them, but I know who made them because they were made under my personal supervision and I watched the drawing of them. They were made by an architect by the name of Gifford, a friend of mine whom I hired as a draftsman after Mr. Bale was no longer with us as our engineer and draftsman.

Q. That is Mr. Charles W. Bale?

A. That's right. My memory is very positive because—

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

The Court: Mr. Bronaugh, just answer the questions.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Were these drawings made at or about the dates they bear?

A. I assume so from the date that is on them. I could not personally recall at this time.

Q. Are there any apparent changes or erasure on those drawings since the date that is on them as far as you can tell?

A. Not so far as I can tell.

Q. Where were they made, Mr. Bronaugh?

A. They were made in the drafting room of the Potter Refrigerator Corporation at 9th and Flanders in Portland, Oregon.

Q. Now, would you refer to Drawing No.—Exhibit No. 3-YY. A. I have it.

Q. I will ask you to take another drawing 3-AAA. A. I have it.

Q. Can you identify both of those?

A. Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-YY is a drawing of the [55] three-temperature Potter cabinet made by Charles W. Bale under my direction and supervision, dated March 3rd, 1931.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-AAA is a drawing of a brine tank and baffle plate for the Potter three-temperature cabinet made by Charles W. Bale and dated also March 3rd, 1931.

Q. Do you know whether those were made on or about the date they bear?

A. I assume so. Mr. Bale dated them and they bear his engineering stamp, his registry stamp.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Q. And how is their condition compared today?

A. As far as I can tell they are just as when they were made.

Mr. Ramsey: Might I make a suggestion, if the Court please? It might save more time if they would just submit them to us and we might stipulate, to move along a little faster.

The Court: Well, they are almost all in now.

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, we are not trying to consume time, but it does take time to get these exhibits straight. There are several, as your Honor knows. I wish I knew a better way of doing it. I am doing the best I can.

The Court: They are already in evidence, you know. I might call that to your attention.

Mr. Cunningham: They are all in evidence?

The Court: The ones——

Mr. Cunningham: Yes.

The Court: ——that this witness has talked about. They [56] are all in evidence and were before he ever described them.

Q. Will you please find Exhibits 3-BBB, 3-CCC and 3-DDD, and when you do tell us what each of them relates to?

The Court: The exhibits speak for themselves, do they not, Mr. Cunningham? How about that, Mr. Maguire?

Mr. Maguire: I am not familiar with those exhibits, your Honor.

Mr. Cunningham: Some of them do; some of

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

them do not, your Honor. For instance, well, it depends on the skill, I suppose, in these details, the skill of the person to whom they are presented.

The Court: Let him testify.

The Witness: Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-BBB is a drawing, detail drawing of the brine tank for the Potter three-temperature cabinet. It bears date of January 29, 1931, and carries the engineering registry stamp and initials of Charles W. Bale.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-CCC is a detail drawing of the finned coil that was used in the fresh-food compartment of the Potter three-temperature cabinet. The drawing is dated January 30, 1931, and bears the initials and registry stamp of Charles W. Bale.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-DDD is a door detail drawing of the door construction of the Potter three-temperature cabinet, bears date of February 7, 1931, and also the [57] initials and registry stamp of Charles W. Bale.

Q. I show you, Mr. Bronaugh, photographs, the first of which is marked Exhibit 6-GG and the second 6-HH. Can you tell us what those show?

A. Plaintiff's Exhibit 6-GG is a photograph of one of the metal-covered Potter three-temperature cabinets that we built in Portland, Oregon, in 1931 and physically exemplified by the box over there at the left hand of that row (indicating).

Plaintiff's Exhibit 6-HH is a photograph of the same box with both of the compartment doors open showing the interior construction and arrangement

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

The Court: Are you offering them?

Mr. Cunningham: I offer them, your Honor.

The Court: Is there any objection?

Mr. Kolisch: May I see them? We have never seen them.

(Photographs presented to Mr. Kolisch.)

Mr. Kolisch: No objection.

The Court: They may be admitted.

(Photographs previously marked Plaintiff's Exhibits 6-GG and 6-HH for Identification were received in evidence.)

The Court: Do you have some others that you would like to offer?

Mr. Cunningham: Yes. [58]

The Court: Show them to Mr. Kolisch.

Mr. Cunningham: I show you, Mr. Kolisch, 3-OO, 3-PP, 3-RR, 3-SS, 3-TT, 3-MM, 3-EE, 3-FF, 3-KK, 3-JJ, 3-II—I beg your pardon: I have been using 3 when I should use 6.

This is 6-EE, 6-FF, 6-KK, 6-JJ, 6-II.

The Court: Mr. Kolisch, have you been able to look at them? I think it might be well in the future for you to display those exhibits that you desire to introduce during a recess or during the noon hour and get those all out of the way.

Mr. Kolisch: No objection to 3-OO.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Court: Did you mean 6-OO?

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Mr. Cunningham: The exhibit Mr. Kolisch showed me was 3-00, and there may be a 6-00.

The Court: 6-00 is a tracing, B109A, the Potter three-temperature refrigerator door details. Is that what you want?

Mr. Cunningham: I believe, your Honor, that is already 3-ZZ. It bears two other markings.

The Court: I think this is a good time to adjourn, and you can give Mr. Kolisch all the others that you propose to use in connection with the testimony of Mr. Bronaugh. Then Mr. Bronaugh's testimony can be completed without any interruptions. [59]

If you desire to use any exhibits in connection with the cross-examination of Mr. Bronaugh, I wish that you would notify either Mr. Cunningham or Mr. Cheatham.

Mr. Ramsey: Yes, your Honor.

The Court: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have heard some testimony now, very little testimony. I want to admonish you again, please do not make up your minds as to how this case should be decided on the testimony of one witness or one witness and a few exhibits. Wait until you have heard all the testimony. I told you yesterday, I believe, that it is the function of the Court to lay down the rules under which the trial will proceed, to pass upon the admissibility of evidence, and to make other rules on questions of law. If I make a mistake as to any ruling, my ruling may be appealed

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

to a higher court where the error may be corrected, but until my ruling is reversed it is the law of the case, and the litigants as well as their attorneys are bound by my rulings. As to the construction of the law or on a question of admissibility, of course, you are bound by my ruling as well.

In other words, when an exhibit is offered and I sustain an objection interposed by an attorney for the other side, or on my own motion I say, "This testimony is inadmissible," you are not to speculate upon what might have been testified to had the ruling been otherwise and the [60] exhibit admitted or the witness permitted to testify. Throughout the trial I will be called upon to pass upon the admissibility of evidence, and, of course, each time I rule one side prevails, and the other side loses on a particular evidentiary matter. The fact that I do rule does not mean that the party against whom I rule must abide by my decision. He must abide by it in this court, but he preserves his record, and every attorney is permitted to preserve a record, sometimes outside the presence of the jury, so that he may appeal to a higher court if he desires.

When I rule in a certain manner, even though a person has an opportunity to appeal it, he is required to abide by my ruling, and he may not attempt to get in the testimony by any devious means—if an attorney deliberately attempts to get in evidence testimony which is ruled inadmissible, or if any attorney deliberately violates any other ruling

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

which I make, I think you may infer from such conduct that this attorney is attempting to get an advantage for his client to which the client is not entitled.

I am doing at the end of the first morning session of testimony something I meant to tell you yesterday, and it applies to all of the attorneys in the case, so that you may know when I rule on a question that rule is final unless I reverse it; but no attorney is prevented from making a record but that does not mean that he may attempt to get in evidence [61] which I rule as inadmissible.

Today we are going to take a full two-hour lunch period. We will resume at 2:00 o'clock. Please remember my admonition. Do not talk to anybody about this case. Everyone will remain seated until the jury leaves. You are now excused.

(Thereupon, at 12:00 o'clock noon, the jury retired and the noon recess was taken.) [62]

Afternoon Session

(Court reconvened, pursuant to recess, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and the following proceedings were had herein:)

The Court: Mr. Bronaugh, you take the stand again.

LEWIS J. BRONAUGH

thereupon resumed the stand as a witness in behalf of the Plaintiff, and testified further as follows:

Mr. Kolisch: Your Honor, I have no objection

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

to Plaintiff's Exhibits 3-PP, 3-SS, 3-TT, 6-EE, 6-FF, 6-II, 6-JJ, 6-KK, 6-RR, and 6-SS.

The Court: They may be admitted.

(The documents, having been previously marked for identification, were admitted in evidence as follows: Photo Potter converted icebox, as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-PP; photo Potter refrigerator open, as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-SS; photo Potter refrigerator closed, as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-TT; Plaintiff's Exhibit 66 of Stewart-Warner Record at p. 2081—Photo 64945, Potter 3-temperature refrigerator, as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6-EE; Plaintiff's Exhibit 67 of Stewart-Warner [63] Record at p. 2082—Photo 64946, Potter 3-temperature refrigerator, as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6-FF; Plaintiff's Exhibit 70 of Stewart-Warner Record—Photo of Potter Walk-In Milk Cooler, front, as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6-II; Plaintiff's Exhibit 71 of Stewart-Warner Record—Photo of Potter Walk-In Milk Cooler, interior, as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6-JJ; Plaintiff's Exhibit 72 of Stewart-Warner Record—Photo of Potter Walk-In Milk Cooler, side and rear, as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6-KK; Plaintiff's Exhibit 81 of Stewart-Warner Record—Bronaugh's specifications attached to Plaintiff's Exhibit 80, as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6-RR; and Plaintiff's Exhibit 82 of Stewart-Warner Record at p. 2086—Tracing B-108, finned coil for 3-temperature refrigerator, as Plaintiff's Exhibit 6-SS.)

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

The Court: Now, there—I understand on two of the pictures that are objected to—on one of those pictures there is a date which will be stipulated to and the other picture has no date. I think Mr. Bronaugh knows the date [64] of that picture he should be permitted to state the date, and I suggest that the picture be handed to him.

Mr. Cunningham: I will do so, sir.

The Court: All right. Hand the picture to him.

Mr. Cunningham: May I hand them both to him?

The Court: Just the one, the one that hasn't got the date on it.

Mr. Cunningham: Oh, yes. It's this one here.

(Whereupon, the photograph was handed to the witness.)

The Court: Mr. Bronaugh, do you recall that picture? It is 3-MM.

The Witness: Yes, I do, your Honor.

The Court: All right. Do you recall the date upon which that picture was taken?

The Witness: No, I do not.

The Court: Do you know about the approximate year it was taken?

The Witness: May I study it a moment, please?

The Court: Yes.

(Whereupon, the witness studied the photograph.)

The Witness: I believe it to have been taken in the year 1930.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

The Court: What part of the year?

The Witness: The impression is that it would have been [65] very early in the year 1930. I am basing that belief on the size of what, apparently, was the working—the shop working staff of the Potter Refrigerator Corporation, which is very small.

The Court: And so——

The Witness: Less than 12 people. And later in 1930 and in 1931 we had a much larger organization.

The Court: So on the basis of that discussion you believe that it was taken early in the year 1930?

The Witness: I believe so, your Honor.

The Court: All right.

Direct Examination

By Mr. Cunningham:

Q. Now, Mr. Bronaugh—and if I may, your Honor, I think it will facilitate things if I could approach the witness.

The Court: All right.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): I hand you the group of exhibits Mr. Kolisch identified in his last statement, and ask you to tell me just very briefly, if you can, what each of them represents.

Mr. Byron: Would you speak a little louder, please?

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): ——and ask you to tell me briefly, if you can, what each of them represents. Exhibit 6-HH and Exhibit 6-GG.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

A. Those are photographs of the Potter three-temperature [66] cabinets that we built here in Portland, Oregon, in 1931, one exhibit being the closed cabinet and the other exhibit the same cabinet with the food compartment and cold storage compartment doors open, showing the interior arrangement.

Q. Exhibit 3-SS and Exhibit 3-TT.

A. One—

Mr. Maguire: Which one? Excuse me, your Honor.

The Witness: One is Exhibit 3-SS and it is a photograph of the exterior of the first metal-covered Potter three-temperature cabinet that we built in 1931.

Exhibit 3-TT is the same cabinet with both compartment doors open showing the arrangement of the food compartment and cold storage compartment.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Were the photographs 6-GG and 6-HH of the same cabinet, one with the door open and the other one closed?

A. Yes.

Q. I show you Exhibits 6-EE and 6-FF, and ask you if you recognize those and if those are not the same cabinet?

A. I believe them to be. Again, they are photographs of the metal-covered three-temperature Potter refrigerators that we built in 1931, one the exterior—6-EE being of the exterior of the cabinet and 6-FF, the same cabinet with the doors open showing the interior arrangement.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Q. Now, Mr. Bronaugh, if we can get rid of these, I show [67] you Exhibit 6-KK. Can you identify that photograph?

A. Exhibit 6-KK is a portable and demountable dairy cooler plant. It was what is known as a walk-in cooler. That is a structure large enough so that you can walk into it and it was used for storing cans of milk. On the outside is an aerator which is used to cool milk very rapidly to remove the animal temperature and prepare the milk for storage at a temperature somewhere below 50 degrees.

Q. Is Exhibit 6-II which I now show you the same device, different view?

A. It is a different view of the same device with the door partly opened to show a portion of the interior.

Q. And is Exhibit 6-JJ another view of that device?

A. Exhibit 6-JJ is a picture taken from the front of the device with the door open showing the interior space, the coils for cooling the device, and the ice pans in the lower part of the brine tank for the freezing of ice.

Mr. Maguire: Will your Honor permit a very short interruption? The last one, 6-JJ, is a different device, or is it the same device as 6-II and 6-KK?

The Witness: The photograph 6-JJ shows the interior of the walk-in cooler that is shown in Exhibits 6-II and 6-KK.

The Court: The answer to your question, Mr. Maguire, is Yes.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Mr. Maguire: Thank you. [68]

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Now, Mr. Bronaugh, can you identify Exhibit 3-TT?

A. Exhibit 3-TT shows the old type of conventional refrigerator that was used in many grocery stores and markets. Originally it was designed to be iced for cooling and having a very large compartment for ice. As shown in this photograph, there has been substituted for the ice an assembly of copper coiling to make a refrigerator coil which performed the same function as the ice in that it removed the heat from the box. It is characteristic of many of the early-type commercial installations that we made of Potter equipment.

Mr. Cunningham: Now, your Honor, I would like to hand this group of photographs to the jury so that they may examine them. Is that all right?

The Court: All right.

(Whereupon, Mr. Cunningham handed the group of photographs to the jury.)

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Now, Mr. Bronaugh, I show you Plaintiff's Exhibit 6-SS. Will you tell us briefly what that is?

A. Exhibit 6-FF.

Q. -SS, is it not?

A. -SS—thank you—is a sketch or tracing of the finned coil for the fresh foods compartment of a Potter three-temperature cabinet. It bears date of January 30th, 1931, and [69] from the initials and engineer registry stamp that was prepared by Mr. Charles W. Bale.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Q. Thank you. I show you Plaintiff's Exhibit 6-RR and ask you if you can identify that?

A. Yes, I can, only because by interlineation there are two words written in, "monel metal" being substituted for "stainless steel." It is unquestionably my handwriting and in green ink that I habitually use in my pen.

Q. All right.

A. And it is an instruction sheet for the construction of and equipment of a Potter refrigerator.

Q. Now, Mr. Bronaugh, before the luncheon recess you identified Exhibits 3-UU, 3-VV, 3-WW, 3-YY, 3-ZZ, 3-AAA, -BBB, -CCC, and -DDD. Are those all drawings or blueprints of products of the Potter Refrigerator Corporation?

A. All of those that I looked at and identified this morning were.

Q. Those, I think the record will show, are the ones you identified this morning? A. Yes.

Mr. Cunningham: May I hand these to the jury, please?

(Whereupon, the exhibits mentioned were handed to the jury.) [70]

The Court: I think the parties should stipulate that when an exhibit has been admitted in evidence it need not be shown to the jury immediately but can be shown to the jury at any time, including the arguments to the jury at the conclusion of the case.

Mr. Cunningham: I will be glad to so stipulate, your Honor.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Mr. Ramsey: So stipulated.

Mr. Maguire: May I just complete the understanding that should it be other than an objective or photographic sketch, whether it be in writing or what not, that it would there apply, the same, with regard to those exhibits?

The Court: That is right.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Mr. Bronaugh, you also testified this morning as to some early experimental work or experimental refrigerators which, as I understood you, preceded any of these finished drawings which go back to at least January of 1931. Can you give us a little bit of detail on any of these experimental refrigerators that were prior to 1931, and if you can, will you, please?

A. I believe, Mr. Cunningham, that I discussed this at some length in my testimony this morning. I attempted to describe some of our very early jobs, one in which we took an old icebox and just shoved—

Q. I think you did, sir. Can you give us some idea of [71] what sort of tests you made on these early iceboxes, experimental boxes?

A. We made every conceivable test that one normally in the process of developing an idea would make. That is, we checked temperatures, checked frosting of the coils, we checked the matter of dehydration of fresh foods.

Q. Did you make any actual food preservation tests?

A. We took from the very beginning, as I recall,

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

because we were aiming at—what we were aiming at was a household refrigerator that would eliminate, insofar as humanly possible, all of the liabilities and drawbacks of the household refrigerator as it then existed and to furnish to the housewife in her kitchen the most usable possible piece of equipment, and we were thinking always in terms of cold in relation to the advancements we had seen occurring in the more modern electric stoves, ranges, in the field of heat. We were trying to eliminate the nuisance and inconvenience of defrosting, to eliminate the dehydration, the drying-out of foodstuffs, outside of the use of so-called hydrator pans, and so on, to keep things covered up so they would not dry out. We wanted to provide in the kitchen means for storing quick-frozen foods which were then coming into the market thanks to my friends, “Spotts” Birds Eye’s, developments, and to provide much faster freezing. In those days most women liked to make frozen desserts, and most of them [72] complained that they would not freeze fast enough, and because of the time required the substances would separate and there was a grainy texture to the product. We figured if we could freeze it fast enough we would avoid that undesirable result. We were reaching always towards those things.

Well, from the very beginning in our experimental work we checked to see what progress we were making towards the accomplishment of those goals.

Q. Did you make any actual temperature tests,

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

and do you have any present recollection of the results of those tests on these experimental boxes?

A. We used in all of our work in temperature testing in the beginning a Taylor Tycos thermometer which was supposed to be a more accurate thermometer to be had on the market. It was a little tubular thermometer, and the first tests were made on the——

Mr. Ramsey: Might I interrupt? A question such as that calls for a Yes or No answer, and each answer is a long speech, and it is difficult to interpose any objection to it. Mr. Bronaugh is a lawyer. It seems that it should call for short questions and short answers and not a rambling statement.

Mr. Maguire: Might I hear that question?

(Last question read.) [73]

Mr. Ramsey: It calls for a Yes or No answer.

The Court: The vice of the question is that there are two questions in one.

Mr. Maguire: We concede that, your Honor, and I think it should be split and then perhaps not asking the witness what did occur.

The Court: Mr. Maguire, I think there is merit in the objection. I wish, Mr. Bronaugh, that you would merely answer the question that is propounded to you. You have to rely on your lawyer and not take it on yourself to make speeches. Just answer the questions.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

The Witness: I stand corrected, your Honor. When you have lived as intimately with anything as I did with this——

The Court: I do not want a speech from you now. Just stop that.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): What did your tests indicate with respect to temperature in the three different compartments of these experimental boxes, what temperatures, if you recall, for each compartment?

A. I can't recall now, and I cannot answer the question too briefly, because the results were progressive. We first determined that we could accomplish a range of temperatures by a proportionate coiling or refrigerating media in the various segments and sections of the box. [74]

Q. What temperatures were you aiming at in the cooling of the fresh-food compartment?

A. An approximate 40 degrees Fahrenheit.

Q. Did your tests show that you got approximately that? A. Yes.

Q. What was the temperature that you were aiming at in the frozen-foods compartment, approximately? A. Plus 10 degrees Fahrenheit.

Q. Did your tests show that you achieved that result over a substantial period of time?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you have any recording thermometers in this early experimental period?

A. Not at the very beginning. We purchased some very shortly after we got into this work.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Q. What did your tests reveal as to the surface condition of the finned coil in the upper food compartment?

Mr. Ramsey: That is terrifically leading. I object to that.

The Court: I do not think so. You may answer the question.

The Witness: I do not recall whether we actually used a fin coil in the very earliest of the hood-ups we made. We may well have used merely sufficient copper coil, which was generally done in refrigeration work in those days, to [75] provide sufficient radiating surface.

Q. Well, sir, you did ultimately—or not ultimately—very shortly did you use a fin coil?

The Court: Do not answer that question.

Mr. Maguire: If your Honor will permit us just a moment?

The Court: Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): When, if at all, did you discuss using a fin coil?

The Court: Are you withdrawing the question, Mr. Maguire?

Mr. Maguire: Yes, your Honor.

The Court: Go ahead.

The Witness: Very early in——

The Court: He has not asked you a question yet. Go ahead.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Mr. Cunningham: May we have it read, your Honor?

(Last question read.)

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): When, if at all, did you start using a fin coil?

A. Very early in our experimental work.

Q. About when was that in years?

A. As near as I can place it in memory, it was early in the year 1930.

Q. Did you at one time earlier employ a so-called cold wall [76] in the cooling compartment?

A. I discussed that this morning, and I believe stated that we did try out that idea and early discarded it.

Q. Was that the first of the ideas you tried out?

A. I do not believe so. I believe we first started using a coil and a separated box.

Q. Was that prior to any use of a fin coil, as you recall it? A. I believe so.

Q. Can you give us a year for that earliest type of use?

The Court: Of what?

Mr. Cunningham: The plain coil first.

The Court: When did you first start to use a plain coil?

The Witness: I think very early in 1930.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Is the same true of the cold wall structure? A. Yes.

Q. That you described?

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

A. Yes, they were being used at the same time.

Q. Over how long a period of time did all the work on these three-temperature experimental cabinets cover?

The Court: I think it would be easier, Mr. Cunningham, if you would ask him when the work commenced, and then your next question is when did it end. [77]

Mr. Cunningham: I will ask you those questions. When did the work commence?

A. As best I can recall, in the winter of 1929-30.

Mr. Byron: May it please the Court, I think we may avoid confusion in thought here. This litigation seems to be over two-temperature boxes or refrigerators, and there is a great deal being said about three-temperature refrigerators, and I understand what they are talking about, but I am afraid there are some here that do not, including the jury. Is this temperature all pertinent to two-temperature boxes, or is it associated with something foreign to this?

The Court: I would like to find that out myself. How about that, Mr. Cunningham?

Mr. Cunningham: May I ask the witness whether he distinguishes in his testimony between three-temperature and two-temperature boxes?

The Witness: I do not. I have used the expression, three-temperature box; that was what we called the Potter refrigerator.

The Court: What are three temperatures?

The Witness: We had one-temperature in the

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

fresh-foods compartment; we had one-temperature in the cold storage compartment, and we had a third temperature in the freezer compartment which I had stated to be approximately plus 40 degrees Fahrenheit in the food compartment, plus 10 degrees Fahrenheit [78] in the cold storage compartment, and minus 10 degrees Fahrenheit in the freezer compartment.

The Court: Was that shown on the original patent application?

The Witness: I cannot answer the question, your Honor.

The Court: Are you not one of the patentees?

The Witness: I did not draw the application, and I had not anything to do with the drafting of the patent claims.

The Court: Did you receive a patent on the three-temperature—

The Witness: We did.

The Court: You did?

The Witness: We did.

Mr. Cunningham: This might help, your Honor, if you can all see it. I will put my hand in this upper compartment. What was the temperature in it?

A. That is the fresh-foods compartment.

Mr. Maguire: Wait a minute. Let us get the question he asked. What was the temperature, he asked.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): What was the temperature of this?

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

A. The temperature, the temperature we aimed at and set the machine to operate was an approximate 40 degrees Fahrenheit.

Q. Now, I put my hand in the lower compartment to the left. At what temperature did you aim at for that compartment? [79]

A. That was the cold storage compartment, and we aimed at a temperature of plus 10 degrees Fahrenheit.

Q. I put my hand in this little receptacle, apparently for ice cube trays, right in the lower compartment. What was the temperature you aimed at there?

A. That was the freezer compartment, and we aimed at a temperature of minus 10 degrees Fahrenheit.

Q. So, if I may summarize, there are three temperatures but really two main compartments. Does that explain why we sometimes refer to that as two-temperature or two-compartment or three-temperature and three-compartment boxes?

A. I think so. I said we have referred to the Potter as a three-temperature cabinet.

Q. I have been referring to Exhibit 11-B.

Mr. Ramsey: If the Court please, do I understand that the reissue patent and the claims thereof and the claims that he says he secured covered the—covered a three-temperature box?

Mr. Cunningham: I object to that question, your Honor. He is not on as a patent expert—are you asking me?

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Mr. Ramsey: Yes.

Mr. Maguire: He is asking you.

Mr. Cunningham: May I have the question?

(Last question read.) [80]

Mr. Cunningham: Yes; as I understand that term, yes.

Mr. Ramsey: Very well.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Did you achieve these results? A. Yes, we did.

Q. By what month in the year 1930 had you achieved these results?

Mr. Ramsey: That is a conclusion. It is meaningless to us. What results are you speaking of?

Mr. Cunningham: I am trying to fix the time, your Honor.

Mr. Maguire: I think, your Honor, he spoke about an approximate 40 degrees in the fresh foods and an approximate 10 degrees above zero Fahrenheit on the frozen food, and an approximate 10 degrees below zero Fahrenheit on the freezing compartment.

Mr. Ramsey: Is that the meaning of counsel's question now?

Mr. Cunningham: That is it, that and the other objectives that he has testified about such as Moist Cold—I limit it to the three-temperatures now, and I will, instead of limiting you to 1930, I will say 1929-30.

The Court: You tell him when it was completed.

Mr. Cunningham: Will you answer the Judge's question?

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

The Court: No, you restate your question.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): What, Mr. Bronaugh, is the most [81] precise time that you now recall when you and the others working with you were satisfied that you had achieved the results that you were seeking in a three-temperature household refrigerator?

Mr. Ramsey: Objected to. That is the same question. What results are obtained; are you speaking now of just when did he get a three-temperature box, or what is your question?

The Court: Are you referring, Mr. Cunningham, to the construction of a box?

Mr. Cunningham: Yes, your Honor.

The Court: All right. Do you know his question, Mr. Bronaugh?

The Witness: It is a very difficult question for me to answer, your Honor. When you are developing ideas, it is very hard to say when you have accomplished what you are seeking to develop and accomplish because it is a progressive matter.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): I realize that, Mr. Bronaugh. I am simply trying to get you to state a time by which you felt, had the sense, that you had accomplished your objectives.

A. As best I can answer that—I will do the best I can with it—from the early tests that we made—

The Court: He is just asking you for a date, Mr. Bronaugh. He is just asking you for a date.

The Witness: The best answer I could give to

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

that would [82] be, in my recollection, sometime during the winter of 1929-30.

Mr. Cunningham: May I have Plaintiff's Exhibit 17?

(Document presented.)

Q. Mr. Bronaugh, I show you the Plaintiff's Exhibit 17, which is a certified copy of the title documents, and direct your attention to the first page below the certificate and to the signature on that page. Whose signature is that?

A. That is mine.

Q. Did you sign that assignment?

A. I did.

Q. Have you any interest in the patent in suit?

A. None whatever.

Q. Any interest in the plaintiff corporation?

A. None whatever.

Q. Did your interest in the patent cease with that assignment? A. Yes.

Q. Proprietary interest, I mean. A. Yes.

The Court: What was the date of the assignment?

The Witness: 1932.

Mr. Cunningham: It was 1932, I think.

The Witness: December 27, 1932.

Mr. Cunningham: That is all, your Honor.

Mr. Ramsey: I am going to make a motion to strike from [83] Mr. Bronaugh's testimony that concerning, first, the preservation of frozen foods.

The Court: Go ahead.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Mr. Ramsey: And the second one having to do with the refrigeration art prior to September 1, 1928, when he entered it.

The Court: What was that testimony? You mean on the state of the art prior to——

Mr. Ramsey: No, there was some testimony as to how the refrigeration practical art stood and the developments of it prior to some time, but his first testimony was that he knew nothing of it until September 1, 1928. [84]

The Court: And you are asking that all of his testimony concerning the state of the art prior to 1928 be stricken?

Mr. Ramsey: September 1, 1928; yes.

The Court: Well, I don't recall the testimony that he gave concerning that. What about that, Mr. Cunningham?

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, I must say I am not sure what the motion is and I might say I do not recall any precise testimony prior to that. I think Mr. Bronaugh testified only as to his own knowledge and if he had knowledge of conventional refrigerators prior to 1928 even though he wasn't in the business he should be allowed to testify about the knowledge. I should think the motion ought to be denied.

The Witness: May I be heard, your Honor?

The Court: No. You are a witness, Mr. Bronaugh, and I think you ought to understand that.

The Witness: I merely wanted to help.

The Court: Any time you want to argue the case you can go down and sit at the counsel table.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Mr. Cunningham, a few minutes ago, you, in answer to Mr. Ramsey's question when he propounded a question to him, you objected to the question on the ground that Mr. Bronaugh was not an expert as to a patent and his testimony is not admissible concerning the reach of the claim and therefore that is what I understood and I think you are correct.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, sir, I hope this isn't addressed [85] as to the patent. This is as to his knowledge as to the conventional refrigerator, the devices, not the words of the patent claim. That was his other question. He is not an expert in the words the patent—I never—I expressly said many times he was a fact expert, not an expert in verbalism.

The Court: Yes. Mr. Ramsey, I don't think that this motion has been made timely and the jury understands that Mr. Bronaugh is not an expert, and therefore I am going to deny your motion with that explanation.

Mr. Ramsey: Very well.

Cross-Examination

By Mr. Ramsey:

Q. You spoke of the early development work after you were President of the Potter Refrigeration Company. There was some testimony by Mr. Potter and he identified certain of these boxes by name and customer name. I wonder whether you have the same recollection. How many experimental boxes were there made, two-compartment?

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Mr. Cunningham: Objection.

The Court: The objection is sustained. If you want to ask him if he knows whether they had names and how many there were, that's all right, but don't compare it to Mr. Potter's testimony at this time.

Mr. Ramsey: Very well.

Q. (By Mr. Ramsey): How many experimental boxes were made before any were sold?

A. I do not recall. A good many. [86]

Q. How many would you say?

A. If I may enlarge the descriptive word "box" to include the very crude assemblies that we made up in the first stages of our experimental work, I would say five.

Q. And those were boxes made of Fir-Tex?

A. One of the first boxes we made or used in our work was an old icebox that I testified this morning that we simply inserted a vertical slab of Fir-Tex to separate the two sides of the box to give us our separated—thermally separated compartments.

Q. Is that the first two-compartment box made?

A. I believe it was.

Q. And what time was that?

A. As near as I can recall it was in the winter of '29-'30.

Q. Thereafter was another box made having a compartment dividing it into two—a partition dividing it into two compartments?

A. That one was divided into two compartments.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Q. Was there another one after that?

A. Several more after that.

Q. And I think it might be four or five——

A. Yes.

Q. ——additional ones. Then what was the first box made which was self-contained; that is, has the motor in it?

A. Your question is, “What was that box?” Do you want me [87] to describe it?

Q. No. Identify it, if you can.

A. The only way I can identify it is by description. There is nothing to show it.

Q. Can you identify it by customer name?

A. No, sir; I cannot.

Q. Those boxes were not identified in the factory by customer name? A. No, sir.

Q. You were in the factory? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where was Mr. Potter?

A. At what time?

Q. When these boxes were made.

A. These boxes were made over a period of some two years.

Q. And the one we are talking about now is the first self-contained box. When was that made?

A. Mr. Potter was in Seattle most of the time and, of course, coming down to Portland quite frequently. Your second question, “When was that made?”—as best I can recall it was made in the fall of 1930.

Q. Yes. And do you know to whom that was sold?

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

A. I don't know whether it was ever sold. It was still there when I left the organization late in 1931.

Q. Do you know of a sale to a man by the name of McChesney? [88] A. I do not.

Q. You never heard of that?

A. I have heard of it; I do not know of it.

Q. Was that during your time?

A. I have no recollection or memory or personal knowledge of the sale of a box to a Mr. McChesney.

Q. And you heard no conversation around the factory about the so-called McChesney box?

A. I do not believe so.

Q. Do you know of the Barry box? B-a-r-r-y?

A. I know it very well.

Q. And why was it called the Barry box?

A. Because I sold it to Jack Barry.

Q. And who was Jack Barry?

A. He is an insurance man here in the City of Portland.

Q. Still is? A. So far as I know.

Q. And when was that built?

A. As near as I can recall it was built in the summer of 1930.

Q. And when was it sold to Mr. Barry?

A. I do not know. I do not recall.

Q. You sold it yourself?

A. I sold it myself.

Q. Was that a self-contained box?

A. No, it was not. It was an unpainted wooden box that I had [89] made for experimental pur-

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

poses. The compressor was separate from the box.

Q. And we understand the word "self-contained" as we are discussing this matter as meaning the mechanism within the cabinet?

A. The compressor mechanism within the cabinet.

Q. That is correct. Can you tell us the construction of the cooling coil in the Barry box?

A. It was a finned coil, aluminum fins, through which extended copper tubing.

Q. Were those purchased?

A. I do not recall. The first of those coils we made up. We were using Larkin coils in commercial work and the first of the finned coils that I adapted to our experimental work were remodeled out of larger Larkin coils. We later, as I recall, purchased a coil of a size suitable for our purpose.

Q. Then your testimony is that you did not use Larkin coils?

Mr. Byron: No.

Mr. Cunningham: I object.

The Witness: I didn't say that. I said the first coils we used were modified Larkin coils. We cut them up and reassembled them to a size suitable for our purpose.

Q. (By Mr. Ramsey): And how did you cut them up, take them to pieces?

A. We sawed the fins in two, the first one. They were a [90] double row, copper. The fins were perhaps so wide (witness demonstrates size). We sawed

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

them right down through the middle so as to make two coils out of one and then we shortened them up. We took the returns off of the tubing or perhaps cut off the other end, I don't recall, and shortened them up to provide a coil of the size and radiating area we wanted.

Q. In other words, you bought too large a coil and made it narrower?

A. We took coils out of stock, coils that we had for commercial refrigeration purposes.

Q. And made them smaller?

A. That's right.

Q. And were those coils that you purchased on the open market?

A. They were purchased from the Larkin factory which, as I recall, was located down in Georgia.

Q. But they were standard coils?

A. That's right.

Q. And purchased on the open market?

A. That's right.

Q. And widely used?

A. I beg your pardon?

Q. Widely used?

A. I don't know how widely used.

Q. You used them? [91]

A. We used them.

Q. And you say you took them out of stock; you had probably quite a few? A. We did.

Q. And had used it for quite a long time?

A. Yes.

Q. You understood their characteristics?

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

A. Yes.

Q. And then, in this particular installation you cut them up in some manner to make them smaller?

A. That's right.

Q. Did it change their function? A. No.

Q. They operated in the same way that they always did except they were smaller? A. Yes.

Q. They were made to fit a compartment?

A. Substantially so. They were made for commercial usage.

Q. Well, let's go back again. When you rebuilt them or reconstructed them, you reconstructed them to fit a certain compartment, did you not?

A. We did.

Q. And when you did reconstruct them they functioned exactly the way they did before except that they were smaller, is that correct? [92]

A. That's correct.

Q. Thank you. Would you recognize a Larkin coil now if you saw it or saw a picture of it?

A. I think I would recognize one if it was the same type and design that I was familiar with 25 years ago.

Mr. Ramsey: May we move the easel over so the witness may see it?

(Whereupon, the bailiff moved the easel to the betterment of the jury's view.)

Q. (By Mr. Ramsey): Would you mind stepping over here, Mr. Bronaugh, and looking at the Defendants' Exhibit 114-K at the upper edge of it,

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

which is marked L. U. Larkin, refrigerant method and apparatus, September 16, 1930, No. 1,776,235

Is that a Larkin coil?

A. Which device are you referring to?

Q. It's marked Figure 3.

A. I never saw a Larkin coil that had the slightest resemblance to that illustration.

Q. How does it differ?

A. None of this mechanism was in there, or device, whatever you want to term it. It was simply copper—or aluminum plates through which extended copper tubing in assembly dependent upon the size and capacity of the coil, and there was no such device as this.

Q. Now, when you are marking "this" that is unintelligible [93] on the record. Something marked with a reference character "4"?

A. 4.

Q. Is that the only point of difference?

A. It has—it bears no resemblance to any Larkin coil that I ever saw.

Q. Well, does it have——

A. Except that it apparently has fins.

Q. Does it have coils?

A. It appears to have copper tubing extending through what appear to be the fins.

Q. Can you tell whether that is copper or aluminum? A. No.

Q. It has coils?

A. I don't know just what you mean by the word "coils."

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Q. You can——

A. It appears to me that the copper tubing merely extends through. A coil, in my thinking, means something that returns.

Q. Does it have pipe? A. Yes, apparently.

Q. Does it have fins on the pipe?

A. Apparently.

Q. You can't tell that by looking at it?

A. I can't tell whether those are fins. They are drawn unquestionably to simulate fins. There is no end section from [94] which I can tell.

Q. But is that what a fin would look like if it were?

A. If you were looking at the edge of the fins, yes.

Mr. Maguire: It's not quite clear to me. Are you speaking about the drawing or do you have another drawing?

Mr. Ramsey: Mr. Maguire, this witness is looking at a drawing and it's been identified to him, he has a pointer in his hand, and he is pointing with that pointer to certain elements on it, and I don't know why it isn't clear to you and——

Mr. Maguire: Well, I thought he said that he could not tell it was a fin unless he had a longitudinal section instead of a flat section.

Mr. Ramsey: Oh! Pardon me.

Mr. Maguire: That's the only thing I was interested in.

Q. (By Mr. Ramsey): What sort of a section does it have?

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

A. It doesn't have any. It merely has black lines with no shadings to indicate any depth or width.

Q. Yes. But you think it is a finned coil?

A. Oh, I think it is drawn to simulate a finned coil.

Q. Would it—would you call it a finned coil?

The Court: I think that is enough on that point. Just go on to your next point.

Q. (By Mr. Ramsey): May I read to you from under that drawing? It may help to identify it more. This is from the same exhibit [95] and it's identified page 2, line 113 to page 3, line 18:

“With the present type coil properly arranged in the casing, a temperature of 36 degrees Fahrenheit can be maintained in the casing without frosting the plates at all, and consequently without freezing or dehydrating any of the contents of the casing whatever. The very large surface area and rapid heat absorption of the aluminum plate all lead to a rapid temperature drop when the unit is in operation. Since this temperature drop is less than 2 degrees, it follows that each refrigerating cycle of operation must be of very short duration, and consequently must greatly reduce the amount of power required to maintain it in operation.

“Whatever little moisture may be picked up from the air in the casing is deposited on the plates; and because of the large surface area of these plates, must, when condensed, be spread on such plates in a very thin film which is constantly being removed by the circulating air and returned to the air and meats from where it is taken.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

“Where below-freezing temperature must be maintained on the blades as in the prior coolers it is obvious that any moisture taken from the meats becomes condensed and frozen on the plates, [96] and cannot be removed therefrom by the circulating air. In this case the meats”

and not only those—pardon me——

“In this case the meats not only lose weight which cannot be recovered but also deteriorate greatly in quality.

“The maintenance of humidity is only one of the most important results flowing from the use of cooling coils designed as disclosed herein.”

Does that explain anything to you, Mr. Bronaugh?

Mr. Cunningham: Objection.

The Court: What were you reading to him, the patent application?

Mr. Ramsey: No. I am reading from the description under this because he says he doesn't know whether it's coils or fins.

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, the answer to your question is he is reading from the patent, another patent. There is a patchwork of patents on that board that he is reading from.

Mr. Ramsey: That is correct. This is part of the description.

Mr. Cunningham: In a patent that we had nothing to do with.

The Court: Do you understand what he read?

The Witness: Yes, sir. [97]

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

The Court: Does that help you out any?

The Witness: I have tried to answer Mr. Ramsey's questions as positively and as clearly as I can talking about what is shown on this drawing. Now, if we are talking about what, in my opinion, that drawing simulates I can talk differently, but when I am limited to that drawing I can only describe what I see in that drawing.

The Court: It is 3:00 o'clock now. We are going to take a short recess and we will continue afterwards.

(Whereupon, the jury was excused for the afternoon recess.)

The Court: I don't think that it is proper to read a prolonged description like that, Mr. Ramsey. You are just wasting time. I don't understand your cross-examination. The man has admitted three times that it's a fin. Now why don't you leave him alone and go to something important instead of reading for half an hour and putting everybody to sleep?

Now take a ten-minute recess.

(Recess.) [98]

Q. (By Mr. Ramsey): Mr. Bronaugh, you signed a reapplication for the original patent, as I understand it, on January 30, 1931; is that correct?

A. I have no recollection of the date, Mr. Ramsey.

Q. You just testified——

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

A. I signed the original application, I assume. I have no recollection of it. If my signature appears and it is dated, that must be it.

Q. That was sort of a formal question. You just testified to the date, and I just was refreshing your mind.

At that time was a search made through the patent records?

A. I do not know. I had nothing whatever to do with that. Mr. Potter handled that end of things through Mr. Birkenbeuel, a patent attorney here in Portland.

Q. You did not discuss the matter with the patent attorney?

A. I don't recall whether I did or not. I had very little contact with Mr. Birkenbeuel.

Q. Do you know when a patent examination—a search was made?

A. I believe a search was made in 1931 because they sent out to me quite a number of file wrappers to examine.

Q. What part of the year was that?

A. I think it was during the summer of 1931, as best I can recall. [99]

Q. These file wrappers covered what?

A. Various patents in the field of refrigeration.

The Court: You do not mean file wrappers, do you, Mr Bronaugh; you mean the patent?

The Witness: They were referred to as file wrappers. That term is a meaningless term. That is the way they were described to me, and that is why I used the term.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Q. (By Mr. Ramsey): You remember what you looked at, and were they a complete file of everything that had occurred in the patent office with regard to these particular patents?

A. I don't know whether they were everything that would refer to it or not. As I recall, there was a good deal of—many pages of them with drawings and descriptions; some of them were drawings and descriptions of apparatus.

Q. They were not just paper copies of patents they were complete files?

A. As I recall, they were.

Q. How many of them were there, how many patents?

A. I have no idea.

Q. Would you say one, two, twelve, fifteen?

A. There was more than one. There might have been twelve. I have no way of remembering at all.

Q. What were they supposed to cover?

A. My understanding was that they were supposed to cover ideas in the field of refrigeration that related in some way [100] or degree to other ideas.

Q. They were the result of a search made?

A. Yes, I understood so.

Q. They were referred to you for your consideration?

A. That is right.

Q. You looked them over?

A. That is right.

Q. Was one of them—you think that was in the summertime of 1931?

A. As best I can recall.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

Q. Your application for a patent was filed in January of that year?

A. If that is the date it bears.

Q. I mean, how long did it follow the filing of your application? A. I don't know.

Q. Well, if the application shows on its face it was filed in February of 1931, would that then correspond with your memory that you received these in the summertime of that year?

A. That is merely recollection. There is nothing to which I can relate it, and I do not know how accurate I am. It might have been 1930. I don't know. I think it was 1931. I don't know.

Q. Could you remember if it was several [101] months? A. No, I can't remember.

Q. I have forgotten; did I ask you was the Anderson Patent one of these that was sent to you?

A. As I recall, it was.

Q. By Anderson I mean Patent No. 1,439,051.

A. The number is meaningless. By Anderson I simply identify and referred to a patent which Mr. Potter purchased.

Q. Is that the drawing you started to look at; does that call it back to your mind?

A. I think that is it.

Q. That is Exhibit 16-B?

A. I think that is it.

Q. You had a file wrapper on that in the summer, you believe, of 1931?

A. As I recall, I believe we did.

Q. Did you discuss that with Mr. Birkenbeuel,

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

your attorney? A. I don't recall that.

Q. Did you discuss it with Mr. Potter?

A. Not if it was in 1931, because Mr. Potter was then, I believe, in Buffalo, New York.

Q. Did you write to him about it?

A. I assume that I probably did. I don't remember specifically.

Q. Did Mr. Potter see those file wrappers?

A. I wouldn't know. [102]

Q. Did Mr. Potter see those file wrappers?

A. I wouldn't know.

Q. Were they sent to him?

A. I wouldn't know.

Q. Do you know whether Mr. Potter purchased that Anderson Patent?

A. By hearsay I was told he did.

Q. Did you see refrigerators manufactured with a patent number, with that patent number on them?

A. No.

Q. Have you looked at them in the courtroom?

A. I think so, yes; I think there is one here.

Q. Of course, it has been a long time, and it is rather hard for you to remember some of these things.

A. It is hard for me to remember things that I did not do and live with.

Q. But you made these refrigerators?

A. I made refrigerators, yes. I know what I did.

Q. No, I mean at a factory of which you were the president.

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

A. I know what I built, I know what I did, I do not know what somebody else did.

Q. Who was the person that made these?

A. Which?

Q. Refrigerators.

A. Which refrigerators? [103]

Q. The ones that carry those numbers, the number of the Anderson Patent. Not you?

A. I don't know.

Q. Well, I will ask you specifically, did Potter make the refrigerator which is marked No. 116? Was that made in the factory of which you were president? Would you care to look at it?

(Witness leaves witness stand and examines refrigerator.)

A. Is that the box?

Q. That is this one here (indicating).

A. I know nothing whatever of that box. That was not made by the Potter Refrigerator Corporation of Portland, Oregon.

Q. This next one is Plaintiff's 11-A.

A. That is right; we built the box here in Portland, Oregon, in our plant.

Q. Fine; thank you.

The Court: Did you say you did build it?

The Witness: The center box, your Honor.

Mr. Maguire: The one last referred to.

The Court: Go ahead.

Q. (By Mr. Ramsey): What did you do with the file wrappers that were sent to you?

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

A. I don't recall.

Q. Going back now to the time in the factory in which you [104] were doing experimental work and you were making some comparative tests, what were you testing with? I mean what other refrigerator compartments were you testing with, if any?

A. I don't know that I understand your question.

Q. Perhaps I can recall—was there a case in there, a display case, two-compartments display case?

A. We had a display case. We had various display cases on display down in our sales room.

Q. Do you remember one called Supercold?

Mr. Cunningham: If your Honor please, I object. I think we ought to keep on the subject of household refrigeration and not storage and display cases, another part of the business.

The Court: I thought in his direct examination he talked about other types of cases.

Mr. Cunningham: Not a word that I recall, your Honor.

Mr. Ramsey: Coolers, walk-in coolers.

Mr. Cunningham: That is a different thing, walk-in coolers, not display cases for storage.

The Court: Objection overruled. This is cross-examination.

Q. (By Mr. Ramsey): Do you remember this Supercold case, a special one?

The Witness: No. We sold some Supercold cases,

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

as I [105] recall, but I haven't any recollection of any specific one.

Q. Did you have a Supercold case there with two different temperatures in it and two separate compartments? A. Not that I recall.

Q. Did you make examinations of that at the same time that you were working with a Fir-Tex box? A. Not that I recall.

Q. Did you make examinations of the Supercold display case and the Fir-Tex box on humidities?

Mr. Maguire: Do you mean tests or examinations?

Mr. Ramsey: Comparative tests.

Mr. Maguire: That is all right, then.

The Witness: I have no recollection of using a Supercold case in any comparative tests with what I was doing in the household refrigeration cabinet.

Q. Do you remember Mr. Elmer Steele who worked there? A. Yes, I do.

Q. Do you remember your taking him upstairs and showing him what work you were doing?

A. No, I do not. I probably took a good many people up there. There was no reason why I would remember it.

Q. Do you remember buying meat at Swift & Company? A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember putting part of it in your cabinet and part of it in this particular Supercold case? [106] A. No.

Q. Do you remember measuring the results of

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

that particular Supercold case against the results of this Fir-Tex box?

A. I have said that I recall no comparative tests between the two.

Q. Very well.

Now, just the subject of that mechanism that you described in connection with the drawings of the original application or of the reissue patent in question, you were mentioning terms to the jury. One of them is an expansion coil, and you were explaining it in somewhat detailed form.

A. Expansion coil or valve?

Q. Expansion valve. I am sorry; you are correct, expansion valve, and this tube that you were talking about with a very small opening in it, is that a capillary tube that is the equivalent of the expansion valve?

A. I do not know exactly what you mean by a capillary tube.

Q. I thought you used the word, and you said there was some tube with an opening ten-thousandths of an inch in it?

A. No, I did not say that with reference to a capillary tube. I merely used that dimension to illustrate the reduction of pressure from a larger tube to the atmosphere, I think, or to a larger tube, merely a restriction device.

Q. Where does that restriction exist?

A. Between the high and low side of the refrigeration [107] cycle.

Q. In what sort of a device?

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

A. It can be anything.

Q. Could it be an expansion valve?

A. It could be an expansion valve.

Q. Could it be a capillary tube?

A. What do you mean by capillary tube?

Q. Let it go. No further cross-examination.

Redirect Examination

By Mr. Cunningham:

Q. Mr. Bronaugh, I offer in evidence and show you Plaintiff's Exhibit 6-KKKK (presenting document to opposing counsel).

Mr. Ramsey: No objection.

(Thereupon the document, sketch of a finned coil in the Potter refrigerator, previously marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 6-KKKK, was received in evidence.)

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Can you tell the jury what the document is?

A. It is a very crude sketch that I made to illustrate the finned coil that was used in the Potter refrigerator in question.

Mr. Cunningham: May the jury look at the sketch, your [108] Honor?

The Court: Yes.

(Document presented to the jury.)

The Court: When did you sever all your connection with Potter and Potter Refrigerator Corporation?

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

The Witness: I believe it was December of 1931, your Honor.

The Court: In other words, you filed your application for a patent in February, 1931. It was issued in October, 1936, but in December of the same year, that is, of 1931, you severed all connection and transferred all your rights to Potter.

The Witness: I had no rights, your Honor, in the patent.

The Court: You never did have an interest in the patent?

The Witness: No, I was employed by the Potter Refrigeration Corporation on a salary basis.

The Court: Therefore, your name which appears on the reissued patent that was issued in 1940, you had no interest in it?

A. Because I was on the original, but I had no interest in it.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Mr. Bronaugh, as I understood your testimony on cross-examination you referred to an Anderson [109] Patent and an Anderson refrigerator, did you not?

A. Yes, I was questioned about it.

Q. Did you see anything in this room that caused you to say that was an Anderson refrigerator?

A. The first box closest to the jury box I would say—I had never seen it before or one like it before, but from its resemblance to the design shown on the sketches shown in the Anderson Patent, as I recall them, I would say that was it.

Q. That is the design and the sketches that you

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

saw in this file wrapper of that particular Anderson Patent. Is your mind refreshed now as to Plaintiff's Exhibit 16-B standing on the easel there?

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, I want to remind you of what I did this morning. Are you going to ask him about that after I told you that that is inadmissible and he was not qualified to do it?

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, it is our position that it was opened up on cross-examination and that now the situation is changed, and I have a short line of questions about that particular Anderson box that is described in the Anderson Patent. May I put on the record that it is Defendants' Exhibit 115, the physical exhibit. I would like a ruling, your Honor, if I may.

Mr. Maguire: On that matter, your Honor, I say that [110] I fully appreciate the attitude your Honor is taking, and I want to say that, so far as myself and my colleague are concerned, we intend rigidly to——

The Court: Make your argument. What do you have in mind?

Mr. Maguire: Counsel on cross-examination after your Honor's ruling asked him whether he had examined the file wrapper in that case—in that patent, rather, and whether or not a particular box was a box which was the exemplification or construction of the Anderson Patent. [111]

Mr. Maguire: He never said that. He just said while he was President of the Potter Refrigerator Company whether a box manufactured by Potter

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

had an Anderson number on it. Well, it couldn't have an Anderson number on it unless they're engaged in fraud.

The Court: Well, the Potter Company, I think the testimony showed and he testified, Potter purchased the Anderson patent.

Mr. Maguire: Quite so. Quite so.

The Court: I don't understand.

Mr. Maguire: All right. Now, your Honor—

The Court: Go ahead.

Mr. Maguire: —either that was cross-examination which was subject to objection, or a cross-examination which your Honor of your own motion would have held—I don't say would have held; I should have said could have held as proper cross-examination, but if in the face of the Court's ruling counsel on cross-examination opened the door about a particular matter other than what this man knows about the matter—for instance, "Did you have a file wrapper in regard to that? Did you examine the file wrapper? Did you make a box or your company make a box?"

Mr. Ramsey: I am sorry, Bob. You are mistaken and I know honestly so. We didn't refer to the Anderson box. We referred to two Potter boxes. See, these two—I know you're [112] honestly mistaken. These two are the Potter boxes and we never touched the Anderson box.

The Court: I am just going to rule right now that he can talk about the Anderson patent but he

(Testimony of Lewis J. Bronaugh.)

can't explain the Anderson patent because by Mr. Cunningham's own statement he is not qualified to do it.

Mr. Cunningham: I don't want him to do that, sir. I want him to talk about boxes made under the Anderson patent.

The Court: Do you know of any boxes that were made under the Anderson patent?

The Witness: No, your Honor, I didn't build any boxes under the Anderson patent, to my knowledge.

Mr. Maguire: I was under a misapprehension, your Honor, and I beg your Honor's pardon.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, your Honor, I was under a misapprehension, too. I thought he did say that he had recognized that Exhibit 115.

The Court: And you asked him when he came into court today if he saw an Anderson box.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, that's all, your Honor.

The Court: All right. That's all, Mr. Bronaugh.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. Cunningham: Thank you very much.

Now, if your Honor please, we have perhaps just [113] about enough time for the Bade deposition.

The Court: Bade deposition?

Mr. Cunningham: Yes.

The Court: Where does Mr. Bade live?

Mr. Cunningham: Well, sir, he is in California.

The Court: Oh, is that the deposition that was taken here?

Mr. Cunningham: It was taken in your Honor's presence.

The Court: Yes. I know that deposition.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, Mr. Bade is a witness on behalf of the plaintiff. He was in California and he came up to Portland a few days ago and there he gave a deposition in my office and he was interrogated by Mr. Cunningham and he was cross-examined by Mr. Ramsey under courtroom conditions. Now, this is the first of a number of depositions that will be read in this case. One or more of the depositions will be of people who are now deceased. Other depositions will be read of people who, for one reason or another, were unable to come to this court to testify in person. But the testimony of each of them was taken under the same conditions as witnesses testifying in court. In other words, they were sworn to tell the truth, they were examined by the person who desired their testimony to be taken, they were cross-examined by attorneys for the opposite side. Prior to the time we came into court in connection with the objections [114] made by one side or the other to questions I ruled on those questions and so today you will have the testimony of Mr. Bade.

Now, it is entitled to the same consideration as you would give to the testimony of a live witness who appeared in court. Now, under our procedure here Mr. Harold Hart will be Mr. Bade. In fact, he is going to be all the witnesses and the questions will be propounded by Mr. Cunningham or, if he desires, by his associate, Mr. Orme Cheat-

ham, and the questions on cross-examination will be asked by Mr. Byron. Of course, it doesn't take a great deal of ingenuity because they merely read the questions set forth in the deposition and Mr. Hart will answer them.

(Whereupon the bailiff took the witness stand to answer the questions in the deposition.)

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, I am sorry we have only one copy.

The Court: It's all right. I heard the testimony. All right, Mr. Cheatham.

Mr. Cheatham: Your Honor, may the record show that Edward C. Bade, a witness called in behalf of plaintiff, having been first duly sworn by the Notary, was examined and testified as follows?

The Court: Well, you don't do that any more. It's not [115] necessary. I have already told the jury.

Mr. Cheatham: Thank you, your Honor.

DEPOSITION OF EDWARD C. BADE

"Direct Examination

By Mr. Cunningham:

Q. Mr. Bade, will you state your name, age, and present occupation?

A. It is Edward C. Bade; 51; refrigeration service engineer.

Q. For whom are you working?

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

A. I am employed by the C. B. Hill & Company, Incorporated.

Q. Where is your office?

A. It is in Trenton, New Jersey.

Q. What is your territory generally?

A. I have the Western United States, Canada, and Alaska.

Q. Can you tell us just briefly the recent circumstances that led to your appearance here at this deposition?

A. Well, I heard of the matter and that they wanted——

Mr. Byron: I think it would be well if you were to speak up so that the Judge can hear you.

Mr. Cunningham: Yes, a little louder.

The Witness: They wanted some inquiries in regards to this refrigeration equipment, and I am very much interested in it, and I know of——

Q. Who asked you to testify here, and when?

A. Well, I got a letter through my sister, and I picked up another letter at San Francisco through Mr. Cheatham. [116]

Q. How long ago was that?

A. Well, let's see, I think, I would say—the first time I heard it I would say four weeks. It is pretty hard to tell definitely. I have been doing lots of traveling, and it has been pretty near every day working.

Q. Well, now, since that letter was received by you through your sister when was the first time

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

you spoke to anybody on the telephone regarding your deposition?

A. Well, it was last evening.

Q. With whom did you speak?

A. It was with Mr. Cheatham——

Q. With me?

A. With you, and I did——

Q. With Cheatham?

A. ——talked to Cheatham.

Q. Then did you discuss your appearing here with us last night? A. Yes, I did.

Q. Where was that discussion, Mr. Bade?

A. That was discussed at my brother's home.

Q. At about what hour?

A. Oh, I would say around nine o'clock.

Q. To what did that discussion relate, generally?

A. Well, we were discussing when I had worked for the Potter Company and what type of work and what I was doing at that [117] time for the Potter Company.

Q. Is that the Potter Refrigeration Corporation?

A. Yes, it would be called the Potter Refrigeration Corporation. That has been quite a while ago. Even a young guy forgets.

Q. Well, sir, can you tell us about when you were employed by Potter Refrigerator Corporation?

A. Well, it was—as near as I can tell, it was around June, 1929.

Q. Was that when your employment began?

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

A. Yes.

Q. About how long did your employment continue?

A. Well, I think I got out of there around 1932. It was in the early part of 1932, I think, I completed—

Q. What were your duties generally?

A. Well, I assembled first, and then I got into the service and the experimental part of refrigeration. When I wasn't busy with the servicing outside, why I was around the experimental part and whatever things we had we would do to keep busy.

Q. By the way, where was this plant?

A. This was at Ninth and Flanders.

Q. In Portland? A. Portland, Oregon.

Q. Well now, did you become familiar with any experimental work at Potter's? [118]

A. Yes, we were working on—of course, he worked on his compressors, and then lots of this work that I did was quite a bit on the two-temperature refrigeration box that they were developing at that time, and I would work on that sometimes. Other times I might be out as some of the work was experimental on mock-up jobs that they would make to check on loads. At that time we didn't know as near about our loads as we do now. It was more of a cut-and-try deal in figuring how to—we did not have the factors that we have now and also the type of equipment you have to make—

Q. Can you recall, Mr. Bade, any of the other

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

people who were familiar with this experimental work?

A. Yes, there was a man by the name of Jim Thompson, but mostly I worked with a man in the experimental, with Eddie Hermann and Mr. Bronaugh, and, of course, Mr. Potter was in there.

Q. Is that Mr. Lewis J. Bronaugh?

A. Yes.

Q. And Mr. T. Irving Potter?

A. T. Irving Potter, and the only thing I know Eddie Hermann is by Eddie Hermann, and Jim Thompson, he was out, and also they did lots of machine work at Fouch Electric, and there was a man by the name of Bittner. He was not really interested, but he would be over there a lot and see what we were doing.

Q. By the way, I give notice on the record of adding [119] Mr. George W. Bittner's name to our list of witnesses. He will be able to appear at the trial, we believe.

The Witness: And there was, oh, Bartlett.

Q. Jesse Bartlett?

A. Jesse Bartlette, and of course, Elmer Steele. I just found he passed away.

Q. Well, now, Mr. Bade, what is the earliest recollection that you have of work on these experimental household refrigerators?

A. Well, I would say it would be, as near as I can recollect, it would be in the fall of the year; probably October, around in there, 1929.

Q. That is of the year you went to work there?

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

A. Yes, that was the first that we had. We had, oh, other work we were doing that I remember. There was, oh, they had things they were working on, and we would assemble the parts and make mock-ups. Then we worked on that through the winter. It was a little slow first, and, as near as I can remember, I would say I installed one at Gearhart, Gearhart, Oregon.

Q. When you say "one" you mean a two-temperature refrigerator?

A. Yes, a two-temperature box that was actually, worked as a two-temperature box. It held, like you would have frozen food now, it would hold it at zero or lower if you wanted to run it that cold, and the top compartment would run, I would say, from 33 to 48. You could adjust it. It was [120] adjustable, and it would defrost automatically on off-cycle, the top, the food holding compartment, and your freezer compartment, the freezer compartment would remain frozen.

Q. Can you describe a little for us in your own words the construction of these experimental household refrigerators?

A. Well, I can some. We had an iron type. We had a brine tank that was fin, and the brine tank had tubing wrapped on the inside of it which would chill the brine, of course, to hold the temperature in the bottom, and that was insulated a little heavier than the top due to the heat transfer in the top parts, and they had a fin coil. The very first one, as I remember now, had a cast iron coil. That was

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

about the first one. We had to jerk that out due—we couldn't get it tight. This refrigerant was methyl chloride, and it was hard to hold. All we had was litharge to hold it. It did not hold very good so we took that out. We got hold of a copper fin coil called a Larkin coil which we split in the middle and mounted that in the top.

Q. Did you have anything to do with splitting that coil?

A. Yes, I did. I helped cut that coil in two.

Q. When did you do that to your best recollection?

A. As near as I can figure, that was, like I say, around, it would be around October. It was all done that time because we had—I think I applied quite a lot of time to that job then because we wanted to get the thing operating. [121]

Q. Did you ever see anybody, and if so who, taking any temperature readings in connection with this box?

A. Yes, Mr. Bronaugh and Eddie Hermann, Mr. Bronaugh—we had a chart worked out, a card that we were recording temperature between the two boxes and what they read at different intervals of time, and in the mornings we would always catch it the first thing, and then we would come in during the daytime with the opening and closing of the boxes, and then later we had recording thermometers that we got, but at first we didn't have one that would go down low enough for the low temperature

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

stuff because at that time—oh, they had them, but they just were not accessible to the trade.

Q. Do you recall what type of recording thermometers?

A. Bristol was the only one we could get at that time in Portland or Seattle or San Francisco.

Q. Did you yourself personally ever take any readings?

A. Yes, I have changed quite a many charts on those instruments.

Q. Do you recall what type of valve was used on this experimental job?

A. Well, yes, we used a—there was two different valves we would use at that time. We used an automatic expansion valve, and we also used a thermostatic type, and we had changed that and gone back to the automatic valve due to the top spilling over and flooding out the compressor when it [122] got warm because the valve actuated by the temperature of the suction line, and also the temperature in the box, if the rise was too great, why, it would make it flood.

Q. Can you recall, Mr. Bade, what type of cabinet was used in connection with these experimental boxes?

A. Well, as I recall, the very first one, as near as I can remember, we started with a regular ice-box and built it up. We added insulation and took away—we did that by applying Fir-Tex which was easier to work than cork. We could get a tight seal because they claimed that the Fir-Tex would

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

make a tight bond as it was put together. Then we built up another one, or, in fact, it might have been two. I am not too clear on this in my memory, but we did build this one that went to Gearhart, and, as I would say, there could have been two of them, but they were not probably just exactly alike, but the one that went to Gearhart, that was built up near the specifications that we had experimented on, and that worked very well.

Q. Well, now, I show you four photographs marked Exhibits 6HH, GG, FF, and EE—the markings are on the backs, Mr. Bade, up here—and ask if you can identify those, if you can identify the apparatus shown, if you can?

A. Well, this here one——”

The Court: Wait a minute.

Mr. Cunningham: There isn't much point in showing them, [123] your Honor; he won't recognize them now.

The Court: This can go off the record.

(Discussion held off the record.)

The Court: Back on the record.

Mr. Cheatham: “——and ask if you can identify those, if you can identify the apparatus shown, if you can? A. Well, this here one——

Q. Referring to which? Would you give the number? A. It says E.”

The Court: Wait a minute. Get me those and we will just show them to the jury, what he is talking about. “A. It says E.”

Mr. Cheatham: -EE.

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

The Court: 6-EE.

Read your answer.

The Bailiff: "6EE."

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Cheatham: Beg your pardon, your answer was, "It says E," and I asked, "6"?

The Bailiff: "A. 6EE.

Q. Yes.

A. That was the last, the newest type that we had had at that time, and those were fabricated—this is the inside of this box here, and that is EX. 6FF.

Q. 6FF? [124]

A. And that was fabricated with stainless steel on the inside. I think we had not used too much stainless steel up until that time. Here is another one, is a duplicate of this. It is EX. 6GG, and this is a duplication of EX 6HH.

Q. One open and the other closed; are they not?

A. Yes; that is right, and this has a Larkin fin type coil that we had split, and I notice a dome light in it that I remember particularly because I had to go out and try to pick them up, and we had to use an automobile type of dome light to light it up, and used our switch in there when the door opened.

Q. Mr. Bade, what was the practice, if you know, with respect to drawings made in connection with these early experimental models, the first ones?

A. Well, Mr. Bale was draftsman, draftsman-

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

engineer at that time, and he would sketch out stuff and then would lay it out to scale, and we would get in the drafting room, and I think lots of us had—we would get ideas, of course, and we would go in there and talk to him, and I think Mr. Potter and Mr. Bronaugh and Bale had worked out probably the dimensions on some—I know Mr. Potter's ideas were a lot along those lines because we had all—we never knew exactly what the loads would be on the refrigeration. It was figured, but it was not figured to the extent to where the coil would defrost properly, and that is why we made the mock-ups, and these jobs here [125] come out, and they worked with—we had an air switch then. That was about the only thermostat available that you could reach in and turn and make it accessible and anybody could read, and it would vary the temperature in the top of the box more really than in the lower. The lower part was fairly constant.

Q. Was that Mr. Charles W. Bale?

A. Right.

Q. Do you know where he resides?

A. Well, I don't know now. I think it is in Portland here.

Q. Portland? A. I haven't talked——

Mr. Cunningham: That is all, Mr. Bade. The witness is with you.

Mr. Ramsey: Thank you.

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

Cross-Examination

By Mr. Ramsey:

Q. Can you identify the two refrigerators identified as Exhibits EE, FF, GG, and HH?

Mr. Byron: There is a 6 before that mark.

Mr. Cunningham: 6.

Mr. Ramsey: 6.

The Witness: Yes, they are the ones that we had in the experimental room at Ninth and Flanders.

Q. When were they made? [126]

A. These were made, I would say in—Well, just in the start of 1930. As near as I can tell, it would probably be around April or May, in there. I can't tell you—because I know it was shortly after I went to work. In other words, they had had this all planned, and I think they could have probably been in the making. I don't know for sure, but I know they had them made and set up, and we got to work and we worked to complete them so we had a finished product. They wanted it for some reason.

Q. You spoke of one box being sold and installed at Gearhart, Oregon. Do you remember the purchaser's name?

A. I think his name was Barry. I can't remember too sure on that, but I am quite sure it would be. This has been a long time ago.

Q. I can appreciate that. You made a visit to

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

Gearhart and serviced the box after it was installed?

A. Yes, I did. My folks had a place at the beach at Gearhart, and I think one Sunday I went down there and took a look at the box, and there wasn't anybody home, as I remember this pretty clear now, and I think I had my brother with me. I am pretty sure.

Q. Would you recognize if I said that the man's name was Jack Barry, would that ring a bell in your mind?

A. Well, it sounds that way, yes.

Q. Do you know whether he is in the insurance business in [127] Portland, Oregon?

A. I don't know whether he is now, but I think then he was connected with it. I am not too sure on that.

Q. You say you remember a visit at Gearhart at that time. What year was that?

A. That was in 1930, and when we went down there it was—well, it was not too long after we had installed it the first time, and then I think I got a call on this. They had had quite a heavy wind, as I remember, because I think that was the reason we went down there.

Q. Can you remember whether it was cold; was it wintertime, spring, summer, fall?

A. Well, it wasn't cold, I wouldn't say, and in fact we had better weather then than you do now. There was more sunshine.

Q. Frequently do. My question was can you re-

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

member because you say you remember well, could you remember what time of the year it was by the weather or any condition or anything?

A. I would say it would have been in the spring.

Q. You couldn't say it was early spring or late spring?

A. No, exactly I couldn't tell you that. It was—it was around June probably. I can't tell you exactly.

Q. But you remember the year definitely was 1930?

A. Yes, I would say I know because my dad went down with me one time, and I had the truck, and we were down on the beach, and we picked up a log on the beach, and it was so heavy [128] that we rolled it up.

Q. When you were down at Gearhart did you meet and get to know Mr. Barry?

A. Well, I would say know him. I knew the man because I talked with him a lot. They were interested in hunting, and I sure was, but I never got a chance to go with him.

Q. You say that the Barry box is that represented by either of these pictures?

A. No, it isn't, no, the Barry box was a little different box than that. The inside was about the same, but the outside, as I remember, was—well, you might say like darker than that. It was not a white, I am pretty sure.

Q. We are thinking more of the construction.

A. Yes, the construction as far as principle,

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

it was exactly the same because it couldn't operate any different because the compressor would run and do the same as this. The compartments were divided. They would have to be divided.

Q. Divided vertically or horizontally; can you remember that?

A. That I can't tell you exactly. It might have been vertically, and yet I can't tell you for sure on that. It could have had a double door, one on the top and one on the bottom. It could have been that way. I can't remember that clearly at all. I wouldn't try to because—but I do know that the bottom compartment was separated from the top which had a fin coil in it, and the bottom part on that one [129] I could be quite sure was a brine tank with fins. I am quite sure on that.

Q. That is in the freezing compartment?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, your memory is quite clear that around the freezing compartment that that insulation was substantially heavier?

A. Yes, it was heavier in the bottom.

Q. No, I mean heavier with respect to the insulation around the top part.

A. Yes, I am sure on that because I think on that one we figured a little heavier insulation due to the heat exchange in the top to get your self-defrosting.

Q. Did you make calculations?

A. No, I didn't make any calculations. Charlie Bale and Mr. Potter and I guess Bronaugh and

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

Hermann, I guess in all we just, we figured a certain amount of thicknesses, and we put it in there and tried it, and we would use gauges and thermometers to tell us what we were getting because a certain gauge pressure will—at that time we did not have the charts worked out. Now, we do.

Q. In other words, you used the thickness of insulation that appeared appropriate to you as refrigeration engineers?

A. Yes, I guess that is what we would call them, yes.

Q. Or people in the refrigeration business?

A. That is right. [130]

Q. Then you would sort of cut-and-try to see whether it worked out?

A. Well, it was experimental just like they do in any other factory. Our factory does the same thing today. They try it and we have a room that we make weather, and we do lots like we did then except it don't take so long, we have more instruments now to tell us.

Q. Continuing now with this Barry box which you say was made either late in 1929 or early in 1930—

A. Well, it was made, I would say, in 1929 because it had been run there, and it had been used and then it was—they were talking something of painting it. I think the inside would have been. I can't be too sure on that.

Q. It is not too important.

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

A. I say I can't be definite, but I do know that box was made, and it worked out, and somehow or other I was asked if I would go to Gearhart and install it, and I——

Q. Do you know whether Mr. Barry had any connection with Potter Refrigeration?

A. That I couldn't tell you; that I wouldn't know because I don't know whether he did or not.

Q. I mean, would you say he was just an ordinary customer that would come in——

A. Well, I would say, to me he appeared that way. I didn't know him to be anything else. [131]

Q. Between the time that this Barry box was completed, where did it stand before it was purchased by Mr. Barry?

A. Well, in the experimental room in right where you see these pictures here for a while, and, as I remember right, it was over against this other wall. This is—in other words, this wall here would be, as I remember, would be looking north. I think the Barry box—of course, I can be wrong, but I mean that is just the way it appears to me, and I know it was in that room with these boxes.

Q. Was it out in front where customers could see it?

A. Well, at first, no. Afterwards, why, we had it out where people would look at it. We had it out in the shop, and then they used to go in there also.

Q. The customers?

A. Some people would come in there. Like I

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

say, I wasn't there all the time, but there was some times that they would come up and look at it. I can't remember who they were, but I know some of the people came up there to look at it.

Q. In other words, it would make no difference at this late date whether it stood inside of the wall or stood outside of the wall?

A. That is right.

Q. People went in on both sides, customers did?

A. Yes, I think they went in there. Well, they had to go through one door to get in that room. It was one big door. [132]

Q. Do you know whether they were trying to sell that one to the public?

A. No, I don't know whether they were or not. I didn't pay attention to what they were selling or anything. I was interested in refrigeration.

Q. Your work, in the main, was service work?

A. Service, installation and also assembly.

Q. Primarily service and installation?

A. Right.

Q. And that work that you describe was——

A. Experimental work.

Q. Experimental fill-in work when you were not busy otherwise? A. That is right.

Q. So that you would be away from the plant a good deal, and you would not charge your mind too much with the details of sales and things like that?

A. That is right, the sales part, why, I wasn't—I was interested in the mechanical end.

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

Q. That is right. Let us pass to that subject. You have a clear memory, I gather from what you have testified in chief, as to exactly how this Barry box was built, and that has stayed with you for—

A. Quite a while.

Q. —the last twenty-five years?

A. Yes. [133]

Q. You spoke of two different kinds of controls, one an automatic? A. Yes.

Q. And another thermostatic. Do you know which type of control was in the Barry box?

A. Yes, I changed that to an automatic.

Q. We are only lawyers and do not know what an automatic valve is.

A. Well, an automatic valve is a valve that is set. You set the pressure on it to whatever amount of pressure that you would want. By going through a cycle you will know whatever back pressure, whatever pressure that is set, you will know what temperature you will get inside your coil, and we in running the job and checking on it, we knew about what the pressures had to be set because you couldn't just go and set it—nowadays I can take a box like that and set that valve and wouldn't probably have to go look at it again, but at that time we didn't.

Q. Would you say that it was a valve probably having a spherical outline?

A. Yes, it was, it was round. I can tell even. I think, the make of the valve. It was a Detroit Lubricator.

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

Q. Would it have a diaphragm extending diametrically therethrough?

A. Yes, it was a bellows. No, the bellows didn't go clear [134] through. It had a bellows that was actuated by a screw which in turn actuated a needle against a seat.

Q. Did a spring oppose the action of the screw?

A. Yes, you pushed against the spring tension because otherwise the pulsation of your pump would rock the—we would not have an even control.

Q. I show you this sketch to see whether this is similar to the type of valve that you are describing.

A. Well, that looks something like an automatic valve, yes.

Q. Was the one you put in the Barry box substantially like that?

A. Well, the one that I had installed down there I took with me myself. I bought it out of a parts house.

Q. If it differs, would you explain how it differs?

A. Well, mechanically it did not differ very much. The only part that differed on it was that it was a little longer, and it was—it was not a round one like you have this type here.

Q. It differs——

A. But the mechanical part of it is identical in this valve and the one that was in there. They couldn't work any different because your law of mechanics would not let it work any different.

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

Q. Then on one side of this bellows or diaphragm—is there any substantial difference between a bellows and a diaphragm? [135]

A. Yes, there is.

Q. You might explain that.

A. A diaphragm has two plates or more. It has more than one. One is concave, and the other one is opposite, and it is in a plate form. Your bellows is made like an accordion. It has little round pleats in it, and that is spun out in the length to take care of expansion and contraction. In other words, you can use a bellows, or you can use a diaphragm. Now we have more diaphragm valves than we do have in bellows for expansion valves. I think every manufacturer right today makes a diaphragm valve. I mean as far as what you would use in a valve like that, the principle of them is pretty near the same. Some of them are just a little different; some of them have an adjustment that they adjust for different pressures and different limit pressures which we never even thought of in those days. We have things come up today that, brother, if we had thought of them a little better than twelve years ago we would have been rich in the refrigeration field. [136]

Q. On one side of the bellows is an intake refrigerant line?

A. Yes, your intake comes in——

Q. Pardon, on the other side is a compression spring?

A. Right; and the needle in a seat, or adjust-

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

ment. The needle and seat is on the other side of your valve which comes in and adjusts, and it has a pin and a lever in there which adjusts the needle and seat which allows the amount of refrigerant or pressure that you want to set there by turning the adjusting screw.

Q. So, then, by turning the adjusting screw you oppose the pressure of the incoming refrigerant; is that correct?

A. You can adjust the pressure by that adjusting screw on the end of it.

Q. And that controls the discharge from the valve?

A. That controls the amount of refrigerant that you would use in that certain amount of coil you have or whatever you were using.

Q. Now we are thinking in terms of the Barry box.

A. Yes, we used that, and at first—now you're talking about that one you have in there. We did have an old one. That was an old Detroit. It was not called Detroit Lubricator then. It was called American Radiator, which is a round type, I think, like you are trying to describe there. The fact of the matter is, I believe over in my basement in my brother's [137] place I have still got some of that old junk.

Q. Then refrigerant flows from there into your freezing coil?

A. Yes, into—goes into the brine tank and from the brine tank—

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

Q. But that was a freezing coil?

A. Yes, in the bottom.

Q. And the brine tank merely means that the coil was immersed in a quantity of brine?

A. That is right. Later they used it dry.

Q. I was thinking now of just the Barry box.

A. Yes, the Barry box, as I remember it, was brine.

Q. Thank you. Then the refrigerant passed from there up through the vertical pipe or conduit?

A. There was a pipe.

Q. To the cooling coil? A. Right.

Q. Then it went to the cooling coil. Now, you spoke of taking readings and, naturally, cut-and-dry adjustments? A. Yes.

Q. You were trying to control the amount of refrigerant flowing through the cooling coil in exact relationship?

A. We were controlling that with the temperatures. In other words, if you would take any box and open the valve wide open you would raise your temperature and flood your [138] pump with refrigerant so that was the need of the valve.

Q. If you flooded it, that would mean that would reduce the temperature of the cooling compartment too low?

A. No, no; you could still have a cold temperature in there with brine. It would be a little longer in pulling it down, but it would be a longer hold-over, too.

Q. Just so that we are talking about the same

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

things, if we talk about freezing coil and cooling coil, now I am speaking of cooling coil.

A. The one in which food——

Q. Of the food compartment.

A. That is right.

Q. When you say it would spill over, that would mean that it would not evaporate?

A. No, it would evaporate, but it would go over in your compressor. The front line would go to your compressor.

Q. In this Barry box about how much refrigerant, liquid refrigerant (I know it is in small quantities), about where would that go with respect to the cooling coil? Some of it would be partly liquid.

A. Oh, it was in the receiver. The refrigerant was in a receiver, and, as I remember right, I think I had four pounds in that, four pounds of methyl. We had quite a large receiver. It was made out of——well, they made some of them, and they were made out of pipe. We cleaned them and [139] scaled them and put valves on them.

Q. That would be on the discharge side of the cooling coil?

A. That would be on the high side. That is called the discharge side.

Q. The intake side?

A. That would be your liquid or feed line valve, and it is on the discharge side of the compressor. That is called the high side.

Q. Now, the amount of liquid refrigerant flow-

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

ing into the cooling coil or what you call a so-called fin coil—— A. Yes.

Q. ——there would be quite a bit of liquid, dispersed liquid particles, that are evaporating in that fin coil?

A. Oh, yes; you would have—I couldn't tell you in weight. We had, I would say, a good, oh, methyl don't travel too fast. We would have around probably two pounds in the receiver. It would be around in that, and in the brine tank naturally you absorb a little more refrigerant than you would a dry expanded coil, so the amount of charge that was in the machine would not have too much to do with it. If you had a larger receiver you could put twenty pounds in it because you would only be feeding so much in, whatever you calibrated that job or whatever your need was of that top compartment.

Q. You spoke in observing this Barry box or generally in [140] any similar box that the frost line could extend entirely over into the discharge line?

A. Well, no, it would not extend to the discharge. It would go to the suction, suction of the pump.

Q. Suction line?

A. Yes, the discharge we always termed the high side, refrigeration men.

Q. We will say to the low side.

A. That is right.

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

Q. It would not go past the cooling coil or to the low side?

A. It could if it was not properly adjusted.

Q. In adjusting these valves doing this experimental work I presume that you watched for frost line?

A. Yes, afterwards, after we got to knowing just about how much we had and it was figured out right, why, we got so that we didn't have that trouble.

Q. But in your test work you would see where the frost line extended?

A. Well, we would keep it inside the coil, yes, inside the box.

Q. I presume if insufficient refrigerant was flowing up there the frost line would not be visible even on the lead-in side of the cooling coil?

A. Well, your job would run continuously if it was not [141] calibrated right.

Q. Well, then, exactly where in this Barry box did you set that frost line?

A. Well, we would come out of the bottom and into the top coil.

Q. Would we pass the top coil?

A. Oh, no; you would just use the top coil. There would not be any use to go past the top coil because that is where you get your efficiency out of the job was because when the machine would cycle it would carry just a perfect humidity. In a certain amount of T.D. temperature degrees, the thermostat would kick over, turn it on again, and that coil would

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

be completely defrosted except for maybe if it was real cold we would set that around 32 degrees, which is frosting, and would have just a bead of ice which is something it would take a very good box you buy today that you would have; I don't believe you can buy one. I got one I wish somebody else had.

Q. In other words, the way that you adjust the degree of frost is by setting this valve?

A. The amount of tubing and the amount of length were all figured out later. Like I say, we cut-and-tried a lot of things, a lot of this stuff, and after we tried those things they seen that they had a basis of engineering.

Q. Yes, but you would adjust it with the valve in the [142] expansion coil?

A. In the bottom part of the box.

Q. You might vary the frost line without—almost no limit?

A. Well, if you had horsepower enough, why, you could stretch it all over the room if you wanted to because it would still be an evaporative coil.

Q. You talked of one box that you said was covered with Fir-Tex. I gather that was one prior to the Barry box?

A. Yes, that was, as I remember, that was the icebox that we converted and tried. We used it first. They didn't want to go to the expense of building something and not have readily—you might engineer it after a fashion, sure, but at that time, why, it was like everything else. Refrigeration engineers didn't know any more about it than anybody

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

else, and it was just like Frigidaire when we first started—this may be out of the picture but it shows you how things will operate—we started to run meat boxes on that defrost cycle. Frigidaire come along and said we were all wet, it would never work. Well, we used that system for months before they ever adapted it, but they later adapted it and, boy, that was the only thing, and that was the way in this box here, why, a lot of people would say it would never work——

Q. Do you remember, during this experimental period about [143] which you are discussing, a display case to be used comparatively?

A. We did have some display cases, yes.

Q. Do you remember—if I would ask you about a Frostaire, does that mean—do you remember that model?

A. I can't remember. I can't tell you about the model. I can't remember that.

Q. Do you remember that there was a display case down there that was set alongside of that Fir-Tex box, and it was—pardon me; it is Supercold.

A. Oh, yes; but that wasn't—that was only a single-temperature box.

Q. This one was a display case.

A. That is right.

Q. It was—— A. It was used for meats.

Q. You are sure that it was not two temperatures?

A. I am quite sure it was not. The only two-temperature it might be would be still from the top

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

of your box to the bottom, which any showcase at that time they couldn't control temperatures and humidities like we do now.

Q. You spoke of Mr. Steele. Would he have a better chance of observing that than you would, or would you have a better chance?

A. Well, that I can't tell you because I was out lots of [144] times, and he could have been in there, but I don't know whether he was in there. I can't tell you.

Q. You are not certain whether it was a one-compartment box or a two-compartment box, but it might have been a box with one compartment which was freezing and occupied a third of the capacity of the showcase and one for meats which was a cooling compartment which occupied maybe two-thirds of the compartment? Does that recall it to your mind?

A. No, it does not. I don't remember any Supercold or any box other than what we had that was a two-compartment box. I can't truthfully tell you that. I mean, I know we had—I think we had a Supercold case.

Q. You remember a case setting out there in the experimental room?

A. It was taken in on trade on one of the boxes that we had installed. You know, we built showcases, too, for grocery stores, and we used that coil and we used the defrost setting. In other words, I think we were about the first ones to use that. The fact of the matter is they demonstrated by keeping

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

hamburger, and that is about the only thing that I can tell you truthfully about the Supercold box because I do know this, that Supercold come out later, and Potter were about the two first self-defrosting commercial boxes. Then Birkinwald built them, and they were built with prime surface tubing which was operated on the same principle that [145] that was for meats.

Q. I know we were told you were in a hurry to get out of town, and it is a matter of personal inconvenience for you to stay.

A. It is. I am just swamped with work.

Q. So for that reason I am trying to make it as short as possible and still get the information for the deposition.

You would not say that there was no Supercold case there and that Supercold case was not in two compartments and that that was in the experimental room at that time? Your testimony is that you just don't remember it?

A. I don't remember of having one in there being of that type. I remember a Supercold case, due to the tubing of it and the bins that were on it. They were a cast-iron bin and that—I can't tell you any different because it is the only Supercold I remember working on, and I have worked on lots of them.

Q. Thank you. You were talking about certain tests being made and charts being taken, graphs being made?

A. Yes.

Q. You have no memory that you personally

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

made comparative tests on this Supercold display case and the so-called Fir-Tex box?

A. No; no, I don't. The only tests I took checks on were on this type of box that—is right in here, and it is the [146] old one in the icebox and as well as the Barry, and then, of course, when they got these, why——

Q. These boxes that you have before you identified by the pictures 6-EE to 6-HH were made, you believe, in 1930? A. Yes.

Q. They were made from drawings made by Mr. Bale? A. Yes.

Q. So that they followed from Bale's employment by Potter?

A. Well, yes, it was through Potter and Bale that they designed these boxes. I know because I would go in there in the mornings, and sometimes Charlie Bale would be in there before we got in there, and he would be working on different——

Q. So these boxes, 6-EE to 6-HH, were made after Mr. Bale was doing engineering work at the plant at Ninth and Flanders?

A. Mr. Bale was there; I guess he was. I can't tell you exactly, but I know he was there when I was in there. I am pretty sure.

Q. When you are speaking of Mr. Bale, it was while he was employed and had his drafting room down there at Ninth and Flanders? A. Yes.

Q. Thank you.

A. I am sure—like I say, everything that went through there, drawings and everything, he is not a

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

drafting engineer, I know everything would surely—I know he was drawing up [147] lots of different things, and we had different things that we would discuss.

Q. I am sure he did. You were speaking of this Larkin. Was that a standard coil at that time?

A. At that time that was about the only fin coil you could buy. Oh, Feters had some, but we never had too many of them here. I think Larkin in this part of the country was about the first one that come out.

Q. That was a more or less standard coil?

A. Well, it was a new type of coil; no, Larkin was something new in the refrigeration business then.

Q. About how long had it been on the market then?

A. Well, I would say maybe a year or so. I don't think it was over that because the way they pressed the fin on and then—of course, they have used fin materials and cast-iron pipe for years, but this was a copper coil. Some of them had aluminum fins, and, as I remember, some copper. I know we had two types. The way they extruded the copper tubing in it, they had a patent on that, I am sure of that.

Q. Did you buy this coil, or was it just supplied to you to cut? A. It was supplied to me.

Q. You say you cut it in half. Was it cut across the narrow—was it so that it was just half as long as it was— A. No, half as thick. [148]

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

Q. Half as wide? A. Yes.

Q. Then the fins would extend only out to one side of it?

A. No, we had enough so that it was cut—as I remember right, we had it cut pretty even.

Q. Was it longer than it was wide or it was wider than it was thick?

A. Yes, it was deeper; I will say it this way, it was deeper than those.

Q. I was trying to get dimensions, that the record may reflect it.

A. I can't give you the exact dimension, but I could give you approximate.

Q. I don't care. I know that after many years and your interest being on many other things, I was just trying to find out how it was cut.

A. No, it was cut with the deepest——

Mr. Byron: Lengthwise?

The Witness: It would be lengthwise of the coil.

Mr. Ramsey: Lengthwise of the coil, midway between the two margins?

A. Yes, that is right. If they had to have a coil made, it would have taken time to do it. They could have had a coil made that they wanted, but we cut it because time was the thing that we were interested in. [149]

Q. Do you know what supply of coils were in Portland of the Larkin make, whether they were a large range of sizes, lengths, fins?

A. Oh, they had quite a few at that time, I think. I don't remember who else carried any. There

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

wasn't anybody else carried much. There wasn't any refrigerator parts houses at that time. You had to send back East for about everything that you had, and some of them in Southern California, but very little, very limited.

Q. The only point I am trying to find out from you, Mr. Bade, is you cut it in two because it was—you found one a standard piece that was——

A. Well, it wasn't exactly a standard coil. As far as any standard, there wasn't any standard to it.

Q. That was not my point. I mean you found a size.

A. Yes.

Q. It had twice as much radiation area than what you wanted so you just cut it in half and fitted it?

A. That is right, yes.

Q. Then I presume you soldered it?

A. I think we soldered the return bin in on that. We had one return bin. I can't tell you exactly.

Q. In other words, you wanted to use half as much radiation as that would afford?

A. That is right. [150]

Q. You cut it in half, and you made it work. If you cut any pipes, why, you fixed them?

A. That is right.

Q. Thank you. I believe that you testified that the Barry box had the refrigeration mechanism outside of the box rather than in the box?

A. It was removed. I put the unit in what we called the basement, as I remember it. First he wanted another size. I remember it was in the basement.

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

Q. But it was not a self-contained box?

A. No, it was not a self-contained box.

Q. You spoke of a brine tank. I am a little confused. Are you talking about a brine tank in the freezing compartment or one in the cooling or food compartment?

A. It was in the freezing compartment.

Q. Didn't you use a brine tank or a cold wall in any of that experimental work?

A. Well, you could call that brine tank a plate which they made millions of them——

Q. I am only asking. You see, I was not there.

A. Yes.

Q. You were there, and I am asking you whether any of this experimenting that was done there at that time and that you are familiar with, was there any experimental work done with the cold-wall type rather than the fin-coil type that you [151] know of?

A. Not that I remember.

Q. Thank you.

A. There might have been; like I say, I can't recollect anything like that.

Q. In the Barry box you said substantially the same things were present as in the boxes made afterwards following the drawings of Charles Bale. I presume that that would include a substantial food compartment? A. Yes, yes.

Q. And a freezing compartment?

A. And a freezing compartment.

Q. Ice trays in the freezing compartment?

A. Yes.

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

Q. They were arranged in a sleeve?

A. Well, they were arranged, you might call it a sleeve, yes. They were put in the tank.

Q. In the tank, yes.

A. In a compartment for the ice cube trays.

Q. The freezing compartment was, did I understand it would go down to about 15 degrees?

A. Well, yes, I think we had it down to 15 degrees at times.

Q. That would be the lower limit?

A. Well, I would say that would be below zero, yes.

Q. Fifteen degrees below zero? [152]

A. Yes.

Q. Not 15 degrees Fahrenheit, above zero?

A. No, 15 degrees below.

Q. Fahrenheit, below zero?

A. Yes. In the ice cube trays I remember we took ice cubes out. Eddie Hermann did one morning, and he would run water on them, and if you know something that gets real cold, it will completely take all the air out of it and put it in water, boom, it will just crackle, and if you have ever been up in cold country like I was it is just like it—it would bring the cube way up.

Q. I think that you typified the Barry box as a good usable box?

A. Yes. I do not think that there was too many boxes at that time that would—you could not duplicate it, I know that. In fact, there wasn't any that I know of.

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

Q. I mean, just elaborating on that, by a good usable box, that is one that had worked satisfactorily? A. It seemed to.

Q. And you were down there more than once to Gearhart?

A. Yes, I have checked the box. When I would go to the beach, I would take a look at it.

Q. A half-dozen times regularly?

A. Well, I might have, yes; I can't tell you, but—

Q. Each time that you checked it, it worked satisfactorily? [153]

A. It seemed to, and I have been, like I say, a couple of times there was nobody there when I got in.

Q. I understand that covered a range of time of six months maybe?

A. Yes, it could have been.

Q. A year? A. Yes, it could have been.

Q. After that, I presume that you didn't see it any more?

A. No, I didn't hear any more about it until, oh—it could have been another box, I don't know, but I doubt it, and it was resold, and a refrigeration fellow called me up, knew that I had been working on it, and wanted to know how to adjust it. I said, 'Well, there is no adjustment that is hardly necessary. You just set that expansion valve at so many pounds by your gauge, and you can forget it.' He called me up the next day. He said, 'Boy, that is all it took.' As long as you had refrigerant in it,

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

why it operated like a million because I remember the setting on it. I think it was $2\frac{1}{2}$ or 3 pounds. That would be pretty close.

Q. That would be the adjusting of that screw that we were talking about?

A. Yes, you would adjust it. I do not think we put any out—I don't know, they might have, with the thermostatic valve. They might have, but if they were I think we changed some of them due to your valve opening up. [154]

Q. But whether they did or did not, they all had some range of adjustment?

A. Well, it would be impossible to work any kind of refrigeration machinery without some sort of metering device.

Q. An adjusting device?

A. Yes; you couldn't run your car without carburetor which adjusts the gasoline.

Mr. Ramsey: That is all.

The Court: Mr. Cunningham.

Redirect Examination

By Mr. Cunningham:

Q. Mr. Bade, you mentioned on your cross and I believe also on direct some converted old iceboxes that you tried out. That was before the Barry box, wasn't it?

A. Oh, yes; yes, that was. The Barry box was not built until they had tried and checked up on their, on the compressor load and different things

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

that we tried. We had watt meters. We took current reading. That is the honest way to check horsepower, is by current readings, so many watts make a horsepower, and that is it.

Q. So that, as I understand you, when they built this Barry box, they were quite well convinced as to their design and what they were going to do; is that right? [155]

A. Yes it was a two-compartment box. It carried the low temperature in the one compartment which was at the bottom, and the food carrying temperature in the top, which would be above, we will say, 33 degrees because 32 degrees a lot of people think it is freezing.

Q. Mr. Bade, you testified, as I recall it, that you went to work for Potter in June of 1929; is that correct?

A. That is right; as near as I can remember that is about it.

Q. What had you been doing before that? What had been your employment before that?

A. Well, I had worked in refrigeration, and I had also done aeronautical repair work, motor work, building airplanes, machine shop practice. I had been in the machine shop; I served my apprentice at Coin Machine Company. It is called Iron Fireman now, some training that was very good, I will tell you.

Q. How long after your employment started in June of 1929 did this experimental work continue with these converted iceboxes?

(Deposition of Edward C. Bade.)

A. Well, the iceboxes I don't think we—I don't think it was two months that we used the old iceboxes because it was right around, oh, around Christmastime, as I remember.

Q. By the way, do you recall whether any of those old converted iceboxes before the Barry box were sold, or do you [156] know anything about it?

A. Well, I couldn't tell you about that. I don't know whether they were. I doubt if the converted ones were sold. I don't know, but I doubt it.

Q. You do not know of any that were sold?

A. No, I do not.

Mr. Cunningham: That is all.

Mr. Ramsey: No further examination."

The Court: I guess that's all.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have gone over a little longer than we anticipated so we will adjourn now until 9:45 tomorrow morning. Please remember my admonition, don't make up your mind as to how this case should be decided and don't talk about it to anyone else.

You are now excused.

(Whereupon the jury was excused.)

The Court: Are you going to read depositions tomorrow?

Mr. Cunningham: Well, your Honor, I think perhaps Mr. Bartlett, we might put him on early for a short time, and I am really not sure until we get back to the hotel who else might have come in.

I think if we have live witnesses I would like to get rid of them while they are here.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Cunningham: Then I would like to take the depositions up when we don't have live witnesses.

The Court: That's a very good idea.

All right. Adjourn until tomorrow morning.

Mr. Byron: I know it's a little late and you most certainly want to go home. There are a few depositions in which Mr. Cunningham and I are having a little discussion. Your Honor was going to read a few pages at the end of one deposition to see.

The Court: Which one was that?

Mr. Cunningham: Bommer, if your Honor please.

The Court: I will take a look at it.

Mr. Byron: Mr. Cunningham brought a motion to strike and, of course, I am very much opposed to that because it is a very material and vital matter, your Honor; it goes right to the merits.

The Court: I will take it up, the deposition of Bommer.

Mr. Cunningham: It's the very last page, your Honor. It is his entire redirect.

The Court: I will take a look at it. You are not putting it in tomorrow?

Mr. Cunningham: I think I should put in the deposition first.

The Court: Potter will take a day.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, sir, we have done some work reducing it, I don't think it will be safe to

think it would take a full day, I may be wrong about that. [158]

The Court: Well, if this deposition took 45 minutes——

Mr. Cunningham: Yes. Of course, you know the Potter deposition was only an afternoon affair.

The Court: Oh.

Mr. Byron: It was from two to six in the afternoon, two afternoons.

The Court: Two afternoons?

Mr. Bryon: Yes. Over 200 pages.

Mr. Cunningham: We have done, I hope, a creditable job of reducing it.

The Court: It will take at least a full day. It's hard for the jury to listen to it and I think we are going to have to take even more frequent recesses to get the jury to understand these depositions.

Recess until tomorrow morning at 9:45.

(Whereupon an adjournment was taken until 9:30 Wednesday, November 16, 1955.) [159]

November 16, 1955, at 9:45 A.M.

(Proceedings herein were resumed pursuant to adjournment, as follows:)

(The following proceedings were had in Chambers out of the presence of the jury:)

The Court: Gentlemen, we just received a call from Mr. Duyck, Juror No. 2, who is living at Forest Grove, Oregon, to the effect that he has been unable to get in this morning because of the

snow. There was a bus leaving Forest Grove at nine o'clock and the other scheduled to leave at nine-thirty, neither of which buses have yet arrived at the station. I told him to try to get in as soon as possible and get his clothes and remain in Portland, but it's very unlikely he will be here before two o'clock and it may very well be that he won't be able to get in at all.

The other eleven jurors and the two alternate jurors are present here today. I want to know what you propose to do. Have you any suggestions?

Mr. Cunningham: If your Honor please, plaintiff would be entirely willing to stipulate now that Mr. Duyck may read the transcript for whatever he misses and we will raise no objection to his absence.

Mr. Maguire: We offer that in the form of a stipulation. [160]

Mr. Cunningham: We are willing to so stipulate.

Mr. Byron: Defendants are willing to so stipulate.

The Court: As I understand it, he will be furnished with a transcript of all the testimony that he didn't hear and he will get it today or tonight or tomorrow. There is a daily transcript here anyway, and he will receive a copy.

Mr. Byron: Yes.

The Court: All right. With that understanding, it's a little unusual but I know the terrible cost that both sides are incurring each day of trial, and for that reason I will permit the trial to go on with that stipulation, and with the understanding, how-

ever, that this is not going to set a pattern for what might happen if some other jurors aren't able to get down.

Mr. Maguire: I think the stipulation should be enlarged a little to this effect: that the parties, plaintiff and defendants, stipulate and agree that his physical absence during this session shall not be utilized or urged by them or any of them either in the matter of a mistrial or upon appeal. Then I think we have it tied up.

The Court: Is that satisfactory?

Mr. Ramsey: That is satisfactory.

Mr. Byron: That is satisfactory.

Mr. Cunningham: Satisfactory with plaintiff.

The Court: Now, let's go to Ruth Kobernuss.

Mr. Cunningham: Maybe this will save time, since we are going ahead, I don't think we will be able to reach her today.

The Court: Fine. I merely wanted to say this to you, Mr. Cunningham, that I have read her testimony about making hors d'œuvres and keeping lamb in the refrigerator and these berries and how much money she saved and how she likes her Potter refrigerator, and I haven't been able to find anything of any relevancy.

Now, as I understand the Rule, the commercial success is one of the things that you refer to when you have got a thin patent, when there is doubt as to whether you have a valid patent or not, and it has to be commercial success of the particular invention.

Now, as I understood from your statement to the

jury, you say that there are all old elements here, and I think you also said that Potter was not the first one to have a deep freezing unit, there were other refrigerators or at least commercial refrigerators, and I think there were deep freezes at that time also, weren't there? The invention was a two-temperature refrigerator, wasn't it?

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, that's my impression. I just don't actually know now with respect to dates. I am not trying to evade the question.

The Court: I don't understand. There is no contention [162] here that Potter was the first one to develop a freezing unit, is there?

Mr. Cunningham: Well, I think it's safe to say that we don't contend he was the first to develop a freezing unit per se.

The Court: Yes, that's what I am talking about. Now, some of the things about which Mrs. Kobernuss is talking are the advantages of a deep freeze or a freezing unit, aren't they?

Mr. Maguire: Oh, no.

Mr. Cunningham: No, your Honor.

The Court: What——

Mr. Cunningham: Would your Honor reserve that? I want to take a little more time.

The Court: I just wanted to know what type of testimony you propose to have her give.

Mr. Cunningham: Your question, I imagine, is prompted by your doubt as to the relevancy of the testimony.

The Court: Precisely right. I think you are in

pretty good shape so far, and I don't want to start getting error in the record.

Mr. Cunningham: May I point out that her testimony demonstrates what is vital to the case; it's not only relevant, it's vital. It demonstrates how this invention which was embodied in the devices that she sold solved the long-felt [163] problem of the industry. There could be no more vital testimony in any patent case, and it's not pure speculation or opinion, it's actual fact.

Mr. Maguire: Personal knowledge. I have some authorities which I do want to present.

The Court: I would like to look at it.

Mr. Maguire: All right. I will give you citations.

The Court: As long as we are not going to reach that problem today it's all right. Now, what are we going to do—who is your first witness?

Mr. Cunningham: I would like to get rid of McChesney first.

The Court: McChesney?

Mr. Cunningham: I have shown Mr. Kolisch the letter I have failed to mark.

The Court: Is there any objection?

Mr. Kolisch: I haven't looked at it.

The Court: Now, do you know McChesney's testimony? Have you read it in the—did he testify in the Stewart-Warner case?

Mr. Cunningham: No, sir, he didn't. He didn't have his refrigerator then.

May I help you, Mr. Kolisch, Mr. Ramsey? I want to state that I am frank to confess I received

that on October 20th from Mr. Potter, as shown by the letter I have [164] shown you. It got in my correspondence file and I failed to mark it. I didn't put it in.

The Court: Bring the jury down.

Mr. Cunningham: I don't want to offer in evidence Potter's letter to me. I just showed that to you.

The Court: Who is your next witness?

Mr. Cunningham: Mr. Bartlett, who also will be short, and then, your Honor, I plan to get right into the Potter deposition, which will finish us for the day, I think.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Cunningham: Incidentally, if Mr. Duyek misses the Potter deposition, we have got an extra copy he can use.

The Court: Do you want the deposition redone a daily copy?

Mr. Bryon: I am not particular about it.

Mr. Maguire: I would suggest that if the entire deposition, whatever it may be, goes in evidence it isn't necessary to make a copy but if only parts of it are admitted in evidence—I take it there may be instances where that will occur——

Mr. Cunningham: Universal in this case.

Mr. Maguire: All right. Universal. Yesterday there wasn't anything.

Mr. Cunningham: Bale is the only one that I can think of that we are going to use only on perhaps—— [165]

The Court: Well, on Potter you have all agreed

upon what you want. You know what is in there.

Mr. Cunningham: We are leaving out a good part of Potter.

The Court: Yes. But that's all by prearrangement.

Mr. Maguire: Yes. But the difference is——

The Court: But as far as these men are concerned, as far as Duyek is concerned, you don't want them to see the portions that have been deleted. [166]

(In Open Court with the Jury.)

(Discussion off the record.)

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, call your first witness.

Mr. Cunningham: If your Honor please, I call Mr. McChesney.

DONALD F. McCHESNEY

a witness produced in behalf of Plaintiff, having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

Direct Examination

By Mr. Cunningham:

Q. Mr. McChesney, where do you reside?

A. In Seattle, Washington.

Q. What is your occupation?

A. I am a boat builder.

Q. What is the address of your business?

A. 2901 East 178th Street, Zone 55, Seattle.

(Testimony of Donald F. McChesney.)

Q. Mr. McChesney, do you recognize this old refrigerator that has been marked Plaintiff's 11-A?

A. I do.

Q. What is that refrigerator; what connection do you have with it?

A. Well, that is a Potter refrigerator that I bought and had in my kitchen for about between 18 and 20 years. [167]

Q. How did it get to this courtroom, if you know?

A. Well, I was advised by Mr. Potter that Mr. Cunningham would like to have it shipped down here as evidence, so I shipped it down.

Q. About when did you ship it down?

A. Oh, two or three weeks ago.

Q. Has it been in your possession ever since you purchased it? A. Yes.

Q. I show you a letter, a photostatic copy of a letter, dated September 12, 1931, signed D. F. McChesney, and addressed to the Potter Refrigerator Company, Portland, Oregon. Would you look at that, please (presenting document to the witness)?

Did you write that letter? A. I did.

Q. Is your signature at the bottom?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Does it refresh your recollection as to the precise date when you purchased the refrigerator, Plaintiff's 11-A?

A. Yes, this letter dated September 12, 1931, says that I have had the box approximately a little

(Testimony of Donald F. McChesney.)

less than three months, so I must have purchased it about June in 1931.

Mr. Cunningham: If your Honor please, the defendants' attorneys have very kindly consented to my including this [168] letter on the list of exhibits. I do not want to represent that it is without objection to its admissibility. I do now offer it in evidence.

The Court: What is the relevancy of the letter? The man has looked at it. He recollects the date, and he has testified as to the date.

Mr. Cunningham: May I ask him a few more questions?

The Court: Yes. Is there any objection to the letter?

Mr. Byron: No objection.

The Court: All right, then.

Mr. Cunningham: May it be marked the next exhibit number, Plaintiff's Exhibit 22?

The Court: Yes.

(Thereupon, the photostatic copy of letter dated September 12, 1931, above referred to, was marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 22 for Identification and received in evidence.)

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Mr. McChesney, back in the spring of 1931 when you bought this refrigerator did you replace any other electric refrigerator in your household? A. Yes, I did.

Q. What make of refrigerator was that?

Mr. Ramsey: That is objected to.

(Testimony of Donald F. McChesney.)

The Court: What do you claim for that? [169]

Mr. Cunningham: I merely want to show that the type of refrigerator—I want to show the type of refrigerator that this Potter refrigerator replaced in Mr. McChesney's house?

The Court: What difference would that make?

Mr. Cunningham: Well, sir, it is my understanding that it replaced a very well-known conventional refrigerator, dry cold refrigerator, with a moist cold. It shows, it is an example of a replacement sale, and it shows the use of the invention by Mr. McChesney in his household over what was the prior art.

Mr. Byron: That has nothing to do with the question of whether this reissue patent in suit is valid and infringed.

Mr. Cunningham: Oh, your Honor, I think it does. It shows that it solved a long-felt need.

The Court: What solved a long-felt need?

Mr. Cunningham: The invention, your Honor, the Potter refrigerator.

The Court: The freezing unit, or what? I do not know. What do you propose to show by this witness, that it is the moist cold that is the invention or the two-temperature refrigerator?

Mr. Cunningham: Oh, I think he will show that the moist cold feature—he is not an expert in refrigerators; he is a user of a refrigerator—he will show that that [170] moist cold feature was absent from the old conventional refrigerators, and he can name the type so that it can be verified if anyone wants

(Testimony of Donald F. McChesney.)

to verify it; simply the fact that this refrigerator was purchased by him and replaced an earlier refrigerator.

The Court: I do not think it is prejudicial anyhow, so let the witness testify. Objection overruled.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): What type of refrigerator did you replace with the Potter, Exhibit 11-A? A. It was a General Electric.

Q. Was that like the refrigerators then on the market, electric refrigerators?

A. Yes, it was a current model, two or three years old.

Q. Did it have any provision for moist or humid cold storage of food? A. No, it did not.

Q. Did it have any provision for the frozen storage of frozen foods?

Mr. Ramsey: Object to this line of inquiry as to the construction of a replacement refrigerator upon the same ground.

Mr. Cunningham: I will withdraw that, your Honor. I would like to have the witness tell me what the differences were, in his own words, what the differences were between this General Electric refrigerator— [171]

The Court: Oh, no; I am not going to let him do that. That is going a little too far.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, sir, I do not want to lead him, but I am trying to get to the point.

The Court: What was your last question that he asked you, whether the General Electric was a two-temperature box or a single-temperature box?

(Testimony of Donald F. McChesney.)

The Witness: I do not recall him asking me that. He asked me if it had had provision for moist cold and what provision it had, if any, for freezing. That is the way I remember the question.

The Court: All right; that is more accurate. Answer that question.

The Witness: Well, it had for freezing only the ice tray compartment or ice cube compartment up in the storage, food storage box. It had no room for storage of the frozen foods but simply a place to make ice cubes.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Did it have a single evaporator coil?

A. Well, I am not a technical man. I don't know.

Q. Did you have to defrost the General Electric? A. I did regularly.

Q. For how long a time had you had this General Electric refrigerator in use prior to 1931?

A. I don't recall the exact time, but I would say about [172] approximately two years.

Q. Was it in a worn-out condition when you bought the Potter?

A. No, it was running perfectly, as well as it did when I bought it.

Q. What did you do with it?

A. Well, I ran some ads in the paper and sold it.

Q. Will you tell us the reasons why you replaced it with this Potter refrigerator?

The Court: Do not answer that question. That is enough on this line. Mr. Cunningham.

(Testimony of Donald F. McChesney.)

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Did this Potter refrigerator, Exhibit 11-A, stay in service in your family from 1931 to what date—1950, I believe it was?

A. Approximately 1950. I don't recall the exact date.

Q. Did it operate satisfactorily through those nineteen years?

A. Well, the compressor unit——

Q. Tell us what, if anything——

Mr. Byron: Wait a minute. Let him answer the question. You stopped him when he wanted to say something.

Mr. Cunningham: I am sorry; go ahead.

The Witness: The compressor unit that furnished the power for it had to be serviced occasionally.

Q. Were there any other troubles with the Potter during [173] the nineteen years, that you now recall?

A. Well, at one time we, through servicing it, someone who apparently did not understand the circuit put the wrong refrigerant in it, and I had to have a hydrator put in the line to take all the moisture out—a dehydrator.

Q. That is a drier in the refrigerant line; is that what you mean?

A. Yes, to take moisture out of the refrigerant.

Q. You do not mean hydrator pans that were on the market? A. No, it is a dehydrator unit.

(Testimony of Donald F. McChesney.)

Q. Do you recall any other difficulties over the nineteen years?

A. Well, eventually the old pump wore out, and I got a new pump unit, complete unit.

Q. Is that a replacement compressor pump unit in the bottom part, bottom compartment of Exhibit 11?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. When did you get that?

A. Well, I don't recall that date exactly either, but probably about 1940, somewhere along there.

Q. I understood you to say that you had some difficulty obtaining skilled service in connection with this Potter refrigerator?

A. That is right.

Q. To what period of time do you refer? [174]

A. Well, that was in the early stages before other manufacturers started making similar kinds of boxes.

Q. Can you place the time as accurately for us as you can?

Mr. Ramsey: I object on the grounds of materiality, if the Court please.

The Court: Objection sustained. Mr. Cunningham, I am a man of great patience, but you are going far beyond the relevancy here, and I think—it does not make any real difference whether this was the most wonderful box that he ever had and worked perfectly or whether he had trouble. We are here trying to find out whether the Amana and Admiral infringed the claims of the reissue patent.

Mr. Cunningham: May I ask him this question, your Honor: Were there any other makes of refrig-

(Testimony of Donald F. McChesney.)

erators on the market during the early '30's that had this moist cold feature?

The Court: Obviously the question is improper. This man is a boat builder and not a refrigeration expert.

Mr. Cunningham: I was asking within his own knowledge.

The Court: Do not answer the question.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Mr. McChesney, what time did you put this refrigerator out of service? A. Approximately 1950.

Q. What did you do, if anything, toward replacement of this refrigerator?

A. I replaced it—— [175]

Mr. Ramsey: Objected to, if the Court please; irrelevant.

The Court: Objection sustained.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Did you buy an Admiral Dual-Temp?

The Court: I do not think that that is a proper question, Mr. Cunningham. The jury is instructed to disregard it.

Mr. Cunningham: Mr. McChesney, have you any interest in the plaintiff, Moist Cold Corporation, plaintiff in this action?

A. Well, indirectly, yes.

Q. Will you explain that interest, please?

A. Well, as I understand it, this Moist Cold Corporation is set up——

Mr. Byron: Excuse me; would you speak just

(Testimony of Donald F. McChesney.)

a little more loudly and distinctly. I cannot hear you.

The Witness: I say, as I understand it, this Moist Cold Refrigeration Company was set up to—owned the Potter patent, and I have since almost the inception of the patent been interested in it because I believe it had a real value because it represented a patent of a new type refrigerator.

The Court: Do you have any financial interest in this Moist Cold Company or any corporation that has stock in the Moist Cold?

The Witness: No, not in the Moist Cold Corporation.

The Court: What is your interest, then, any financial interest? [176]

The Witness: I have been through the past 24-odd years contributing to Mr. Potter's efforts to establish the validity of his patent. I have no stock, no legal claim for any money, and I have just been helping him to carry on the efforts to validate the patent in the belief that if he was successful he would do what he could to compensate me for the money I had put into it.

Mr. Cunningham: The witness is with you.

Mr. Ramsey: No cross-examination.

The Court: That is all.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. Cunningham: Mr. Bartlett, please. [177]

JESSE E. BARTLETT

a witness produced in behalf of Plaintiff, having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

Direct Examination

By Mr. Cunningham:

Q. Mr. Bartlett, will you please state your age, residence, and present occupation?

A. I am seventy-two years old.

Q. And your residence?

A. Grants Pass, Oregon.

Q. And your present occupation?

A. Well, retired.

Q. What has been your principal occupation, Mr. Bartlett in life?

A. Well, for a great many years I was salesman and sales manager. Since I have quit the refrigeration business in 1932 I purchased a mine in Southern Oregon and also a farm.

Q. Were you ever employed by the Potter Refrigerator Corporation in Portland, Oregon?

A. I was.

Q. At what time?

A. Well, I think I went to work for them in November in 1929.

Q. How long did your employment continue?

A. About two years. [178]

Q. Where was the place of business of Potter Refrigeration Corporation?

A. Well, it was on Ninth and Glisan.

Q. In Portland, Oregon? A. Portland.

(Testimony of Jesse E. Bartlett.)

Q. In what capacity were you employed?

A. Sales manager.

Q. For what territory?

A. Well, I think to start with we were primarily interested in only Portland, and later we extended it to take in all the outside territory of the State of Oregon, Idaho and Washington.

Q. Have you any recollection of experimental work being done while you were in the employ of Potter Refrigeration Corporation?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. On a refrigerator adapted to maintain different temperatures in different compartments?

A. I did; I observed this machine.

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, I know that you have been reading somebody else's question, but in this Court you do not ask leading questions, so just shorten the question.

Mr. Cunningham: All right, sir. Will you please tell us what that first recollection was? [179]

A. Well, naturally being interested in selling and sales talk, why, when I heard this new method being discussed I went to look at it upstairs and—and from time to time I could see it had many selling points if they could—could develop a box that had both a low and a moderate temperature. So being interested in it I looked at it a great many times over the first year that I was there.

Q. Was this a household refrigerator?

A. It was.

(Testimony of Jesse E. Bartlett.)

Q. And do I understand you to mean that it was two different temperatures in the same cabinet?

Mr. Byron: Well, now, your Honor, we want to object to that. We want to be kindly to the other side and fair and generous.

Mr. Cunningham: I will withdraw it, your Honor.

Mr. Byron: After all, there is a limit.

The Court: All right. He has withdrawn the question now.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Can you describe it, what kind of a box it was?

A. It was rather a crude-looking box from the outside and it had a brine tank in the one compartment and a coil—my first recollection of it was just a copper tubing wrapped around a core.

Q. Can you place the time for us now, your first recollection, and will you please, when you first saw it? [180]

A. I suppose within the first month I was there or the second.

Q. That would be in 1929?

A. That's right.

Q. December or November?

A. I think so.

Q. Well, now, will you continue with your description, please?

A. I remember the compressor or the pump set on the side of it on the floor and the copper tubing run up to the box.

(Testimony of Jesse E. Bartlett.)

Q. What was the means of cooling the other compartment?

A. I don't just understand your question.

Q. What compartment have you just described as having the coils in it?

A. Well, the top part of the refrigerator, as I remember, was a low-temperature part and the larger box was in the bottom and the compressor was on the side.

Q. What cooling elements were in each of those compartments?

A. Well, I wouldn't know what you would call them.

Q. Well, as I understood your answer you say the low temperature was in the top. Was that what you said?

A. Yes; that's right.

Q. And that the higher temperature or the warmer was in the bottom?

A. That's my recollection of it.

Q. Will you notice Plaintiff's Exhibit 11-A. Does that [181] refresh your recollection?

A. It seems to me it was a different box from that at the time. It was a much smaller box to my memory.

Q. What type of box was that, Mr. Bartlett?

A. Oh, it was a wooden box.

Q. Was it just an old household refrigerator?

A. Yes; an old household refrigerator.

Mr. Byron: Just a minute. I object. It's leading again.

The Court: He has already answered that ques-

(Testimony of Jesse E. Bartlett.)

tion so you can answer it. Go ahead, Mr. Bartlett.

The Witness: Well, it was just a regular household type but a very dilapidated old icebox, from my recollection.

The Court: I can't hear you.

The Witness: It would be a very old type of icebox.

The Court: All right. Mrs. Connell, can you hear the witness?

(Whereupon, the juror shook her head.)

The Court: Now, that's what I was suspecting, Mr. Bartlett.

The Witness: I'm sorry.

The Court: Not only are the attorneys finding it difficult to hear you, but the jurors can't hear you.

The Witness: I will turn around.

The Court: You will have to speak up.

Mr. Cunningham, I want to make a suggestion to you. Why don't you go back there in back of Mr. Ramsey and sit down, [182] and then if you hear Mr. Bartlett you will know that the jury is hearing him.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Now, did you see any tests—

The Court: Now, I just wanted to say one other thing, Mr. Cunningham. In our Court you don't stand right by the jury, you don't put your hand on the rail; you stay away from that jury.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Did you see any

(Testimony of Jesse E. Bartlett.)

tests being performed on this experimental refrigerator?

A. Just how do you mean that? What kind of tests?

Q. Well, if you say you saw some I will ask you what kind. Did you see any?

A. Well, there were thermometers in both compartments and a chart on the wall that the temperatures were being tabulated on. Is that what you—

Q. Yes. What were those charts? Did you ever notice any of them?

A. Yes, I noticed them frequently.

Q. Were you able to understand the purpose of them? A. Oh, I think so.

Q. What did they show, these charts?

A. Well, the thermometers in the high temperature usually run around 40 degrees and in the low temperature right around zero.

Q. Did these charts give you any information with respect [183] to the maintenance of those respective temperatures?

A. I don't know just how often they were taken, personally. I didn't take them. I didn't—probably over once a day or probably once every two or three days, but the calculation was on the wall on the chart.

Mr. Byron: I object, not competent.

The Court: Well, the witness has already testified.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Who did conduct

(Testimony of Jesse E. Bartlett.)

these tests in the Potter Refrigerator Corporation?

A. Oh, I think Mr. Bronaugh.

Q. And who was Mr. Bronaugh?

A. He was the president of the Potter Refrigerator Corporation.

Q. Had you had any prior experience in refrigeration—

A. Yes, I had.

Q. —before you went with Potter? Will you please tell us briefly what that was?

A. Well, I had worked the first for Frigidaire here in Portland, Mr. E. McClurg, distributor.

Q. When was that?

Mr. Byron: I question the materiality of this line of conversation, your Honor, and I object.

Mr. Cunningham: The purpose is, your Honor, to show that he would at least understand the workings of a refrigerator from his prior experience.

The Court: You were a salesman for Frigidaire, is that [184] right?

The Witness: That's right.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Any other company?

A. Later, Copeland Refrigerator Corporation.

Q. Can you give us some idea of the dates of these employments?

A. Well, I was just trying to think. I think I worked for Mr. McClurg probably in '24 or '25, and then I went to Seattle. I don't know how long—I must have worked for Mr. McClurg about a year, possibly longer. Pretty hard to remember. This is

(Testimony of Jesse E. Bartlett.)

going back a long time. That's pretty near the \$64,000 question.

Q. Now, Mr. McClurg was the Frigidaire—

A. Distirbutor.

Q. —distributor? A. In Portland.

Q. I beg your pardon? A. In Portland.

Q. In Portland. Now, when was your work with the Copeland Refrigerator people?

A. That was—I went immediately from Portland to Seattle with the Harper-Magee Company which were distributors for Copeland.

Q. Did you, in the course of this employment, become familiar with the product that you sold, Frigidaire and Copeland?

A. I naturally had to. [185]

Q. Were you also familiar with your competition at that time and household refrigerators?

A. Certainly.

Q. These were both household refrigerators you sold, were they not? A. Certainly, yes.

Q. Will you describe, please, the general types of household refrigerators that were available prior to your employment by Potter?

The Court: Objection sustained.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Will you describe, please, the ones you sold, Frigidaire and the Copeland?

The Court: Objection sustained.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Did they provide a moist cold storage for fresh foods?

Mr. Byron: Same objection; not material.

(Testimony of Jesse E. Bartlett.)

The Court: I am going to let him answer that one.

The other boxes, Frigidaire and Copeland, provide for moist cold in their boxes?

The Witness: No, they did not.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Did they have provision for the storage of frozen foods over sustained periods of time? A. They did not.

Q. Did they require periodical defrosting?

A. Yes, they did. [186]

Q. Is that true of both the Frigidaire and the Copeland? A. That's right.

Q. Well, now, how long did this experimental work at the Potter Refrigeration Company continue, as far as you know, on these converted ice-boxes?

A. Oh, I think nearly all of the two years that I was there.

Q. Was it all on this same first cabinet, or were there other cabinets?

A. Oh, there were other cabinets.

Q. Will you tell us what your recollection is as to the succession of cabinets?

A. Well, I don't remember all of the cabinets that were being operated.

Q. We understand that, Mr. Bartlett. We merely want what you do remember in your own words.

A. Later they had a cabinet downstairs that was much better equipped than the one upstairs, and that set just back of a partition from the salesroom.

Q. Did that have a compressor condenser unit inside or outside of the cabinet, if you recall?

(Testimony of Jesse E. Bartlett.)

A. The compressor unit was—the pump was in the bottom, inside-contained.

Q. Did that refrigerator resemble anything that is in the courtroom, and I direct your attention to the one with the doors open? [187]

A. That is the refrigerator that was downstairs.

Q. You recognize that as the one that was downstairs? A. That's right.

Q. Do you remember whether there were any tests conducted on that refrigerator downstairs?

A. Well, I think they had thermometers in it all the time.

Q. Did you observe the thermometers or any records of the thermometers?

A. Yes; occasionally.

Q. What sort of results did you observe as to the temperatures maintained in the box?

A. Well, the temperatures were about the same as upstairs. In other words, they held very close to 40 degrees in the food compartment, and about zero in the freezing compartment.

Q. Do you know whether any tests were then made with food, fresh and frozen?

A. Yes. They had some food from Swift & Company in the freezing compartment.

Q. And did you observe the results with respect to the preservation and storage of this food?

A. Well, it was—always from all the handling I ever did of it—was always froze hard.

Q. Do you recall any tests with fresh foods?

A. No, I don't.

(Testimony of Jesse E. Bartlett.)

Q. Well, now, do you know whether at a later time and during [188] your employment the Potter Refrigerator Corporation began work on a commercially salable household refrigerator?

A. I don't remember too much about their household that they were to put on the market. I think that they had a box built up that was a more finished job than this one.

Q. Did you see it?

A. Well, yes. I passed by it many days. Explain it—that would be pretty hard to do in this late day. I have seen a good many refrigerators in the meantime.

Q. Mr. Bartlett, I don't want you to strain your recollection because that is always dangerous and you may make a mistake. But just give us what you now recall. Can you recall any other experimental boxes than this first one that you saw? [189]

A. I think I would rather not say any more than these first two.

Q. All right, sir. Did you have an opportunity to observe these—either of these first two boxes with respect to whether or not frost accumulated in the warmer compartment?

A. After they put in a fin-type coil, then I don't think that they had any ice form on that coil. That is just my memory of it.

Q. By the way, can you give us the month or give us as accurately as you can the time when you first saw the fin-type coil in that refrigerator?

A. They held a convention about a year after I

(Testimony of Jesse E. Bartlett.)

was there. I believe it was in January or February, and at that time they had these fin-type coils. I think it was something over a year after I went there.

Q. I think, Mr. Bartlett, we have a listed exhibit here which we should be able to find. It was identified as 3-00, and our trouble is in finding it.

The Court: You can call him back this afternoon, and during the recess you can look for it.

Mr. Cunningham: All right, your Honor.

Q. Are you sure that the date is 1930 or 19—well, strike that. That is all.

Mr. Ramsey: No cross-examination.

The Court: That is all, Mr. Bartlett.

(Witness excused.) [190]

Mr. Cunningham: If your Honor please, I would like to begin the reading of the Potter deposition.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Cunningham: Is Mr. Bartlett gone? We have found the exhibit.

The Court: Call him back.

JESSE E. BARTLETT

a witness in behalf of the Plaintiff, was recalled for further examination, and testified as follows:

Further Direct Examination

By Mr. Cunningham:

Q. Just one more question. I show you Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-00.

The Court: For identification.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Does that bring back any memories?

A. I was at that convention.

Q. Are you in the photograph?

A. I think so.

Q. Do you recognize yourself?

A. That is right.

Q. That means you were present when the picture was taken? A. That is right.

The Court: I assume it does. When was that? [191]

The Witness: It says January 17-18, 1938.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Is that the convention to which you referred?

A. That is the one.

Q. In your recent answer? A. Yes.

Mr. Cunningham: That is all.

Mr. Ramsey: No cross-examination.

Mr. Cunningham: I offer the photograph in evidence.

Mr. Ramsey: We repeat our objection, your Honor.

The Court: Objection sustained.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. Cunningham: I should like to start the reading of the Potter deposition, your Honor.

The Court: Mr. Lucas will ask the questions, and, Mr. Cunningham, are you going to ask questions?

Mr. Cunningham: Yes, your Honor, if I may.

The Court: Very well.

Mr. Cunningham: I will also have for your Honor's use, I am happy to say, an extra copy of it.

The Court: Have all matters in controversy been determined prior to the time that this deposition is being read?

Mr. Byron: Yes. [192]

(Discussion off the record.)

The Court: The question I was asking is, have you and Mr. Cunningham—have I previously passed upon all controversial matters?

Mr. Cunningham: Yes, your Honor.

Mr. Byron: Yes, that is correct with respect to this deposition.

The Court: Start at the top of page 132.

Mr. Cunningham: I was trying to put in the date of the deposition. Do you think that is important?

The Court: The date of the deposition?

Mr. Cunningham: Yes.

The Court: It was on October 17, 1955.

Mr. Cunningham: No, your Honor, it was at 2:40 on October 25, 1955, pursuant to notice served October 17th, and it continued on the 26th.

(Thereupon, the reading of the deposition of Thomas Irving Potter proceeded with Mr. Cunningham reading the questions and the Court Crier reading the answers as follows:) [193]

DEPOSITION OF THOMAS IRVING POTTER

“Q. Will you please state your name and residence, Mr. Potter?”

A. Thomas Irving Potter. My residence is 5 Tudor City Place, New York 17, New York.”

Mr. Byron. Just before you go on, I think it should be noted that this deposition was taken in New York City at Mr. Potter’s residence.

The Court: Very well.

(Thereupon, the reading of the deposition continued as follows.)

“Q. Are you the Thomas I. Potter named as one of the patentees in the United States Patent No. 2,056,165? A. I am.

Q. And in its reissue No. 23508? A. I am.

Q. Are you an officer or an employee or agent of the plaintiffs’ Moist Cold Company?

A. I am.

Q. Have you any proprietary interest in the plaintiff, Moist Cold Corporation?

A. I don’t understand what you mean by ‘proprietary.’

Q. Are you a stockholder?

A. No, except I may probably own one share of stock. That is at its discretion of the trustees to hold the majority of the stock.

Q. Have you, Mr. Potter, at your own instigation and also [194] at my request consulted whatever record you have available in an effort to straighten out the chronology of the invention by the patents I have mentioned?

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

A. Do you mean the chronology—do you mean a timetable?

Mr. Cunningham: The question was merely, have you consulted your record, and thought about it for the preparation of this deposition?

The Witness: Yes, sir.

Q. In connection with that work, have you prepared any notes to help refresh our recollection?

A. I have them before me.

Q. Is this document that I hand Mr. Byron a carbon copy of those notes?

A. That is a carbon copy of what I have before me, sir.

Q. Mr. Potter, would you tell us just briefly and very generally what your first activities were in connection with the refrigeration of any sort, household or commercial?

A. My first activity in connection with refrigeration dates back to, I would say, 1920, or thereabouts, and that is when I was with the Federated Engineers Development Corporation, and we did experimental work on refrigerators at that time. My first activities that led to the development of the patent that is now in controversy started in June of 1925. At that time I left the East."

(Discussion off the record.) [195]

"A. (Continuing): I went to Portland and made my headquarters there. In the late summer of June, 1925, I went to the beach in Oregon called Gearhart and at that time I spent several weeks

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

working on the designs of a compressor to be used in refrigeration equipment. When I finished the design, I returned to Portland and made arrangements with the Fouch Electric Company, on what I believe at that time was North Ninth Street in Portland, Oregon. I made arrangements whereby they gave me space in their shop and supplied workmen as I needed them. I carried on that work from an experimental standpoint until I had a very practical compressor equipment designed.

On the 10th of November, 1926, I applied for my first patent on this compressor or pump, if you want to call it such.

Q. Now, that brings us to 1926. What did you do throughout the balance of that year?

A. In 1926 I continued the experimental work, seeking to improve the pump, both from a functional standpoint and from a production standpoint. That experimental work continued over a long period of time.

Q. By a long period, do you go into 1927 with that experimental work?

A. Yes, I go into 1927.

Q. Did you have a practice of trying out these refrigerator [196] pumps or compressors during that period of time?

A. We tried those out in the shop, tested them as best we could there.

Q. Stop me if I am going too fast, but when was the first time you put them in practice, experi-

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

mentally or in experimental use in the homes of the people, if you did so?

A. Mr. Cunningham, I have before me this chart here, if I can call it that, or this calendar, and before that I have—before we have asked, I have a note, that on the 5th day of July, 1927, the Potter Pump Patent was issued, Patent No. 1,635,058.

Mr. Ramsey: May the record show that Mr. Potter is sitting at his desk and reading from a memorandum, and referring to the notes and the dates thereon?

Mr. Cunningham: A copy of which Mr. Ramsey has in his hand.

Mr. Ramsey: That is correct.

The Witness: Shall I continue, sir, to answer your question?

Mr. Cunningham: Yes, if you will continue your chronological statement.

A. (Continued): Shortly after the issuance of that patent we started what we called, for want of a better name, the Potter Syndicate.

Q. Would you explain that a little? [197]

A. I had carried all of the expense of the development work of this pump up to that time out of my personal pocket. My funds were running low and I needed added capital to carry on the work and bring it up to a commercial point, so I sold some undivided interest in the pump patent to different people, and in doing that I gathered a group of men who had bought an interest in this patent.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

It was that group that we, for want of a better name, called the Syndicate.

Q. Called 'Potter Syndicate,' wasn't it?

A. Called the Potter Syndicate, I believe. Now that provided me with the added capital necessary to continue the development work. As part of my arrangement with each person who came into that setup and bought an interest in the patent I insisted that included in the deal was the right to put one of my machines into use in their kitchen for the personal use in their housekeeping. This gave me an experimental laboratory, if I could call it that, for use in the homes, and that first started in the late summer or the early fall of 1927.

We considered that as part of our laboratory checks and gave us a picture of the attitude of people who used them in their homes. [198]

Q. And did you check with these people and get reports on the use of your compressors?

A. We kept in close touch with them.

Q. By these people, do you also mean the wives of these people who were active in the kitchens?

A. On that end, it was largely through the wives, because the men came into my deal and put the money into it and it was the women who used the equipment and we tried to keep in touch with them as to whether they found it satisfactory, whether they had any complaints. So our contact on that end was largely with the women.

Q. Did you learn anything as a result of these contacts with respect to the adequacies or inade-

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

quacies of your equipment and of household refrigerators in general?

A. Yes, we learned a great deal.

Q. Was there anything that had any bearing on your subsequent activities in household refrigeration?

A. A great deal depended on that. At that time—that was in the early days of the commercialization of household refrigeration. The only two refrigerators that were on the market at that time in a national way were Kelvinator and Frigidaire to the best of my memory. We were very proud of our equipment because we were freezing faster than either Frigidaire or Kelvinator. We had a self-defrosting cycle so the machine never had to be shut down for defrosting. Then [199] we were startled to find that some of our women users were complaining about our equipment, stating that it dried the food out and that it didn't freeze fast enough.

Q. Was that a complaint that caused you any concern?

A. At first, I thought that the women were just merely ignorant and didn't know what to expect, because every one of these women—none of them, if I can correct myself—that I knew of, had had electric refrigerating at the time we put our equipment in.

Q. By the way, what was that equipment, generally, Mr. Potter?"

The Court: I think before you finish——

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Mr. Cunningham: Actually we crossed that out. Perhaps——

The Court: It's a little after eleven o'clock now, and in accordance with our usual procedure I think this is a good time to take a short recess.

(Whereupon, the jury was excused.)

The Court: Mr. Duyck, do you want to remain here a minute and read two pages of this deposition so you will get the beginning of this deposition?

(Whereupon, the juror, Mr. Duyck, was afforded a copy of the transcript for the purpose of reading the two pages mentioned by the Court.)

(Recess.)

The Court: What page are you on? [200]

The Bailiff: Page 138.

Mr. Cunningham: "Mr. Cunningham: Yes.

A. I think I would keep it—I think it would keep it simpler."

The Court: Wait a minute.

Mr. Cunningham: 138, your Honor.

The Court: Go back to 137 to the last question on there and we will get better continuity on it.

Mr. Cunningham: And skip the colloquy, I think.

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Cunningham: "Q. Was that a complaint that caused you any concern?"

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

A. At first, I thought that the women were just merely ignorant and didn't know what to expect, because every one of these women—none of them, if I can correct myself—that I knew of, had had electric refrigerating at the time we put our equipment in.

Q. By the way, what was that equipment, generally, Mr. Potter?

The Witness: Before I answer that, can I finish what I started to say?

Mr. Cunningham: Yes.

A. I think I would keep it—I think it would keep it simpler. Every one of these people had ice-boxes—and we equipped the icebox which they then owned with an evaporator which in effect was an artificial cake of ice, and we connected [201] that to our condensing equipment, which consisted of what we called the Potter pump, a motor to drive it, and a condenser. That was connected to the evaporator in the icebox and gave them refrigeration. Sometimes that machine was connected, and set up beside the icebox. In most cases, it was—the machine was put in the basement and the connection was made through tubing to their icebox, which was either in the kitchen, their pantry or on the back porch.

Q. Now, if you will cast your mind back to this problem, the ladies of Portland and environs that presented you with: Did you make any early attempts at a solution to that problem—tell us in your own words what you did?

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

A. Well, in the first place, when we began to get these complaints we considered it was based on ignorance on the part of the women. They would have to be educated with what they would expect from household refrigerators, and I will confess it made very slight impression on us at the beginning. We had gradually, during that time—we began to sell our equipment to other people who were not in our Syndicate and we began to sell our equipment to stores and commercial users.

In the fall of 1928 Mr. L. J. Bronaugh came to work for me and took charge of the commercial operations.

Q. May I interrupt a minute? Is that the Mr. L. J. Bronaugh co-patentee on the two patents mentioned?

A. That is the same Bronaugh. That was in the fall of 1928. [202] At that time we had an office in the Public Service Building in Portland, and that office contained a showroom where we showed our equipment. Mr. Bronaugh had never had refrigeration experience up to the time that he came to work for me, as I understand it. He showed a very quick grasp of the subject, and in a short time we had placed him in charge of that side of the business.

Mr. Ramsey: May I interrupt? What side of the business are you referring to?

The Witness: The commercial and the shop. That included—he was in charge of the shop, the

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

production end, all that went on in the shop. At the same time he was in charge of our commercial sales.

Q. Had he started with you originally as a salesman?

A. He started first as a salesman, and he was a very intelligent person and a very intelligent personable chap, but he was not successful as an individual personal salesman. But he had so much intelligence that I felt that many men are not good salesmen, but they are certainly strong on other points. Because, I felt that I brought him into this managerial position, and I was not wrong. He showed full capacity for that.

Q. Can you date that, please, Mr. Potter—the date of Mr. Bronaugh's change from sales to management?

A. That was in the late summer or the early fall of 1928. [203]

Q. I notice on your notes here a reference to a Cheatham wire of October 20, 1955. What is the significance of that reference?

A. I wanted to check my own memory as to the dates I had been given. Mr. Cheatham is the attorney in Portland. I believe he is your associate, and I wired him to please get in touch with Mr. Bronaugh, and ascertain three things. When Mr. Bronaugh became manager for me, also when we went into the second floor of our shop at Ninth and Flanders, and also to check there with him as a

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

guide to my memory when we took over the entire building, including the first floor. And Mr. Cheat-ham's wire, after talking with Mr. Bronaugh, confirmed my memory of these dates. That is why I have that reference.

Q. With those physical moves in mind, which took place in the beginning of the late summer or early fall of 1928, what did you and Mr. Bronaugh do with respect to this complaint of the ladies in Portland and vicinity?

A. That didn't happen immediately with us. As I said before, we discounted the complaints. We became active on the pushing of the sales on our equipment for iceboxes and commercial and that continued until February 23, 1929. We organized the Potter Refrigerator Corporation.

Q. By the way, I think you'd better go back a minute there. I have on the copy of your notes a reference to May 24, 1928— [204] 'Potter Refrigerator Sales Company organized.'

A. That was on May 24, 1928.

Q. Was that a predecessor of Potter Refrigerator Corporation, or what was it?

A. Up to that time, all my business was done in my personal name, and I ran into certain slight difficulties, which at the time I thought were peculiar. We were in the Far West. We could order refrigeration supplies from the East from the different suppliers, and I would order them on my personal letterhead. Immediately the order would

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

be held up until they immediately would write for references and so forth.

Q. This is 1928, now, or earlier?

A. Away back in 1928 and before, whenever we wanted supplies.

Q. Thank you.

A. (Continued): So I found the difficulty of doing business just as an individual. So, we organized a company which we called the—I have got it here—the ‘Potter Refrigerator Sales Company.’ I owned all the stock in that company, but it made it far easier for us to do business. And also in selling our own individual equipment, people were hesitant about buying equipment from just an individual; by doing business through a company, that removed that mental hazard and that was the purpose of that company.

Q. What was the relationship, if any, between the Potter Refrigerator Sales Company and the Potter Refrigerator Corp.? [205]

A. The Potter Refrigerator Corp. was organized. Mr. Bronaugh became its first president, and then we dissolved the Potter Refrigerator Sales Company. I believe, and this is only my hazy remembrance—

Q. By this, you are referring to your notes?

A. Yes, but you asked me about the relationship between Potter Sales Company and the Refrigeration Corp.

Mr. Cunningham: Yes.

A. (Continued): The Sales Company in its

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

name was restricted to sales. The Potter Refrigerator Corp. was all-embracing, which would cover manufacture and sales. So that was consolidating all of that in that Corporation.

By that time, Mr. Bronaugh in my estimation had proven himself, and we had confidence in putting him in there as its president.

Q. Now I note this on your note under date of February 23, 1929, for the date of incorporation of Potter in the Refrigerator Corp.—

A. Yes, of Oregon.

Q. And then another note right below, March 18, 1929, for the date of dissolution of the Potter Refrigerator Sales?

A. That is what I thought I had covered.

Q. Those are the dates, are they?

A. Yes, sir; those are the dates.

Q. Now will you tell us in a little more detail where were [206] your offices in February up until April of 1929?

A. Our offices were in the Public Service Building in Portland, Oregon.

Q. That is whose offices—what individuals?

A. I had my own personal private office there. We had a large display room, a showroom, if you want to call it that, and there was an additional office on the other side of that which Mr. Bronaugh occupied.

Q. Did you have any plant facilities at that time prior to April?

A. Yes, we had facilities through the Fouch Elec-

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

trie. When I first started with Fouch, we started with a small corner in his shop. At that time he had a one-story shop. As we needed more and more room, Mr. Fouch put a second floor under his building, and we rented the entire second floor of his building. He did the machine work on his floor under—we paid him on an hourly basis for the men that he employed.

Q. Can you give us a date when you moved to the second floor?

A. The second floor we used for assembling, testing, and so forth. Now I do not have in my notes any confirmation of the date that we moved to the second floor of the Fouch Building.

Q. Well, I may have misunderstood your notes. What is that opposite April, 1929? Is that a confirmation from Mr. Cheatham?

A. That—we have been in the second floor on the Fouch [207] Building a very long time. By that time we were active in selling our equipment to the public. We needed more room and we found that the second floor of the building adjacent to the Fouch Building could be rented. We rented that and cut an opening between the second floor of the Fouch Company into the second floor of the adjoining building, and that gave us added room.

Q. Can you identify that building?

A. That was the building at the corner of Ninth and Flanders. I have here a photograph of that building, taken in the fall of 19—1929—when we occupied the entire building.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Q. What do you mean by the entire building on this photograph—the corner building?

A. Yes. This picture shows at the right a two-story building. That was the Fouch Electric. When I first began using Mr. Fouch's facilities, we had a small part of the lower floor. At that time there was only one story to that building.

Q. Referring to the white building at the right?

A. Yes. Then he built the second floor and leased us that entire second floor. Then from this picture—I spoke of our leasing the second floor of the building adjoining Fouch's—that is this corner building shown in the photograph——

(Counsel hands Exhibit to Counsel for Defendants.)

Mr. Cunningham: I ask that that be marked for identification as Potter's Exhibit 1." [208]

Mr. Cunningham: I now offer it in evidence, your Honor.

The Court: Is there any objection to it?

Mr. Ramsey: No objection.

The Court: It may be admitted.

(A photograph, having been previously marked for identification, was received in evidence as Potter's Exhibit 1.)

Mr. Cunningham: "Q. Did you do any experimental work after this move to the second floor of the building at the Ninth and Flanders corner, and if so what?

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

A. Before we moved into that building on the second floor Mr. Bronaugh and I had numerous discussions as to the complaints of slow freezing as they called it. We thought it was fast freezing, and the drying out of food. They began to get deeper and deeper into our consciousness as time went on. And in the spring of 1929, before we moved into this second floor of the corner building, we were seriously trying to find the mental answers at least to that problem, and during that time—I cannot say the day or the hour or the month—but it was during the time prior to our going into that second floor of the corner building that we got the first concept of what we hoped could prove an answer to these complaints.

Q. By 'we' do you mean yourself? [209]

A. I mean Mr. Bronaugh and myself. My mind works in my memory by association. I know that coincident with our moving into that second floor—that is why I asked Mr. Cheatham to confirm the time, because coincident with our going into that second floor of the corner building is when we started to experiment along the ideas that we had conceived during the spring of that year.

Q. And what were those ideas that you conceived earlier that year?

A. The problem at that time that was causing complaints was what they called slow freezing and what they called drying out of the food. Like everybody else in the business at that time, we thought that those could not be eliminated, because all re-

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

refrigerator boxes were functioning just the same as iceboxes except they had artificial cakes of ice. It was easy to give them better humidity conditions. All you had to do was to set the temperature of the chilling unit warmer. If you set that warmer, then you lost your freezing ability. It was easier to give them fast freezing, because all you had to do was set the temperature of the chilling unit colder, but in so doing that we dried the air out more. Our first flash that came to us as a possible solution was that if we would divide the box into two compartments and separate those functions then we could make it as cold as they wanted it and give them faster freezing. [210]

Q. In one compartment?

A. Yes and run the chilling unit in the other compartment at a warmer temperature and thereby give them high humidity or moist cold.

Q. Did you have any mental concept of means of that date prior to April, 1929?

A. Once we got the concept, the means just sort of naturally flowed. We had used in commercial refrigeration—it was old—we had used show cases, and we had used finned coils, so that was our common knowledge. We had built and sold ice cream cabinets and that was common knowledge. Our job was to take these things that were of common knowledge to use and try to get a balanced construction that would give us the results we wanted, and that would be within commercial limits. [211]

Q. Did you have, as you now recall, precise men-

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

tal concepts prior to April of the constructions that would get that result?"

Mr. Cunningham: We are skipping now, sir, to Page 149, the question.

The Court: Are you going to rephrase the question?

Mr. Cunningham: I will read what is on 149.

"Q. Confining your answer now to a period prior to April, 1929, what physical embodiment did you do—you recall that you conceived—you and Mr. Bronaugh—conceived with respect to this problem that you have been discussing?"

Mr. Cunningham: Another question:

"Q. Mr. Potter, before making any notes, such as those in front of you, did you have a present and unrefreshed recollection as to the salient points covered in those notes?"

A. I can best answer that by saying that I first made out what I might call a calendar on a sheet of paper starting with 1925, and going through month by month. Without any data in front of me I tried to fill that calendar out to the best of my ability from my strict memory, as I had it at the time. When I had that, then I took that and tried to find spots of confirmation to refresh my memory.

Q. Where did you try to find confirmation?

A. Wherever I could find it, in my records and——

Q. For an example, what records? [212]

A. Correspondence, largely. Some of the Court records that came in later."

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Mr. Cunningham: Will you skip the first sentence of that?

The Crier: "A. I have already spoken about wiring Mr. Cheatham for confirmation of my memory, and to me the interesting thing, and I think it is fair to put it out—the basis of this entire calendar, if I can call it that, is my present memory before I got these confirmations, and then whenever I found a spot that would give a confirmation to that I made a note of that on this calendar.

Q. Do you have any recollection of any significant alteration in your memory for dates that resulted from these efforts that confirm that memory?

A. No, sir, I do not."

Mr. Cunningham: Skipping now, sir, to Page 152:

"Q. As nearly as you can recall, and without reference to any notes—and there is no note on here that can help you, as I see it—can you recall what physical means you conceived prior to April, 1929—by 'you,' I mean you and Mr. Bronaugh—which was an answer in whole or in part to the problem that was posed to you by the ladies of Portland?

A. I do not believe we reduced anything physically until——

Q. That was not my question. Do you have any mental concept [213] of physical means? I didn't ask you if you produced anything. Did you have any mental concept——

A. Yes, a mental concept of the general direction.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Q. Was that prior to April, 1929?

A. I relate my memory there to the time that we went to the upper floor of the shop and that was in the spring of 1929, and up to that time we had discussed it—we had made rough penciled sketches, and we had a definite concept, yes.

Q. Now, what do you recall, independently of any notes, that rough concept was other than what you have already testified to?

A. I have forgotten what I already testified to, but that concept was to divide the functions into parts, to separate them into two compartments.

Q. What means were you going to—by what means were you going to do that?

A. We were going to use a finned coil in the upper compartment of—the upper compartment operating above 32, above the freezing point. That would give us the answer of the drying out of the food. In the other compartment we were going to run that at what in those days we used to call a sharp freezer. Today I think we call it frozen storage.

Q. Did you have in mind operating both of these coils as you call them of a single compressor unit?

A. Absolutely. [214]

Q. What else did you have in mind, Mr. Potter, prior to April, 1929?

A. Our mental concept was to build a household refrigerator that would satisfy women in their kitchens, to operate it with a **Potter machine**.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Q. What idea of physical means did you have in mind? A. A concept of a Potter machine.

Q. What was that machine?

A. Compressor equipment that we were using and selling commercially.

Q. Anything else besides a compressor?

A. Then we had a chilling unit or freezing unit and a finned coil, in each—each one in a separate compartment.

Q. Anything else besides chilling and freezing units and the compressor?

A. Yes, we had a thermostat in there.

Q. Now, where were these elements to be placed?

A. Our concept when the whole thing was finished was to have a single unit which would make a household refrigerator, that would be sold complete as a unit.

Q. Each one of these three or four elements were to be in a single housing, is that what you mean? A. That is correct.

Q. Had you any concept with respect to insulation at that time? [215]

A. Just the normal concept at that time of an insulation or an insulated box which is your normal concept.

Q. What do you mean by 'normal concept'?

A. When you are active in a business certain things become second nature to you.

Q. Yes, but I want to know what you mean by 'normal concept'?

A. An insulated cabinet such as was being sold

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

generally, with a dividing wall between the two compartments and that was to be insulated, keeping one from the other.

Q. Now, Mr. Potter, did you proceed to build anything, and, if so, tell me when——

A. Without referring to my notes, because they seem to bother this gentleman over here, we moved into the upper floor of the corner building, in the spring of 1929. Now, we had discussed this problem. This I know, because my association of ideas—I know it because of my association of ideas—we discussed this problem before we made that move. It was all just sketches between us or mental discussion between us.

Our first effort to put this to use in the trial was coincident with our moving into the second floor of the corner building and immediately after we moved in there is when we started making models.

Q. How many models did you make? [216]

A. I cannot state that with exactitude.

Q. What is your present recollection?

A. My present recollection is the first one we made was taking an icebox, either that or one of the General Electric cabinets which we purchased—but that wasn't equivalent to an icebox. We divided that vertically between the two sides. We put a slab of insulation vertically down through the center——

Q. Of the food compartment, do you mean?

A. Yes, of the food compartment.

Mr. Cunningham: Go ahead.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

A. (Continued): And on one side we put one of our cooling units which we at that time—which at that time were standardized. That was a casting, a coil—a casting with a coil wrapped around the outside, a hollow casting. And inside we placed the ice trays. That was in production with us. We didn't have to make it. We made those from a production standpoint in it, one, two or three sections, according to the size of the refrigerator that we wanted.

Q. That is, the trays?

A. No, we had units—cooling units—freezing units, if you want to call them that, chilling units, if you want to call it that. But we had a standard form which could be used either singly, doubly or in triple. We took one of those and put it on one side of this converted icebox. We [217] put a finned coil on the other side. We connected the two. We brought our circuit from the receiver in the machine compartment to that freezing unit through the coils of that, and we exhausted from that into the finned coil in the other sections. From there we returned that to the compressor.

Q. That was the complete circuit, was it not?

A. We had a thermostat which I remember very well. If I remember—I think I remember the name—it was some 'Air' something—That was a small round housing about the size of an alarm clock. In that there was a bimetal coil that looked like a spring. Connected to that spring or the bimetal it was a glass tube containing mercury and the contacts for the switch. There was a lever controlling

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

the relative position of that bimetal unit. That came through to the outside. By changing the position of that lever you would change the point at which the machine would turn on, and off, and thereby control the temperature of the chamber in which that unit was placed.

Q. Now, is this the first unit that you recall, experimental unit?

A. Yes, that was the first one that was built on the second floor on the Ninth and Flanders building.

Q. Do you remember or recall any other experimental unit that you built at that time? [218]

A. I recall two others. One followed the other.

Q. Describe the first one.

A. I have just described the first one.

Q. How about the second one?

A. The second one was roughly the same as the one I first described. Now here I cannot be exact. I know that we built the second one. I don't know the changes that we made between that one and the first. We must have made some changes to cause us to build that second one. There were modifications in that. I am frank to confess, and I don't remember what they were.

Q. Can you go on to the third?

A. The third I can remember distinctly because the first two had a vertical division. The third one I remember distinctly, because that was the first time we had used a horizontal division, and that horizontal division divided the compartments, the

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

principal of two compartments divided in another way. We used the lower section of that as the cold section, its freezing section. Then we had the finned coil in the upper section with our thermostat.

Q. Where was your compressor?

A. The compressor on all of those models was set up separate from the box, and usually set beside it.

Q. Beside the box?

A. Yes, beside the box. [219]

Q. Now were these just old-fashioned iceboxes or were they anything else? What were the boxes that you also used?

The Witness: Can I explain that?

Mr. Cunningham: Yes, I wish you would.

A. (Continued): During a previous period to what I am speaking about, the General Electric Company had announced their electric refrigerator with their Monitor top, and they had Portland distributor. I was told that the first machines that went out had deficiencies in them, and that the factory called all of these machines back for construction by the factory. I suppose you legal people will say that is hearsay.

Q. Tell us what the cabinets were.

A. The distributor had a large number of cabinets left on hand. He sold them at anything he could get for them and we bought, if I remember correctly—I can't be exact—but I thought we bought 15 or 20—we bought 15 or 20 of those cabinets with the unit removed and it left a square hole in the

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

top. We took those cabinets; we filled in that hole with insulation and put metal plates on either side of it, and then we had a cabinet which we could use. I go into this for this reason. At that time we had a number of these cabinets on hand. We also had some iceboxes on hand, and here I will confess to a deficiency in my memory, if I can put it that way. I don't know, and I can't swear whether we used the [220] General Electric cabinets or whether we used some iceboxes. To me they were relatively one and the same.

Q. Now were there any other differences in this third converted icebox?

A. Except for the change of position or direction of the dividing wall, all three of these were roughly along the same lines.

Q. Did they have the same——

A. I remember the principles, but I can't give you the exact details.

Q. Well, were there any differences in the refrigeration system?

A. Not in the system; no, sir.

Q. Did you have the same general type of thermostat in this third box? A. Yes.

Q. There were other differences than you have already explained?

A. My mind works on principles. The principles for all three were alike.

Q. Who is Eddie Bade?

A. Eddie Bade was one of our servicemen.

Mr. Cunningham: Continue:

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

A. (Continued): And I am trying to establish the dates that can be authenticated. I turned to a deposition of Eddie Bade, [221] and I found in that deposition that he stated he started work in June of 1929, which confirms my general picture on principle as to about when he started.

Q. Did you have an independent recollection of Bade starting for you prior to that recollection of the transcript?

A. In my mind I had in mind that it was sometime in 1929. I did not have it exact as is on these notes. I made that from his deposition.

Q. Now the next note is opposite the month of September. What is the significance of that note?

A. That was a confirmation of what my memory said, that we had taken over the entire building in the fall of 1929.

Q. Does it have any significance—

A. The note here was merely to give me a confirmation on my own memory.

Q. Does it have any significance with respect to these converted iceboxes that you have testified about?

A. It has a number of connections in my mind, because at that time we had our general office over in the Public Service Building. When we moved or when we took possession of the entire building, we moved Mr. Bronaugh's office over in that building which we then called our factory, and we centered all sales at that time in the factory, and they had the showrooms on the ground floor.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Q. Was your office also in that building? [222]

A. No, sir; I kept my office in the Public Service Building.

Q. I notice your note opposite October and the reference to the 'Angelus photo of factory and workmen' dated October 19, 1929. Is that Potter Exhibit 1? A. Yes."

Mr. Cunningham: And here it is——

Mr. Cheatham: 3-MM.

"A. Next to what? I have lost the track of continuity.

Q. Next to September and October of 1929, with respect to these converted iceboxes.

A. Well, we started the work on those boxes in the spring of 1929. That work continued. It wasn't all in one day. It was continuous, and we were taking it easy. That continued on through 1929, and I don't remember just when these different models were built. I know they were one following the other. I know we were testing them during that period.

Q. Who worked on them during that period, Mr. Potter? That is, if you recall.

A. I know that we had a foreman of our shop. I think his name was Herman. I am not accurate on names. Don't hold it against me if I am wrong. I think that was his name and in that kind of work we would give a sketch, just a hand sketch and Herman would have the responsibility of executing it. Then Bronaugh and I would check up and follow

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

it. We both [223] followed up the work and kept track of it.

Q. Were there any trusted few that worked on these boxes at that time?

A. No, on hookups we usually called the servicemen because they were used to hooking up and so forth.

Q. Can you remember the names of any serviceman?

A. I have already mentioned Eddie Bade. He was a serviceman. We had another serviceman who preceded him, who worked coincidentally with him. His name was Thompson. If I remember correctly, he was the first serviceman we had. He was with us almost from the beginning.

Q. Was he contemporaneous with Bade or do you recall?

A. No, he was before Bade and then he continued on after Bade came, because our work had increased.

Q. Can you recall anybody else working on these converted iceboxes?

A. I don't individualize my memory of personalities beyond that.

Q. Do you recall a Mr. Steele?

A. Yes, Mr. Steele was a salesman selling commercial and domestic equipment.

Q. Did he have anything to do with these converted iceboxes?

A. Not under—not in their manufacture. He was a salesman or in the building—

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Q. How about Mr. Bale? [224]

A. Mr. Bale was our draftsman. He did not have any contact with these boxes until after we had built one of the—can I say the final models, because all of that preliminary work—it didn't pay to try and lay out working drawings when you were just reaching for ideas. Mr. Bale was not brought into it to make any drawings until after we had completed the large box which we hoped would be a commercial model.

Q. How about Mr. Bartlett?

A. Bartlett was a salesman.

Q. At that time?

A. Yes. He was not on the mechanical staff.

Q. Now did you build anything that you characterized as a walk-in cooler? A. Yes.

Q. Will you tell us about that?

A. That was built in the fall of 1929.

Q. How do you fix that date, Mr. Potter?

A. Because that was set up on the ground floor almost coincident with our moving in and that is how I tie that in my mind. Now later I checked the records and confirmed that. Of course, my instincts are to bring in the confirmation. This gentleman over here seems to object. I don't know what to do about that.

Q. What records did you check?

A. I have before me here a photostatic copy of the Potter [225] Refrigerator account with the Anderson Sheet Metal Works.

Q. Of what town?

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

A. In Portland, Oregon. Mr. Irving R. Halsey obtained these from Anderson or he had them made with Anderson's permission from his books.

Q. Is that in connection with the suit against Stewart-Warner? A. I think it was.

Q. Did Mr. Halsey give those to you?

A. Yes, we had them here in our records.

Q. How did you get that record?

A. I found it here in our record.

Q. What does that record disclose?

A. That record discloses the purchases that the Potter Refrigerator Company made from the Anderson Sheet Metal Works and is definitely related to the work that we did, or that was going on, because they manufactured our sheetmetal parts for us.

Q. Now, can you give us, with reference to that record, any dates accurately—more accurately than you have done?

A. I have lost track of this. This is all of the Anderson record here, and over here. Those are the records we have from the Anderson Company and they are now my records in my possession.

Q. Well, let me get them in chronological order. I hand [226] you, Mr. Potter, five photostatic sheets apparently a ledger account of T. Irving Potter, the first entry on the first sheet being 1929, March 18, and the last entry on the last sheet being January 11, 1930.

A. May I state for the record that the first one

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

shows T. Irving Potter. After that it is Potter Refrigerator Corp.

Q. That is correct. Can you point out in those five sheets any item that has significance to you with respect to the building of this walk-in cooler unit?

A. The first item I come to is dated December 6, 1929, and that is brine tank for cooler, charge \$70. On December 31, 1929, four pans for cooler.

On January 6, 1930, four pans for walk-in cooler.

On January 8, four additional pans.

Now that was the walk-in cooler that we spoke of and there can't be any question but what that is what that is.

Q. Was that January 8 or January 6?

A. January 6, brine tank, four pans—January 6, four pans for walk-in cooler. And January 8 for four additional pans for cooler. So that is the sixth and the eighth of January, 1930.

Mr. Cunningham: I ask that the two sheets containing the references—(Off the record)—I will correct that. The one sheet marked as Potter's Exhibit No. 2, for Identification." [227]

Mr. Cunningham: I now offer that as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-NN.

Mr. Ramsey: We do not know the materiality of it, of the bills for something, but we will not enter an objection.

“Mr. Cunningham: Q. I show you, Mr. Potter, a photograph entitled ‘Potter Refrigerator Conven-

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

tion, Portland, Oregon, January 17-18, 1930.' Can you identify that photograph?

A. I am familiar with this photograph, sir.

Q. How did you get it?

A. It is part of our record.

Mr. Cunningham: I offer it in evidence and ask that it be received in evidence as Plaintiff's——"

Mr. Cunningham: As Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-00.

Mr. Ramsey: That is one we objected to, and continue our objection.

The Court: This is the one that has a date on it. We are cluttering up the record with a lot of things, but I am going to allow this in. I think, Mr. Cunningham, that the jury is going to have a lot of things which are important, and let us not try to clutter up the record with things that are—about which the witnesses have already testified.

Exhibits 3-00 and 3-NN are received, both [228] of them.

(Thereupon, the exhibits referred to, previously marked Plaintiff's Exhibits 3-00 and 3-NN, were received in evidence.)

"Mr. Cunningham: Q. Well, Mr. Potter, can you identify yourself in the photograph?

A. Yes, I am right here, if I can point it out.

Q. Were you present when it was taken?

A. I was certainly present or I wouldn't be in the picture.

Q. Has it been in your possession since it was taken? A. Yes.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Q. Do you recognize anybody else in the photograph?

A. I am poor on remembering names and faces, but seated at my right or to the left of me in the picture is Mr. Bronaugh. On the front row, the third from the right, is Mr. McClurge—I believe that is the spelling—I am not certain. I think that should be sufficient to identify it.

Q. I ask you, Mr. Potter, was that photograph taken on or about the dates stated in the legend of the photograph?

A. That is unquestionably the date that was marked by the photographer, and that is the date.

Q. Do those dates help you with respect to any of these boxes that were converted iceboxes as you now call them?

A. Yes, they do. [229]

Q. What were their conditions as of that date?

A. By that time we had completed the three models I spoke of before, and we were still continuing in our work, because my mind works on association and I have a definite memory of those in relation to this photograph. We had a number of dealers scattered throughout the Northwest who were selling our commercial equipment for grocery stores, butcher shops, and so forth.

Q. Have you anything to illustrate that equipment in front of you?

A. Yes, this would—this would illustrate some types of a conversion.

Q. Where did you get this photograph?

A. From my records."

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Mr. Cunningham: I offer in evidence as Exhibit 3-PP—

Mr. Ramsey: We have no objection.

The Court: Very well.

Mr. Kolisch: That has been admitted, your Honor.

The Court: Yes.

“Mr. Cunningham: Q. Will you tell me who made that photograph?

A. That was made by the Angelus Studio, sir, in Portland. May I see that photograph of the Dealers' Convention? This picture was made some time before the Dealers' Convention. I can see that and anyone else can see it by the consecutive [230] numbers which Angelus used. That is a lower number by far than the Dealers' Convention.

Q. By that you mean Potter's Exhibit 4?

A. Yes.”

The Court: Where are you going from there? Are you going to Page 181?

Mr. Lucas: Yes.

The Court: Do we start on a new subject now?

Mr. Cunningham: Sir, I do not recall. Yes, it runs right along, and it would be a good breaking point.

“Mr. Cunningham: Q. Do you remember Mr. Steele?

A. I remember Steele's personality very well. I know that he came to work for us immediately after this so-called Dealers' Convention, and I remember his terrific enthusiasm when he had been

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

shown this coming equipment, if I could call it that, and that is a refresher of my memory to that effect. I also remember in relation to this Dealers' Convention that prior to the Convention Mr. Bronaugh and myself had discussions as to what was to be done at the Convention, and so forth. That was his Convention. He was taking responsibility. But I remember very clearly that we discussed what they should be shown and should not be shown. That Bronaugh and some of the rest of the organizations were quite enthused on the shape that this new product was taking, but we discussed whether this dealer should be shown any of this or not. That I [231] remember very clearly, and it was agreed that we would not show them anything that was in the making, particularly this two- or three-temperature box that was called. Sometimes we called it a three-temperature and sometimes a two-temperature, but whether it was called two- or three-temperature we meant the same thing. We agreed that we would not show them that or give them any hint because as salesmen we didn't want them disconcerted. We wanted them to become enthused on what they had to sell, not what was coming. That was very definitely and markedly in my mind, and this Steele deposition just merely gives me a further crystallization and refreshing of my memory along those lines.

Q. What happened to these three converted ice-boxes, Mr. Potter?

A. As was our custom, when we had experi-

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

mental models and we were through with them, we sold them. Many of our employees found an opportunity to buy something very cheap they could use. Sometimes they brought friends in and once in a while people would walk in off the street and those models were sold at that time.

Q. Do you have any records of any such sales?

A. Unfortunately, I do not, because the shop record when we moved our headquarters to Buffalo and did away with the shop, the people in charge of dismantling the shop discarded all of our shop records and it was very unfortunate for me, because we do not have those shop records. Those sales were [232] made from the shops. They were not made through the sales department.

Q. Can you date those sales in any way or in any fashion from memory?

A. Yes, sir; I have a very definite basis of dating those sales.

Q. Well, will you tell us what that basis is?

A. That ties in with the work on the patent. Mr. Birkenbeuel was the original attorney on my patent case. He unfortunately allowed enough time to elapse before he forwarded to me the last Patent Office action, so that before I could reply to it the time allowed by the Patent Office for reply had been exhausted. As soon as I found that out I immediately got in touch on long-distance telephone from Buffalo to New York and called Mr. Bond, a patent lawyer in New York. I asked him to come to Buffalo and take over the case.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

He came to Buffalo, conferred with me, returned to New York, and started work on the case. It was necessary for him to make a decision due to this lapse of time to make a decision as to whether he should drop the filing date and start a new application, or whether to fight it through and see whether he could get this original patent reinstated.

When it reached that point, I came to New York and had a conference with him and this is very vivid in my [233] memory. He explained to me that if any machines had been sold two years prior to the date at which he was trying to reinstate the patent and the patent was dropped and a new date established or a new application made, the patent might issue, but if machines had been sold two years prior to that, after the issuance of the patent if somebody brought out the fact that those machines had been sold that would void the patent.

He discussed that fully with me and asked whether such sales had occurred. That was many years ago—if you will look at the dates. At that time my memory was very vivid and sharp and fresh as to occurrences previously.

After he explained it—with my memory fresh at that time—and I told him of certain sales that had been made, and so he had me sign an oath that such sales had been made two years prior to the date at which he was asking this patent to be reinstated.

He impressed on me—and this I will never forget—that I must be strictly careful that I could not

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

sign that oath if such sales had not been made, and I know from that, because at that time I would not have signed that oath if those sales had not been made prior to that two-year period. I signed that oath, that discussion is vivid in my mind, and I know that those sales were made.

Q. I direct your attention to the last paragraph of your [234] affidavit dated November 5, 1932, appearing at Pages 23 and 24 of the file wrapper of your original patent, No. 2,056,165.

A. Yes, sir."

The Court: What page are you reading?

Mr. Cunningham: Sir, that is a question that we agreed on in substitution for the one that appears at the bottom of Page 185. It is written in my long-hand.

The Court: That is all right.

"Mr. Cunningham: Q. First, what is the date of that affidavit?

A. The date is the 5th day of November, 1932.

Q. Is that the affidavit to which you refer?

A. Yes, sir; that is the affidavit to which I refer.

Q. And does that last paragraph contain the statement to which you refer?

A. It does, sir.

Q. Now, did these converted iceboxes which you say were sold—did they embody proportional installation? Well, did they or did they not?

A. I do not think they did. I cannot swear to it. I do not think they did.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Q. I show, Mr. Potter, a negative photostat of what is apparently a bill of the F. A. Anderson Manufacturing Company, Third and Glisan Streets, Portland, Oregon, made out to the Potter Refrigerator Corp., and bearing the date November [235] 20, 1930. Do you recognize that?

A. I do, sir.

Q. What is it?

A. That is a bill on the billhead of F. A. Anderson Manufacturing Company, of sheetmetal products.

Q. For what equipment?

A. That bill was for a brine tank and liner that was used in building one of our two- or three-temperature boxes, whichever you want to call it. That particular box later became known in my organization as the Barry box. The reason that that name was attached to it was that at a later period Mr. Barry of Portland, Oregon, purchased that box and had it sent to his summer home in Gearhart Beach.

Q. Does this date of November 20, 1930, have any significance with respect to the time the Barry box was built?

A. That is a very significant date because Anderson built not only this brine tank and liner, but he also built a liner for the upper compartment of this box. That liner and brine tank were delivered to the Mathews Refrigerator Company, and around those two liners Mr. Mathews built a four-door refrigerator, utilizing conventional construction, which was common at that time in iceboxes, but

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

this was the first box which we built as a complete box from the ground up. Up to that time what we had made were conversions of iceboxes.

Q. I notice, Mr. Potter, that you have referred to a second [236] photostat of a bill, what is apparently a bill from the Mathews Refrigerator Company, dated December 18, 1930, and directed to the Potter Refrigerator Corp.

A. That covers the box that Mathews built around what was supplied to him by Mr. Anderson.

Q. Are both of these photostats from your regular records? A. Yes."

Mr. Cunningham: I offer them in evidence and ask that they be marked as Plaintiff's Exhibits 3-QQ and 3-RR.

Mr. Ramsey: We have no objection.

The Court: They may be admitted.

(The exhibits referred to and identified above as Plaintiff's Exhibits 3-QQ and 3-RR were thereupon received in evidence.)

"Mr. Cunningham: Maybe it would help your understanding, Mr. Ramsey, if I would refer to the application date for the patent to Gibson, original Patent No. 2,073,741, which I believe was reissued and re-reissued, both reissues having been cited by the defendants in that date. That date is September 30, 1930. I assume the defendants are relying upon this as anticipatory of the patent in suit, are they not?

Mr. Ramsey: I state for the record that that

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

has been cited as prior art, prior to the original Potter patent from [237] which the reissue in question sprang.

Mr. Cunningham: As merely a state of the art reference and not an anticipation.

Mr. Ramsey: In some wise it anticipates it, which is our contention.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, it is cited as anticipatory.

Mr. Ramsey: Not wholly so."

The Court: I think this is a good place to stop. Ladies and Gentlemen, we are going to take a full two hours today for lunch, and we will return at 2:00 o'clock.

(Thereupon the jury retired for the noon recess.)

The Court: I am going to try to finish this Potter deposition this afternoon. It is a long one. We have not done too well. It took about two and a half to three hours, and let us finish that and get that behind us today.

(After further discussion off the record Court adjourned for the noon recess.) [238]

Afternoon Session

(Court reconvened, pursuant to adjournment, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and the following further proceedings were had herein:)

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, go ahead. Page 190.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Mr. Cunningham: "Q. What is your best recollection with respect to the building of the box that embodied this special brine tank and the four-door refrigerator shown in Potter Exhibits 5-A and 5-B?

A. That was built in the fall of 1930, sir, and was in operation."

The Court: Just one second, Mr. Cunningham. What is 5-A and 5-B? What are the new numbers for those exhibits?

Mr. Cunningham: Well, sir, I seem to have 6-A and 6-B before me.

The Court: Oh, you can come back to it later and Mr. Cheatham will give it to you.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, I think my recollection is accurate, your Honor; there are the two.

Mr. Cheatham: 3-QQ and 3-RR.

The Court: 3-QQ. 3-RR.

Mr. Cunningham: They are the bills, I think.

The Court: They are not pictures. They are just bills from that to Admiral Refrigerator Company and Anderson Company. [239]

Mr. Cunningham: My recollection is that there is a drawing. I think they have, sir, been offered and received.

The Clerk: They are in, your Honor.

Mr. Cunningham: "Q. Can you say whether or not it was prior to November 20, 1930?

A. My memory is that that was built earlier because I have a memory of its being in the fall.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Q. Can you give us any more accurate testimony than just that it was earlier?

A. Not at this moment, I can't.

Q. Well, maximum or minimum—two weeks or two months, or what?

A. Well, I would say—from the date you mentioned?

Mr. Cunningham: November 20, 1930—before that.

A. (Continued): I would say probably it was in October. To me that is in the fall and certainly it could not have been built after they billed us. It was built before.

Q. Can you tell us as accurately as possible when the Barry box was sold?

A. I think from my unassisted memory, without referring to notes—I think it was approximately a year after, because I know that was on the floor for a long time.

Mr. Byron: A year after what?

The Witness: After it was built and in operation.

Mr. Cunningham: Which he has estimated to be in October— [240] October, 1930 or 1931.

Q. I show you, Mr. Potter, a couple of photographs and ask you to identify those if you can?

A. Those are two pictures of the same box, one closed and the other the doors open.

Q. What box is that?

A. That is the first box that was built after the so-called Barry box was built.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Q. What does it represent?

A. This is a picture of the first cabinet we built after and almost immediately after we built the Barry box. The functioning of the Barry box was so successful that we felt that all that remained was to duplicate the Barry box roughly and include in that a machine compartment so that we had a single unit.

Q. Was that the first of the machine compartment?

A. That was the first box we built that was a complete unit with the machine unit in it, so it could be sold as a complete article of merchandise.

Q. Can you give any estimate of the time when that was built?

A. That was built within one or two months after the completion of the Barry box.

Q. Which I believe you placed about October of 1930; is that correct? [241]

A. Approximately, yes, so this would have been built, without referring to anything to refresh my memory, I can do that, because I have some definite places that I can remember or refresh my memory, I can do that, because I have some definite in December of 1930.

Q. Well now will you refresh your memory from any source you can and give us an accurate date, if you can?

A. I can refresh my memory from records that I have, sir.

Q. Would you please do so, sir?

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

A. That is from the Anderson box, a copy of which I have. I don't have them here.

Q. Are these they? A. Yes.

Q. The group that I handed you does not contain Potter Exhibit 2, which is one of those entries or entry sheets.

The Witness: On December 26, 1930, Anderson billed the Potter Refrigeration Corp., for one dome light, one door swing, monel liner for refrigerator box, one brine tank. Now that was the billing for the equipment that went in this box.

Q. By this box, are you referring to the pictures that I just showed you?

A. Yes, and I can definitely identify that without a question of doubt, because that is the first time we had ever used a dome light in any refrigerator we built. At that time the only dome lights available were the type that were used in [242] automobiles.

Q. Do you see a dome light in that picture?

A. Yes, I see it clearly. I hadn't noticed it before. That gives me a definite identification of that box.

Q. Are these pictures part of your regular record? A. Yes."

Mr. Cunningham: I offer those pictures in evidence and asked that they be marked. Exhibit 3-SS and Exhibit 3-TT.

The Court: Are they in evidence already?

Mr. Cheatham: Yes.

Mr. Cunningham: Are they?

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Mr. Cheatham: Yes.

The Court: If they are in evidence, Mr. Cunningham, don't read that.

Mr. Cunningham: They are in evidence.

The Court: All right. I might suggest from now on, Mr. Lucas, you are Mr. Lucas and you are Mr. Byron and you are Mr. Ramsey. Don't repeat the names just because you represent everybody on the defendants' side, and the same with Mr. Cunningham. You don't have to say "Mr. Cunningham." Just ask the questions.

Mr. Byron: No objection.

Mr. Maguire: Unless there be an interpolation from counsel who is not examining in this deposition.

The Court: Well, I thought that Mr. Cunningham takes [243] the part of all of the plaintiff's attorneys.

Mr. Maguire: Yes.

The Court: When Mr. Cheatham reads it he is Mr. Cunningham, and yourself or anyone else.

Mr. Maguire: When we are reading from the deposition. Now, there have been and there probably will be interpolations which were probably by Mr. Byron at the time the deposition was taken, but I suppose when there is that interpolation in the direct or an interpolation by opposite counsel in the cross that ought to be indicated in the record.

The Court: Yes. But Mr. Lucas makes the statements on behalf of Mr. Byron.

Mr. Maguire: Oh, I see. All right.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

The Court: He doesn't say "Mr. Byron." He just makes the interpolation.

Mr. Maguire: Just so I clearly understand it, your Honor.

Mr. Cunningham: "Q. Did that box have a name?

A. It later acquired a name.

Q. Well, what was that name?

A. That was sold to a Mr. McChesney, and he was the purchaser of that box and so within the organization it became known as the McChesney box.

Q. When did he purchase it, as accurately as you can remember?

A. He purchased that sometime in the year 1931, and I would [244] say within nine months to a year of its completion, which is my best memory.

Q. Do you mean of the completion of the box?

A. Of the finished box, yes.

Q. Did that box embody proportional or relative insulation?

A. That box had a differential of insulation between the upper and the lower compartments; that is the two compartments were differently insulated.

Q. Was the same thing true of the Barry box?

A. Yes, that is definite. The same thing is true of the Barry box.

Q. Mr. Potter, in the case of the so-called Barry box, was the machinery, motor and compressor, et cetera, contained within the cabinet or not?

A. No, the compressor equipment was set beside the box.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Q. Mr. Potter, I wish to quote again from the Stewart-Warner record, this time at page 591—

Mr. Ramsey: May the record show that I make the same objection?

Q. (Continued): And from the testimony of Mr. Charles W. Bale, and I ask you in advance whether you read this testimony of Mr. Bale?

A. Yes, sir, I did.

Q. It was a deposition, I notice—I would like to change that. It is page 580." [245]

The Court: Is there anything for me to pass upon? Mr. Byron made the objection.

Mr. Cunningham: I think it was a hangover from an objection that we agreed was out, your Honor.

Mr. Byron: Nothing, your Honor.

The Court: Well, if that's the case, don't read it.

Mr. Cunningham: (Reading from a deposition contained in the Potter deposition.)

“Q. Now I call your attention to a drawing which has been marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 83 in this case, and ask you whether you are able to recognize that drawing? A. Yes, sir.”

The Court: One second. Every time you say “Q” say “Question” and “A,” “Answer.”

Mr. Cunningham: “Q. As what do you recognize it?

A. As three-temperature cabinet for household refrigerator.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Q. Do you know by whom this drawing was made? A. I made it myself.

Q. And at what date?

A. Very shortly before December 17, 1930.

Q. I notice that this drawing is dated December 17, 1930. Is that date put on in your handwriting? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was it put on or about that date?

A. I believe so. That was usually the case after the drawing [246] is finished. The last thing is the title put on and dated and signed.' "

The Court: Just one second.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, what Mr. Cunningham has been doing which seems to have caused a little consternation is that he is reading the questions and answers that were propounded to a Mr. Bale in another case, so he is just reading both the question and the answer which is perfectly proper, because on the basis of that testimony he is going to ask the witness Potter a question.

Go ahead, Mr. Cunningham.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Mr. Potter, I show you a tracing, and can you identify that?

A. That is a drawing of a box similar to what we called the McChesney box which I have just identified. It is marked as the date February 7, 1931.

Q. Can you say whether or not that was a drawing made by Mr. Bale?

A. That was a drawing made by Mr. Bale. He has the initials—he initialed the drawing. That is

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

not the first drawing in my memory which he made. As I look at it, I believe that this drawing was made for a metal sheath cabinet. The McChesney, as I remember it, was a wooden sheath cabinet. I definitely remember—I definitely remember that the first time development work was after the McChesney box was [247] completed. All the drawing up to that time had been sketches given to workmen or given to Mathews or Anderson.

Q. Were they sketches by Mr. Bale?

A. No, I don't think Bale entered into any of that. They were sketches given either by me or made by me or by Mr. Bronaugh, and I remember that this is a later drawing, because as soon as the McChesney box—we will call that—was completed, when they called Mr. Bale down that box was on the first floor. Mr. Bale had his office—drafting office—on the second floor. We called him down and asked him to make a complete detailed drawing of that box and that drawing must have been started or made in the fall of 1930. This is marked February 7, 1931.

Q. Was Mr. Bale an independent draftsman or a full-time employee?

A. No, he was a draftsman in our employ. Most of his work up to this time—in fact, all of it, was consumed on our pumps and compressors and our assemblies.

Q. The testimony I read you from Mr. Bale's deposition refers to a drawing of December 17, 1930. That would be correct, would you say?

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

A. That would be correct, sir."

Mr. Cunningham: I offer that drawing that the witness has identified in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-UU.

Mr. Maguire: -UU. [248]

Mr. Cunningham: 3-UU. Two U's.

The Court: Has that been admitted?

The Clerk: Yes, your Honor.

Mr. Cunningham: It's not marked by any clerk's stamp to show that it was admitted. I don't know, the record may show it.

Mr. Byron: No objection.

The Court: It has been admitted.

The Clerk: It has been admitted.

The Court: You did. All right. I just said leave it in front of you and then it will be picked up later. Go on to page 202.

Mr. Cunningham: 200 now, sir.

"Q. Now, I show you blueprints and ask if you can identify each of those?

A. It is the drawing of a box similar to the one we have just looked at. It bears the date 7/26/31."

Mr. Cunningham: I offer in evidence, if it hasn't already been received, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-VV.

The Clerk: They are all in.

The Court: Mr. Bishop says it's in. Pick up those two exhibits, Mr. Bishop, and put them in the file.

Mr. Cunningham: "Well, will you take the next drawing, Mr. Potter, and identify it?"

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

A. This is a detailed structure on the cabinet which I have [249] just identified and is marked 'Door Details, three-temperature cabinet.' This has a date of 7/26/31."

Mr. Cunningham: Again I offer in evidence, if it hasn't already been received, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-WW.

The Court: Is it in?

The Clerk: Yes, those are all in, all that he has.

Mr. Cunningham: "Q. Can you identify the next one?

A. Yes, this is a drawing of the same type of box that we have had under discussion. It is a later design in certain minor details. The drawing is marked 'Potter three-temperature household refrigerator cabinet.' The date on the drawing is 3/3/31. I initialed, or rather it is initialed by the draftsman, W. C. Bale."

Mr. Cunningham: I offer that drawing in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-YY.

The Court: Is it in?

The Clerk: They are all in that he has, your Honor.

Mr. Cunningham: I believe, your Honor, now, and I am slow about it. I think these are the drawings that we showed the jury the other day.

The Clerk: They are.

Mr. Cunningham: "Q. The next one?

A. This is a detailed drawing of certain door details pertaining to the box which I have just

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

identified and is marked under the date of 3/3/31 and is initialed by C. W. Bale." [250]

Mr. Cunningham: I merely identify that as Plaintiff's Exhibit -ZZ already in evidence.

Mr. Cheatham: 3-ZZ.

Mr. Cunningham: Correct. 3-ZZ.

The Court: Where are you reading from?

The Bailiff: 203, center of the page.

The Court: 203. I think it's a good thing, the next time you come to an exhibit, let's hold it up to the jury so they know what you are talking about.

Mr. Cunningham: "Q. Have you another one, Mr. Potter, there?

A. I have another one before me which is a detail of two"—

Mr. Cunningham: Will you go ahead, please?

The Bailiff: "Which is a detail of two things that are included in the structure of the layout that we are discussing. This drawing is dated 3/3/31 and initialed by C. W. Bale, marked 'Brine tank and baffles, three-temperature cabinet.' This drawing shows the brine tank as an integral part of the liner that goes into the frozen storage compartment of that box. It also shows the baffle plate which was used in front of the finned coil in the food compartment of that box."

Mr. Cunningham: I identify that as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-AAA. I believe that's already in evidence.

The Court: Just show it to them. They have already seen it, but I want them to be able to compare the number with the exhibit they have already

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

seen. It makes the testimony [251] much more meaningful.

(Whereupon the Clerk exhibited the mentioned exhibit to the jury.)

Mr. Cunningham: "Q. Mr. Potter, I show you three other blueprints and ask if you can identify each of those? A. I can, sir.

Q. Would you take whichever one is in front of you?

A. The first one in front of me is marked 'Brine tank for three-temperature cabinet. The date is 1/29/31. It is initialed by C. W. Bale. This is a drawing of the brine tank and liner that went in the frozen storage compartment of the McChesney box. I have just identified that by checking it against the photograph of the McChesney box, and I know I am correct."

Mr. Cunningham: That is identified as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-BBB, and I believe it's already in evidence.

May it be understood, your Honor, if I make a mistake as to what is in, that I now offer these in evidence?

The Court: Yes. But they are already in. Mr. Bishop has noted that on several occasions.

Mr. Cunningham: "Q. Can you identify the next one, Mr. Potter? A. I can, sir.

Q. Will you do so, please?

A. This is entitled '22-32, Fin Coil for Three-Temperature [252] Cabinet. The date is 1/30/31. It is initialed by C. W. Bale, and this is a drawing

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

of the finned coil which went into the McChesney Box.”

Mr. Cunningham: That is Exhibit 3-CCC.

“Q. Can you identify the next blueprint?

A. The next drawing is door details of the three-temperature cabinet. This is dated 2/7/31, initialed by C. W. Bale.”

Mr. Cunningham: I identify that as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3-VVV.

“Q. Please state whether or not it was the practice of Mr. Bale to make his drawings from sketches or from actual constructions—

A. There was no common practice on that. Sometimes I would go to Mr. Bale and make a sketch which he would develop as a working drawing. In this particular instance, the boxes up to this point had been built and completed from sketches and Mr. Bale then came in and made mechanical drawings from the box itself.

Q. Is that true of all of the sketches you have identified here?

A. That is not necessarily so. The first drawings he made were made from the box itself. That was in the fall of 1930. Some of those other drawings were undoubtedly made in planning the added boxes to be built. So those were laid out by Mr. Bale on a drawing board before the boxes were built and [253] then those boxes were built from the boxes which we supplied.

Q. Now, Mr. Potter, what did you do with respect to obtaining patent protection on these house-

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

hold refrigerators of the construction you have described?

A. As soon as what we are calling the McChesney box was completed and tested, then I called in Mr. Birkenbeuel and sold him the box, explained its operation, explained its features, and asked him to draw up patent papers to cover it.

Q. Did he do so?

A. He did that, and we applied for a patent as soon as his work was completed. The patent was applied for on February 16, 1931.

Q. That is the application for the original of the patent in suit, is it not?

A. That is the application of the original patent in suit, yes.

Q. Now, what next did you do after filing that application?

A. We then proceeded to make our first metal covering, or to use the expression I used before, metal sheath box.

Q. Do you have any recollection of when you proceeded with that?

A. That continued right after the McChesney box had been completed and it was essentially the same box, except that this was a metal box instead of a wooden box. The principles and proportions were the same. [254]

Q. Have you any means of fixing the quantity and dates of these metal boxes?

A. I have, sir.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Q. State what it is, please.

A. I refer to the Anderson records which are merely confirming my independent memory. These records show that on the 20th of February we received a bill.

Mr. Byron: What year?

The Witness: 1931; covering three-temperature refrigerator, \$27. Monel liner for same, \$34. Copper brine tank, \$42.50. Baffle plate, \$2.50. Now that was the first metal covered or metal sheathed box. That followed the structure of the wooden box—I should have said the construction.

Q. Now, have you any record of the Anderson Company that refreshes your recollection as to the further activity with the metal box?

A. I have my own independent memory of that. The Anderson is merely to confirm my independent memory.

Q. Tell me how many of these metal cabinets were built by the Anderson Company?

A. We built all totaled either 12 or 13. I believe it was 13, because I have just told you about billing a single one. Then following that, almost immediately, as soon as that was completed and satisfactory, then we built six further boxes in one batch, all the same as this metal box which I have just [255] told you about. The completion of those we then built—upon the completion of those we then built an additional six, so all totaled we started with the McChesney wooden model and we then built a single metal model. We then built six of

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

the metal boxes, following with another six. That would make a total of 14 boxes, if I am correct.

Q. Did these all have the refrigerating compressor and motor in the cabinet?

A. These were all the same as the McChesney box, a complete unit, with the machine and the cabinet all in one compartment—in one part rather or all in one piece. Could I correct it and say, all in one structure, which I think would be better?

Mr. Ramsey: You mean, all within one cabinet?

The Witness: Yes, sir.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Well, can you give us any more definite date as to the building of these first six boxes?

A. I have confirmed my memory on that again from the Anderson record and—I don't want to get too tired so I don't, or I can't go on tomorrow, if I do get tired, but I am ready to go on.

From the Anderson, it shows March 19, 1931, one brine tank, three-temperature box, one food compartment liner, cover outside cabinet, extra tank for three-temperature. Now that is undoubtedly the billing of the first metal box which I spoke of. [256]

Q. Now how about the six?

A. I am coming down to that.

Mr. Ramsey: Do I understand you are testifying as to the completion date or are those the completion of parts of the supplier?

Mr. Cunningham: Can you answer that question, Mr. Potter? I mean, if you know.

The Witness: They would be very close to the

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

completion dates one way or the other; probably a few days, because naturally he is not going to bill us until he has completed and delivered what he has given us.

Mr. Ramsey: I mean, the completion of the complete cabinets and refrigerators with the mechanisms therein?

The Witness: That is what I am referring to, I would say it would be within a few days, one side or the other.

Mr. Ramsey: Thank you.

Q. (By Mr. Cunningham): Can you give us the date from that record of the Anderson Company?

A. Yes. May 28, 1931—six three-temperature cabinets. Six casings outside. Six food compartment liners and five brine tanks.

That is interesting, because from the earlier first metal box in his billing he billed it as one extra brine tank, so evidently that is why the five brine tanks were billed here instead of six. He charges \$528.50. July 9, 1931, [257] they billed us for six cabinets covered, six linings, six tanks. The bill was \$561. That was the second batch of six, three-temperature boxes.

Q. Now, Mr. Potter, was this the complete construction of cabinets that you can recall prior to the first half or rather prior to August of 1931?

A. Yes, sir, I think that covers them completely, as I remember them.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Q. Now, what else did you do after July of 1931, with respect to this refrigerator business?

A. I left Portland in the early part of 1931. I left before these last cabinets were built. That was under the direction, built under the direction of Bronaugh.

Q. Was he still with you? A. Yes.

Q. Where did he stay?

A. He was in Portland. I came to Buffalo to establish sales headquarters, commercial sales headquarters, for our three-temperature cabinets.

Q. By that time it had been pretty well agreed that you were going to market these cabinets?

A. That is why we came to Buffalo, because we did not feel that we could market anything nationally from the West Coast. The freight would be against us. We came to Buffalo, because we felt that that would make a sales center. We could [258] go in any direction from Buffalo overnight and reach the biggest markets.

Q. Did you have any negotiations at about this time, the middle of 1931, with a concern called the Jewett Refrigerator Company in Buffalo?

A. One of the first things we did when we came to Buffalo, we had two or three of these cabinets which we had been speaking of shipped to Buffalo. In Buffalo there was the Jewett Refrigerator Company.

Q. Who were they?

A. The old line refrigerator company that had been in business many, many years, and largely on

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

iceboxes, but they had a large business of commercial refrigeration, big commercial installations for mechanical refrigeration, such as hotels, clubs and some of the wealthy people's homes you could afford to keep a big home. That was the bulwark of the Jewett business. They had an outstanding reputation for quality.

Q. Did you select that company?

A. Yes, I selected that company, hoping that they would be able to do the manufacturing for us under contract, Jewett. My first contact with them—with my first contact with them, they or I showed them the boxes we had brought from Portland and they stated that certain structural changes should be made in order to put it on a better manufacturing basis.

I engaged them as the first step to redesign [259] the box, not in principle, but in detail, to make it better and easier for manufacture. At that time I met Mr. Bommer. Mr. Bommer was the chief engineer of the Jewett Company. I sat in with Mr. Bommer, and together we worked out the working drawings of what according to him, based on his manufacturing experience, would be the proper way to construct it. They made two cabinets for us, one large and one small.

Q. Can you state the date when they made the two cabinets?

A. Oh, that would be the middle of 1931, the summer of 1931.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Q. By the way, Mr. Potter, what did you show the Jewett cabinet?

A. I showed them one of the cabinets that we had shipped to Buffalo that we were talking about, and it was from that that Mr. Bommer and I worked. He supplied the manufacturing experience in manufacturing cabinets. I had never manufactured cabinets. He supplied that. With his experience, from that standpoint, we designed two cabinets which met with his okay on the basis of production. They met with me okay on their ability to perform. They completed those cabinets and on their completion I negotiated with Edgar Jewett, the head of that business, for production. Mr. Jewett and I arrived at an agreement. His attorney was to put it in contract form.

A few days later his attorney came to me or to my office with a contract. I did not consider that the contract [260] was in the spirit of our agreement between Jewett and myself, but he had to interpose his own thoughts on how the deal should be made. The result was that that deal fell through. That was in the latter part of the summer of 1931. As soon as that fell through I immediately got on long-distance telephone. I called the Rex Company in Connersville, Indiana, who were cabinet makers. We had bought a number of those or a number of their cabinets when we were operating in Portland, and installed our machines in them and sold them as a complete unit, so I was acquainted with the company.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

I also called the Universal Cooler Company. I asked them to send representatives to meet me in Buffalo to discuss production on a new refrigerator.

Within a few days of my call we had arranged a definite date for, can I say, a three-cornered meeting, myself, the Rex Company and Universal Cooler?

That meeting was held. I was present. Mr. C. C. Hull was the president of Rex, and he came himself personally. From Universal Cooler, I believe it was Mr. Gleason. I am not clear on that, whether it was Johnson, the president, or whether it was Gleason. But they represented the Universal [261] Cooler.

Q. Where is Universal Cooler?

A. Detroit, Michigan.

Q. Where is Rex?

A. It was in Connersville, Indiana. They were purely cabinet manufacturers. Universal Cooler were purely machine manufacturers. I had my own compressor equipment, but commercially I was afraid if we included that in this new cabinet our competition would shoot at us and say that our mechanism had not been proven. I figured from a commercial standpoint if we used the Universal compressor that had been on the market for years and had a fine reputation, and nobody could throw anything against our mechanisms. We came to an agreement that the Rex Company were to build our cabinets for us. They were to be shipped to Universal Cooler. They would install the mecha-

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

nism and from there they would be shipped direct to dealers.

Q. Now did that contract go into effect?

A. That contract went into effect—that was in the summer of—or thereabouts—toward the end of the summer of 1931. The Rex Company—then we shipped our two models we made at Jewett—not the Portland models—but the Jewett models were supposed to be ready for production.

We shipped those to Rex. Their engineers wanted to make still further changes to fit their methods of production [262] which weren't the same as Jewett. So they redesigned it still another time, from a production standpoint.

At the same time we figured that to enter into the business and be able to compete with others we had to have a more complete line, and so the Rex Company who made cabinets generally for the trade selected certain of their smaller cabinets that we could put out as a semi-competitive—I don't mean that—but as a competitive item—completing our line.

Q. Those were not the two-temperature boxes?

A. We had what we called two de luxe boxes and what we called Potter boxes, but they got that all organized for a complete line, for complete production.

When we knew that that was ready and ready to make deliveries, we then took up with an advertising agency in Buffalo that was Landshet and Bonning. They were an advertising agency in Buffalo,

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

and they stopped in and helped us plan our commercial attack. Our first step naturally was to get dealers. The refrigeration industry has a trade paper, have had it for many years, a trade paper called Refrigerator News, or Refrigeration News. I think it is Refrigeration News.

Q. May I interrupt you a minute and show you a copy of what has heretofore been marked Plaintiff's Quinn Exhibit No. 9? Now, is that the ad which you speak of?"

Mr. Cunningham: Unfortunately, your Honor, that is [263] in another group I have here. We will get it in a minute.

"A. That is the ad of which I speak. That ad was planned by the Landshet and Bonning agency and was placed in the Refrigeration News, and that was our first announcement publicly of this type of cabinet."

Mr. Cunningham: It will be in connection with the Quinn deposition, and it is identified in this proceeding as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-I.

"Q. Referring to the two-temperature type of Potter cabinets, is that correct?"

A. Up to that time, we had always been calling it three-temperature. Now we simultaneously were getting this lined up with the manufacturers when they organized the Potter Refrigerator Corporation of New York—pardon me—we organized a company. At that time we called it on the advice of our advertising people 'The Tricolor.' We had been using the three-temperature cabinets. They thought

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

that would make a better name for it than Potter, so we launched our first sales under the name of Tricold. All of our literature at the beginning was under the designation of the Tricold Refrigerator Company. Later we ran into a conflict on names between the Trucold, which was owned by Montgomery Ward, and they notified us that they considered our Tricold was too [264] close to theirs.

As soon as we got that notice we met the issue and instead of battling with them we changed the name to Potter Refrigerator Corp., and changed the names of the boxes to Potter, so these boxes were introduced to the public first as Tricold and then it carried the Potter name."

Mr. Cunningham: I shall state that the deposition was there adjourned until the next day, October 26th, at the same time and place.

"Mr. Cunningham: On the record, I would like to continue the practice of yesterday and hand you, Mr. Byron and Mr. Ramsey, the memorandum that the witness has himself prepared to assist him in his testimony which I expect to reach now or in very short order.

Q. Mr. Potter, whose idea was it to get these memoranda up in advance of your testimony?

A. That was my own personal idea, sir. I knew I was coming into this deposition, so I sat down and made a calendar.

Q. Now, Mr. Potter, before we get to this new advance outline which we have given the other side, I wish to backtrack just a little bit on yesterday's

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

outline. Do you realize that we have so far failed to produce any drawing or written [265] description or document as to these three converted boxes that you testified to? Have you looked for any such documentary evidence?

A. Yes, I am very conscious of that. But when we dismantled the shop in Portland, I was in Buffalo getting organized to get the thing on the market. I left it to others to dismantle the shop and dispose of any equipment we had. They did that, but in doing that they disposed, just threw out all the shop records. We had no records at all, and I have no means of producing them, because they are all gone. They never came to me in Buffalo.

Q. Do you recall that you ever had any formal drawings of these early converted iceboxes by Mr. Bale or anyone else?

A. No, sir. All of that early work was done on sketches. This was not the only experiment we were doing. We were going through many things. The simplest and quickest way was to make a pencil sketch and give it to a workman and Mr. Bale did not enter the picture until after the McChesney box was completed. You know what I mean when I say 'McChesney box.'

Mr. Cunningham: Yes.

A. (Continued): And he was brought down—he brought down a box finished and tested, and we were pleased with it, and it was brought down to make the working drawings. That is the first draw-

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

ings that Mr. Bale in any official capacity [266] made.

Q. And some of the drawings—

A. Identified yesterday, yes. Some of those drawings have evidently been lost. I know that I supplied Mr. Bristol of Watson Bristol when they were handling the Stewart-Warner trial—I supplied them with drawings, but somehow or other they have not come back to us. There are a number of things given on the record that Bristol had that never came back to us.

Q. Mr. Potter, do you mean that you supplied Mr. Bristol with any drawings of these early converted iceboxes?

A. No, we did not. The first drawings that we gave Mr. Bristol were the first drawings that Mr. Bale made for the McChesney box, and we have searched and searched, and we can't find them. They never came back.

Q. All right. Will you tell me, please, to the best of your recollection, what was embodied in any one or all three of these converted iceboxes. Just describe them or any one of them. The fundamental principle of—

A. The fundamental principle of our invention was in all three. Each one had two compartments. Each one had a chilling unit in the cold compartment. Each one had a finned coil in the warmth department, each one had a thermostat, and they were in an insulated box with two compartments, one insulated from the other. [267]

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Q. Where was the compressor machinery.

A. The compressor machinery was at the side. At that stage we weren't thinking in terms of propping either up or putting either underneath, because it made no difference in function. So on those early boxes we were only considering the food preservation section, and we just took it as a matter of course to put the machine beside it. We had the use of the machine—

Q. How about proportional insulation?

A. I have given a lot of those—given a lot of thought to that. I do not think the first three had proportional insulation.

Q. How did these experimental converted ice-boxes operate? What results did they get?

A. They got very encouraging results, because we found that on the frozen storage side we could get good low temperatures. As I remember it, between the first and the second we made one step. The first one, as I remember it, we had a series of standard evaporators. There were sections. As I remember the first one, we used one evaporator in one—the standard. That is our wraparound coil evaporator. On the first one we used that. We used a finned coil, which as I remember it, was cut up from a condenser. It had the small fins on it. The second one we used a double evaporator on the cold side. That is the [268] only difference. I am frank to confess, I have tried in my memory to remember what the coil was. I know it was a fin coil. I have a distinct memory on the third one. That is where

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

we divided the insulating between the two on a horizontal instead of a vertical. That I know we used a Larkin coil there.

Mr. Ramsey: Is that a trade name?

The Witness: Yes, sir. Now that is as much as I can give out of my memory on those three boxes. They differed in detail but not in principle.

Q. All right, please state whether or not they operated in accordance with the principles—

A. I have already said they all embodied the principles.

Q. The answer is Yes? A. Yes.

Q. Did they get—will you state whether or not they got the results which were your objective as stated in your patent in suit?

A. There is no question about that, sir.

Q. Do you know a Mr. H. B. Hull?

A. I did not know him personally. I know that he was the author of the books that were used as standards in the refrigeration industry in household refrigeration.

Q. I show you, Mr. Potter, four pages of photostats and state for the record that I obtained these this morning from [269] the regular photostat service from the New York Public Library, being the first title page of this entitled 'Household Refrigeration' by H. B. Hull, M.E., published by Nickerson Collins Co., Chicago, being the fourth edition. The title page seems to omit the date. I will state for the record that I recall it was 1933.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

The next three photostats are Pages 56, 557, 558 of that publication.

Q. Are you familiar with that?

A. I am fully aware of this, because I used to own that particular volume of Hull, and I loaned that volume to Mr. Bristol. We tried to find that here. We couldn't, and one, two or three days ago I told you of my memory of this and you said that you would go to the library and obtain photostats. Here are the photostats, which I recognize, of having read in the Hull book which I owned, and which I recall and told you about."

Mr. Cunningham: I offer these photostats in evidence, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-EEE.

Mr. Ramsey: We have no objection.

The Court: They may be admitted.

(The photostats referred to, previously marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-EEE, were received in evidence.) [270]

Mr. Cunningham: I might interrupt at this time, your Honor, to read a short statement in these photostats to the jury. It seems a little more informative than just saying the pages of a book.

The Court: All right; I was hoping a lot of these things would be omitted. It seems to me we are getting off the issue in this case quite a bit.

Mr. Cunningham: Would your Honor reserve until you hear this? I am quoting from Page 56 of Mr. Hull's book on "Household Refrigeration," 1933:

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

“The humidity of the air in the household refrigerator has been considered to be too dry from the time of the earliest units that appeared on the market. The low humidity——”

Mr. Byron: That is hearsay, isn't it, your Honor?

The Court: Yes, but you have admitted it.

Mr. Cunningham: “The low humidity is a material but unavoidable consequence of low temperature of the cooling coil. As has been mentioned, the storage of salad vegetables has been successfully accomplished by the use of a container designed to permit only limited circulation. The housewife also covers many of her foods with a dish or paper. The most desirable humidity depends——” It is a very poor photostat—“on many factors, and [271] no single value meets all of the requirements. The evidence available would indicate that a relative humidity of 75 per cent would be the lowest which would be desirable.”

I am having so much difficulty reading that page, and it is about all that was on it. I will not read but characterize and state subject to check that on Pages 357 and 358 is a description of the Potter refrigerator.

The Court: All right; go ahead.

(Thereupon the reading of the deposition was continued as follows:)

“Mr. Cunningham: Q. Mr. Potter, have you

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

read the description of the Potter refrigerator on Pages 357 and -8? A. Yes, I have.

Q. Have you any correction to make in the description given there by Mr. Hull?

A. I will have to reread it. I remember there was an error. I have forgotten what it was.

Mr. Cunningham: Maybe I can help you, Mr. Potter.

A. (Continued): I can't pick it up. There was something that I called to your attention that was not exactly in that description. Right now I can't pick it up.

Q. Would you read the words, please, and make your correction?

A. 'Figure 107 shows a typical cabinet; the upper part [272] of this cabinet contains a general food storage compartment. The humidity in this compartment is maintained at a desirable high value by means of a separate finned tube-type cooling coil which operates on a defrosting cycle.'

Now that is in error, because that should have been, if he had been correct in his description—that should have been 'on a non-frosting cycle.'

Q. I show you, Mr. Potter, a book which I believe is your property, entitled 'Mechanical Refrigeration and Service,' by Adrian J. Snyder, with the date 1937 on it, published by Louellen Publishing Company, Inc., 39 Union Square West, New York City, and direct your attention to Pages 76, 77 and 78. Are you familiar with those pages?

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

A. I am. This is a text book that came from my library, my personal library.

Q. Now to shortcut this a little, have you any correction with respect or any disagreement with the statement of the author made on those three pages describing the refrigerator?"

Mr. Byron: Your Honor, the author is not here to be cross-examined. It is just hearsay evidence.

Mr. Cunningham: No, your Honor, this is a description by Mr. Potter.

The Court: Are you offering the document?

Mr. Cunningham: Yes, sir. [273]

Mr. Byron: I object to it.

The Court: Objection sustained.

Mr. Maguire: It it may please the Court, your Honor has ruled. May we reserve the right to discuss that matter with your Honor later?

The Court: Yes. I told you before that you may make an offer of proof at any time, and if I find that I am incorrect I will reverse myself.

Mr. Maguire: Thank you, your Honor.

Mr. Cunningham: Thank you, your Honor. I will continue with the reading of the answer which relates to the book. You have it in front of you, I think Page 228.

Mr. Byron: Well, that will be before the Court only, as I understand it.

The Court: Yes; just go to 229 and new questions by Mr. Cunningham, "I now show you, Mr. Potter——"

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

“Mr. Cunningham: Q. I now show you, Mr. Potter, a publication entitled ‘Potter Service Manual, 1938,’ with the date 1939 written in ink below it, and ask you to identify that, if you can.

A. That was the Service Manual of the Potter Refrigerator Company in Buffalo. It was used by the dealers and the servicemen.

Q. When? Was it about the dates that appear there?

A. Yes, this is published in 1938 and for the 1938 line, [274] but there were no changes between the '38 and '39 lines, so this was not revised for '39.”

Mr. Cunningham: I offer that in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-GGG.

The Court: Has that been admitted already?

Mr. Cunningham: No, sir.

The Court: Is there any objection?

Mr. Ramsey: No objection.

The Court: It may be admitted.

(Manual, “Potter Service Manual, 1938,” previously marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-GGG, was received in evidence.)

“Mr. Cunningham: Q. I now show you a series of exhibits that were identified in the Bommer deposition in this case. The same numbers were used to identify those exhibits as were used in the Stewart-Warner record. They are——”

This is a little confusing to read, it seems to me, because we have different exhibit numbers.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, why don't you substitute the new exhibit numbers when you ask the question?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Cheatham: Exhibits 3-L, 3-M, 3-N, 3-O, 3-P, 3-Q, 3-R, 3-S, 3-T, in this proceeding.

“Mr. Cunningham: Q. I now show you a series of exhibits [275] that were identified in the Bommer deposition in this case. * * * Can you identify each of those, Mr. Potter? Just state briefly what they are.

A. This was sales literature. Do you want me to identify them by numbers?

Mr. Cunningham: Were they all put out by the Potter Company?

The Witness: Yes, Potter Company first went under the name of Tricold Refrigerator Company. This one in front of me is marked Tricold.

Q. Will you look through the entire group of them and let me know——

A. The next one that I come to is marked 1933. That illustrates one of our boxes. It is marked Potter and also Tricold. That is before the change of name.

Q. Just let us know if you can identify each one of them and then they will speak for themselves, I think.

A. All right, this one I recognize is what we called in our office the Gold folder. It was a sales circular showing the different models. Here is an-

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

other one of the same type of sales literature, also Gold. Here is still another one marked 1936, same thing, sales literature showing the models. Here is another one marked 1937 showing the models for that year. Here is still another one marked 1937, showing the models for that year. Here is still another one [276] marked 1938, showing that year's models. Also, same type of literature showing the models for 1939. Those were all Potter boxes.

Q. Still on yesterday's memorandum I notice opposite——”

The Court: Have those been offered, Mr. Cunningham?

Mr. Cunningham: Well, your Honor, we expect to offer them in the Bommer deposition. I wonder if it would be clear if we offered them the first time they were mentioned? I think there is no objection to it.

The Court: They may be admitted—you are not objecting to anything in connection with the history of the invention if it relates to Potter Company?

Mr. Byron: That is right, your Honor.

The Court: It may be admitted. Do you want to read it to the jury now or show them anything, or do you want to do that at a later time?

Mr. Cunningham: I think we will make more progress if we go right ahead and can show it later.

The Court: That is perfectly all right, and it is under our stipulation. Page 231 near the bottom of the page, Mr. Cunningham.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

“Mr. Cunningham: Q. Still on yesterday’s memorandum I notice opposite October, 1931, a notation of Anderson Patent No. 1,039,051 purchased October 29. That is quoted ‘Anderson to October 29.’ Will you tell us briefly— [277]

The Witness: What is that date?

Mr. Cunningham: Opposite October, 1931.

Tell us briefly who purchased that patent?

A. I purchased that patent, personally, from the company that owned it, and they were in Chicago. I never am certain about names, but I believe the man I purchased it from was a Mr. Reese. I am not certain about that, but I merely think that is the man I bought it from. But we had developed our first Potter machine and we used a particular circuit, refrigerating circuit, in their construction. The circuit was very simple. And the way we used it it was very successful. After I moved to Buffalo it came to our attention, I believe, through a patent lawyer, the existence of this Anderson patent. That did not cover what we were doing, except it did cover part of what we were doing and that is the type of circuit we were using.

I then had the choice of redesigning the box to use another circuit or to purchase the Anderson patent.

I would not have gone ahead utilizing the Anderson patent and ignoring it. I took it up and found out—I have forgotten how I found out who the owner was—but I know I found out, and I took it up with them and they offered to sell that patent

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

for \$5,000. I figured it was cheaper to buy that patent and therefore not infringe it. It was cheaper to do that than to redesign the circuit we were [278] using, and that would have caused delays in our production plans. So we bought the Anderson patent and proceeded and continued to use that circuit.

Q. Where did you get the money to buy the Anderson patent?"

Mr. Byron: Now, if your Honor please——

The Court: Objection sustained.

“Mr. Cunningham: Q. Now, Mr. Potter, I notice a gap between your memorandum of yesterday and the first entry of the memorandum of today. The last one was November, 1932, and the first entry on today’s memorandum is early 1935.

A. Yes, sir. I made no notes on those dates, because I did not think that there was anything of particular significance as applied to this present controversy. I may have been wrong, but, as I remember it, I did not remember anything during those dates that had significance. During those dates we were devoting all of our time and attention to the best of our ability to the marketing of our boxes, establishing dealers, training dealers, and so forth, and so on.

Q. Did you or did you not become aware of any competition in these two-temperature refrigerators?

A. The first competition that I remember of or about at this time—and when I say ‘competition’ I mean of our type.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Mr. Cunningham: That is what I mean. [279]

A. (Continued): We had terrific competition commercially, because we had something entirely different than the other people. We were offering moist cold preservation. We were offering frozen food storage, offering faster freezing, and so forth. None of the others had anything of that type on the market, and as a consequence in order to meet or to beat us, that competition was very vicious. I don't believe that from the patent standpoint—maybe I shouldn't volunteer this. I will pass that.

Q. May I ask, what was the first make of refrigerator that made any effort to offer moist cold that came to your attention?

A. The first competition of our type of refrigeration came to our attention when the Kelvinator Company brought out a two-compartment, two-temperature box, and they advertised that as a very special de luxe Kelvinator with all these features.

Q. About how long did that last?

A. That lasted a very short time. As soon as I came out, I went up to Detroit and called on Mr. Mason, the President of the Kelvinator Company. I asked him to see his boxes. I had seen the announcement, but not the boxes.

He took me out into one part of his plant and showed me the boxes. They were all lined up on the wall in their big assembly hall. They had them for the dealers' [280] convention. He showed them to me, and I looked them over. I told him this, after looking them over——''

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

Mr. Byron: I object to the conversation.

The Court: Objection sustained.

“Mr. Cunningham: Q. What was the result of this visit?

A. I saw and inspected his full line of this full-compartment type, and I criticized them very severely and told Mr. Mason that as long as he was going to come into that field in one way I was glad, because there would be more people selling our principle, but that I didn't feel that what he had would be commercially satisfactory, because the frozen storage he provided was too small. It wouldn't even hold a turkey or a big roast. I told him—I said, ‘It is too bad that you didn't come to me as long as you were going into this field. It is too bad you didn't come and get my advice so that you would put out a proper box.’

We had further discussion, but we bought one of those boxes. We brought it to Buffalo, put it into our laboratory and found that they had made a grievous mistake in their design, because they had a frozen storage compartment operating well below freezing. They used paper insulation and the machine had been running for a while and then shut off; when it was running, it would collect frost around the liner. When it shut down, that frost mounted. After a [281] few operations we opened it up and we found that the insulation in that was thoroughly saturated and had gone soggy and was ruined. And shortly after that the Kelvinator Company withdrew that box from the market.

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

I believe—and I can't swear to the accuracy of this—but I believe that that was somewhere in 1936 that they brought that box out. I think they took it off the market in 1937:

Q. At the time of this conversation with Mr. Mason do you recall whether or not your original of the patent in suit issued—the date was October 6, 1936—the answer is, I suppose, that it had not.

A. The date of issue—am I wrong? Wasn't that issued—

Mr. Cunningham: October 6, 1936.

A. (Continued): Then this, I know, was before our patent issued.

Mr. Cunningham: There is no charge of patent infringement here.

A. (Continued): It must have been in the spring of 1936 that I called on Mr. Mason. I know that they took it off the market in 1937. I can make guesses as to why, but I am not doing that.

Q. Good. Now, Mr. Potter, what was the next competition of this moist cold type that you recall?

A. The next competition was Stewart-Warner, as I recall it. [282]

Q. What, if anything, did you do about that or attempt to do?

A. Before they brought out in the market competing boxes, Mr. D'Olive came to my office with Winter Hull. Mr. Winter Hull was the chief engineer for the Rex Manufacturing Company who were

(Deposition of Thomas Irving Potter.)

building our cabinets. Mr. Winter Hull also built cabinets for Stewart-Warner.

Q. Was this before Stewart-Warner had brought out a moist cold box? A. Yes.

Q. Continue.

A. Winter Hull was using a Potter box in his home, and he was terrifically enthused over it. Several times when I was at the factory, he said that he would like to interest other manufacturers. At that time he told me that they were building a large number of boxes for Stewart-Warner——”

Mr. Byron: Object to that as hearsay, “He told me.”

Mr. Cunningham: We have agreed that this motion to strike is to go out.

The Court: What did you say?

Mr. Cunningham: We have agreed that the motion to strike should go out, that they are withdrawing that motion. The motion appears on the bottom of Page 237.

Mr. Byron: Well, I am objecting now to its going in [283] because it is pure hearsay.

The Court: This is a good time to take our recess, and we will discuss that now. Ladies and Gentlemen, we will take our afternoon recess at this time, fifteen minutes.

(Thereupon, the jury retired for the afternoon recess.)

The Court: I think Mr. Maguire wanted to make

some statement here. He is not here. What do you claim for this testimony, Mr. Cunningham?

Mr. Cunningham: You mean this precise hearsay statement?

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, your Honor, I suppose it relates to the last part here, "Mr. Hull came to my office and brought D'Olive with him and they both stated——"

The Court: I want to go further, and I have listened to this testimony, much of it that has come in on Potter's deposition, and for the life of me I cannot understand the relevancy of the fact that they went up to Jewett Refrigerator Company and talked about having built some refrigerators and then no contract was entered into, and then they go up to Rex. I don't know what has happened as far as Rex is concerned. Then there is testimony with reference to Kelvinator, "Kelvinator's box is no good." Now, how many cases are we going to try here, and what possible relevancy is the fact that here, and what possible relevancy is the fact [284] that Mr. Potter went and talked to the Kelvinator people, and their box was no good? How does that establish the validity or invalidity of this box? All this drivel that is coming into this case, no objection to it, I have not said anything before, but it seems to me that this testimony, much of it, should go out of this case. [285]

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, I think it is a subject that could be made, perhaps, much clearer by a little memorandum or brief. However, it is

very striking to me. It's the first time in my life that I have ever had it questioned that the history of an invention, the trials and tribulations of the inventors both before the invention was made and after it was brought on the market isn't the firmest guidepost to a Court and jury as to whether or not it was more than ordinary skill. It is one of the finest, firmest landmarks in our patent law.

I think I can quote just from the Supreme Court alone on that. I am not prepared to do so at the moment, though. But it is directed squarely in response and in rebuttal of this defense of lack of invention. In other words, it is not beyond just the ordinary skill. And judge after judge after judge, case after case after case has admittedly exactly this type of testimony and that, your Honor, seems to me that you have some idea that we are trying to try more than one case at a time, but we are definitely not, because we have mentioned the name Stewart-Warner or Kelvinator, because those are all factors in this case.

The Court: And you think the fact that Mr. Potter went to the Kelvinator factory and looked over their box and accused them of not making a good box is part of the [286] history of this patent and shows patentability?

Mr. Cunningham: As your Honor states it, but I think the fact that when they saw his invention as it was embodied in his boxes and decided to copy it or to approximate it, at least that shows very cogently and very significantly the impact of that invention on the art.

The Court: And how about his conversation with the Jewett people and the lawyer imposing conditions that they couldn't meet and therefore they didn't go through with the contract? Is that part of the history of the invention?

Mr. Cunningham: Yes, your Honor, and of his activities in connection with the pioneering of this idea. He did more than just patent it, he pioneered it, and that is the most cogent, significant type of evidence you can have in a patent suit.

The Court: Let me see a decision to that effect.

Mr. Cunningham: I would be glad to, sir. I will say I am not prepared at the moment, though.

Mr. Byron: Then, your Honor, this story they are about to tell is about Stewart-Warner. Mr. Hull introduces somebody to somebody in Stewart-Warner and they have a talk, and finally Potter encourages them to take a couple of these Potter refrigerators and test them. Well, they were tested.

In the meantime Stewart-Warner asked to see the patent application of the patent in suit—the apparent [287] patent—and that was refused by Potter. So Stewart-Warner says, “Well, we are not going to buy a license here unless we know what we are buying.” Potter said, “Well, I refuse to show you.” Negotiations were dropped.

Now, what has that got to do with this suit?

The Court: Did you make an objection to that?

Mr. Byron: I have objected to Stewart-Warner all the way through, every bit of it.

The Court: Go ahead, Mr. Maguire.

Mr. Maguire: Well, your Honor, the history of

inventions, the state of the art, is not limited to the state which existed prior to its application. It is not limited to the time that the inventive concept has been reduced to practice. Whether it is an invention or not and what was the state of the art and the impact of this concept reduced to practice is a part of the history of the invention.

You just can't say it starts here and stops at this particular point.

The Court: Mr. Maguire, I have been in this case now for five years, or four years.

Mr. Maguire: Yes, sir.

The Court: And I have asked time and time again what this invention is, and I have never been told what the invention is. Certainly it's not a two-temperature refrigerator that they are claiming the invention on, and the fact that [288] people who after the two-temperature refrigerator came on the market used it as a freezing unit and bought meats wholesale, that can't be used by Potter because he has a monopoly on the whole theory of two-temperature refrigerators.

Mr. Maguire: Not on the temperature. It's not a question of the theory of it.

The Court: Or on the practice of two-temperature refrigerators, I will go that far. Anderson is before that but he is not claiming on Anderson because Anderson has expired, but there is a two-temperature refrigerator that preceded him.

Mr. Maguire: Upon the question of whether there is in fact, a two-temperature, I think there will be some dispute on the evidence, your Honor.

But the question of an impact of a new combination or idea upon the art and what those who are engaged in practicing the art did with respect to that kind of a disclosure is always a part.

The Court: That is a general statement, and that's absolutely right, Mr. Maguire.

Mr. Maguire: All right.

The Court: But that doesn't mean, does it, that the testimony is admissible that Jewett was a good, respectable outfit making commercial refrigerators and refrigerators for rich people, and then Mr. Potter went over there and talked about designing of a new box for him and then an attorney [289] who imposed conditions drew up a contract and submitted it to Mr. Potter which was unsatisfactory? How does that have anything to do with commercial success?

Mr. Maguire: If your Honor will permit me just a moment. I know your Honor is not in a position to advocate this case.

The Court: No. But I am trying to keep this record clear.

Mr. Maguire: Of course. That's your Honor's duty, and it is our duty on both sides to see that it does not become unclear or muddled or lead your Honor into error. That's the impression that we have, that responsibility is on both sides. But it isn't a question of whether Jewett is respectable, it isn't a question of whether or not in that particular whether or not the particular lawyer imposed—Jewett's lawyer imposed terms that Potter didn't

like, but it also was the proposition as to his attempt to get this into manufacture because——

The Court: Is that important, as to a date? Are you claiming that is the date of reduction to——

Mr. Maguire: Oh, no.

Mr. Cunningham: No.

The Court: Well, then, what relevancy has it got? I don't understand that.

Mr. Maguire: One of the things they are claiming, one [290] of the defenses is that this is an inoperable thing and nobody paid any attention to it.

The Court: Well, does the Jewett conversation show that it is operable?

Mr. Maguire: It is part of the step. You can't put all your testimony on in one piece of evidence. If that's so, why, we would only have to have——

The Court: I know that. But here is a whole line of evidence from the beginning to the end that doesn't prove or tend to prove any issue in this case. That's what I am concerned about. And I am not only concerned about the plaintiff reading it; I am wondering where the defendant is that permits the testimony of this kind to come into a case when it has no relevancy at all.

Mr. Maguire: Well, I would say, your Honor, with all due respect that there is always a possibility——

The Court: That I am mistaken? I know.

Mr. Maguire: No, don't take it that way, please. There is always a possibility that counsel on both sides have had the opportunity to study this case over the months and years and if there is some ob-

jection it's quite possible that they think that it does have relevancy.

The Court: Yes. But apparently now Mr. Byron has changed his mind after he listened to this testimony.

Mr. Maguire: Well, see, it's taken him a good many [291] months to change his mind.

Mr. Byron: No. I object. The very first day of the Stewart-Warner I said it had nothing to do with it and the paramount effort here by the plaintiff is to try to connect up Stewart-Warner and Admiral trying to, for some purpose, place the onus on Admiral for some reason which I do not know. And there is no relevancy, no pertinency, no materiality in any of the Stewart-Warner testimony or any of their negotiations or failure in the negotiations.

I have said from the very beginning I want to keep Stewart-Warner out completely, and I have said it on the record completely and I say it now, and I stick to it.

Mr. Maguire: Well, your Honor, evidently both of us are under a misapprehension. Evidently they are objecting.

The Court: Oh, I knew that he was objecting strenuously to Stewart-Warner. He has been telling me that from the first day he came into court.

Mr. Maguire: That was the question of what happened to litigation of Stewart-Warner.

Mr. Byron: No; everything about Stewart-Warner.

Mr. Maguire: Well, this is the first time I have heard of that.

The Court: Oh, I think, as I have looked over this deposition, I have seen that both he and Mr. Byron and Mr. Cunningham were apparently agreed that the name of [292] Stewart-Warner should go out, and many times when I didn't think it was prejudicial at all. He takes a much more strict point of view than I do because I have come to the conclusion that you can't keep out the Stewart-Warner case, and I have said so time and again, and I think it's just folly to strike the name Stewart-Warner time and again in exhibits because these people know that there is a Stewart-Warner case, and I told them that there was a Stewart-Warner case.

But that doesn't alter the situation, and I think that the negotiations between Mr. Potter and the Stewart-Warner people have no relevancy to this case at all and I have stated time and again that I think we have enough here.

Mr. Cunningham: If your Honor please——

The Court: I think we have enough here to try one case.

Mr. Cunningham: I have found a quotation from one case in the Second Circuit. I just happened to have it with me. It is Bresnick against U. S. Vitamin. There the patent was held invalid and I don't know——

The Court: What are the facts of the case?

Mr. Cunningham: I don't know, sir. Let's see——

The Court: Well, I will tell you this, Mr. Cunningham——

Mr. Cunningham: May I just quote some language?

The Court: Tell me the facts of the case.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, I—— [293]

The Court: I want to say this at this time, that in this court language doesn't mean anything because I say a lot of things. I want to know what the facts of a case are because what Mr. Maguire quoted as general law I agree with.

Apply it down to a similar case. Let's see what the facts are before we determine whether the case is applicable.

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor doesn't care to hear this language?

The Court: Have you ever read the case before?

Mr. Cunningham: Yes, your Honor.

The Court: Tell me what the facts are, Mr. Cunningham.

Mr. Cunningham: I do not now recall them, but I will give you the citation.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Cunningham: I do have in mind one fact, and that is that the patent in that case was held invalid. 139 Fed. (2d) 239. And the language I intended to quote but will refrain from doing so is on page 231.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Cunningham: That is certainly not offered by me as squarely in point on it. The patent there was held invalid and obviously was invalid. And

if you want, your Honor, to look at a more considered list of cases on this point, it shouldn't be too difficult—it's very well known [294] and I'm surprised that we met any objection here.

Go way back to the *Carnegie vs. Cambria*, 185 U.S. 403, the language at 429. *Smith against Good-year*, 93 U.S. 486.

The Court: 93 U.S.—

Mr. Cunningham: 486.

The Court: 486.

Mr. Cunningham: Case, 143 U.S. 275.

The Court: What are the facts of this one in 93 U.S. 486?

Mr. Cunningham: I can give you a summary that I have here.

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, what I would like in brief is not language, as I have told you.

Mr. Cunningham: I am not going—there are no quotations, your Honor. To start with, the *Carnegie vs. Cambria*:

“The Court spoke of the common history of important inventions, the simplicity of which seems to be the ordinary observer to preclude the possibility of their involving an exercise of the inventive faculty.”

The Court: Well, perhaps I will be able better to follow the testimony. Mr. Cunningham, will you at this time tell me what you claim for the invention? What is the invention? I asked you that before when the jury was here. Maybe you want to tell me now what the invention was. [295]

Mr. Cunningham: Well, your Honor, I tried to do so in my opening statement, and unfortunately I think I have left the language I used at home, and perhaps I could tell you better if I could find it. Let's see—yes. But, of course, a short answer, and I think it may be an adequate one, it's the combination of the elements as defined in the claims of the patent.

Now, those are eight or ten in number, depending upon the claim. There will be no difficulty about them. They define a structure which is new, which is not, of course, shown in the Anderson patent.

The Court: Which is not what?

Mr. Cunningham: Which is not shown in the Anderson patent of 1918 which was 14 or 15 years before Potter, in which the Patent Office in the Stewart-Warner court and everybody else knew all about and allowed the Potter patent.

It's true that the Anderson patent had a compressor and two compartments. There is no dispute about that.

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, I just asked you a simple question, "What is the invention?" and you are telling me the invention is that which is defined by the claims, the patent. I know that. But I mean, what is it? Tell me in simple language what do you claim for your invention? What is the new and novel portion of your invention? [296]

Mr. Cunningham: The new and novel combination was in short, and very inadequately might be summed up in this way—and this, of course, is a

paraphrase of the claimed elements which are a much better definition—it was having in a household refrigerator which in normal operation provides above freezing moist cold air for preserving fresh foods and also providing storage facilities for frozen foods in the one cabinet.

The Court: All right. We will stop right there. Are you claiming an invention on that up to there, a two-temperature refrigerator?

Mr. Cunningham: That, your Honor, was the setting for the invention.

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Cunningham: Now, the elements——

The Court: Well, there won't be any mistake. You are not claiming an invention on having in one box a cooling chamber and a deep freeze or a freezing——

Mr. Cunningham: We are not disclaiming that as part of the invention but that is not by any means an adequate description of the invention.

The Court: Fine. So in other words, up to that point is there anything new and novel, do you claim, about a refrigerator in one box that has a cooling compartment and a freezing compartment? [297]

Mr. Cunningham: With moist cold air?

The Court: Just leave out the "moist cold air." Now——

Mr. Cunningham: You mean just have two-temperature boxes?

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Cunningham: No, I don't think that's——

The Court: You couldn't have gotten a patent on that, could you?

Mr. Cunningham: Not at the date of this patent.

The Court: That's right. Now, in other words, the one box with a compartment, one for cooling, and one for freezing, and the third one for ice cubes, there is no invention there at this time?

Mr. Cunningham: Of course, I have in mind when I say that the Anderson patent, and I can't keep all the art in my mind. I would say that that had two compartments, the one down at the lower right-hand side was for freezing ice cubes, anyway, and at lower temperature than the one above. That is, as I understand, the actual patent. Two temperatures, yes, that is older.

The Court: Two or three temperatures is old in the art. And, anyway, it would be an aggregation of elements?

Mr. Cunningham: Oh, no, sir.

The Court: It wouldn't be in aggregation of elements to have two temperatures in one [298] box?

Mr. Cunningham: Oh, no.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Cunningham: I don't think it's ever that simple, your Honor. Aggregation is one of the rarest of defenses.

The Court: I thought that that would be a classic example but maybe I am mistaken.

All right. Now, you don't claim an invention on the two-temperature box, but then when you put moist air, is that your invention?

Mr. Cunningham: In combination with the other elements I think that is a point of departure from what was prior. I think it answered a need that hadn't been filled in household refrigerators.

The Court: Is the moist air one of the elements or is it a result? That's what I would like to know now.

Mr. Cunningham: The moist air?

The Court: Yes. You are claiming it's new, two temperatures with moist air. Is that a result you attained or a means?

Mr. Cunningham: Well, it's a means. It's an element of combination. It's an operative element of the mechanism.

The Court: And that's one of the new elements introduced in your invention?

Mr. Cunningham: And I don't mean that Potter invented air or even moist air, but it certainly is an operative element of his combination. [299]

The Court: Moist air is an operative element. What are the other operative elements?

Mr. Cunningham: Well, some of the others—and you don't want me to read the whole claim—

The Court: No. Just tell me. You have been living with this patent for a long time, you ought to know.

Mr. Cunningham: There is the compressor-condenser, receiver element—that's the liquefying unit, that is called, as I recall it—

The Court: Then there is the liquefying unit.

Mr. Cunningham: Then there is, of course, your expansion valve in the line and the refrigerant

through those, and then before we come to the primary or freezing coil you have this expansion valve which is, of course—cooperates with the rest of the organization including the thermostat, and keeps the balance between the cooling expander and the freezing expander. You have as an element your thermostat and it exercises a control and the operation of the thermostat is an element of the invention the way it's positioned and arranged.

The Court: Well, how is that? Tell me that. Tell me how that thermostat is arranged and how it operates.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, that, you have a thermostat sensing the temperature in the specified compartment and a—the specification, I believe is a little broader in Claims 1 [300] and 2 than it is in Claims 3 and 4. I didn't quite finish—

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, I don't want to be captious about this thing, but I have a responsibility here and I certainly ought to know what you are claiming in order to be better able to follow the testimony. How will I know whether you have proved the case unless I understand, and that's precisely the reason I have asked you time and again about this. Maybe I shouldn't have asked you in the presence of the jury before, but I would like to know now, and that might help me to determine what testimony is admissible.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, have I failed to answer your question?

Mr. Maguire: Just a moment. Your Honor, I

wonder if we could have about five minutes with consultation amongst counsel?

The Court: Fine. You can have more than that and let's thrash this thing out and I will appreciate it very much if you will just tell me what the invention is.

Now, I might for your edification and your information tell you that I haven't found out yet and I would like to find out which of these elements mentioned by Mr. Cunningham represents his invention, whether they are anything new in the art, and what result was accomplished by this invention which is an advance in the art. That's what I am trying to find out. [301]

Mr. Maguire: Now, I think perhaps we could certainly in this conference try to iron that thing out so that I think we can give your Honor what you want. I understand what your Honor has in mind and if we could have about five or ten minutes I believe we can provide it for you.

The Court: I will just tell you one other thing, and that's the reason I am doing it. I have been up against the proposition of determining what testimony is admissible, what is relevant, and I don't believe that you can come in and bring in evidence of the commercial success of two-temperature refrigerators or the commercial success of some of your competitors, but it seems to me that commercial success is tied down definitely to the patentable features of your invention. That's the reason why I want to know what are the patentable features of your invention.

Mr. Maguire: If I may paraphrase that——

The Court: I didn't ask you to answer me. I just want you to know.

Mr. Maguire: I just tried to see if I clearly understand your Honor. What I take it your Honor has in mind, if I may paraphrase your inquiries, is what things and what elements did the patent combine whereby they brought about a new, different, or better result than had theretofore existed.

The Court: That's right. [302]

Mr. Maguire. All right. Now I understand.

The Court: I want to know what you claim as the means and what you claim to be the results, the means comprising the result.

Mr. Maguire: I think if we can have a little conference we can iron that out.

The Court: Recess for ten minutes.

Mr. Maguire: Thank you, sir.

(Recess.) [303]

Mr. Cunningham: We have come to what we think is perhaps the answer, at least it seems to me the only answer, the only honest and forthright answer I can give you. I would be glad to point out to you each of the elements of the combination. You see, it has been our position from the beginning that there is no particular element that is the invention. It is the combination of all and that all of the elements coact to make this unitary combination which gives new and improved result.

The Court: Not new result; just an improved result, isn't it?

Mr. Cunningham: I think it is—well, I would call it a wholly new result, your Honor. I know that the Court of Appeals in the Seventh Circuit used the word “improved,” and that is a matter of language, perhaps, but I would be glad to point out the eight or ten elements in, let us say, the shortest claim or the broadest claim is a better word, say Claim 2, and if your Honor has the patent in front of you I will shorten that a little, and you can follow it.

The Court: Go ahead.

Mr. Cunningham: I have a copy here, sir, if you want it.

The Court: I would appreciate it very much. If you are using it, go ahead. [304]

Mr. Cunningham: No, sir; I have another. May I pass this up? (Presenting document.)

Before beginning, your Honor, I point out that I select Claim 2 merely because it contains, I believe, the fewest number of elements and is therefore the broadest claim. You will understand—well, I will say Claims 1 and 2—they are broader than Claims 3 and 4.

Mr. Byron: No; what I meant to say was merely because it was shorter is no reason it was broader.

The Court: I think, Mr. Byron, Mr. Cunningham ought to be permitted to make his own statement.

Mr. Byron: I am sorry.

The Court: I am waiting for this occasion. I have been waiting for a long time, and I am just going to take full advantage of it.

Mr. Cunningham: Now, sir, if you will look, Claim 2 is at the bottom of Page 6.

The Court: I see it.

Mr. Cunningham: You will find there somewhere the word "comprising," and it is down in Line 65. Now, if your Honor will just make a mark there——

The Court: I have got it.

Mr. Cunningham: Everything up to that point we characterize as preamble or setting. It is part of the claim, but the word "comprising" is quite a usual word to [305] designate an enumeration of elements in a combination claim like this.

The Court: Go ahead.

Mr. Cunningham: So it does have, of course, the focusing function that it is in a household refrigerator, you understand that. That is the preamble of the claim. Now, sir, I will read from the claim 2, and this is Element 1;

“* * * a cabinet having a cooling compartment and a freezing compartment, thermal insulation around said compartments thermally insulating said compartments from each other and from the outside atmosphere.”

The Court: As I understand it, you do not claim that any one of those elements is new?

Mr. Cunningham: Oh, no, sir. We admit that they are not.

The Court: Very well.

Mr. Cunningham: You see, it is the combination that is the invention, of these old elements, admittedly old elements.

Now: “* * * a cooling refrigerant expander——”

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Cunningham: You might separate, and you will see— [306] “a freezing refrigerant expander—” Now, sir, I am not reading the patent.

The Court: That is all right.

Mr. Cunningham: “A single liquefying unit associated with said expanders.” That is the fourth element.

“* * * a freezing refrigerant expander having heat-conducting surfaces within said freezing compartment and constructed and arranged to maintain its heat-conducting surfaces at a temperature well below 32 degrees F. while withdrawing heat from said compartment whereby air in said freezing compartment is cooled to a temperature well below 32 degrees F.”

That is another element, and here is its corollary:

“* * * a cooling refrigerant expander having heat-conducting surfaces in said cooling compartment and constructed and arranged to maintain its heat-conducting surfaces at a temperature above 32 degrees F. while withdrawing heat from said compartment whereby air in said cooling compartment is cooled thereby to a temperature above 32 degrees F.”

Next element:

“* * * a single liquefying unit associated with said expanders and expanded by heat [307] extracted from both said compartments, the volatile

refrigerant circulating through said expanders being the sole heat-extracting medium.”

Now, sir, that was the shortest claim and, I believe, the broadest. You will notice that it has reference to claims when—because there is a little difference and a very slight difference in the language of Claim 1 with respect to the air, the way that is defined. It is set forth as a positive element in Claim 1, but, otherwise, the claim, as I recall it—I am not checking it now—is substantially the same as the combination of Claim 2.

The Court: What is your invention?

Mr. Cunningham: The combination, sir.

The Court: What is new and surprising, what is the new and surprising result that it creates? What does it do?

Mr. Cunningham: It gave to the world for the first time in a household refrigerator—

The Court: Now I am going to take down what you say. Give me the elements—1, 2, 3—that are new and surprising or different.

Mr. Cunningham: These are the elements, your Honor, the results.

The Court: Results?

Mr. Cunningham: This is what was [308] achieved.

The Court: What was achieved? Give me No. 1

Mr. Cunningham: I am giving you this on the cuff because our patent is a published document. It is our position that nobody skilled in the art should have any difficulty understanding what the results were, what they sought to do and what they got,

and I will say that it was providing for the first time in the history of the world in one cabinet, household refrigerator, two compartments; one in which it made a climate, proper moist humid climate was maintained for the storage of fresh foods to prevent dehydration, the other in which a proper climate or atmosphere was provided for the storage of frozen foods, and that latter compartment containing a, possibly a sub-compartment or, integral therewith, a little chamber for the freezing of ice cubes.

Now, I do not believe any refrigerator prior to the date of the invention of the Potter patent provided that.

The Court: I am going to try to interpolate——

Mr. Cunningham: With a single liquefying unit.

The Court: Yes, all right. As I understand it, you claim your invention to be these various elements which you read?

Mr. Cunningham: No, sir.

The Court: Wait a minute. [309]

Mr. Cunningham: We claim the invention to be a combination of these elements.

The Court: The various elements in combination which produced the following result: A two-temperature refrigerator in one box, one chamber which is a cooling compartment, the other chamber which is a freezing compartment, and in that second chamber you have a third small chamber which produces ice. I also assume from what you said

before that together with the fact that, I assume, in the cooling compartment there is moist cold.

Mr. Cunningham: Yes, your Honor.

The Court: You claim an invention on that?

Mr. Cunningham: Now we do not say that our particular invention is the only way of getting that result. We do say that we get it by the means we disclose and that we were first. We do not say that there cannot be an element and not later might be other ways of getting those results so it is wrong to define the invention by the results. The only way you can define the invention is by the structural elements of the combination, none of which are new.

The Court: Let me see if I understand you now. You claim that no element which in combination produces this result is new in the art; they are old in the art?

Mr. Cunningham: All of the elements of the combination are old. The invention is the combination. [310]

The Court: And that these old elements combined to produce a new result or an improved result?

Mr. Cunningham: That is correct, sir.

The Court: And that this is only one combination that produces that same result. There are probably other combinations that produce identical results?

Mr. Cunningham: Actually, I happen to believe that it was the first to produce the result. It does not really make any difference if the result had been gotten by other means at an earlier date be-

cause our invention is the combination. I do not think, however, there was any. I know of none, and, certainly, the Anderson patent was not one.

The Court: Now, from our conversations previously we mentioned a number of other boxes. For instance, I think you mentioned the Philco box which is an infringement on this cabinet.

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, could we go off the record on Philco?

The Court: Yes, go off the record. Give me another, another box that you say does not infringe the two-temperature box.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, isn't this adequate: I will admit that there must be many makes of household refrigerators that do not infringe the claims of this patent. I know that [311] is the fact. They may not get the same results.

The Court: Now we are getting down to the very crux of the problem which has been plaguing me. If that is true, and if other companies have manufactured boxes which achieve the same result—that is, a freezing compartment and a cooling compartment—why, then, is it relevant to say that, in the history of the patent, that a woman goes down and buys 60 pounds of meat and 30 pounds of berries and some hors d'oeuvres and puts them in this freezing compartment and when she decides that she is giving a party she takes it out, defrosts it, and everybody is happy, and it is just wonderful? Now, why is it that this evidence that you propose to submit, why is it peculiar to the Potter pat-

ent? Isn't that a general condition in the market which is available to all of the whole industry?

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, I think I see, I hope I see what is troubling you, and I think I understand. This testimony will be tied in with refrigerators that were made under the Potter patent, you understand that, and that did embody the invention of the Potter patent. Now, I do not think, and I do not even know or even consider whether that Kelvinator box infringed the patent. I do not know what it was, and it is very possible that people could devise non-infringing structures, but the point of [312] the testimony, and I think we are talking about testimony that we have in mind here, is to show what happened when this box which obviously did embody the invention hit the commercial market. It does not make any difference, just the fact that somebody else would approximate it even though they did not infringe or embody the invention is some evidence, and, your Honor, in some of those cases that I am sure I can cite to you it is a most helpful guidepost because judges like yourself have had no experience in the refrigeration art, and you want to know what happened, and let me at the risk of being a little facetious quote a remark of a very dear friend of mine, a patent lawyer. I think he may have been a little facetious, but he kept saying things frequently become patentable long after they are patented, and what he meant was that it was not recognized when that is what happened.

For instance, in the Dupont Duco lacquer case

the testimony there that I recall very well was that the invention had revolutionized automobile finishing, your finishes outlasted the life of your car after Duco. Before that you had to have your car repainted every year. Now it is that sort of thing, you see, that is quite a help and aid to any Court, and I am sure all the Courts feel this way about it that I have had any contact with. They look for those aids, guideposts, in determining this very [313] difficult question of whether or not it is beyond ordinary skill because they reason that if it had not been beyond ordinary skill, if the need had lasted for a long time and not been solved and then it was solved by the advent of your invention it must be more than ordinary skill.

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, everything that Mrs. Kobernuss testified to with reference to two-temperature box is equally true to a household freezer, and I own a household freezer and I am an expert on that. I can testify to everything she said can be duplicated practically on the results for a one-temperature household refrigerator, General Electric.

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, her testimony is merely—and it is very plain, it seems to me—it is merely to show the impact of this particular invention which was embodied in the refrigerators that she was selling how it affected the housewife and the consuming public, the purchasing public, and this other testimony—we have it in other ways—shows the effect of it on other manufacturers. You have a little bit in the testimony here of Mr. Potter about what happened to Kelvinator, and, of

course, the long story of this invention is most helpful to your Honor and to the jury in deciding the only real question in the case. There is no real question in this case of infringement. The only real question is that of lack of [314] invention.

Mr. Byron: We object to that. There is a real question.

The Court: I noticed that all of your statements are in direct conflict with the opinion of Judge Sparks of the Seventh Circuit where he, after looking over all of these various elements which you referred to, and as you mentioned those I kept checking them off on the table appearing on Page 977—and then he after stating that they cannot view appellant's strict view of refrigerator art with such enthusiasm that there was no new combination of elements, and then they pointed out there was in appellee's alleged invention no new result, there was an allegedly improved result such as a non-frosting coil and the non-dehydration of foods, which improvement the jury verdicts established. That is the way they interpreted this decision, two elements; a non-frosting coil, a non-dehydration of foods.

Mr. Cunningham: They did not throw over the patent for that reason; it was simply an invention of a non-frosting coil.

The Court: That is right; they do not do it directly, but they mention your claims 5, 4 and 8. In connection with that they say if it were held to be valid it would cover any conceivable means hereinafter invented where the results stated were ob-

tained. I appreciate the fact that they did [315] not hold this invention invalid, and they claim that the jury's verdict established two things, a non-frosting coil and a non-dehydration of foods. That is what I was trying to find out, Mr. Cunningham. Are you claiming the same things, or are you claiming more, or are you claiming less?

Mr. Cunningham: Well, I think, your Honor, we are claiming less over the broadest claim. Now, if you are talking about a particular claim that Judge Sparks had in mind, I am sorry——

The Court: This was not in reference to any particular claim. He says the jury's verdict established two things, that the invention consisted of non-frosting coil, the non-frosting coil, and, second, the non-dehydration of food. [316]

Mr. Cunningham: Of course, your Honor.

The Court: Were you claiming either of those?

Mr. Cunningham: We are claiming what I have just tried to tell you, that we have this moist cold——

The Court: I am not as hard to convince as the jury is. I don't understand all of these things. You have to talk simply to me, Mr. Cunningham.

Mr. Cunningham: I think, your Honor, by non-frosting coil he meant what I am trying to describe, a humid climate in the fresh foods compartment. For the first time it is getting away from this dehydration problem. I don't think that Judge Sparks, himself, meant that we invented any kind of a finned coil because that was obviously old.

The Court: He never said you invented the finned coil, but he——

Mr. Cunningham: He called it a non-frosting coil and that's his way of expressing it, I guess.

The Court: And you think what you outlined to me is a narrowing of the original patent, the claim to the original patent? It is a two-temperature box?

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, may I hand up a copy of a little analysis I happened to find in my book here comparing the broadest of the original claim of the original patent with what I consider the broadest of our claims, which is Claim 2 of the reissue? I think it will answer your question [317] and actually was the memorandum that I used when I listed the elements.

The Court: Well, can you answer this one question, Mr. Cunningham, which I think is a fair question, and which I don't think is an unintelligible question? You have outlined to me the results which you claim were achieved by these elements upon which you claim an invention, and you have told me that it's a household refrigerator in one box having one cooling compartment, one freezing compartment, and in the freezing compartment there is another compartment which is even colder for ice cubes, and that in the cooling compartment they have moist cold, and that is what you are claiming on your invention.

Mr. Cunningham: And claiming——

The Court: And the question I am asking now is do you now tell me that that is a narrowing or a broadening of the claims of the original patent?

Mr. Cunningham: You mean what I told you?

The Court: No. I would like to know that.

Mr. Cunningham: Oh, well, your Honor—

The Court: It is not a fair question?

Mr. Cunningham: Yes. And I think everything I have said applies equally to the original patent. It's neither one. And what I hope you understand is that it really is a statement of what the invention is in terms of what I think [318] was new in the commercial art at the time. The real invention is stated and can only be stated in the language of the claims. Your Honor knows that this patent was pending in the Patent Office for almost five or six years and that the whole point of that long six-year proceeding is to get claims that will define the invention. So it's a little difficult for a lawyer or—to put a lawyer or anybody on a spot to answer just from a sidewalk just what these claims are. This is a six-year process arriving at this language.

Really the only answer, the invention is defined in the claims and there are four separate definite definitions of it in our reissue patent, and that, your Honor, is the answer I have to make to your question of "What is the invention?"

The Court: Maybe that's right, but it seems to me one of the most important elements in the invention is the definiteness of the description so that a person who is not versed in the art would be able to read the elements and know what the invention is.

Well, maybe you have done it, but I think the last question I asked you was capable of answering, and, frankly, I don't think it has been answered.

Mr. Maguire: Well, I think, if, your Honor, I may speak on that one subject for a moment, I

think what your Honor [319] was talking about was the result of the combination and not the combination itself. One cannot patent results; one patents ways and means of accomplishing results.

The Court: Yes, that's true.

Mr. Maguire: You will remember the old Morse telegraph patent. They held that he was really patenting results rather than means because he claimed any kind of a way, all kinds of ways of transmitting an electric current and breaking it and making marks without specifying the way in which he did it. One doesn't patent function, one doesn't patent results, one patents devices or combinations which, when working together, bring about something new or better.

Now, on this particular thing I don't think anybody questioned that one could take a box and put in a compressor and use that compressor to bring about a deep freeze or a sharp box and have another box on it with another compressor having different—and have a temperature just above freezing. But the question is, when you have this particular kind of a combination whether or not that combination would enable you to get both of these results or all three results.

The Court: New or improved?

Mr. Maguire: Yes. Yes.

The Court: And you are claiming that this is a new and improved device which—— [320]

Mr. Maguire: It is a combination of elements which brings about a new and better or convenient result than we could get otherwise.

The Court: Well, I think I have gotten as much

information as I possibly could get on this thing. I thought that a combination of old elements should produce an improved result or a new result.

Mr. Cunningham: And it does, your Honor, in this case. You know—may I just relieve myself by quoting about five lines from an opinion. It's the language of the Court, Second Circuit, and it's just apropos of your Honor's last remark. He says, "We have repeatedly said that in the judging whether a new combination is an invention we regard the history of the art as a much greater importance than our own untutored judgment as to what advantages demand imaginative originality in specialized fields. Nothing can be less reliable than our own naive impressions based upon gross appearance."

The Court: All right. Did you want to say something?

Mr. Kolisch: Your Honor, I think you put your hand on the nub of the situation when you asked both Mr. Cunningham and Mr. Maguire, "What is the new result?" I think we all agree as a matter of patent law this is an old combination and we know that the law is that when you have an old combination you have to have a new and surprising result. [321]

Now, we still haven't heard what this result is. We keep being referred back to the claims. Well, the claims don't tell us anything and we are still waiting to find out what is the new and surprising result. That is something that if there is such a result can be defined very simply and very clearly

and it always is, and that's how these combination patents always fall.

The Court calls up and says what is the result that you produced and, if what you produced existed before there is no invention, this is not patentable. And I don't think you have got an answer. I certainly don't know and I don't think anybody in the defendants knows what the result is.

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, I would like to have Mr. Kolisch point out in what prior patent he gets the result that I tried to define; just one specific patent.

Mr. Kolisch: I would like to know the result, sir, so we can show him.

Mr. Cunningham: I stand on the record. I made a statement of what I thought the result was. I will challenge him to point out anything, and I have in mind the Anderson patent. There is certainly nothing closer than Anderson's, isn't that true, Mr. Kolisch?

Mr. Byron: We are not saying that.

The Court: Well, all I have got to say is that what I [322] told Mr. Maguire a few minutes ago, that patent lawyers try cases differently than any other kind of lawyers that I have ever seen, and maybe the theory is to keep the Court in the dark.

It's four-fifteen now. Do you want to start reading the deposition again, or do you think we ought to let the jury go?

Mr. Cunningham: I guess we had better let them go.

The Court: Let's let the jury come down and

maybe then we will continue with this little discussion, and I will excuse them.

(Whereupon, the jury was called into session.)

The Court: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, during the 15-minute recess that you took we began to discuss various questions of law which was quite productive, at least, to me, on various issues of this case. Now, I don't want you to feel that every time something interesting comes up you are shifted over to the jury room and you can't hear what is going on, because that's not the case. But I think I told you earlier that you are to decide certain questions of fact and I want to tell you right now that every time any fact question comes up you will hear all the evidence. There is nothing being held back.

But many times questions arise involving law problems which are of no concern to the jury until I instruct [323] you as to what the law is. So the reason I am telling you that is sometimes jurors feel that they are being kept out of some of the most important elements of the trial. That's not true.

Now, we have certain other things to argue about and it's now four-fifteen, and I think it would be advisable if you would just retire this afternoon and maybe come back at nine-thirty tomorrow morning.

Now, in spite of the fact that we are coming back at nine-thirty, that does not mean that we are going to take a long session. We will make it a little

longer tomorrow because of this longer recess. But I want to tell you right now about one situation that has come up: On Monday we are not going to start until one o'clock in the afternoon so you won't have to report at ten o'clock or nine-forty-five in the morning. We have a situation in this Court where we are going to have four judges and three courtrooms and so I am lending this courtroom to another judge for about an hour and then I am going to take up some other matters. So we will start at one o'clock on Monday, so you don't have to come down here until Monday at one o'clock. I will remind you of that on Friday but should I happen to forget, you will know that.

You are now excused until tomorrow morning at nine-thirty. [324]

(Whereupon, the jury was excused until 9:30
Thursday, November 17, 1955.)

The Court: I would like to propound a question to Mr. Maguire. Maybe he is my kind of a lawyer. So, Mr. Maguire, I don't know, you have had a lot of experience in patent law, and you have had plenty of experience in the trial of cases, and so I want to ask you a question.

Am I incorrect in believing that where you have a combination of old elements, in order for that combination to be patentable that combination must achieve a new or improved result? Am I right or am I wrong in that statement of law?

Mr. Maguire: Well, I think we can say this, your Honor——

The Court: Now, just don't give me "this" that the witnesses do. Can you answer the question Yes or No? Isn't that a simple question?

Mr. Maguire: Well, it's not quite as simple as your Honor pleases. It is not an invention, there is no inventive factor displayed and therefore not patentable unless there be an improvement and step forward in the progress of that particular art.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Maguire: Now, but the question is this, your Honor, if I may be permitted—

The Court: All right. I will keep still. [325]

Mr. Maguire: The question is whether or not it is. That is a question of fact which the jury determines.

The Court: Wait a minute. You are just going ahead of me now. I want to ask you the next question.

Mr. Maguire: If I could answer it, your Honor.

The Court: As I understand it, you have said that for this old combination, this combination of old elements to be patentable it must achieve a new or an improved result, it must be a step forward in the art?

Mr. Cunningham: I didn't understand him to so state, your Honor.

The Court: Well, will you please tell me in simple language?

Mr. Cunningham: Go ahead, try it.

Mr. Cheatham: Old elements may be rearranged in different combinations. Mr. Kolisch says this is an old combination; it is not.

The Court: Yes. I am not worried about what Mr. Kolisch says.

Mr. Cheatham: And a new combination of old elements of itself must have been done for a new result. I think we have that here.

The Court: Now, so there won't be any mistake about that, it is your contention that a combination of old elements to achieve patentability must result in an improved or new [326] result?

Mr. Cheatham: No, I didn't say that, sir, your Honor. I said that a combination of old elements arranged in a new manner of itself and as different results in new results from the prior art. I think that we have agreed to——

The Court: What about that? What about that? A combination of old elements rearranged achieves a new result. Is that what you said?

Mr. Cheatham: Right.

The Court: All right. Now, it is your contention that these are combinations of old elements rearranged. Tell me the answer to my next question that I am going to ask you. What new or improved result did the Potter reissue patent achieve?

Mr. Cheatham: It achieved the result of giving the housewife one article of merchandise which replaced a—two old articles, one a deep freeze, the other an icebox.

The Court: Now, I thought that Mr. Maguire a few minutes ago said that he admitted that you could have in one box a freezing compartment and a cooling compartment, each with a different motor, and it would have about the same effect?

Mr. Cheatham: Certainly.

The Court: Now, if it didn't achieve for the housewife one box with two compartments—because Mr. Maguire said and we all know that instead of having one compressor they could have two compressors. [327]

Mr. Cheatham: That is right.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Cheatham: If you had old deep-freeze boxes with their own refrigeration system. You might have had, I don't know, old moist cold boxes. I don't know.

The Court: Now, Mr. Cheatham, in commercial boxes isn't it a fact that they had those cabinets with two types of refrigerators, I mean a cooling and a freezing compartment?

Mr. Cheatham: I don't know, sir.

The Court: Well, I can tell you I brought a case against the people, I think, that either made the Potter box or the Birkinwald Company on Fifth and Everett Street many, many years ago when I first started to practice law and they had a two-temperature box in a showcase there and the basis of that was that the grocer said that the meat in freezing compartment turned black and he wanted his money back and I represented him and I got his money back. So they must have had those a long time. If they had it in a commercial box the mere fact that it was put in a household refrigerator, would that be a step forward in the art?

Mr. Cheatham: You may be talking about what

would be an aggregation of tying two boxes together by bolts or with a string around them. That would not be an invention. [328]

The Court: That is right. And that is what I thought that Mr. Maguire's statement was, an aggregation, because you were the first one that ever explained that to me by a pencil and eraser; I remember that very clearly. You explained that to me as a combination of elements. That is where I got my information and that is why I used it here today on Mr. Cunningham, because you told me about that a long time ago.

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, I think maybe one trouble, if I could ask you a question—

The Court: Go ahead.

Mr. Cunningham: Do you think that a result is ever an invention?

The Court: No.

Mr. Cunningham: Do you think that a result is ever patentable?

The Court: No, I don't. But I think that in order for a mechanical patent or process to be patentable it must achieve a new and different result. It must be an advance in the industry.

Mr. Cunningham: It has to be new. Your Honor, here is a homey way and—

The Court: Am I incorrect in that statement?

Mr. Cunningham: Well, I think you are. I am trying [329] to answer it. Suppose I have in my hand here a marvelous little gadget; wheels go around and sparks come out and there is running water in it and it makes a noise and plays a tune

and there was never anything like it in the world, some fellow comes along and he sees that and he says, "Jeepers, that's just the result I want. Who is the inventor, the fellow who appreciates the result or the fellow who put together the novel combination? That is what Mr. Cheatham has been trying to tell you and I agree with him one hundred per cent. When the invention is a combination of admittedly old elements, that is the invention, the combination. Don't think it is a non-frosting coil as Judge Sparks did.

The Court: I don't think Judge Sparks said that, in the first place. That is not the way I read it.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, I don't think he did either, but I think he may have felt that he thought it was that.

The Court: Now, a combination of old elements rearranged which does not produce an advance in the art is not patentable in my view.

Mr. Cunningham: It could be, your Honor. It could be way ahead of itself. It could be just a brand new combination doing in a better way the same old thing that they had had for years, get the same result with a different combination. You can't patent a result. Mr. Kolisch is [330] 150 per cent wrong.

Mr. Kolisch: Your Honor, may I speak?

The Court: All right; go ahead.

Mr. Kolisch: Well, I think that Mr. Cheatham made the only frank answer to the question you have been propounding to the plaintiff right along as he did state what he understood to be the result.

You have been asking him right along, and as soon as you get down to the question, "Now, what is this result?" they know perfectly well they have to give a result. They take you back into the claims again and they say it is this combination. Now, I don't think that anybody sitting over there will disagree with the statement that you made that in order to have a patentable invention in a combination-type claim you have got to have a new and surprising result.

Mr. Cunningham: I will say, your Honor, it helps but you don't have to have it.

Mr. Kolisch: Well, I would be very glad and I think that we could all learn something if Mr. Cunningham will now give us a case on that.

The Court: He doesn't have to do it tonight, and you don't have to do it tomorrow.

Mr. Cunningham: I won't have time, your Honor.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Cunningham: We are going to try to do it. [331]

The Court: Over the week end I would like to have that.

Now, we are going now to be getting into the Kobernuss testimony. I have told you frankly what I believe about this testimony and I don't want general statements. Mr. Maguire knows what I want and Mr. Maguire says he has some authorities. So, tomorrow morning, **Mr. Maguire, will you come in** about 9:15 and maybe somebody from the other side, or, they don't have to; I know what their po-

sition is. I got a letter from them. Just tell me what Mrs. Kobernuss proposes to testify to in this Court and why it is admissible.

Mr. Maguire: Well, as a matter of fact, your Honor, to be quite frank, I haven't the slightest idea what she is going to testify to. But I think Mr. Cheatham does.

Mr. Cunningham: Didn't we give you a memorandum on that, your Honor?

The Court: Yes. It is the same kind of a hocus-pocus that I have had before. It is language.

Mr. Cunningham, now I know that the type of legal training that you have had is one of the best legal trainings in America. I even think that you have gone to a better law school than I have. I have recommended a lot of young fellows go to that same school and I am sure that they tell you that language is meaningless except in relation to the facts of [332] the case. I can find language on anything. I don't even let people believe the language that I write. In fact, I have held against Mr. Pierre Kolsch not long ago when he cited my own language that I said. And I told him, "Don't worry about that. Just look at the result that I came to. That's what I want; I want the facts of these cases and I want to know what the judge did on those facts. If you have any case in which there is anything close to the facts in this case, I would appreciate an opportunity to look at those. [333]"

Mr. Cunningham: Yes, I think it is well established, a well-established proposition supported by cases, that getting a new result as a means of a

new combination is patentable, and getting an old result in a new way is patentable. That is what it really amounts to.

The Court: I am not talking about that now. I am talking about Mrs. Kobernuss' testimony. Why does a housewife or saleslady who puts meat into a refrigerator, why can she testify to that in a court?

Mr. Cunningham: Well your Honor, why can't she? Is there any reason against it? It is an invention. That is, the refrigerator involved an invention. Will you tell me why——

The Court: I am the one asking the questions, Mr. Cunningham, and I have tried to find out on numerous occasions what you claim the invention to be, and I am frank to tell you that as of this moment I do not know what that invention is. Perhaps I am stupid, but I think that I understand things just as well as the normal person does.

Mr. Cunningham: We are sure you do, your Honor.

The Court: And yet I have not been able to find out—I am going to study again tonight. Perhaps I will find out. We will recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, the evening adjournment was taken to Thursday, November 17, 1955, at 9:30 a.m.) [334]

Thursday, November 17, 1955—9:30 A.M.

(Proceedings herein were resumed, pursuant to adjournment, as follows:)

(In Chambers.)

The Court: Mr. Maguire was in chambers this morning, and I told him about some of the things which I found in the Potter deposition which I desire to repeat now.

Yesterday the deposition ended with a question relative to the Stewart-Warner case, and that is on Page 236, and at that time Mr. Byron objected to the introduction of any of the testimony with reference to the Stewart-Warner case. I have read all that testimony. It begins at Page 236 and ends on Page 245. I am of the opinion that all of the testimony is immaterial; it is self-serving; and at times it is hearsay, and I think it is very prejudicial. In my view, none of this testimony which goes to the misdeeds of the Stewart-Warner Company has any relevancy to this case at all. I have read the testimony that follows it concerning the negotiations with Sanitary Refrigerating Company, and I think it is Apex Electrical Company, in which Potter testifies that he entered into agreements with each of them, and they required different forms, and each time he went to another factory different molds were required, and the [335] upshot of all this testimony is that after a few boxes were built there was a proxy fight between two companies. The bankers were controlling these companies, and, therefore, they could not enter into production.

That is followed by testimony relative to Stewart-Warner, I think, again.

Mr. Byron: Morris, I guess.

The Court: Morris of the Weed Chain Company.

Mr. Byron: Yes.

The Court: I cannot see why it is relevant in this case or that they got \$100,000 from Mr. Morris, of which a great part of that money went for payment of attorney fees, in the latter portion of the deposition, and that Mr. Morris didn't want to sue his own customers. Now, then, we get into the matter which I talked to Mr. Maguire about in connection with the General Electric Company. In that case the deposition is just filled with statements of what Potter said to Mr. Bristol, his own attorney, "Watch out for that dangerous company, General Electric Company," and "They are going to take advantage of you," and finally they did take advantage of him.

Now, I just do not understand how any of that testimony has any relevance to this situation, and even if it did, some of it. the answers are full of hearsay, and it is full of poison, prejudicial, of the worst kind, and if you want to let it in it is perfectly all right with me— [336] well, it is not all right with me either.

Mr. Byron: We object to it, your Honor. The only part that I thought that might possibly have some right in there was the fact that, and just the fact, that Apex took a license, and it had it for license; it was licensed for less than a year, and,

after, it was canceled; but it was a license. It did not work out—I do not know if that will do the plaintiff much good. He seems to think so.

The Court: Why can't you, in lieu of this, perhaps enter into a stipulation to the effect that a license was taken with Apex; that they had negotiations with other companies looking towards an agreement, and they were not successful?

Mr. Byron: I will take that stipulation.

The Court: But I realize that Mr. Potter is a difficult witness, but that does not justify all of the statements that he makes in here.

Mr. Byron: If we are going to speak about Apex, then I think we should have in there that the royalty rate was one per cent.

The Court: Then you get into a lot of other difficulties because Potter testified that he made a specific and particular deal with Apex, and they were going to offer him a lot of inducements, and I do not think that the one per cent royalty rate should go into a deal of that kind. [337]

Mr. Byron: Very well. Then I move to strike all that we have discussed this morning in connection with those various negotiations.

The Court: With the exception of the fact that they did enter into a contract with Apex?

Mr. Byron: Oh, yes; that is right.

The Court: That portion of the transcript, all right.

Mr. Byron: We will stipulate that portion.

Mr. Maguire: Well, I think it should be under-

stood I do not think I have been present at the reading of the deposition——

The Court: I volunteered the information to Mr. Maguire.

Mr. Maguire: I know, but I could not express any opinion because I have not, did not know the context of it. That is why his Honor suggested that counsel come in here.

The Court: Yes; well, I have been asking attorneys about various things and have been complaining to the attorneys, also.

Mr. Maguire: The only question that your Honor brought up was the question that I was not in a position to discuss. I had not read it.

The Court: I wish that you would have read it, Mr. Maguire. You could better appreciate what I was thinking of in this portion of the deposition.

Mr. Maguire: The difficulty is I got into this very, [338] very late, your Honor, and I have not had an opportunity——

Mr. Cunningham: Of course, your Honor, I read it, and I was there and took it. Our theory of relevancy is with respect to all of these people that the Rex and Apex and Sanitary, Universal Cooler, Morris, all of those that I have mentioned are the commercialization. They were actually producing refrigerators under the patent in suit. They sold thousands of them over a sustained period. By a sustained period I mean a year or two. They were going licensees, and, more than that—and the Jewett Company—they were Potter's source of supply for compressors and cabinets, and, like a great

many manufacturers, most of them, including Stewart-Warner, they had to have these sources of supply, and they are just as much a part of his commercial production under the patent, his licensing business under the patent, as anything else.

The Court: Do you have your production records of these companies or of Potter?

Mr. Cunningham: Well, sir, I did not bother to put them in. They are in the Stewart-Warner case. I thought the figures were not very pertinent. I have got them in the——

The Court: I think that is the most pertinent part of your case, is not what negotiations broke down or why the bankers did not crack down on these companies, but your production figures, and I think that if you want to put [339] those in, even though they have not been marked, it is perfectly all right. I will permit you to do it at this time. I think it is much more relevant than those.

Mr. Cunningham: Of course, your Honor, I feel——when you talk about generally there are certain statements in here, of course, that I think Mr. Potter was wandering and did not stick strictly to the answers to the questions, and so on, that there was nothing we could do about that. He is that type of witness. You have seen them before.

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, I just want to say I think you stimulated him into talking and to giving those types of answers——

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, he did not need any stimulating. I tried to hold him down. I really did. I interrupted his answers, which I think is ap-

parent here, and I do not see how we could possibly do any better than put the testimony in just the way he gave it. It ought to go in in his words, I think.

The Court: Even if much of the material is prejudicial and immaterial?

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, I do not know what is really prejudicial. Now, taking—of course, Morris, I did not mention him. Now, he was a businessman who undertook, as I recall the testimony, to try to license as many people as he could, and he thought the leaders of the industry, [340] under this patent. Well, it turned out that after he got to operating under the license he decided he did not want to, for business reasons of his own, so that matter resulted in a suit which was settled, but that is the other part of the operations under the patent. That is pure license, and, incidentally, there was a great deal of testimony, and I trust we are not going to get it in this case, of his efforts with different people—that was in the Stewart-Warner record—and with Frigidaire and other people like that. We have really boiled this down to quite a small piece, then, if you compare this with the Stewart-Warner case.

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, I am not comparing it with the Stewart-Warner case. I was not the judge in the Stewart-Warner case, and I am not criticizing the judge who sat on that case except to say that if I was the judge on that case I would not have permitted a lot of testimony that was per-

mitted. He may be right, and I may be wrong, but that is the way I run a Court.

Mr. Cunningham: Then, your Honor, we get to that case, the Stewart-Warner case, and, as your Honor knows, that was definitely the result of competition with Stewart-Warner. It was the only thing that the Potter people could do, was to bring this suit in 1943 because—we couldn't even get their suppliers and their dealers to handle those, then, and they had entered into this suit. [341]

The Court: That is the very reason you want all this testimony here. Here is a big conspiracy between all the big companies to prevent Potter from getting into business.

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, there isn't a word here about a big conspiracy. It is all the activity of Stewart-Warner.

The Court: Yes, perhaps there is not, but that is the impression that will be left with this jury, and I do not think it has any place in this case. I think that we have plenty to do to find out what your invention is and what the reach of the patent is and whether the boxes of Amana and Admiral infringe the claims of your patent, and, if so, what is the measure of damages.

Why don't we stick to the real issues in this case instead of getting on all these peripheral issues?

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, I think you are reading a lot more than I must be able to read out of this deposition. I think you are unduly sensitive to it. It is a pretty factual statement, as I recall it.

The Court: I do not read it that way, Mr. Cun-

ningham. I do not think that Mr. Potter's statements are factual. I think that they are—many of them are in the realm of fantasy, and he is putting in poison all throughout his deposition, self-serving declarations, no way of checking them, conversations that he had with various people who had [342] no connection with Admiral or Amana, conversations with his own lawyers. Now, under what theory of law, or under what rules of evidence is testimony like that admissible?

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, it is our position that, certainly, most of it from 236, did you say, on to the balance of the deposition—

Mr. Byron: No, up to 263, Page 263. We only went up to Page 263 in our discussion.

The Court: General Electric Company, how they happened to enter into that stipulation.

Mr. Byron: Up to 263.

Mr. Cunningham: I must say this, that I am somewhat taken aback. I could have—I really thought that Mr. Byron and I had agreed, and I can tell you exactly what my notes indicate, that we had agreed upon. Now, of course, that is not binding on your Honor, I realize that, but I did not think that that agreement, as long as we had reached it, would be disrupted in this fashion.

The Court: You agreed on the relevancy?

Mr. Byron: Oh, no; of course not. Relevancy is an entirely different question. We agreed on things that mutually we believed should go in. Of course, I wanted more out. He didn't want more to go out, and we covered those things upon which we

did come to an agreement, but on the other things we always reserved our rights to make [343] objections as to relevancy, materiality, and so on.

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, my impression was that Mr. Byron from the first minute he ever came into this case was complaining about the Stewart-Warner references.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, now, for example, I have noted here, and this is the only record I have found so far going forward from 236, that Mr. Byron—on Page 252 Mr. Byron informed me he was going to make a motion to strike that and it runs over to the top of Page 253, three lines, and I expected him to strike that, but nothing in between, according to my notes. Let us see if I have any more like that. I think I do. I do not know as I stopped short of that page.

Mr. Byron: I certainly didn't say I wouldn't raise an objection as to relevancy and pertinency and materiality.

Mr. Cunningham: Charlie, all I can say is that I felt—no, I beg your pardon—that these that I am now noting were the only points that you were going to raise. That was my honest feeling.

The next one was on Page 254, I believe—wait a minute, as I am not quite sure that you didn't agree to let that in, I had it crossed out, after we discussed it.

Running over to 255, my notes indicate that we agreed to let that in because it is a nationwide license, you see, and what these people were trying to do was to license [344] their patent liberally and

make some money out of their royalties through Mr. Morris. They wanted national advertising, and the big—and a big manufacturer to take on the exploitation of the patent under license.

Mr. Byron: But that did not work out. You sued Morris for \$500,000 and got a \$100,000 in settlement. What has that got to do with the patent in suit?

Mr. Cunningham: That is true.

The Court: Was that the portion that was stricken?

Mr. Byron: No.

Mr. Cunningham: My notes indicate that we agreed that we should let that stay in. That was my understanding.

The Court: Mr. Byron does not have that understanding, and in the absence of agreement as to the understanding, then I am going to permit Mr. Byron to continue with his motions to strike.

Mr. Cunningham: Now, there is another note which I think Mr. Byron is going to strike or move to strike, and that is on Page 258.

The Court: I have already passed that.

Mr. Cunningham: May I complete running through——

Mr. Byron: Up to the bottom of Page 263.

Mr. Cunningham: That is where we are; that is right. I did understand, sir, that from the very bottom, the last two pages of Page 258 to 263, that Mr. Byron reserved his [345] motion to strike. I did not understand that he was going to strike anything else, and my notes so indicate, and I think that——

Mr. Byron: Most certainly I have a right always to object to evidence or testimony that is not material and is not pertinent.

Mr. Maguire: I am a little at a loss. I was not there, and so I am a little at a loss about the time spent going over the deposition.

Mr. Byron: Well, to take out things that we could mutually agree upon that could be taken out. I wanted more taken out, and Mr. Cunningham didn't, so there was no use of our having a courtroom fight between ourselves, getting nowhere and spending the midnight oil, so we passed on.

Mr. Cunningham: And we noted these portions we wanted to strike, and I thought those were brought to his Honor's attention; we would strike them or not strike them if we were persuaded they were all right, but we had no such blanket striking, as your Honor now indicates, even when we were talking with Mr. Byron.

Mr. Byron: I do not say we had an agreement on blanket striking. I brought a motion to strike and objected to certain testimony here, and that is what we are considering here now.

Mr. Cunningham: Of course, relevancy—now, clearly, [346] the history of the invention after it was put on the market and the pioneering—

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, I am just telling you that if you want to put in production records of the boxes that were constructed by these various companies, I will permit you to do so. You can also put in a record of the royalties you received from

these companies, and I would suggest to Mr. Byron that a stipulation be entered into, if you desire, relative to some of the companies that you had negotiations with and that they broke down, if you want that.

Mr. Byron: I have no objection to that. [347]

Mr. Cunningham: That is no substitute for the flow of facts that we get in this record, your Honor.

The Court: I don't think that they are relevant and I am sustaining the motion to strike.

Mr. Cunningham: And I wish to make a record, if I may.

The Court: Certainly.

Mr. Cunningham: I wish to make a record, if I may, verbatim on all of this Potter deposition.

Mr. Maguire: I am just wondering in that respect where we are using depositions, I understood we were originally discussing this—to discuss this at an appropriate time, not necessarily interrupt the course of the trial, that those offers could be made.

The Court: Yes, that's right. I don't think it would be necessary for you to make a—read all the questions and answers into the record. I am striking all of the Potter deposition from page 236 to 263, with the exception that that portion of the testimony relating to the Apex contract which shows the licensing agreement alone may be admitted.

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, I suppose you mean the three-party licensing agreement?

The Court: Apex and—what is the other company?

Mr. Cunningham: I don't recall. I think it's—

The Court: Sanitary.

Mr. Cunningham: And then there is Sanitary and Universal [348] Cooler. I may be—there are two three-party licensing manufacturing arrangements and then there is this Morris thing, which is a straight license totally unrelated to Stewart-Warner, and anyone else that I know of, except, of course, the whole industry.

Mr. Byron: He is merely appointed agent to go out, run an agency to license people, and he didn't do anything about it.

Mr. Cunningham: And you realize we got \$100,000 for the rights that he had.

The Court: Yes. And I realize it and if I let it in the jury is going to realize it from now to the end of the case.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, sir—

The Court: And that's what one of the main issues is going to be, and I am going to not permit it in this case.

Mr. Cunningham: Those were payments for rights under the patent.

Mr. Byron: I would like to make another point, that Rex was a manufacturer, he wasn't a licensee. That company wasn't a licensee. And that other company, Universal—

The Court: I will tell you what we can do—

Mr. Cunningham: Well, Continental was the

manufacturing outfit. That's a name we haven't even mentioned.

The Court: Will you, Mr. Byron and Mr. Cunningham, during [349] noon hour, go back to this testimony that I have stricken and agree, if you can, on the portions that may be admitted which deal specifically with the terms of the licensing agreement?

Mr. Cunningham: That's what we did before.

Your Honor, I think we have already done that. I will do anything that your Honor directs, of course.

The Court: Otherwise I will go through the thing myself and designate the portions which may be read.

Mr. Byron: I think time will be saved in doing it that way because——

The Court: I will do it at noon. We will start in at page 263 with the question "The patent was reissued" and the answer "Yes," and then go from there on.

Mr. Cunningham: 263?

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Maguire: Now, if your Honor permits an interruption, I am not arguing about your ruling——

The Court: Yes, I understand that.

Mr. Maguire: But I think for the record, because the deposition is not an exhibit, that it will be necessary to read in the question and answer. I don't see how we can preserve it otherwise.

The Court: Let's do that beginning at about 12:00 o'clock so that we can take up some of the— get these witnesses out [350] of the way.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, your Honor, why couldn't we just deliver this part to the reporter and let him copy it?

The Court: Well, if we are going to do that that way I want to be here when the questions are read and the answers are read, and I will rule on each question separately.

Bring the jury down.

Now, is Kobernuss one of your witnesses?

Mr. Cunningham: Bob is going to handle that. She wants to get away and I have two others that want to get away.

The Court: Now, so there won't be any misunderstanding about Kobernuss I want you to know that I am not going to permit her to testify as to the commercial success of other types of refrigeration, and her testimony must be limited to commercial success of the patent or of the invention here. This is going to make it a little difficult for me because, as I told you again, we talked about it this morning. I haven't found out what the invention is, but Mr. Maguire has promised me that sometime this morning he will dictate either to my secretary or maybe to the reporter, or maybe to his own secretary, a statement of what he believes the invention to be, and I am looking forward to that statement and I will give a copy to Mr. Byron.

Mr. Maguire: Well, I think, your Honor, your Honor's inquiry was made in open court. It will

only take me five [351] minutes—not over five minutes to say what I have to say, if it takes that long.

The Court: Do you want to say it right now or do you want to write it out and take a look at it and make corrections?

Mr. Maguire: I have tried to put in layman's language, to answer your inquiry, language that I could understand. As I said, your Honor, I think if I can understand it I know you can.

The Court: I believe that to be true, Mr. Maguire, and that's why I am so enthusiastic about your suggestion.

Mr. Maguire: Well, I can.

The Court: When do you want to do it?

Mr. Maguire: I can do it now.

The Court: All right. Fine.

Mr. Maguire: Yesterday afternoon the Court inquired as to what it was claimed the invention was, and in making this statement I want to make it perfectly clear that what I have endeavored to do—what I am endeavoring to do, rather, namely, to put in, as far as I was able, in layman's language, without waiving or limiting the language of the claims in the patent and the description of invention. I have done this because not only in patent cases but in any specialization persons who are engaged in it develop terminology of their own which is not always clear to persons who are not so engaged.

I think this is the way a layman would express it [352] and perhaps will answer your Honor's questions. The patentees invented a combination of

elements which co-operated together and produced the result of a refrigerator which, with a single power unit, enclosed in a single box of at least two compartments, in one of which temperature could be maintained above freezing, the air therein having a high humidity in which fresh foods, vegetables, fresh meats and light foods could be cooled but not be subject to dehydration to any substantial degree, and which did not require defrosting; and another compartment in which frozen desserts, and so forth, could be produced and already frozen foods could be maintained in that condition indefinitely, and in which the freezing element would not require frequent defrosting.

The Court: That is the invention?

Mr. Maguire: Yes.

Mr. Cunningham: Subject to the definition of the claims.

Mr. Maguire: Oh, yes.

The Court: I have listened pretty carefully to what you said and I would like to know from you how that is to be read in accordance with this statement: "The conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something. Only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable." Sometime when you get around to that I would like to know that.

I am reading from a note in the Berkeley Pump [353] Company vs. Jacuzzi Bros., 214 Fed. (2d) 786, and that's on page 787, the second paragraph of the note on the first column.

Mr. Maguire: I have that citation in another place, but I thought I would put it right on this note here. What is the title of the case?

The Court: 214 Fed. (2d) 785. That whole note is pertinent to the very thing that you have said here. Now, Mr. Cunningham, do you want to start with the deposition of Potter, or do you want to start with a witness?

Mr. Cunningham: Well, sir, I would like to get rid of these two witnesses.

The Court: All right. That's fine.

Mr. Cunningham: I would like to get rid of these two witnesses, Mr. Bittner and Mr. Hermann, and then I think Mrs. Kobernuss, because she was here and has been here ever since the first of the week. Mr. Maguire will handle that.

I would like to make a statement with respect to her testimony, if I may.

The Court: You certainly may.

Mr. Cunningham: I think it would be better for me to do it here than in the courtroom because of what I am beginning to suspect is the difference between us, your Honor. I think it's a perfectly understandable difference, but I think it's a very real difference and probably almost approaches disagreement on the purpose of this testimony. But it is our [354] understanding that the law provides that a combination of old elements which produced, as they did here, a new and improved result, constitutes invention and is patentable and therefore it is absolutely essential that we have competent

testimony showing that our combination produced improved results over anything developed up to that time, or anything on the market up to that time.

I think the Stewart-Warner and the Admiral advertising—mostly the Admiral, as in this case—both explain some of the improved results in food-keeping and housekeeping to be obtained from the plaintiff's invention. The Potter advertising does the same thing and this testimony that your Honor has ordered stricken, I think, does it very significantly and cogently.

The Court: What testimony have I ordered stricken?

Mr. Cunningham: Well, that, as I understand, your Honor has ordered pages 236 to 263 of the Potter deposition stricken.

The Court: Well, go ahead.

Mr. Cunningham: I just wanted to point out—and it's not only in respect to that, but that Mrs. Kobernuss is a domestic science expert far more competent to give testimony on food-keeping and household results than could any engineer in the refrigeration industry, and she is called for precisely that purpose.

The Court: Well, I just want to tell you one thing right [355] now, that you are not going to introduce any testimony on the advertisements of Admiral or Amana to show commercial success. You can't do that by your adversaries.

Mr. Cunningham: It isn't to show commercial

success, your Honor. I don't know that I can improve the statement. I do think that unless your Honor allows us to show the effect of these improved results or new results——

The Court: Well, I think that your statement of the law, Mr. Cunningham, is impeccable; it certainly is correct, but it is only in the application of that law that there is any disagreement.

Mr. Cunningham: Well, your Honor, may I point out that I think you are depriving us of the only opportunity we have had after a 25-year struggle to prove the patentability by showing the improved results.

Mr. Kolisch: Of the invention. So long as you stick to talking about the invention, we have no objection. As soon as he starts talking about frozen food as such, or cooling, or something like that, we will object and we are making it right now. I don't want to have to get up in Court and start yelling about this. I think that your Honor appreciates our position. As long as the commercial success has to do with the invention——

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor——

Mr. Kolisch: ——we are not going to say anything about [356] it. They are entitled to make some sort of a picture. We don't think commercial success is particularly significant in the absence of patentability and in the absence of the patent. It must be the commercial success of invention.

Mr. Cunningham: The housekeeping results, the new and improved results of this invention.

The Court: What does that tend to prove?

Mr. Cunningham: It tends to prove that we solved a problem that has long plagued the industry. It's old in the patent law and that's what I understand we are able to prove.

Mr. Maguire: The Eibel process, paper machine, the wire, the guide of the pulp chest to feed into the rolls, those things are all old. All Eibel did was not to change the product but to enable the product to be produced more rapidly and did it solely by using the well-known law of gravity by changing the pitch so that the pulp would descend it more rapidly. Now, outside of that there was no new element whatsoever.

Mr. Kolisch: A process patent, wasn't it?

The Court: Mr. Maguire, let's talk about this patent in suit. Suppose Mrs. Kobernuss gets up and says that now she can buy berries in the summertime and have them all throughout the year or she can, when she gives a lot of parties, instead of working the day before the party, weeks in advance she can make hors d'oeuvres and therefore put them [357] away and the day before or the day of the party she takes them out and it is just wonderful. How does that go to show result to the Potter patent? The freezing unit has been in use for years.

Mr. Cunningham: The Potter patent, your Honor?

The Court: No. No. A freezing unit. Maybe they weren't in a Dual-Temp refrigerator or a two-temperature refrigerator, but freezers are old in the art. The same thing is true with the fact that she says that she could buy lettuce and put it in the

cooling compartment and after four days the lettuce is just as good as new.

Now, is it your claim that moist cold was invented by Potter? [358]

Mr. Cunningham: Of the patent, your Honor?

The Court: No, no; of a freezing unit. Perhaps they were not in a dual-temp refrigerator or a two-temperature refrigerator, but freezers are old in the art. The same thing is true with the fact that she said that you could put lettuce, could buy lettuce and could put it in the cooling compartment, and after four days the lettuce is just as good as new. Now, is it your claim that moist cold was invented by Potter?

Mr. Maguire: You had moist cold when you had an old-fashioned icebox with a cake of ice.

The Court: Then moist cold is not something new in the art, but is an electric refrigerator that maintains moist cold new in the art?

Mr. Cunningham: We think so.

The Court: That is precisely what I am trying to find out. If that is your theory, Mr. Cunningham, you are going to be able to put in evidence with reference to vegetables or any other type of commodity that maintains itself in an electric refrigerator, but that is the very reason why I have been asking time and again what is your invention. Is it a non-defrosting coil? Is it a moist cold as pointed out by Judge Sparks? If those are the reach of your invention, then I know what to permit.

Mr. Cunningham: Your Honor, I think we may get together. [359] Freedom from frosting, those

things, I have really tried to point out to you, those are the end results. Maybe this will make it simpler. Supposing I invent a plow, a plow that plowed the field better than something else, couldn't I show evidence of that desirable improved result? We did not invent the field or the furrow; we invented a housekeeping tool.

The Court: Mr. Cunningham, perhaps this is not going to be an unmixed blessing for you, but, when I instruct the jury, I am going to have to tell them what you claim to be your invention. That is the very reason why I am asking you. I am going to come in and say you are claiming that you have an invention because you have a non-defrosting coil——

Mr. Cunningham: Because we have a result of humid atmosphere in an electrical refrigerator, that is one thing, one result, and our freedom from these defrostings, it is all combined in a unitary structure, and it is all subject to the much more perfect definition of the four claims in suit, your Honor.

The Court: I wish you would not go back to that all the time.

Mr. Cunningham: I know that, but I have to be realistic about the patent law.

The Court: We are not going to read the Potter deposition [360] until later. I will make a statement to the jury that there are live witnesses which we would like to have heard first.

(Thereupon, Court and counsel returned to open Court, and the jury having returned to the jury box, the following proceedings were had:)

The Court: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, in a case of this kind which has technical aspects there is always a number of things to straighten out, and that is the reason why you have been called down earlier. Just as I thought I knew all the answers to the problems that were coming up this morning another problem arose, and, therefore, you had to remain in the jury box longer than you anticipated before we came out.

Yesterday afternoon before we adjourned we were reading portions of the deposition of Mr. T. Irving Potter, one of the inventors. Instead of resuming that deposition now, by consent of all the parties, certain witnesses will be called. I understand from Mr. Cunningham that they are short witnesses. Many of them or several of them might have come from long distances, and they would like to get home, and I do not blame them. So we will now permit Mr. Cunningham to call his first witness.

Mr. Cunningham: Thank you, your Honor. Mr. Hermann. [361]

No. 15057

United States
Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

MOIST COLD REFRIGERATOR CO., INC., a
Corporation,

Appellant,

vs.

LOU JOHNSON CO., INC., a Corporation;
MEIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC., a Cor-
poration; ADMIRAL CORPORATION, a
Corporation, and AMANA REFRIGERA-
TION, INC., a Corporation,

Appellees.

Transcript of Record

In Four Volumes

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Volume II

(Pages 409 to 806)

PAUL P. O'BRIEN, CLERK

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon



No. 15057

United States
Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit

MOIST COLD REFRIGERATOR CO., INC., a
Corporation,

Appellant,

vs.


LOU JOHNSON CO., INC., a Corporation;
MEIER & FRANK COMPANY, INC., a Cor-
poration; ADMIRAL CORPORATION, a
Corporation, and AMANA REFRIGERA-
TION, INC., a Corporation,

Appellees.

Transcript of Record
In Four Volumes

Volume II
(Pages 409 to 806)

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon



EDWARD T. HERRMANN

a witness produced in behalf of the Plaintiff, having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

Direct Examination

By Mr. Cunningham:

Q. Mr. Herrmann, I am standing way over here so you will keep your voice up and the ladies and gentlemen of the jury can hear you. Who are you?

A. My name is Edward T. Herrmann.

Q. Where do you live?

A. I live in Eugene, Oregon.

Q. What do you do?

A. I am a service manager for a Lincoln-Mercury dealer down there, automobile dealer.

Q. Have you ever had any connection with the Potter Refrigerator Corporation?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. Of Portland, Oregon? A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was that association?

A. I had charge of their shop. We made compressors and did various experimental work on refrigeration systems.

Q. Can you place the time of this employment?

A. Yes, sir; it was from early summer, 1929, to early summer, 1931. [362]

Q. Where was that plant located?

A. It was at Southwest Ninth and Flanders.

Q. What were your duties there, just very generally?

(Testimony of Edward T. Herrmann.)

A. Well, I had a crew of five or six people; they were mechanics and they did the work on building up refrigeration compressors as complete units and as single units; oh, compressors, for instance, and dehydrators, and we made coils, freezing coils.

Q. What do you mean by dehydrators?

A. That is a device that is put in the line, in the refrigeration line, to take the moisture out of the refrigerant so that it would not freeze in the expansion valve.

Q. What was the business activity of the Potter Refrigerator Corporation during these years?

A. Well, as I recall it, it was a group of people that had banded together for the development of a refrigeration process under Mr. Potter.

Q. Were you aware of any developmental work or experimental work that was going on at the Potter Refrigerator Corporation?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Were you aware of any such work in connection with household refrigerators?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. At what period of time were you aware of this work?

A. Well, that work went on continuously from the time that [363] I joined the company until I left.

Q. Do you recall any so-called three-temperature or two-temperature boxes, household refrigerators?

A. Yes, I do.

(Testimony of Edward T. Herrmann.)

Q. Did you use those terms, three-temperature and two-temperature, to mean the same object?

A. Well, the two-temperature box and the three-temperature box would vary by just the term. In other words, if you had a box, two-temperature, you had two temperatures; if you had a three-temperature, why you would have a three-temperature box.

Q. Do you see any old friends around the room in any of these refrigerators?

A. The only two that I recognize are the two tallest ones.

Q. May I identify those? You mean this one that I am stating is marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 11-B? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And this one that is marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 11-A? A. Yes.

The Court: Mr. Cuningham, are you going to use 11-B?

Mr. Cuningham: I just want him to identify it.

The Witness: Yes.

Q. (By Mr. Cuningham): If you want to come over and look at them——

A. No, I recognize them at this distance; yes, sir. [364]

Q. You recognize them well enough?

A. Yes.

Q. Were those two refrigerators or refrigerators of that type preceded by any other structures designed to accomplish the same end?

A. Oh, yes.

(Testimony of Edward T. Herrmann.)

Q. Can you give me in your own words a brief description of what those structures were that preceded these?

A. Well, the first ones we used were just the old-fashioned so-called iceboxes; that is, you had a place in the top where you put the ice and the food storage below.

Q. Can you tell me what mechanism was put into these old iceboxes?

A. Yes, we put freezing coils in them; that is, coils where the cold was produced, if you want to put it that way.

Q. How do you know that you put freezing coils in them?

A. Well, I know, because the work was done under my direction.

Q. Did you actually see it done?

A. Yes, sir; I did.

Q. What kind of freezing coils did you put in these old iceboxes, the first one, let us say?

A. Well, the first ones were just coils of copper tubing. We would make these coils up on a wooden form on a lathe. They were circular in shape, and we would put an expansion [365] valve on them and place them in the ice compartment.

Q. How many compartments were in these experimental iceboxes?

A. Well, the early ones were two compartments.

Q. How were they divided; vertically or horizontally?

A. They were vertically.

Q. You are speaking of the first ones?

A. Yes, sir.

(Testimony of Edward T. Herrmann.)

Q. Can you give us with some more accuracy a statement as to the time when that box was being experimented with?

A. Well, it was one of the earliest things that I can recall that I was called on to do. I would say it was some time, well, some time between September and May, some time during that wintertime between 1929 and 1930. I couldn't come any closer on dates.

Q. Does that period of, as I figure, about seven or eight months, does that encompass all of the work on all of these experimental boxes? You say there were more than one.

A. Say that again, please.

Mr. Cuninghame: May I have the question read, please?

(Last question read.)

The Witness: Oh, no; the experimental work, as I recall, was practically continuous, I would say, until about the spring of 1931. We were in experimental work all of that time.

Q. Can you give me a date for the earliest complete box but [366] without the compressor in the housing as it is in Plaintiff's Exhibits 11-A and 11-B?

A. It would be pretty hard to do, sir.

Q. Will you do the best you can?

A. Oh, I would judge that those boxes were probably built in the summer of 1930.

Q. Would you say early summer or can you go that close?

(Testimony of Edward T. Herrmann.)

A. I am afraid I couldn't do any better than that.

Q. Now, if you know the refrigeration circuit of these early boxes, could you describe it, please, briefly, if you know it?

A. Yes, I think I can. On the early boxes that we made we used just a coil of copper tubing. We placed it in the upper compartment. Then we would attempt to govern the temperature in the lower part of the box by what we called the runoff from the cold storage compartment. We would attempt to adjust the expansion valve so that we would just get sufficient refrigeration in the lower part for food storage and have a frozen food compartment in the top part of the box. We had considerable difficulty with this because this was in the winter-time, and if we had a cold night we would find our frost line running clear on through the frozen food storage, and we had recording thermometers, and it would show that it would get down below freezing there. Then during the day the frost line would leave the lower box, [367] and it would become a normal condition for food storage, but it was not controllable, so we evolved the plan of controlling the food storage compartment, and we found that we had sufficient cold. As I remember the temperatures in the cold part, that is, the frozen part, it was running around 10 below zero, and we would still have adequate refrigeration but not too much in the food storage, that is, the normal food storage compartment.

(Testimony of Edward T. Herrmann.)

Q. Did you have frosting in the normal food storage compartment with this new arrangement?

A. Very little, very little frosting. It would frost through, as I remember it, just a very short distance.

Q. How about the relative insulation between these two compartments?

A. Insulation, did you say?

Q. Yes; was it heavier——

A. Well, the top compartment was heavily insulated, and the lower compartment was just normal.

Q. Do you mean the freezing compartment had heavier insulation; is that what you mean?

A. Oh, yes; very much.

Q. Are you sure you are correct in recalling that the top compartment was the freezing compartment? Wasn't it the bottom compartment?

A. No, the earlier experimental work—in the earlier [368] experimental work the top compartment was used.

Q. Did you reverse those compartments later?

A. Later on we put a brine tank in the bottom.

Q. Did you do that with some of these experimental iceboxes that were not really specially made?

A. Yes, we did.

Q. How did the circuit differ when you made this reversal of compartments, if it did differ?

A. Essentially, it was the same. I don't recall that there was any particular difference.

(Testimony of Edward T. Herrmann.)

Q. Mr. Herrmann, how did it happen that you are testifying here? Why?

A. I was asked to. I was asked to come up here.

Q. By whom? A. By yourself, sir.

Q. When?

A. Monday of this week, Monday evening.

Q. Are you sure of that? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Of this week?

A. Well, it was Monday. I am sure it was a Monday.

Q. Well, it is——

A. It was Monday a week ago.

Q. That is correct? A. That is right. [369]

Q. Have you any interest in the plaintiff, Moist Cold Corporation? A. No, I have no interest.

Q. Any interest in the patent in suit?

A. No, sir.

Q. You know about the patent, do you?

A. Yes, I know there is a patent.

Q. Potter patent. The witness is with you.

Mr. Ramsey: No cross-examination.

The Court: That is all, Mr. Herrmann.

(Witness excused.)

Mr. Cuningham: Mr. Bittner, please. [370]

GEORGE W. BITTNER

a witness produced in behalf of Plaintiff, having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

Direct Examination

By Mr. Cuningham:

Q. Mr. Bittner, where do you reside?

A. Where do I what?

Q. Where do you live?

A. I live out here at West Slope.

Q. What is your occupation?

A. Well, I worked under—in the Fouch Electric machine shop. I was a foreman up there.

Q. For how many years, sir?

A. I was there for 44 years.

Q. Did you ever know a person by the name of T. Irving Potter?

A. Yes, sir; I did.

Q. Were you ever familiar with an organization called the Potter Refrigerator Corporation?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Can you recall—can you tell us a little bit about how you came to know these people, this company?

A. Well, Potter came to us in 1927, and he laid a bunch of blueprints out for us—or to Mr. Fouch, and Mr. Fouch brought them out to me, thought we could handle that job, [371] and I said we could after looking them over. So we designed the first pump—or he had designed the first pump, and we made it, built it, and we done experimenting down below in the lower part of the building.

(Testimony of George W. Bittner.)

Q. What do you mean by pump?

A. Well, a compressor.

Q. For what purpose?

A. For refrigeration.

Q. That was what type of refrigeration?

A. Well, I don't—it was just ordinary refrigerating pump.

Q. Any type, household or commercial?

A. I don't know where they all used them, but then they used them mostly for household refrigeration right away; that is what he started. Afterwards they went into commercial stuff, too.

Q. Can you give us a date for this first association with Potter?

A. Well, that was in 1927 when they first—early in 1927 when we got acquainted with Potter.

Q. Where was his office then, if you recall?

A. Well, he didn't have an office right then.

Q. Where was the first office?

A. The first office was up in the Yeon Building, Fifth Floor of the Yeon Building, or it was the Tenth, I don't [372] know which, either one. It is in the Yeon Building.

Q. Was that about 1927?

A. That is the latter part of 1927.

Q. Did there come a time, Mr. Bittner, when he had any office in the Fouch—or plant in the Fouch Electrical Company premises?

A. No, he hadn't—

Mr. Kolisch: Your Honor, we are going to object

(Testimony of George W. Bittner.)

to a continuation of this line of testimony. Apparently he has not any idea or he has not stated anything to do with the patent in suit. He had something to say about a pump, and now he is starting to talk about some office space of Mr. Potter.

Mr. Cuningham: It was all preliminary, your Honor.

The Court: I want to tell you about a rule in this court, that when a matter is not in controversy you cannot prove it more than three times. Three witnesses is all you are going to be permitted. You have had at least four witnesses testify to the location of the Fouch Electric Company. You cannot do that any more. There is no dispute about where Fouch Electric Company is and that there was a machine shop because three times is all you can prove an undisputed fact. I do not think it makes a great deal of difference whether Mr. Potter had an office in the Public Service Building and prior to that time in the Yeon Building, so I suggest we [373] would get along much faster if you would ask the witness about problems about which you want him to testify.

Mr. Cuningham: I will try to, sir.

Q. Were you familiar with any developmental work on household refrigerators that was carried on at this Potter Refrigeration Corporation?

A. Not very much.

Q. All right. Will you tell us——

A. I really didn't have very much to do, I really

(Testimony of George W. Bittner.)

didn't have much to do with that except the machine work.

Q. Well, will you just describe what you did have to do with the Potter household refrigerator development?

A. That was the first one, the first one we made.

Q. First what, sir?

A. First refrigerator made by us.

Q. Where did you make that?

A. That we made at Fouch Electric.

Q. Was that made for Potter?

A. No; when Potter was there.

Q. When Potter—— A. He was there.

Q. Yes; you mean physically with Fouch Electric? A. Yes, he was with us.

Q. Was he employed by Fouch Electric?

A. No, no; he was there as the man that was, that would give [374] us the orders or what we wanted. He always brought his blueprints and drawings, and we built them according to the plans.

Q. You built these compressors; is that what you are talking about? A. Yes.

Q. Did you have anything to do with any experimental refrigerators that made use of the Potter compressors?

A. Not after we made the first one.

Q. Will you tell us about the first one, sir, the refrigerator?

A. The first one we made, Potter and I worked one night, and we experimented with it, but we

(Testimony of George W. Bittner.)

had trouble with losing pressure, and I just got a bright idea to turn that upside down so it would submerge them in oil. We put it in a lathe and tried it, and that is when we got onto it, onto the present compressor.

Q. You are still talking about the compressor, are you not? A. Yes.

Q. Well, do you, Mr. Bittner, know anything about the experimental work that went on with household refrigerators in a cabinet using a compressor?

A. No, I had nothing to do with that.

Q. You had nothing to do with it? [375]

A. No.

Q. You do not recall that Potter did any of that at Fouch Electric when he was there?

A. We made one, the first one we made, the very first one I am talking about; that is the only one.

Q. Are you talking about a refrigerator or a compressor? A. Both.

Q. All right, sir; will you tell us about the refrigerator?

A. Well, all I know is that one we made where we used one of those old G.E. boxes. We put an evaporator inside of that box.

Q. Can you give us a date for that?

A. Well, that was in 1927. That was the first one we ever made. I have a picture of it here.

Q. Do you have a picture of it here?

A. Yes.

(Testimony of George W. Bittner.)

Q. Could I see it, please?

A. I left it right under my coat there.

(Picture referred to produced.)

The Court: Do you want to have that marked for identification?

Mr. Cuningham: Your Honor, it may not relate to the issues. I have never seen it, as I recall.

The Witness: It shows the compressor.

Mr. Cuningham: Yes. [376]

The Witness: There is the box with the evaporator. (Indicating.)

Q. What is this binder, Mr. Bittner?

A. Well, that was just the first patent, the first pump we ever made and testimonial letters of different people when they seen the machine, what they thought of it.

Q. Does this have the type of compressor that you have been talking about here?

A. Yes, there is a compressor right there. That is the one there (indicating).

The Court: Mr. Bittner, will you please speak a little more loudly so that the jury can understand you. [377]

Q. (By Mr. Cuningham): Well, if I understand you, Mr. Bittner, do you mean that you do not recall any refrigerators like those, and I point to the one that is marked 11-A, the far one on the left, at the Potter Refrigerator Corporation?

A. I don't remember seeing it, no, sir.

(Testimony of George W. Bittner.)

Q. I mean, ones like that?

A. No. No. They weren't like that. We used a G.E. box. The first one we ever made was a G.E. box.

Q. And what is your best recollection as to how long this work went on with the General Electric boxes?

A. Well, it went in the year '27 and into '28, and then they started buying different boxes, Gibson boxes, Leonard boxes.

Q. Well, now, did you see any of those at the Potter plant?

A. Oh, I have seen them. That's when they took the place next door to us.

Q. Yes.

A. They had—they had to expand, needed more room, and they moved next door in an empty building.

Q. Well, now, have you any recollection at all of the construction operation of those boxes when they took the plant next door?

A. No, I don't.

Q. You don't know?

A. Potter had his own crew by that time, his own people, and all we done was machine work on special experimental work. [378]

Q. Was there any secret that might prevent you from knowing about them at that time?

A. Well, they had their own floor and they didn't allow everybody to come in there then.

(Testimony of George W. Bittner.)

Q. And you were not——

A. I very seldom got in there.

Q. You were not an employee of Potter, you were an employee——

A. No, I was not.

Mr. Cuningham: The witness is with you.

Mr. Ramsey: Might I see the document you were looking at?

The Witness: What do you want, the box?

Mr. Ramsey: Yes. That's the one. I would like to look at it.

The Witness: That is the box.

(Whereupon, the bailiff handed the document to Mr. Ramsey.)

Cross-Examination

By Mr. Ramsey:

Q. Can you remember the details of that box that you have a picture of?

A. You mean describe the compartments in it?

Q. Yes. Was there more than one compartment?

A. Oh, yes. There was——there is a big door on one side [379] and a three-quarter door on the other and a small door down below.

Q. That is, did it have more than one temperature? A. No, not that box. It was a——

Q. Single temperature?

A. Single temperature.

Mr. Ramsey: No further cross-examination.

Mr. Cuningham: Thank you, Mr. Bittner.

Mr. Maguire: Call Mrs. Kobernuss.

(Witness excused.) [380]

RUTH KOBERNUSS

was produced as a witness in behalf of the plaintiff and, being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

Direct Examination

By Mr. Maguire:

Q. Will you state your name, please?

A. Ruth Kobernuss, K-o-b-e-r-n-u-s-s.

Q. Mrs. Kobernuss, where do you now live?

A. Hot Springs, Arkansas.

Q. And are you in business there?

A. Yes, I am.

Q. What is the nature of the business?

A. We do interior decorating.

Q. Were you ever an employee or have anything to do with the Potter Refrigerator Corporation?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And where was it?

A. Buffalo, New York.

Q. Buffalo, New York. And about what year?

A. Early in 1937 through '40.

Q. 1937 through 1940? A. Right.

Q. And in what capacity?

A. I was the home economist of the Potter Refrigerator Corporation. [381]

The Court: I didn't hear.

The Witness: I was the home economist of—

The Court: Of what?

The Witness: —the Potter Refrigerator Corporation.

(Testimony of Ruth Kobernuss.)

Q. (By Mr. Maguire): Did you have anything to do with the sale of the products?

A. The sale of what?

Q. Did you have anything to do with the sale of its product? A. Yes, I did.

Q. And what were your functions there as home economist? What was the nature of your work?

A. Mostly after a refrigerator was purchased, it was my duty to call on the housewife, the new owner of the Potter refrigerator and to help her to get the greatest benefit out of her refrigerator.

Q. Now, do you see here in the courtroom any of the Potter refrigerators of the type which were then being manufactured and sold? A. Yes.

Q. And would you point out which one it is?

A. It is this one at the end in different sizes.

Q. And that is—what is the exhibit number, Mr. Cuningham?

Mr. Cuningham: That is Defendants' Exhibit 116.

Mr. Maguire: Thank you.

Q. And were you familiar with that refrigerator and its [382] mechanism, how it operated?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Now, before you went with Potter were you familiar with the electric refrigerators which were then on the market? A. Yes, I was.

Q. And were they in separate compartments so far as the food and frozen food were concerned, or was it all one compartment?

A. Anything that I had ever known about was

(Testimony of Ruth Kobernuss.)

one compartment—one-compartment refrigerator.

Q. After you became employed by the Potter Refrigerator Company, did you have occasion to become familiar with the various makes which were on the market and which might be called competitors of the Potter in the electric refrigerating business?

A. Well, to my knowledge there wasn't anything else like it.

Q. Well, I don't mean that they are the same type. A. Oh.

Q. But the other kind of electric refrigerators on the market. A. Yes.

Q. At that time did you learn or become acquainted with any electric refrigerator which had compartments, one which we will term roughly as a fresh food compartment, a comparatively high temperature above freezing, and another compartment or compartments which were freezing [383] compartments?

Mr. Kolisch: Your Honor, I would like to inquire at this time what this witness is now being offered for, an expert on refrigeration?

Mr. Maguire: No, sir.

The Court: No, apparently not.

Mr. Maguire: No, not at all.

Mr. Kolisch: Thank you.

Mr. Maguire: What was the last question?

(Last question read.)

The Witness: No, I had no knowledge of such.

(Testimony of Ruth Kobernuss.)

Q. (By Mr. Maguire): Were there on the market at that time? A. Yes.

The Court: The objection is sustained, the jury is instructed to disregard it. She can't tell whether there were any such boxes on the market. She was living in Buffalo, New York. Is she going to testify that of her own knowledge there were no such boxes on the market?

Mr. Maguire: Why, yes, I think so.

Mr. Kolisch: Well, that is the reason why we asked whether she was an expert who knew everything in this field. Obviously she didn't know. How could she testify?

Mr. Maguire: Well, that's a conclusion.

The Court: That's right, that's a conclusion, Mr. Maguire, and we want the witness to testify about facts.

Mr. Maguire: I was speaking about Mr. Kolisch's conclusion, [384] not the witness', your Honor.

The Court: Well, that's her conclusion, too. All right, it is in, anyway. I will take care of it at a later time. I might say I am going to give you wide latitude with this witness, Mr. Maguire. I am notifying the other side of that and at a later time I will rule on some of the admissibility.

Mr. Maguire: Well, your Honor, I don't intend to take much latitude on this witness.

The Court: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Maguire.

Q. (By Mr. Maguire): Now, had you and did

(Testimony of Ruth Kobernuss.)

you at that time and during your time there acquire by observation and by use knowledge of how the refrigerator worked in operation? A. Yes.

Q. And did you during that period have an opportunity to observe and to learn how refrigerators which had a single compartment worked and how they operated? A. Yes, I did.

Q. In what we will call the fresh food or the moist—it's been termed here in the courtroom moist cold compartment—did you observe what effect the cooling there had upon fresh foods, particularly those which had water content like lettuce, fresh peas, or fresh fish, or things of that kind, with respect to whether they remained in the same condition after they were put in as they were when they were put in? A. Yes, I did. [385]

Q. Would you explain that, if you will? State what you learned and what you observed.

A. The fact that it was moist cold, it wasn't required that vegetables or foods with high water content be kept covered to retain their moisture nor was there a transference of odors of one food to another of all those foods kept in the moist cold compartment.

Q. Now, did you observe what happened when those same kind of foods were put in the refrigerator—in an electric refrigerator which did not have a moist, cold compartment of a comparatively high temperature above freezing, up to 40?

A. Yes.

(Testimony of Ruth Kobernuss.)

Q. What did happen?

A. They would dry out and, of course, would have to be wrapped or put in airtight containers in order to retain their moisture.

Q. Did you observe whether or not the coils or pipes, whatever the technical name is, in the fresh food compartment became frosted?

A. That was called the finned coil and did not gather ice.

Q. And did not gather ice?

A. No, not gathering ice, it did not take out the moisture from the food except in the compartment, and thereby retained—that was the principle by which it retained its moisture.

Q. And did that require defrosting at all? [386]

A. No; never.

Q. Now, with respect to the other compartment, for lack of a better term I will call it a freezing compartment, did that compartment have an arrangement there whereby you could freeze things like water and make ice or desserts of any kind?

A. It had a freezing shelf on which the ice cube trays were kept and then a compartment directly below that, or in the same compartment, in which, as today, meat and anything else would freeze very quickly after it was placed in that compartment.

Q. Could that freezing compartment be used for the purpose of making desserts, frozen desserts, of any kind? A. Yes, it could; uh-huh.

Q. Now, at that time and during the time you were employed with Potter, were the so-called

(Testimony of Ruth Kobernuss.)

frozen foods, any of the so-called frozen foods on the market?

A. Well, there were vegetables. Back in those days there wasn't a variety. I don't recall just what there was. Just some vegetables, I believe, and strawberries.

Q. Yes. A. Nothing of any great variety.

Q. Now, in that same compartment we have been talking about, why, we will call it the freezing or sharp cold—I don't know just what the trade term is for it—could that be used and was it used for the purpose of either storing and [387] keeping in frozen condition foods which were already frozen or in freezing foods which had not been frozen?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And in that compartment did those foods which were already frozen or foods which had been frozen and put in there—what can you state as to whether or not that compartment maintained them in the same condition in which they were put in?

Mr. Kolisch: Now, your Honor, we are going to object to a continuation of this line of questioning. There is no issue in this case whether or not you had a freezing compartment, and that there was a freezer. We all know that freezers exist. I don't think that there is any question here as far as the defendants are concerned that frozen foods existed and that there were devices by which you could maintain frozen foods.

The Court: Yes. Well——

Mr. Maguire: All right. If it is conceded I will

(Testimony of Ruth Kobernuss.)

not pursue it.

The Court: I am just going to let you permit this witness to continue for awhile unless you want to withdraw the question.

Mr. Maguire: Well, it's—

The Court: There is no question about, and you are not claiming a patent on the freezing compartment. They have been in existence for a long time.

Mr. Maguire: If counsel will so concede it we will go [388] along with it.

Mr. Kolisch: Oh, we concede it.

Mr. Cuningham: Your Honor, may I have the question?

(Last question read.)

Mr. Cuningham: Now, as I understand the question, your Honor, it refers to the freezing compartment in the combination of the patent in suit. Those, of course, we do not concede.

The Court: Well, Mr. Cuningham, I think that Mr. Maguire knows what he is doing. He is an old, experienced trial lawyer, and doesn't need any help.

Mr. Maguire: I am going to have to concede that even Maguire makes mistakes at times. It's humiliating but I will concede that.

Q. Now, did you, yourself, during that period of employment sell Potter refrigerators?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And can you tell us either the exact number

(Testimony of Ruth Kobernuss.)

or the approximate number of Potter refrigerators which were sold?

A. I don't believe I could answer that question exactly.

Q. Well, go ahead. I didn't mean to interrupt. Go ahead.

A. I know that I demonstrated the use of several hundred. I don't know that—whether I was in the store—I would take a part in the sale of refrigerators and the sales organization handled most of that. But I helped in the selling of the refrigerators. [389]

Q. I see. Now, in a refrigerator—electric refrigerator—which did not have these two separate compartments, one for moist cold and the other for freezing—which did not have those, was it possible to keep fresh vegetables and foods, fresh foods, which had moisture content in open containers or laid on the shelves?

A. Well, it would be possible, but they would dry out very rapidly because of the——

Q. What was there about the fact of drying out that would have any disadvantage?

A. Well, foods—many have a high water content. We want to eat them when they—in the same condition in which we placed them in the refrigerator. That's why we have a refrigerator.

Q. Now, did you, yourself, own and use a Potter refrigerator? A. Yes, I did.

Q. And did you have occasion there in your own domestic realm to observe the same thing you have

(Testimony of Ruth Kobernuss.)

observed—you have testified here as to the customers?

A. I tested everything that I told them the refrigerator would do and I did the very same things at home to be sure that I was right.

Mr. Maguire: Yes. Would your Honor excuse me just a moment?

The Court: Perfectly all right. Take your [390] time, Mr. Maguire.

Q. (By Mr. Maguire): Do you know, Mrs. Kobernuss, whether or not the users of the electrical refrigerators, those whom you had contact with, replaced the old single-chamber refrigerator—electric refrigerator with Potter?

A. I do know that in most every case the Potter replaced the conventional-type refrigerator of one compartment.

Q. And why?

A. Well, for two reasons: One, to have a moist cold compartment, and then, two, to have a refrigerator in which they could keep frozen foods and freeze their meat and have the other compartment in one refrigerator.

Mr. Maguire: May I approach the witness?

The Court: Yes.

Q. (By Mr. Maguire): I hand you here a book which bears the tag containing the Exhibit No. 6-DD, and I will ask you to examine it and state whether you recognize it.

A. Yes, I do. This is the literature used in the

(Testimony of Ruth Kobernuss.)

sales of our refrigerator, the Potter refrigerator.

Mr. Maguire: Yes.

May I approach the witness?

The Court: What do you want?

Mr. Maguire: May I approach the witness?

The Court: Yes.

Q. (By Mr. Maguire): And that was during the time you were [391] employed by them in the years in question. And is that what one might call the kit? A. That was part of the kit.

Q. Part of the kit. A. That's the kit.

Mr. Maguire: Now, your Honor—

The Court: Has that been identified already?

Mr. Cuningham: Yes, your Honor.

Mr. Maguire: It's been identified but not received.

The Court: Have you offered it?

Mr. Maguire: I am going to try to save a little time, your Honor, if I may. I, of course, will turn it over to the defendants' attorneys.

The Court: Yes, I would appreciate that. I am getting to like you better and better all the time.

Mr. Maguire: I never take more time to curry a horse than is necessary. There may be some discussions about this. I think perhaps it has been identified, and if we may offer it without the necessity of the witness being on the stand, we could do it that way.

Q. Now, I hand you another document which bears identification No. 6-Z—

The Court: Let me take a look at that.

(Testimony of Ruth Kobernuss.)

Mr. Maguire: Yes.

(Whereupon the exhibit was handed to the Court.) [392]

Q. (By Mr. Maguire): I likewise hand you another one which is marked 6-AA, and I will ask you to state whether you are familiar with them?

A. Yes, I am, with that one.

Mr. Cuningham: Will you repeat the answer?

The Witness: Yes, I am.

The Court: Both of them?

The Witness: They were part of the same literature used.

Mr. Maguire: Yes.

Q. That was put out by the Potter Refrigerator Corporation?

A. By the Potter Refrigerator Corporation.

Q. Did you have occasion in your work to use it?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you use both of them or just one of them, or what?

A. Well, different parts of both of them.

Q. Yes.

A. At different times we used all of it.

The Court: Are plaintiffs offering it?

Mr. Maguire: I would like to do the same thing. I don't know whether to offer all of it or——

The Court: Give it to Mr. Byron.

Mr. Byron: Thank you.

Mr. Maguire: You may inquire. [393]

(Testimony of Ruth Kobernuss.)

Cross-Examination

By Mr. Ramsey:

Q. Mrs. Kobernuss, you testified that you put vegetables in the food compartment and they did not dry out. Did you put them in water, for example, such as lettuce?

A. Celery or lettuce was put in a small dish of about a half inch, quarter inch of water. [394]

Q. You were asked about frost accumulating in that chamber, and you said it had a finned coil. What frost was in that chamber, not referring to the fins on the coil?

A. There was no frost in that chamber.

Q. No frost in the chamber whatsoever?

A. No, no frost.

Q. Did you examine the pipes in it carefully?

A. Well, on the coil that was in the—in that compartment there was no frost.

Mr. Ramsey: No further cross-examination.

Mr. Maguire: That is all.

The Court: Mrs. Kobernuss, you are excused from further attendance at the trial, and the same applies to Mr. Bittner and Mr. Herrmann if they are still in the courtroom.

(Witness excused.)

The Court: Ladies and gentlemen, we have gone now for an hour. We will take a short recess.

(Thereupon, the jury retired for the morning recess.)

The Court: Mr. Maguire, I want to publicly acknowledge the deep debt of gratitude I owe you for the excellent way in which you handled that witness. I thought I was going to [395] have a lot of trouble, and there was no trouble at all. I hope all counsel emulate Mr. Maguire. He only asked for things that are important.

(Recess taken.)

The Court: Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, I call your attention to the fact that this morning we interrupted the reading of the Potter deposition because we wanted to hear from some witnesses. Some of this testimony I have ruled to be inadmissible. Counsel, start with the questions on Page 263, the statement: "Mr. Cuningham: May I interrupt"—from there on. You may have an exception and preserve your record at a later time.

(Thereupon, the reading of the deposition of T. Irving Potter was continued as follows.)

DEPOSITION OF T. IRVING POTTER

(Continued)

“Q. (By Mr. Cuningham): The patent was re-issued? A. Yes.

Q. That is the patent in suit, is it not?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, what was the state of your finances at

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

about this period—you and the patent owners' finances in 1948, '49 and '50? [396]

A. In 1948, '49 and '50?

Mr. Cuninghame: Yes, would you characterize them for me? Were they low or high?

A. They were very low.

Q. Did you have any money left after you re-issued this patent?

A. Practically none, sir. Very little.

Q. How did you meet that situation?

A. Some of the people who had backed me from the very beginning in carrying on my battle, they all were making monthly payments to the firm of Potter and Halsey.

Q. How long had that been going on?

A. That had been going on since 1938.

Q. Do you mean 1938 or '28?

A. No, I mean this: The first money they put in, they put in by purchasing interest in my pump patent.

Q. What year was that?

A. That goes back to 1927 when we started. You can divide the money I received to carry on my work into two sections. In 1927 we started what we call the syndicate where people purchased an interest in my pump patent. Now that is all they purchased legally. They did not give me the money as an operating fund. They purchased from me and that money was mine and the patent was theirs. But I used that money to further the interest of all

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

of us. It was during that [397] time that I evolved, along with Mr. Bronaugh, this two-temperature or three-temperature cabinet. The capital that I used came from that group in that way. I continued holding the patent on the cabinet in my name.

In 1938, I believe I am correct on that date—I think I am correct on that—we formed the Refrigeration Patents Corporation. I turned over everything I had, patents, models, rights, everything to the Refrigeration Patents Corporation.

I first turned it in or I turned it over in trust to our lawyers with instructions that they organize that company, that when the company was organized, that they distribute the stock of that company according to the list which I gave them and which embraced all the people who had put money up with me on the pump patent, because I technically—technically they were only in the pump. I felt they were morally interested in everything I was doing.

This was my means of establishing that. That left them in a position that we weren't in a position to raise money as we had in the past. The people who had been putting money into it, they hired the firm of Potter and Halsey to represent them in their interest in that company.

Q. Mr. Potter, I think——

A. (Continued): They paid us as a service fee.

Q. I think you misspoke. You said, 'I felt they were [398] morally interested in the pump patent.'

A. No.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Q. The patent in suit, you mean?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. Did you mean that you felt they were morally interested?

A. I thought they had a moral right to an interest in the pump patent. Over that period of those two periods that I speak of, those men had put in over \$1 million to back me personally in my fight.

Q. Over what period of years?

A. Starting with 1927, but most of what they put in would start from the cabinet period. They put in much more during that period.

Q. Is that from the early '30's? A. Yes.

Q. Would it be a conservative—

A. From the early '30's up to the present would represent a period of some 25 years.

Q. Now, do I understand you correctly to say that over \$1 million was collected from these backers of yours throughout that period?

A. I don't know that it was exactly that. I know that the total runs away over \$1 million. The biggest part of that would be from the '30's on. I have never totaled up the figures. I don't know. It would be—I believe it would [399] probably add up to \$1 million.

Q. Did you get this \$1 million in one lump sum, or how did you get it?

A. That came in monthly payments.

Q. Have you ever had a million dollars in your life? A. No, sir.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Q. What did you do with respect to continuing your business, if you did anything, in 1949 and '50, and by that I mean your business under the Potter Reissue Patent—Potter and Bronaugh—

A. In our efforts to get ahead and get into a commercial position that we thought was warranted through a Mr. Seamore, a man who I had known, he introduced me to a Mister—

Q. Is the name Sanborn?

A. Yes, Mr. Sanborn, who claimed that he was in a financial business. He was a lawyer, but he said his principal interest was in finance. Mr. Sanborn stated that he could organize a company that could give us the capital necessary to go ahead. We had built, designed and built, a new model Potter, which we felt would go into the market with the least amount of difficulty, because all the refrigerators on the market then and until now are in the class of Fords and Chevrolets. We felt nobody put out what I would call a Cadillac type. Whenever you have a large market you can always get a percentage of people who want to buy the luxury type, the best— [400]

Q. May I interrupt you a minute? To shorten this, is a picture of that cabinet on the wall in this room?

A. Yes.

Q. Are there other pictures of it overhead?

A. Yes.

Q. I show you a photograph and ask you if you can identify that?

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

A. That is the cabinet I am speaking of."

Mr. Cuningham: I offer that photograph in evidence and I would like to have the jury look at it. It is No. 3-III.

Mr. Byron: Your Honor, we will object to this because this is something that is being produced after the expiration of the patent in suit and is a new product entirely. It has nothing to do with it.

The Court: Tell me that over again. It was produced after the patent in suit?

Mr. Byron: Yes; after the patent in suit expired. Now, he has gone into a new project here developing or selling this so-called de luxe, this Cadillac-type of refrigerator. Well, that's all right, if he wants to do that, but it has nothing to do with this suit.

Mr. Cuningham: That is not quite true, your Honor. It wasn't, as I recall, after the patent expired.

The next exhibit which I intend to offer here is 3-JJJ, and that shows a design patent on a portion of that [401] particular patent.

The Court: Is the design patent involved in this litigation?

Mr. Cuningham: No, sir; but it simply is illustrative of what the intentions were at this time and I suppose still are with respect to the future business.

Mr. Byron: That's right. And intentions are nothing.

The Court: The objection is sustained. Mr. Cun-

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

ingham, I listened with great interest to this testimony about this million dollars but I really can't see the relevancy of that, and I was just wondering because I hadn't read this portion of the testimony before. Have you gotten together on the balance of this testimony?

Mr. Cuningham: Oh, yes, your Honor.

Mr. Byron: Well, we have gotten together in this sense: Mr. Cuningham and I went through the record with the idea of following your instructions to eliminate as much as we could. Well, sometimes Mr. Cuningham and I agreed and sometimes we didn't. Where we agreed we canceled those portions, but there are a lot of portions that have not been canceled and we do not agree. Now, where I am reserving my rights on anything involving materiality and relevancy and competency, we did not agree.

The Court: All right. Now, what about this design patent?

Mr. Byron: I don't see where that has any relevancy at [402] all and I object to it.

Mr. Cuningham: I will offer it, your Honor, for the purpose of the ruling.

The Court: All right. The objection is sustained.

Mr. Cuningham: Exhibit 3-JJJ.

The Court: A design patent issued August 30th, 1949, has no relevancy to the patent in suit nor to any of the issues involved in this litigation and, therefore, the objection will be sustained.

Mr. Cuningham: May I note on the record, your

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Honor, and I agree with Mr. Byron's statement that we did get together and we did have this agreement. I didn't intend to bind him by such an agreement as to any motion to strike that would be made.

The Court: What about this testimony which I see on the bottom of page 269? Doesn't that refer to the Cadillac-type refrigerator and the designed patent?

Mr. Byron: Yes.

The Court: Well, for how long does that continue?

Mr. Cuninghame: Well, if your Honor please, you realize there are certain fringe issues in the case that we perhaps may not have in mind to which this testimony may relate. I submit they are important issues.

Mr. Byron: Well, this Sanborn, referring to Sanborn, he was a financier and Mr. Potter apparently wanted to become [403] associated with people with money, with the idea of developing some organization, probably, to ultimately manufacture or to sell with all the financial schemes insofar as this testimony is concerned to develop some corporation, do some of these big things and get some income.

The Court: How far did that go?

Mr. Byron: I would say to about page 272. Then beginning there, there is another situation, another financial setup. We would be glad to have that in.

The Court: But, Mr. Byron, I might say this: That even—either this testimony is admissible or

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

inadmissible, and you can't select portions like that million-dollar one and this portion over here which is advantageous to you. I don't think that that is exactly cricket. Now, either the testimony is hearsay and is not applicable, or it is relevant. And if it isn't relevant I don't think it should come into the case, even though it may be beneficial to you. I want to state my position on that. So I think if it has no more relevancy than the portion on 272, it shouldn't remain in the case.

Mr. Ramsey: I think, if the Court please, that on 272 it goes into the question of title in this patent and predecessors in interest to it. Now, plaintiff in the case—and to that extent it is relevant.

In other words, there was a series of [404] transactions in which interests flow from one to the other and we have put them on proof of title, and to that extent it is relevant. How relevant, I don't know.

The Court: Well, is it your opinion then that in order to prove plaintiff's case plaintiff is required to put in this testimony, or do you have other testimony of this kind?

Mr. Cuninghame: Your Honor, our proof of title is complete and it was admitted by the defendant four years ago.

The Court: No speeches, Mr. Cuninghame. I just asked you a simple question. So you don't need this testimony.

Mr. Cuninghame: No, your Honor, but I have no desire to hold it back.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

The Court: All right. If the defendant wants it it is all right with me. 269 to 272 is stricken and you will have an opportunity to make a record. Start in on 272.

Mr. Cuninghame: May I note an exception, your Honor?

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Cuninghame: Now, where may I start, 273?

The Court: 272, "By Mr. Cuninghame."

"Q. What is your intention, or what is the intention as you understand it, of the holders of these patent properties?

A. I would have to speak on that for the trustees of our former syndicate, because they are part of the Board of Directors of the Moist Cold Company. They have been interested from the earliest time to see this commercially successful, and [405] I have no authority to speak for the Moist Cold Company. I am sorry, but my personal desire, and I know it is their desire, because they have expressed it to me, is that as soon as possible we want to put this de luxe box on the market.

Q. Now I think you said at the outset something to the effect that you had one share of stock in the plaintiff. Have you any other interest in the Plaintiff corporation, Moist Cold?

A. I have a moral obligation to all of the people that have backed me through the years, and I consider that is more than a financial obligation.

Q. Did you turn over any property to them or to the trustees for that group of backers?

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

A. I turned over everything I had to the Continental Company, for which the trustees received 60,000 shares of the Continental stock. Now to make the position clear, prior to that time things were largely in my name. I had had a serious break in my health. I was conscious of the fact that if anything happened to me where I was the key man and had title to things, that that could just disrupt everything.

So I formed a trusteeship with three of the leading backers who backed me through the years as trustees. I turned over full title of everything to them, full control and in that—

Q. You mean trustees for these backers? [406]

A. Yes, and in that trust agreement I set it up that it was to be entirely in their hands, in their judgments. I would not superimpose my judgment on it. That when we got around the corner and got over to a profitable basis, the operation—in the operation—that whatever in their judgment they felt I had coming to me, they would get—and I told them to make it clear from a legal standpoint if it was only one share that I gave a full clearance and a release from any obligations beyond that one share; anything else that I received was to be at their judgment as to what they thought was fair and right.

I also laid out in this Trustee Agreement that they were to take the responsibility of seeing that those of my backers who had backed me right on

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

through were taken care of, and that how they did that was to be based on their judgment, and I tried to word that in such a way that lawyers couldn't get in and interpose technical objections, and so forth. I wanted to protect the interests of those men who had so loyally backed me. I felt it was necessary, because of my state of health. Something might happen to me before our big battle was finished. By putting it in the trustees, I set it up where it was a self-perpetuating organization, and therefore the hazard of any person's death or incapacity would not be loaded onto this operation.

Q. Mr. Potter, I find in glancing through my papers a [407] photostatic copy, or I guess it is the original'—

The Court: How many exhibits are there, Mr. Cuningham?

Mr. Cuningham: They are all together, sir. I think it will just take a minute. They were identified separately in the deposition and here they seem to be marked with one number, Exhibit 3-KKK, seven sheets in all. They are a little long.

The Court: Do you want the jury to look at them?

Mr. Cuningham: They are a little long. I think a later time would be better. I have no objection.

The Court: Go ahead with the question.

Mr. Cuningham: —“being apparently a letter on the letterhead of the Potter Refrigerator Company and attachments. Can you identify that as coming from your files?

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

A. Oh, yes, that comes back to mind. I had completely forgotten it."

Mr. Cuninghame: I offer that in evidence.

Mr. Ramsey: We would object to it on the ground of relevancy.

The Court: All right. Let me take a look at that. I will take that one under advisement.

Mr. Lucas, are you going to ask the questions?

Mr. Lucas: Yes, your Honor.

"Cross-Examination

By Mr. Ramsey:

Q. Mr. Potter, you were testifying about a Trust Agreement. [408] Is that in writing?

A. Yes, sir, that is in writing.

Q. Will you produce it, please?

The Witness: Mr. Cuninghame has it, I think.

We can get it for you.

Mr. Cuninghame: Mr. Potter's secretary has handed me a copy of the photostatic—a photostatic copy of a three-page letter, dated April 4, 1950. apparently a letter agreement, and I hand it now to Mr. Ramsey.

Q. (By Mr. Ramsey): Mr. Potter. I think it should have been handed to you. Would you identify that, and is that the first Trust Agreement to which you referred?

A. Yes, that is the Trust Agreement.

Q. You are handing me a photostatic copy thereof? A. Yes, sir."

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Mr. Lucas: I ask that this be marked for identification as Defendants' Exhibit 120-A.

The Court: Go ahead.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. Mr. Potter, you started to say something about Potter and Halsey.

A. Yes, I don't know what you are referring to. There is such a firm.

Q. And you are interested in that?

A. I am President of it, sir.

Q. And presently? [409] A. Yes.

Q. For how long a period of time?

A. Since its organization.

Q. That was when?

A. I believe that that was approximately 1938. I am not certain. It is necessary to be certain—if it is necessary, I can have the record looked up.

Mr. Ramsey: I think that is satisfactory.

Q. You say that that firm of which you are president was retained and paid by the so-called Syndicate owners?

A. The individual members.

Q. And to do what?

A. To represent their interest in the Potter Enterprises, if I can call it that, because that is the patent, the commercial effort and so forth.

Q. What are you supposed to do?

A. Do everything we could to advance their interests on a service basis.

Q. Substantially carte blanche?

A. What?

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Q. Are you operating—I said *carte blanche*—

A. I know what you mean. Yes, sir.

Q. Would you say that your firm and you were in a management position over their interests or how would you define it?

A. I would say in an advisory position. [410]

Q. And you are paid to do that?

A. They pay us a monthly fee.

Q. And is that continuous?

A. That has continued over a long period of time, sir.

Q. Is that a substantial sum? I don't want to pry into your business, so I don't care to know exactly how much it is.

A. In finances that is a relative thing, because one man might think \$1,000 is substantial; another man might think it is chicken feed."

Mr. Cuninghame: I object to further questions along this line as having nothing to do with the validity or infringement of the Potter patent.

Mr. Lucas: "Mr. Ramsey: I think that it will be connected up."

Mr. Cuninghame: I object, your Honor.

The Court: I am going to overrule the objection on the ground it goes to the witness' interest.

Mr. Lucas: All right.

"Q. Then I will ask you how much is your fee?

A. That has varied.

Q. From what to what?

A. That would vary from \$10 a month from

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

some men up to as high as \$100 a month from others.

Q. How many members are there?

A. That has varied over the years. [411]

Mr. Cuningham: May I note a continuing objection, Mr. Ramsey, to this whole line of testimony about Potter and Halsey?"

Mr. Cuningham: I'm sorry; it will be overruled.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. At the present time, how many members are there?"

A. I would say in the neighborhood of between 90 and 100.

Q. What is the top number?

A. Do you mean over the period of years?

Mr. Ramsey: That is correct.

A. (Continued): I would say approximately 200.

Q. It has never exceeded that?

A. I can't say accurately, sir.

Q. I will ask the question again so that there will be no confusion. What are the total number of so-called members of your syndicate, the top number?

A. You would have to define the period, sir."

Mr. Lucas: Top of page 279 he is not objecting.

Mr. Cuningham: I have no objection.

The Court: Oh, do you want to go—on to, "That is the reason why I rephrased it"?

Mr. Lucas: No, sir; just the paragraph above that, "The Witness."

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

The Court: Go ahead.

“The Witness: Your question is confusing, because part [412] of the question originally—you originally asked about the number of people who employed the services of Potter and Halsey. Now I don’t know whether you want the people who employed Potter and Halsey or if you want to know the number of people who purchased interests in the pump. That is confusing.

Q. That is the reason why I rephrased it. Please give us the number of people first who are syndicate owners, the top number?

A. You will help my thinking if you will make that clear. Thank you. To the best of my knowledge, we sold about 250 interests only in principle in our pump patent, that is, I sold personally. Following some of those sales, some outsiders came in and bought up some of those interests on their own and resold them. They would buy a larger interest and break it up into parts and they would resell it. I had absolutely nothing to do with it, but on the books of the company those transfers, I think, built up close to around the neighborhood of around 500 people, of which I personally was responsible for selling somewheres around the 250 mark—maybe 225 or 250. But due to these outsiders breaking in and speculating in our interests, they brought in a lot of these other people into the picture. I had no means of stopping it. I protested, but it didn’t do any good.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Q. Did anyone other than you sell those original interests [413] on your behalf?

A. I employed some salesmen. Their job was to go out and find people who stated that they would be interested in such a thing or could be interested. Those salesmen explained what it was all about. None of them had authority to close a deal until I okayed it. I even endeavored in most cases to meet those people personally and explain to them that if they came into this picture with me, they would have to rate it as a speculation. Until they could assure me that they were able, without any difficulty on their part, to afford such a speculation, I would not take them in. That was in most cases. Later on——

Mr. Ramsey: I only asked the number.

A. (Continued): I am trying to give you the picture.

Q. You say there were seven salesmen?

A. Several.

Q. How many?

A. It varied from time to time.

Q. The top number?

A. I would say seven or eight at one time.

Q. Was Mr. Bronaugh one of them?

A. Mr. Bronaugh started on that and failed. He was hired as a salesman for that, and he failed.

Q. How long did he act as a salesman?

A. Not over two months. Probably it was [414] less.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Q. That was where?

A. He was hired in Portland and sent to the Seattle office.

Q. Did he later attempt to interest capital in the purchase of these shares?"

Mr. Lucas: You are not objecting?

Mr. Cuninghame: No.

The Court: All right.

"A. No, sir, he did not.

Q. You are quite confident of that?

A. Yes.

Q. He didn't come to Buffalo and attempt to sell shares? A. No, sir, he did not.

Mr. Cuninghame: Please note a continuing objection to all this as to the selling of shares in the pump patent or any other patent. I think it is wholly irrelevant, and immaterial.

Mr. Ramsey: May I proceed?

Q. The number of shareholders that you referred to as being somewhere in the neighborhood of 200, are those that are paying this service fee to your firm?

A. I told you that other people were brought into the picture by outsiders who bought interests and broke them up into smaller parts.

Q. I don't care where they came from. Are they paying?"——

Mr. Cuninghame: No objection. [415]

"A. I am trying to get your question so that I can answer it strictly in accordance with your question.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

You speak of shareholders. I don't understand your question from that standpoint. I want to give you a correct and exact answer.

Originally people bought interests in the Potter Pump Patent. That was a piece of property. It was not shares. We got in the habit of calling them syndicate members. When the Potter Refrigerator Corporation was formed, to which I testified, I testified to the fact that my assets, everything I had, was turned over to a lawyer. He organized the Potter Refrigerator Corp.—or, rather—I am sorry—the Refrigeration Patents Corporation. I must have misstated that in my previous testimony. It was the Refrigeration Patents Corporation. And he caused stock of that company to be distributed to these original people who bought interests in the pump.

In proportion to their interests in that pump patent, thereby they became shareholders, as you call it, in the Refrigeration Patents Corporation, and from that time on the syndicate, as such, ceased to function. The Refrigeration Patents Corporation——

Q. With your explanation, how many of such people were there who were employed by Potter and Halsey?

A. Of those stockholders of Refrigeration Patents Corporation? [416]

Q. As you have defined it. You have defined the relationship.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

A. I would say probably at a maximum about 200 or thereabouts.

Q. Thank you. You spoke of the fact that on September 22, 1950, Mr. Bradkin of Kling and Company came to see you? A. Yes, sir.

Q. In what capacity were you then serving so far as these stockholders were concerned?

A. The same capacity, sir.

Q. What, if anything, did you do thereafter with regard to Mr. Bradkin?

A. The Continental Company or the promoter of it had failed to perform. Mr. Bradkin brought me down and introduced me to Mr. T. Roland Burner, and I discussed the question of financing the Continental Company with him.

Q. Mr. Burner is the attorney of record in this case? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Then what did you do with regard to this matter?

A. Mr. Burner said that he would take the matter up with some of his clients and see whether he could interest them in financing our situation.

Q. Did you have a number of verbal conferences with Mr. Burner? A. I did.

Q. Covering what period of time? [417]

A. I would say from memory probably over a period of a month.

Q. How many conferences?

A. I don't remember exactly. It was several.

Q. Over ten? A. I don't think so.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Q. You say you do or don't think so?

A. I don't think so.

Q. Over five?

A. I can't tell you that. I know it was several. I can't tell you exactly.

Q. I ask you whether or not on November 1, 1950, you addressed a letter to Mr. Burner, and whether that set out an outline of your conversations and your agreement. This is identified as Plaintiff's Exhibit 120-B "for identification and dated 6-14-1951.

A. This is the first time I have read that since it was written. This is so blurred on the last page that I can't decipher it. But that letter I recognize, sir.

Mr. Ramsey: Let the record indicate that the witness took seven minutes and a half to read the letter and to read it very carefully.

Q. Did you write that letter?

A. To the best of my belief, I did.

Q. Did you send a copy of that to Mr. Burner?

A. I must have. [418]

Q. Does this letter constitute the general agreement under which the Moist Cold Corporation was formed? A. In general, yes.

Q. How does it differ?

A. I don't get what you mean—"How does it differ?"

Mr. Ramsey: These are your words. I am trying to understand you. These are your words. You said

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

it does in general. I asked you how it differs. You are the only one who knows.

A. (Continued): There were other things in the minds of the Trustees beyond what was there, things that weren't necessary to put in.

Q. Do you have a copy of this letter in your records here? A. I should have.

Q. Would you produce it, please?"

Mr. Cuninghame: I object to it, your Honor, as irrelevant and I also object to it as not proof.

The Court: Well, I don't know whether it's relevant or not, and so I am going to pass that and take it under advisement along with the other exhibits.

Go ahead. Are you all through? Are you over to 290?

Mr. Lucas: Could I speak to Mr. Ramsey, your Honor, please?

The Court: Yes, you may. [419]

Mr. Lucas: If your Honor please, we will start on page 290.

Mr. Cuninghame: That means that you are not offering the deposition?

Mr. Ramsey: The reason we are not is they are big——

The Court: No; we don't have to have any reason. No speech.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. On your direct examination, Mr. Potter, you referred to that certain affidavit signed by you November 5, 1932, to support a petition to revive, which application was abandoned by reason of failure to respond to the Patent Office

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

action dated April 9, 1932. In that affidavit you stated, 'While I was in Portland it was my practice to consult with him personally and advise him in the preparation of amendments to my application.'

The 'him' referred to was your patent attorney?

Mr. Birkenbeuel: Yes.

Q. Continuing it reads, 'Owing to a long experience in patent matters, I felt that I could analyze citations against my applications and assist in overcoming references by argument or amendment.'

I ask you, do you remember whether this affidavit was put in after the second action of the Patent Office and the application in the Bronaugh-Potter matter?"

Mr. Cuninghame: I move now to strike that as entirely [420] irrelevant as stated in the record and also on the ground since the objection was made I believe it relates to a defense that has been given up by my friends on the other side.

The Court: Is that correct?

Mr. Ramsey: I don't believe so. It goes to the question of the qualifications of this witness who has been testifying on patent matters.

Mr. Cuninghame: No, your Honor; the defense, as I understand it, is the one that the Patent Office was wrong in giving two or three weeks' extension of time to file an answer to an action, and I understood that was given up as not worth pursuing. That's what this affidavit was offered for, it was to procure the delay in answering the patent action of three or four weeks back in 1932.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Mr. Ramsey: You mean that is the position it occupies in the file wrapper?

Mr. Cuningham: Yes.

Mr. Ramsey: But you are not saying that's the purpose that was referred to here?

The Court: Well, I don't want any argument between counsel. You state the basis.

Mr. Ramsey: The relevancy is that this affidavit says he has long experience in patent matters.

Mr. Cuningham: I don't know how that is relevant. The validity of his patent, he can have an invalid patent or not [421] infringed if he is experienced in patent matters.

Mr. Byron: Your Honor, there is just a little more to that. Let me speak a little piece. There is an affidavit here of a certain date in which he, among other things, says that this application will have to be revived. We cannot file a new application. If we do file a new application it will have been filed more than two years after——

The Court: Yes, I understand that.

Mr. Byron: We have a defense here that they are putting in new matters more than two years after certain refrigerators were sold.

Mr. Cuningham: Well, if your Honor please, this affidavit has nothing to do with that matter, as I understand it. Certainly it isn't proof that there were any refrigerators sold.

Mr. Byron: Mr. Potter said that under oath.

Mr. Cuningham: It is not binding even if he

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

did, and even if there have been it makes no difference. But, anyhow, it's not binding on the plaintiff here.

The Court: Well, I will take that under advisement, Mr. Cuningham, and I will rule later as to whether the statements made in the affidavit are admissible.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. Now I ask you if you remember whether this petition to revive in your supporting affidavit was filed after the first or second action of the Patent Office? [422]

A. That I wouldn't know.

Q. To refresh your memory, I will read the affidavit into the record."

The Court: I think that at this time we will hold the reading of the affidavit into the record until I pass upon the admissibility.

Mr. Cuningham: All right.

The Court: Where do you go from there?

Mr. Lucas: 296, your Honor, in the middle of the page.

Mr. Cuningham: That's correct, I think.

Mr. Lucas: "'With said letter he sent a copy of office action (Paper No. 4) rejecting all the claims.'"

The Court: Well, I don't think that comes in now because it refers to the affidavit. Go to 297.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. Have you had a long experience in patent matters, Mr. Potter?

A. From an inventor's standpoint, yes. Not from a lawyer's standpoint.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Q. And you understand what office actions are?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you understand what claims are?

A. Yes.

Q. What amendments or references are?

A. Yes."

Mr. Cuningham: Objection on the ground that it's [423] irrelevant, immaterial.

The Court: Objection overruled.

Mr. Byron: It goes to the very heart of this situation.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Byron: He is O.K. and they proved his claims when he originally filed and the application when it's originally filed, the specification describing what he regarded as his invention at that time. That's all very pertinent here.

The Court: I think the man can tell how much he knows about his patent and patent law, particularly when he has acted as an adviser for 200 investors.

Mr. Lucas: "Mr. Ramsey: You do understand those things, Mr. Potter? A. Yes.

Not as a lawyer. I understand it from my experience as an inventor."

Mr. Cuningham: I move to strike.

The Court: Objection overruled.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. You signed this oath, did you not? A. Yes.

Q. You understood the oath, did you not?

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

A. I did.

Q. And you understand oaths, do you not?

A. I think I do.

Q. But you don't know what Paper No. 2 or Paper No. 4 mean in [424] your oath or in your affidavit?"

Mr. Cuningham: That is objected to. He has not so testified.

The Court: "In your affidavit, do you refer to Paper No. 2? Do you know what Paper No. 2 is?" Did you read that question?

Mr. Lucas: Yes, sir; I did.

The Court: All right. Go ahead.

The Bailiff: "A. At the time I signed that affidavit, Mr. Bond was my attorney. He must have pointed out to me at that time what Paper No. 2 was. After all these years, I cannot identify in my mind Paper No. 2. That is asking too much. Undoubtedly I knew what that Paper No. 2 was. He probably put that paper in front of me.

Q. Do you know from reading your affidavit that there was one office action that was sent to you? A. Yes.

Q. And that was sent to you in due time, referring to your affidavit? A. Yes.

Q. Now, in this portion that I asked you about originally, where you said when you were in Portland it was your practice to consult with your attorney personally? A. Correct."

The Court: One second. I think that all of this

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

testimony [425] is relevant to the affidavit and either it should come in in its entirety or it should be deleted. And I am going to ask you to refrain from asking any more questions dealing with this issue until I have made my ruling.

Mr. Lucas: If your Honor please, may we go to the bottom of page 303?

The Court: That's right.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. While you were in Portland—possibly I had better get a chronology of your activities, so that there will be no confusion, and we will be able to move along.

You are now about sixty-eight years of age, Mr. Potter? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you were born in Oakland, California, in 1887? A. Yes, 1887.

Q. You lived in California until you were fifteen or sixteen years of age? A. Correct.

Q. And in 1902 when you were approximately fifteen years old, you moved to Portland, Oregon? A. Approximately that.

Q. You lived in Portland, Oregon, until about 1915 or 1916?

A. There was a short interval in there where I went to San Francisco with my parents, and then returned—I returned to Portland.

Q. Except for that time interval, you were living in Portland, [426] Oregon? A. Yes.

Q. You attended high school in Portland?

A. I did.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Q. And the time that you went to San Francisco was in 1916? Is that correct?

A. Again, to pick a date out, I find it difficult. I am not criticizing.

Q. It isn't important. Let us pass on to another thing. On June 20, 1910, were you one of the incorporators and First President of the Coin Machine Manufacturing Company? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And how long did you occupy that position?

A. I would say until 1916, approximately. I might be off a little.

Q. Was that immediately preceding your trip to San Francisco?

A. No, I had been in San Francisco before that company was incorporated.

Q. Then you would say from 1910 to 1916 you were associated with the Coin Machine Manufacturing Company? Were you President at all times during those periods of time?

A. Toward the end, I was not President.

Q. When did you then leave Portland?

A. I would say somewhere around 1917. Again, my mind works on relations, and if I take a single date without checking it [427] with relation, but I would say roughly about 1917.

Q. How long were you in San Francisco?

The Witness: Are you inferring that—I am trying to understand or co-operate with you—but you are inferring that I went to San Francisco after 1917.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Mr. Ramsey: You told me that. I asked you how long you were in San Francisco when you did go.

A. I said I went to San Francisco before the date you speak of with my parents, and then I returned to Portland.

Q. And you were associated with Coin Machine in Portland——

A. After I returned to Portland.

Q. That was from 1910 to 1917, you say?

A. Approximately.

Q. Then where did you go?

A. Then I went East.

Q. By East you mean what?

A. I first went to Chicago.

Q. How long were you there?

A. Several months.

Q. Then where did you go?

A. Then I went to Detroit.

Q. How long were you there?

A. Several months.

Q. Then where did you go?

A. Then I came to New York. [428]

Q. How long were you in New York?

A. I was in New York quite a while, and from New York I moved to——

Q. How long were you in New York?

A. I would have to find some basis for checking my memory.

Q. Would you say approximately one year?

A. That is reasonably close.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Q. Where were your offices?

A. If I remember correctly, I think around 42nd Street at what they at that time called the Aeolian Building, the piano people.

Q. During the time that you were in Chicago and Detroit, what were you doing?

A. I was trying to see whether I wanted to make my permanent headquarters and enter business there. [429]

Q. When you later moved to New York, what were you doing?

A. I opened an office as a Consulting Engineer.

Q. Do you mean to use the word "Engineer" advisedly?

A. Not from the standpoint of a college degree.

Q. Did you have a high school degree?

A. I did not finish high school, sir.

Q. But you were consulting on some basis with clients or customers?

A. I was trying to build up a clientele.

Mr. Ramsey: Thank you.

Q. Then you moved where?

A. Then I moved to Orange, where I had my residence.

Q. And there under what name did you do business in New York? A. My own name, sir.

Q. What name did you do business under?"

Mr. Cuninghame: That I thought we had agreed to come out.

Mr. Lucas: That is not on my copy. Will you go to the answer in the middle of Page 308.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

“A. A corporation was formed by those gentlemen and some others that I was introduced to, called the Federated Engineers Development Corporation, and they put me in as President of that corporation. [430]

Q. Was that incorporated in December 11, 1919?

A. It could have been.

Q. You say that prior to the date of incorporation you were not doing business at West 44th Street under the name Engineering Development Company? A. I did not say that.

Q. I am asking you that.

A. It may be that when the Federated Engineers Development Company was formed the office might have been associated or in my office at that address.

Q. How long were you associated with the Federated Engineers Development Corporation?

A. I was President of that corporation until somewhere around the latter part of 1924 or the first part of 1925, I think.

Q. I ask you whether in 1924 you organized a Delaware corporation, offices at 1155 Broadway, New York, New York, to sell stock in Fedco Number Plate Corporation; is that correct?

A. I was one of the incorporators, I believe. About that I am not certain, but I believe I was one of them.

Q. Did you hold an office in that corporation?

A. Of the Fedco Number Plate?

Mr. Ramsey: Yes.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

A. I do not believe I did; no, sir.

Q. After that where did you go? [431]

A. I was still with the Federated Engineers.

Q. When did you return to Portland?

A. In 1925, if I remember correctly. I can check my memory on that. In 1925, yes.

Q. During the time you say you were with Federated Engineers Development Corporation, you were living in Orange? A. Yes.

Q. And did business in Hoboken, New Jersey?

A. We were on the dividing line between Hoboken and Jersey City, and below us was Hoboken, and I think that we were right on the line. I am not absolutely certain whether we were in Jersey City or in Hoboken. We were closer to Hoboken.

Q. Wherever you were, you did business there for ten years? A. Yes.

Q. When you returned to Portland you did business originally under your name, T. Irving Potter?

A. When I returned to Portland in 1925, yes.

Q. And later you formed Refrigerator Sales Company?

A. The Potter Refrigerator Sales Company was formed.

Q. Is that a corporation? A. Yes.

Q. You are not confusing that with Potter Refrigerator Corporation, are you?

A. No, sir. [432]

Q. They are two separate corporations?

A. Yes.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Q. Now, after that chronology and your statements that you had a long experience in patent matters, did you have experience in patent matters in many of these companies with which you were associated during this period of time, from 1910 to 1925?

A. My experience in patent matters as an inventor—and I want to emphasize as inventor, not a lawyer—dated from my early youth when I was making inventions, and some of which I patented.

Q. We are talking about experience from or in patent matters.

A. As an inventor, yes. That continued through the years.

Q. Well——

A. (Continued): I had many inventions.

Q. Prior to 1925 how many inventions did you file applications for patents on?

A. Oh, before 1925——

Q. When you returned to Portland.

A. This is only a guess. I would say thirty or thirty-five. That is just a guess.

Q. I presume you did business with a number of different attorneys?

A. My early work was handled by a firm in Washington, [433] D. C., the firm of Church & Church. Before that I think my first efforts to get a patent was through Munn & Company. They owned the Scientific American, and they had a Patent Department where they took patents for in-

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

ventors. So my first experience was with Mumm & Company, and as a youth I was impressed with the Scientific American, so I thought this must be good.

Mr. Cuningham: How old were you, Mr. Potter, approximately?

A. Oh, I was in my eighteens, or my teens.

Mr. Cuningham: Twenty or twenty-one?

The Witness: Yes.

Q. (By Mr. Ramsey): Now in connection with those patent applications, and any patents that were obtained thereon, did you consult with your attorneys?

A. If they were within physical reach, I did.

Q. Did you write to them or telephone them?

A. You are recalling to my mind now things that I have not thought of for many years.

Mr. Cuningham: Please answer the question, Mr. Potter.

A. Yes.

Q. And that was the background of your statement, that through thirty or thirty-five patents you had watched them closely, generally, in the preparations stage, the application stage? [434]

A. At the beginning I was a youth. I had an invention. I didn't know patent practice, so I didn't encroach on the first ones. As I went along, I gathered more experience and therefore my contact with the attorneys became more intimate.

Q. Fine; but you spoke of a practice, and you are the only one who knows. I am trying to find

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

out when the practice began of consulting with your attorneys and advising them.

A. I can't say when it began. It was a gradual growth of experience.

Q. Well, would you say prior to 1910?

A. Yes.

Q. And since 1910 to 1925 you did follow that practice?

A. Yes, I would say you are accurate on that.

Q. Fine. And you read carefully all applications that were presented to you for signature?

A. You are so specific.

Q. I am speaking of your practice.

A. (Continued): I tried to take an interest in it and follow it, but at this late day and age, I can't say in each and every case I read everything carefully. That is what you are asking me to say. I am talking in terms of principle."

Mr. Lucas: If your Honor please, I am concerned about [435] the next question, the affidavit.

The Court: We will omit that for the time being.

Mr. Luas: We will go to the top of Page 314.

"Q. And you have testified as to the length of your experience in following that practice and your connection with the applications——

A. As an inventor.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Q. As an inventor. You are not a lawyer, are you?

A. Not remotely.

Mr. Ramsey: Thank you.

Q. And in that practice, you analyzed the citations, as you say. I suppose that means that you read the patents that are cited by way of rejection?

A. To the best of my ability I did.

Q. And then give the results of your determination to your attorney for his——

A. I don't know how you or what you mean by determine, but I formed conclusions, and I gave him my picture.

Q. Well, following that practice, did you give Mr. Birkenbeuel the advantage of your long experience in connection with the amendment filed over his signature on April 4, 1932?

A. I could not have, because I was in Buffalo in 1932. I worked with Mr. Birkenbeuel at the beginning on that by explaining the box, its functions. We had what we called [436] the McChesney Box in front of him. I explained to him that box. I asked him to make the application for it. Now I left Portland in the spring of 1931. Mr. Birkenbeuel carried on from his standpoint, but that meant a physical separation between Birkenbeuel and myself. I was in Buffalo, and he was in Portland.

Q. Then you say that your usual experience, you didn't help with the amendment then in April 4, 1932, in the case in question?

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

A. I would have to see what that amendment was. I can't carry all those things in my mind, specifically.

Mr. Ramsey: I don't blame you.

Q. Before you filed the application for patent, did you make a preliminary examination? I am talking about the patent in suit—pardon me, Mr. Byron corrects me on that. It is the original patent, on which the reissue is the one in suit.

A. I do not remember whether we had a patent research on that or not.

Q. When did the Anderson patent, U. S. Patent No. 1,439,051 come to your attention?

A. That was while I was in Buffalo, and at this moment I cannot remember how that came to my attention. I know it came to my attention. At this moment I don't remember how it came to my attention. [437]

Q. Mr. Bronaugh was in Portland?

A. Yes.

Q. And he might have had a search either before or afterwards, and that is the reason you cannot remember?

A. Mr. Bronaugh would not have that within his province.

Q. So that any search made would be under your direction rather than Mr. Bronaugh?

A. Yes, if it was made, it would have been under my direction, and I do not say it was not made or that it was made. I don't remember.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Q. Can you fix a time when you were in Buffalo when this Anderson patent was first brought to your attention? A. During 1931, sir.

Q. The first part of the year, or the latter part of the year?

A. To the best of my ability, I would say probably in the middle of the year.

Q. Would it help you to be reminded that you bought this patent according to your knowledge and your testimony, October 2, 1931?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long before that had you known of the Anderson patent?

A. A very short time. It might have been months, I would say. [438]

Q. You don't know whether Mr. Birkenbeuel called this patent to your attention or not?

A. I wish that I could remember, but at the moment I can't place it in my mind.

Q. Why did you buy the Anderson Patent No. 1,439,051?"

Mr. Cuningham: The answer is on Page 319.

"A. I bought that patent because it seemed to cover one of the elements which we were using in our Potter Box, and that was the circuit, the refrigeration circuit that we were using.

It was easier; I mean cheaper and quicker to buy that patent than it would be to hold up our

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

production plans and redesign our refrigerator circuit.

Q. Please state what that circuit was that we are concerned with, controlled by the Anderson Patent?

A. That was what I would call a series circuit."

Mr. Cuningham: Now, if your Honor please, I think, as I recall this from now on, and subject to correction if I am in error, this relates solely to the Anderson patent. I think it is entirely improper cross-examination; not within the scope of the direct examination.

The Court: Did he refer to the Anderson patent in his testimony in chief? [439]

Mr. Cuningham: I think, your Honor, there may be some reference to it because the portions that we have omitted covered the period when he bought it. I am not sure. We omitted a great chronological block of this testimony.

Mr. Byron: This testimony, your Honor, is very pertinent. Mr. Potter testified that he purchased this Anderson patent because it showed a series circuit.

Mr. Maguire: It seems to me——

Mr. Byron: May I make my statement?

Mr. Maguire: I am just suggesting that you should not make your statement. This may not be the proper place in which to make your statement.

Mr. Byron: I will not say anything that is out of order.

The Court: It is almost 12:15. Mr. Byron, will you please take up your objection a few minutes later. We will excuse the jury now and I shall then pass upon the admissibility of that testimony.

Ladies and gentlemen, we will take a recess until 2:00 o'clock.

(Thereupon, the jury retired for the noon recess, and the following proceedings were had without the presence of the jury.) [440]

The Court: Proceed.

Mr. Byron: Mr. Potter testified that he bought this Anderson patent for one reason, that it had a series circuit which he was embodying in his Potter refrigerator. The testimony that the other side wishes have deleted is along this line, your Honor. We show, and Potter admits, element for element, element in the Potter arrangement, same element in Anderson. We go right down the line, and he admits that all of the elements that I refer to in the Potter are found in Anderson, and he bought that patent because he was infringing, not because of a series circuit but because of the whole organization, and it is very pertinent on the question of infringement.

The Court: I want to say this. I have become convinced here since the beginning of this case that most of the attorneys operate under the theory of Pike Davis; that is, you object to evidence because it is harmful regardless of whether it is admissible or not, under the rules, and you try to get in evi-

dence that is helpful regardless of whether it is admissible.

As I see this particular testimony, Mr. Potter was able to testify concerning the patent and the reach of the claims because he was one of the original inventors. It was on that basis that we prevented the testimony of Mr. Bronaugh when I questioned his qualification. In addition [441] to that, we have Mr. Potter testifying that, on his direct examination, that he is a management consultant or a consultant with reference to this patent. He might not be qualified, in spite of his statements, to talk about the Anderson patent, but he is qualified to compare the Anderson patent to the Potter patent particularly. This evidence, if it shows what Mr. Byron says it shows, is admissible on the question of impeachment. He says he bought it because it shows a circuit, but if they can prove that he bought it because the Potter patent infringed this patent or he felt it did, I think it is quite cogent testimony. I am going to rule that that is admissible.

Now, tell me more about that affidavit. What is the relevance? Perhaps I had better hear from Mr. Cuninghame first. You are objecting to that affidavit, which I have not read recently, but is that the affidavit that was referred to in the General Electric case?

Mr. Cuninghame: It was referred to in both the General Electric and the Stewart-Warner cases. It is in the Stewart-Warner record, your Honor.

The Court: What defense does that have to do with?

Mr. Cuningham: The affidavit was offered——

The Court: On the reinstatement petition?

Mr. Cuningham: Pardon?

The Court: On the reinstatement petition? [442]

Mr. Cuningham: Yes, your Honor.

The Court: I ruled some time ago that was abandoned by the defendants in the defense in the original case or in our first case before it went to the Court of Appeals.

Mr. Cuningham: I am sure, your Honor, I cannot remember. It was abandoned recently, then, over again because it was within the last two weeks.

The Court: As I understand it, Mr. Byron does not want to use it for that purpose but merely for admissions contained in the statement.

Mr. Byron: That is right.

The Court: For what purpose?

Mr. Byron: I can tell you exactly, your Honor.

The Court: Proceed.

Mr. Byron: Mr. Potter took the position that he had to have his application reinstated rather than dropping that and filing another application, and the reason he gave was, "If I file another application, the filing date will be more than two years after I sold a refrigerator embodying my invention, and, therefore, I could not come in under the law because I could not get a valid patent. There would be a statutory bar because I did not file the application within two years after I made a sale." Now,

it is on that.

The Court: What does that prove or disprove in this [443] case?

Mr. Byron: Well, for the first time, two years after—more than two years after he made that sale he injects for the first time descriptions about this differential insulation and also about this moist cold feature. There are no claims in this original application about moist cold at all.

The Court: What difference would that make, Mr. Byron? How would Mr. Potter's statement of what he regarded the law—and I understand it is the law——

Mr. Byron: He does not make a statement with respect to the law. He takes oath that he sold a refrigerator embodying his invention on a certain date. Now, that date is more than two years, under his oath, more than two years—his application—more than two years after these were sold, that is, two years after he introduced into his application these features, the moist cold feature in the claims and the differential insulation into his claims.

The Court: I do not understand that yet.

Mr. Byron: It is an entirely different defense.

The Court: You are even now. I do not understand Mr. Cuninghame's original statement on the patent, and I do not understand your claim here. I am going to go back to the one statement that I made. Don't you have independent evidence to show that this box was constructed some two [444] years before the date of the application?

Mr. Byron: Well, before, two years before amendments in the application bringing in for the first time these alleged patentable features.

The Court: To what defense does this testimony go?

Mr. Byron: Statutory bar; more than two years.

The Court: Is it a legal bar? Are you going to submit it to the jury?

Mr. Byron: It is a statutory bar, yes, it is—

The Court: You are going to submit that as an issue to the jury?

Mr. Byron: Yes—well, submit it to the Court.

The Court: Either it is a question of fact or it is not; and if it is a question of fact, it goes to the jury.

Mr. Byron: Yes. I think it is largely a question of law, your Honor.

The Court: What page is it on? Well, I will take a look at it, and I will try to make a determination by 2:00 o'clock. We will come back a little early and then we will look at it, and I will pass upon all these issues.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Court: I did not read all of the Bommer deposition so I cannot tell what Bommer testified to on his direct examination. As I read the recross, Mr. Byron is now impeaching Bommer on something that he testified to in the [445] Stewart-Warner case, an inconsistent statement. Now, you cannot ask on recross a question for the first time, but

what I would like to know is, did Mr. Bommer make a statement which was in conflict with the testimony he gave in the Stewart-Warner case.

Mr. Cuninghame: If your Honor please, perhaps I can help. I will withdraw my motion to strike all of the so-called impeaching—and I do not agree that it is impeaching—testimony, and it may go in. I withdraw the motion to strike.

The Court: Fine. I do not know whether that came in originally or not. If he did make an inconsistent statement, obviously it is admissible. We will recess until 2:00 o'clock.

(Thereupon, a recess was taken until 2:00 o'clock p.m.) [446]

Afternoon Session

(Court reconvened, pursuant to adjournment, at 1:45 o'clock p.m., and the following proceedings were had herein:)

(The following proceedings were held in Chambers out of the presence of the jury.)

The Court: You wanted to make a statement concerning the deposition, didn't you?

Mr. Byron: In connection with the reading of the Potter deposition, we were at page 320 when a recess was taken and a discussion followed to the Court as a result of which defendant concluded that they would not read at this time before the jury pages 320 up to the middle of page 326. That is up to the time that Mr. Byron cross-examined.

The Court: Well, do you want to read from 326 to the end of the deposition?

Mr. Byron: Yes, sir.

The Court: Well, what about the portions that I reserved prior to page 326, dealing with the affidavit written by T. Irving Potter and the questions concerning the affidavit?

Mr. Byron: Well, we find that the affidavit is in the file wrapper of the original Potter patent and that is in evidence or will be, and we can refer to that affidavit from [447] the file wrapper.

The Court: Now, I don't understand what you mean, you are "refraining from reading at this time." Do you mean you reserve the right to read pages 320 to 326 at a later time or are you—

Mr. Byron: I think we can waive that, your Honor.

The Court: Waive it entirely?

Mr. Byron: Yes.

The Court: Mr. Cuninghame, you heard the statement of Mr. Byron. He merely wants to put in the evidence between 326 and the end of the deposition, about five pages.

Mr. Cuninghame: That is still subject to my motion to strike.

The Court: I am going to rule that the evidence is admissible and you may read that portion of the deposition.

Mr. Cuninghame: Have you now ruled, or do you want to hear argument on it?

The Court: I have ruled, but you may have an exception to my ruling.

Mr. Cuningham: Yes, sir.

The Court: It's almost 2:00 o'clock. We are not going to permit you to make an offer of proof at this time.

Mr. Cuningham: Yes.

The Court: But you will be given an opportunity at a later time. [448]

Now, I want to rule on two other documents. Exhibit 3-KKK, as I understand it, the defendant has objected to the admissibility of this exhibit. On what grounds? What are you objecting for, on the ground of hearsay?

Mr. Ramsey: Oh, yes. That one on hearsay.

The Court: What do you claim for this, Mr. Cuningham?

Mr. Cuningham: Well, your Honor, I don't think it's hearsay, it's part of the business records of the Potter Refrigerator Corporation.

The Court: Well, it's a survey made by an advertising agency.

Mr. Cuningham: It shows the rating of the different refrigerators as of the time of the agency, and I think it is very significant as to whether or not we had fulfilled in the open marketplace the promises of our patent. [449]

The Court: How are they going to be able to see the study and find out how large a sample was taken and whether that sample was adequate and various things surrounding that, the information therein contained?

Mr. Cuningham: I do not think, if your Honor please, that is essential. They have their right to bring their own proof in. I would not object to any such study.

The Court: How could they bring their proof in at this late date when that was written, how many years ago?

Mr. Cuningham: They can have their case.

Mr. Maguire: 1935.

The Court: 1935.

Mr. Maguire: I think it does have a ground of admissibility, your Honor, quite aside from what has been suggested. This is one of the things upon which the plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest acted in getting out of the market. It is a contemporaneous record.

Mr. Cuningham: Predecessor, that is true, in interest.

The Court: What page was that offered on?

Mr. Cuningham: I think I can tell you that. It is in the back of the book here.

The Court: It might be admissible on another ground.

Mr. Cuningham: What is the Potter number?

The Court: 22.

Mr. Cuningham: 22, that is on Page 274. [450]

The Court: Page 274.

Mr. Cuningham: I do not know what part of the testimony you ruled out. I do not think it is, or we would not have put it in. There was no objection to it at the time.

The Court: What about that?

Mr. Kolisch: Well, you reserve your objections.

Mr. Cuninghame: No objection was reserved.

Mr. Kolisch: You do not have to, under the rules.

The Court: You did not object, though.

Mr. Kolisch: You do not have to.

Mr. Byron: We do now.

Mr. Kolisch: We can now.

The Court: But you cannot now only on the basis of materiality.

Mr. Cuninghame: I should think so, your Honor.

Mr. Kolisch: I think only the questions as to the form of the question. All other objections are reserved.

The Court: Let us take a look. The vice of the offer is that there was no showing that this was a record kept in the ordinary course of business. If there had been such an offer, you could get it in under the shop book rule.

Mr. Cuninghame: I think there is, sir.

The Court: No, there is not. I just checked it.

Mr. Cuninghame: Well, of course, I state now that it was one of the papers, and he identified it. [451]

Mr. Maguire: Well, I do not think counsel would make any question that it was a paper, part of the files as of the date it was performed.

The Court: I am going to let it in on this ground. 32(e) says: "Objections to the competency of a witness or to the competency, relevancy, or

materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to make them before or during the taking of the deposition, unless the ground of the objection is one which might have been obviated or removed if presented at that time.”

If they objected to that testimony on the ground that it was not under the shop book rule, then that testimony could have been obviated at the time, and I am going to let it in on that ground. With reference to the two exhibits, 120-A and -B, what is the basis of the objection to them?

Mr. Cuninghame: What are those, sir? I am sorry.

The Court: They are the letters that Mr. Potter says that he is the owner of the patent and all the rights, and he is transferring them over to these corporations. Then there is one where he says that he has right of representation as far as all of the trustees are concerned in making deals.

Mr. Cuninghame: Well, your Honor, the really basic objection to these is that they are not—the one of September 1, 1950, is not proved, for one thing. There is [452] no proof that this was ever signed—I happen to know that it was not.

Mr. Byron: Oh, well——

The Court: What did Mr. Potter say about that? Let me find the testimony.

Mr. Cuninghame: That it has no bearing—that is the main objection—shows how dangerous it is to let things, this sort of thing, in—the main objection, your Honor, is that it is prejudicial and has nothing whatsoever to do with the main issues in

the case, the validity and infringement of the patent. It has, in fact, no relevancy to any serious issue in the case that I know of.

The Court: I was under the impression prior to the time of the trial that there was no question about title. At the commencement of the discussion with reference to this trial Mr. Ramsey pointed out that he never intended to waive title and that he did not put it in issue—he merely did not put it in issue on the segregated issues involving summary. I told him at that time that ordinarily we require such things to be raised, but in view of the fact that there was a great number of out-of-town lawyers who were not acquainted with our particular rules, local rules, that I was making an exception in this case and going to permit him to raise the issue now.

I do not think that I can keep out evidence [453] because it is not relevant to the main issues, so-called infringement or validity, but here is an issue which the defendants claim that they are seriously urging, and, therefore, if there are no technical objections to the admission of the exhibit, I am going to let it in.

Now, you say that this agreement was never signed?

Mr. Cuninghame: Yes, I object to its competency.

The Court: **What did Potter say about it?**

Mr. Byron: He said he wrote it and sent it, and Mr. Burner had several conferences in connection with it.

Mr. Cuningham: I think that is correct, your Honor, and I happen to know it was never signed.

Mr. Byron: Oh, well—

Mr. Cuningham: But that is not testimony; it is not proved.

The Court: The objections are overruled, and it may be admitted; all three of the exhibits are.

(Trust agreement previously marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 120-A was received in evidence.)

(Letter to Mr. Burner dated November 1, 1950, previously marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 120-B was received in evidence.)

Mr. Cuningham: Your Honor, this one—and by this [454] one I mean 120-A—the one we have been talking about is 120-B—that, of course, is a signed agreement.

The Court: Are you willing to do this: Instead of making Mr. Cuningham take the stand, are you willing to stipulate that if Mr. Cuningham testified he would testify that he of his own knowledge knows that that agreement was never signed?

Mr. Byron: No.

Mr. Cuningham: Your Honor, I will not say that. I will say that I have seen an original, I believe it is—just this to Burner—I saw the original of this probably three or four months ago, and then I saw it again in October. It had not—the original had not been signed that I saw in Mr. Burner's files, and there were notes on the side indicating objections to this and that. That was in the file. I

think it was after the Potter deposition that I paid particular attention to it.

Mr. Byron: Mr. Potter says about that on Page——

The Court: Well, he admits that, but the only thing is if Mr. Cuningham knows of his own knowledge that it had not been signed, I was wondering whether you would be willing to stipulate that he would so testify; not that it is true; apparently he does not know whether it was signed—a copy, a duplicate original may have been signed. [455]

Mr. Cuningham: All I know is what I saw, your Honor.

The Court: Yes, that is right.

Mr. Cuningham: It is my inference.

The Court: Yes, that is right. I was trying to avoid the necessity of counsel, any counsel in this case, taking the stand. I do not like that in my Court, and when an attorney says that this is the state of the record I think that counsel should stipulate to it.

Mr. Cuningham: Do you know what I would like to offer to do? I will wire Burner and have him send it on here.

The Court: That would not show that another copy, a duplicate original, was not signed. Potter has already testified——

Mr. Byron: Here is what Potter said:

“Does this letter constitute a general agreement in which Moist Cold Corporation was formed? In general, yes. How does it differ?”

And then he could not point out any difference. Then we made an offer.

Mr. Cuningham: Burner, of course, should know, and the trustees.

The Court: Would you permit Burner, if they got a wire from Burner to the effect——

Mr. Byron: No, I would not take that. [456]

Mr. Ramsey: If I showed you an exhibit taken in the New York case showing signatures on it, would that relieve your mind?

Mr. Cuningham: Surely; I wish you would.

Mr. Byron: No, you cannot do that.

Mr. Ramsey: I know that first was never signed.

The Court: Well, go ahead and see. I do not want anybody to do something that they feel they should not, but, ordinarily in this Court these courtesies are extended to every member of the Bar, and I just want to tell you nobody is going to be required to do it. Let us go ahead.

Mr. Ramsey: We will not observe any courtesies.

The Court: Let us talk about it a little later.

Mr. Cuningham: Your Honor, I have another exhibit marked in the portion you marked out. Just to make the record, I assume the exhibit goes out with the testimony? It is marked 3-HHH for Identification (presenting document to the Court). It is germane, of course, to the testimony you ruled out.

The Court: All right; that goes out, also.

Mr. Cuningham: Now, sir, may I take this first

opportunity I have had to give notice of the reliance on other depositions of the Admiral Company and other portions of them than I did before. It is the exclusion of this testimony that has forced that change in my attitude, and I shall [457] start to read them as soon as possible.

Mr. Byron: Are you going to tell me what portions?

Mr. Cuningham: Do you want to take the time now?

The Court: Are we going to do it today?

Mr. Cuningham: Oh, I do not think so, sir.

The Court: Do it after a while.

(Thereupon, Court and counsel repaired to open Court where the following proceedings were had with the jury sitting:)

The Court: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we were late this afternoon again, but I think we have accomplished quite a bit, and, as a result, the testimony that you will hear has been considerably shortened. We are going to recess or adjourn for the day promptly at 4:00 o'clock. It is snowing outside, and there may be some jurors who live some distance from the center of town, and they may want to be able to get home.

We will start now with Page 326, beginning the cross-examination by Mr. Byron. As you know, Mr. Lucas takes the part of Mr. Byron. Mr. Byron, what are you going to do—point out these numbers?

Mr. Byron: Yes; Mr. Lucas is going to read my cross-examination questions to Mr. Potter, and as it is read I am going to point out corresponding parts with respect to the [458] Potter Patent in Suit. By the way, this is the Potter Patent in Suit (indicating). It is not so marked, but it is, and I am going to point corresponding parts in the Anderson Patent. It is not marked "Anderson," but that is one drawing of the Anderson Patent in Suit (indicating), and I am going to show corresponding parts. This Anderson Patent is, oh, ten, twelve, thirteen years earlier than the Potter.

Mr. Ramsey: Not the Anderson Patent in Suit.

Mr. Byron: No, not the Anderson Patent in Suit. It is the Potter Patent in Suit. Anderson is the reference against it.

DEPOSITION OF T. IRVING POTTER

Cross-Examination (Continued)

"Q. Mr. Potter, in your patent in suit you have or show a Cabinet 10, do you not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the Anderson patent shows a Cabinet 9, does it not?

A. I don't know what the number is, but it shows the cabinet. I don't know whether that would indicate just merely a structure around the machine compartment, but I say that shows a cabinet. Doesn't that answer you?

Mr. Byron: I was trying to simplify it for you by giving numbers.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Q. (By Mr. Byron): Now, in the Potter construction there [459] is a freezing compartment, is there not? A. Yes.

Q. That is the intermediate compartment?

A. I don't know what you mean.

Q. It is between the cooling compartment 14 and the lower compartment 11?

A. Yes, there is a compartment between the two."

Mr. Cuninghame: May I note on the record, your Honor, that Mr. Byron is pointing both to compartments 13 and 12 when he questioned as to the "freezing compartment."

Mr. Byron: Let us have an understanding on that. As I understand the position of plaintiffs, it is that they have a portion in which trays are set for freezing water, and that is, say, 8 degrees below zero, and the adjacent compartment 13 is 20 degrees above zero but still freezing because it is below 22 degrees. Now, then——

Mr. Cuninghame: Objection. I do not think you should testify as to what this is.

Mr. Byron: I am not. I am asking you how we shall consider it. I do not want to make any misrepresentations, and I will not.

Mr. Cuninghame: I am not prepared to take a position. I note that you take the position that the two compartments were the same. [460]

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Mr. Byron: Well, he said "freezing compartment," and those are both freezing compartments, and I thought I should not just show one but both freezing compartments.

The Court: Go ahead. [461]

The Court: All right. Go ahead.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. And there is a freezing compartment 7 in the Anderson patent?

A. They have a freezing compartment there, yes.

Q. And there is a cooling compartment 14 in the Potter refrigerator, I assume from the patent in suit, 14; is that right?

A. A compartment labeled 14, yes.

Q. And that is a cooling compartment, is it?

A. Yes.

Q. That is the lower temperature compartment?

A. No, higher.

Q. Thirty-two degrees and over?

A. Yes.

Q. And then there is a corresponding cooling or refrigerating compartment—

Mr. Cuninghame: I have an objection to that 'corresponding.'

Q. (Continued): But there is a cooling or refrigerating compartment 6 in the Anderson patent, am I right?

A. They have a compartment marked 6 in the Anderson.

Q. And that is for cooling food at a temperature above 32 degrees, is it not?

Mr. Cuninghame: I make an objection.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

A. There is no indication of what the temperature is.

Q. The temperature in compartment 7 is below freezing, is [462] it not?

A. There is no indication.

Q. Well, there is a description of it in the specifications.

A. That is why I said I would have to study this.

Q. Now there is a freezing coil 22 in the Potter arrangement, is there not? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And there is a freezing coil?

A. That is in the brine tanks.

Q. And there is a freezing coil 34 in the Anderson patent?

A. From the drawing that could be a freezing coil or not.

Q. Well there are ice trays 37 there, are there not?

A. There seems to be indications of ice trays there.

Q. And then they would be freezing coils, would they not? A. In all probability.

Q. And there is a cooling coil, a refrigerant coil 40 in the upper chamber of Anderson, is there not?"

Mr. Cuningham: Mr. Byron is pointing—

Mr. Byron: Just don't get excited. I will point to the right one.

The Bailiff: "A. There is something marked 40 and the drawing shows a pipe system in the

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

upper compartment. I don't know whether that 40 identifies that, but it shows a pipe system——

Q. And there is a cooling coil 25 in the upper compartment [463] 14 of the Potter arrangement?

A. There is, sir.

Q. And the freezing coil 22 in Potter and the cooling coil 25 in Potter are connected in series are they not? A. Yes.

Q. And the freezing coil 34 in Anderson is connected to the cooling coil 40 in Anderson, and they are connected in series? A. Yes.

Q. And the freezing coil 22 in Potter is connected to the compressor condenser set in compartment 11; is that right?

A. The freezing coil 22 is connected to the compressor equipment.

Q. That is correct?

A. Yes, in the Potter, yes.

Q. And the freezing coil 34 in Anderson is connected to the compressor condenser set in Anderson?

A. Yes.

Q. And in the Potter patent there is an expansion valve 23 between the condenser compressor set and the freezing coil 22; is that correct?

A. There is an expansion valve 23——

Q. Between the freezing coil 22 and the condenser compressor set? A. Yes. [464]

Q. Now in Anderson, there is an expansion valve 33 between the freezing coil 34 and the condenser compressor set in Anderson, is that right?

A. That looks like an expansion valve, and I presume it is.

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Mr. Byron: It is described as such.

The Witness: All right.

Q. And then in the Potter arrangement, there is connection between the cooling coil 25 and the condenser compressor set, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And in Anderson patent, there is a connection between the cooling coil 40 and the condenser compressor set, is that right? A. Yes.

Q. And in the Potter arrangement, there is a thermostat 31 in the cooling compartment, is that correct? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And I call your attention to the Anderson patent specification, page 1, beginning in line 91. Do you find that in the second column?

A. I find line 91, yes.

Q. And I quote now 'suitable automatic controlling mechanism, as exemplified by a thermostat in the refrigerating chamber,'—that refers to a thermostat, does it not in the refrigerating room or rather the refrigerating chamber? [465]

A. They say a thermostat, yes.

Q. In connection with the Potter refrigerator, you used Anderson patent No. 1439051 on the patent plate secured to your Potter refrigerator; is that correct? A. Yes, sir.

Mr. Byron: The cross-examination is closed.

Mr. Cuningham: I have no redirect.

Mr. Byron: The deposition is closed."

The Court: Do you want Mr. Hart for another deposition?

(Deposition of T. Irving Potter.)

Mr. Cuningham, will you announce the name of the deposition you desire?

Mr. Cuningham: May I confer with Mr. Cheat-ham?

The Court: Yes. Excuse me.

Mr. Cuningham: May it please the Court, I would like to read the deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer, taken on the 21st day of April, 1955, at Orlando, Florida.

The Court: Is it Bommer?

Mr. Cuningham: Yes, it is B-o-m-m-e-r, and it happens to be misspelled throughout the deposition as B-a-u-m-e-r. I happen to know the name is o-m-m-e-r.

The Court: I think that was corrected in my copy of the deposition. Now, may I have another copy? Are there other copies available of this?

Mr. Cuningham: Your Honor, we only have one.

The Court: How about the defendants, how many do you have? [466]

How many copies do the defendants have, just one?

Mr. Byron: We have another that we will loan to your Honor.

(Whereupon Mr. Hart, the bailiff, took the witness stand to answer the questions being read in the deposition, the part of Mr. Berner in the deposition being taken in the present case by Mr. Cuningham, and the part of Mr. Byron in the deposition being taken in the present case by Mr. Lucas.)

DEPOSITION OF FERDINAND J. BOMMER

“Q. Would you please state your name, age, residence and occupation?

A. Ferdinand J. Bommer; 59; my residence, 111 Rose Arden Drive. I am the owner of Hill's Colonial Hardware.

Q. Now could you give us a brief resume of your business experience right to date?

A. I formerly started with Heintz & Meunschauer Refrigerator Company in Buffalo, New York, where I was employed for some time. Later, during World War I, I was with the Curtis Airplane Company, and later in 1919, or early 1920, I was with the Jewett Refrigerator Company at Buffalo, New York. I was with the Jewett Refrigerator Company until December 1, 1933, when I went with the Potter Refrigerator Company, and I was [467] with the Potter Refrigerator Company until June, 1939. I returned to Jewett Refrigerator Company to do some special test work until August, 1940, when I joined the Sanitary Refrigerator Company, and I was with the Sanitary Refrigerator Company until March 31, 1954.

It might be noted that on December 1, 1952, the name of Sanitary Refrigerator Company was changed to Quicfrez, Inc.

Q. All of them are in the refrigerator business?

A. Yes, sir. All of them are in the refrigerator business. My entire experience from 1920 to 1954 was all in the refrigeration industry, directly.

Q. It would be fair to say that you spent most

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

of your life, or about 34 years, in the refrigeration industry? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now what sort of work did you do for Heintz & Meunschauer?

A. I worked in the factory, performing various production operations.

Q. And after that, you were with the Jewett Company; after a short interval, with Curtis?

A. Yes.

Q. And what did you do with the Jewett Company?

A. Jewett Refrigerator Company of Buffalo?

I started in learning the mechanics of the Jewett refrigerators. Subsequently became an installation engineer, [468] factory foreman, factory superintendent and chief engineer.

Q. Now how long had the Jewett Company been in the refrigerator business?

A. If my memory serves me correctly, they started in 1871 or 1879.

Q. And what was their reputation in the refrigerator business? That is, the reputation of the Jewett Company.

A. They built the highest class of custom-built refrigerators that were ever made.

Q. And what type of boxes did they build?

A. All types. It would be hard to limit the scope. Their operation was different from a majority of the large companies, as we know refrigerator producers today, because they built both commercial and domestic refrigerators.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. And could you tell us the sort of places where you installed the Jewett refrigerators? That is, where you personally had something to do with it?

A. Very well. We put in installations such as all of the Statler Hotels over the country; all of the Biltmore Hotels; the big Cornell Medical Center in New York City; the Columbia Presbyterian Hospital in New York City; the Western Reserve University in Cleveland; Chicago University; a good many of the Union League Clubs all over the country; the Cloud Club in the First National Bank in Chicago; and such homes as Henry Ford's, Edsel Ford's, Charles M. Schwab; the Borden's, the [469] Leaders, Alvin McCauleys; I think that's enough, isn't it?

Q. Now did Jewett install any mechanical refrigerators? A. Some.

Q. And did they manufacture the mechanical refrigerating equipment? A. They did not.

Q. When they had a job to install a mechanically-refrigerated outfit what did they do?

A. In those cases, the mechanical parts were subcontracted. I would like to note that in later years the Jewett Company did manufacture complete electric refrigerators. Cabinets were completely made at the Jewett factory and the mechanical parts were purchased parts which were assembled and installed in these cabinets and sold as a complete unit.

Q. Now about when did you become Chief Engineer for Jewett? Was that about 1927?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

A. About 1927.

Q. And it was that position you held when you first became acquainted with the Potter Refrigerator Company? A. It is.

Q. Now could you tell me whether or not you have ever held any social memberships or offices?

A. For a period I represented the Potter Refrigerator Company in the National Electrical Manufacturers Association. Later, after I joined the Sanitary Refrigerator Company, I represented the Sanitary Refrigerator Company in the National Electrical [470] Manufacturers Association, and during my membership in the National Electrical Manufacturers Association I served as Chairman of the Farm and Home Freezer Division on two occasions, and lastly was Chairman of the Household Refrigerator Division of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association, ending my office in 1955.

Q. Now how did you come to leave the Jewett Company as Chief Engineer?

A. After working on the Potter refrigerator it seemed that this was an opportunity that had tremendous possibilities. It seemed that the Potter-type refrigerator would most assuredly revolutionize the refrigeration industry. Being ambitious, I wanted a part in it.

Q. And did Mr. Potter invite you to come over with his company?

A. Mr. Potter did invite me to come with the Potter Refrigerator Company.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. And in what capacity?

A. As Chief Engineer.

Q. That was in what year?

A. That was in 1933.

Q. Now prior to that you had done some work in connection with the Potter refrigerator?

A. Yes, sir, I had.

Q. That was while you were with the Jewett Company? [471]

A. That is.

Q. And was the Potter Company a customer of the Jewett Company?

A. They were.

Q. And that is how you became acquainted with Mr. Potter?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now just what work did you do for the Potter Refrigerator Company while you were with Jewett?

A. I designed cabinets patterned off from a sample submitted by Mr. Potter into the latest production methods that we knew of at that time.

Q. Is it fair to say that you did the detail engineering on some of the Potter cabinets under Mr. Potter's directions?

A. I had all of the contact with Mr. Potter.

Q. Then by 'Mr. Potter,' you mean Mr. T. Irving Potter?

A. T. Irving Potter; yes, sir.

Q. Now what sort of job was it that Jewett undertook for the Potter Corporation?

A. Mr. Potter submitted a sample refrigerator to us and wanted us to make the necessary detail construction changes so that it could be produced

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

on a production, or let's say, a high volume production basis.

Q. Can you recall approximately what time this was that Mr. Potter submitted to Jewett the sample box?

A. I think I had the time more accurately. I would say it was about 1931. [472]

Q. That was what you testified to previously.

What was the distinguishing characteristic of the refrigerator that Mr. Potter brought to Jewett as a sample?

A. Mr. Potter brought a household refrigerator. It was different in that it contained two compartments instead of one. The compartments were insulated from each other and one compartment contained considerably more insulation around it than the other.

Q. And do you recall what the two compartments were lined with?

A. The two compartments were lined with some sort of Monel metal, or stainless steel.

Q. Are those corrosive-proof?

A. They are.

Q. Now how were the compartments arranged?

A. There were two compartments, one above the other.

Q. And what was the purpose of having the two compartments?

A. The refrigerator was designed so that the upper compartment to provide refrigeration for

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

foods in a fresh state at normal refrigerating temperatures, and the lower compartment, which was more heavily insulated, was designed for the storage of foods in a frozen state. It also contained the device for freezing ice cubes.

Q. Now about what degrees temperature?

A. The upper compartment for fresh food operated approximately [473] forty to forty-five degrees. Had a variable range.

Q. Now could you tell us the various units that were within the cabinet that Mr. Potter submitted Jewett Company as a sample?

A. You refer to the mechanical parts?

Q. Yes.

A. As I testified before, there is a question in my mind as to whether or not there was a condensing unit in the lower section of the cabinet. A condensing unit had been in the lower part of the cabinet and there was evidence that a machine had been run and connected to the rest of the mechanism which was in the cabinet when submitted. From the machine there was the tube leading into the lower, or frozen, compartment at the end of which was attached an expansion valve. This expansion valve was attached to a cooling unit known as a freezer plate which was the cooling and freezing mechanism in the lower compartment. A tube from the freezer plate then led up to a finned coil in the upper compartment which had a tube connected to it leading back to the unit.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. Now could you describe the relative thickness of the insulation above the frozen storage compartment and the ordinary storage compartment or the frozen food compartment?

A. The insulation in the upper, or fresh food compartment, or surrounding the upper or fresh food compartment, was three inches thick; and the insulation surrounding the frozen food [474] compartment was five inches thick.

Q. And the insulation between?

A. The insulation between was two inches thick.

Q. Now was there a thermostat in the box?

A. There was.

Q. Where was that located?

A. The thermostat was located in the upper, or fresh food compartment.

Q. Was there any thermostat in the lower compartment? A. There was none.

Q. Now how were the evaporators connected?

A. With a tube.

Q. And can you give us the circuit of the refrigerant starting with the high side of the pump, and tell us where it went?

A. After the expanded gas was condensed in the compressor it passed through a condenser where the heat was dissipated, and into a receiver. From the receiver it flowed through a tube up to the expansion valve in the frozen storage compartment; through the freezer plate in the frozen storage compartment up through a tube to a finned coil in the

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fresh food compartment, and then back through another tube to the compressor.

Q. And from the compressor went to the condenser to complete the circuit?

A. We started with the compressor.

Q. All right. Then it would start over again. Is that right? [475]

A. Continuous operation.

Q. Have you ever seen a refrigerator of this design prior to the submission by Mr. Potter to the Jewett Company?

A. No.

Q. Had you at that time a good working acquaintance with the various makes of domestic electric refrigerators which were on the market?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now did you proceed to build any production models?

A. We did.

Q. Where were those built?

A. At the Jewett Refrigerator Company.

Q. Under whose supervision?

A. Under my supervision.

Q. As Chief Engineer of the Potter Refrigerator?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now I show you a folder which has been previously marked in an earlier litigation as Plaintiff's Exhibit 28 for identification, and ask you first whether you recognize this as a circular put out by Potter Refrigerator Corporation."

Mr. Cuninghame: That is identified as Exhibit 3-L, and already in evidence, I believe.

"Q. Do you have the question?

A. I recognize the photographs of the refrigera-

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

tors as the type we built for the Potter Refrigerator Company. [476]

Q. Now I call your attention to the illustrations in this which are labeled 'Tricold Host,' and 'Tricold Imperial.' Now how do those illustrations compare with the production models which were produced in the Jewett plant under your supervision?

A. They are very similar, if not identical.

Q. Now did the Jewett Company ever manufacture these cabinets in production quantities for the Potter Refrigerator Corporation?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you know where such cabinets were manufactured for the Potter Refrigeration Corporation?

A. Rex Manufacturing Company, Connersville, Indiana."

Mr. Cuningham: I now offer this in evidence. Skip it.

The Court: What page are you reading?

Mr. Cuningham: Page 13, sir.

Q. At some later date, did you become directly connected with Potter Refrigeration Company? Did you become connected with the Potter Refrigeration Company in December, '33?

A. I did.

Q. And what title did you assume with the Potter Refrigeration Corporation?

A. Chief Engineer.

Q. What were your duties as Chief Engineer?

A. To handle the design of cabinets under Mr.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Potter's [477] guidance and instruction and also to supervise production of the Potter refrigerators.

Q. Now did you have anything to do with the procurement of refrigerating units for such cabinets? A. I did.

Q. Now I'll show you another circular which has been marked in the earlier trial as Plaintiff's Exhibit 29, and ask you if you can identify this circular of the Potter Refrigerator Company.

A. I will give you the same answer as I did in submission of Exhibit B28."

Mr. Cuningham: That is identified as 3-M already in evidence, your Honor.

I shall substitute, with your Honor's permission, the exhibit number we have given this next one, Exhibit 3-L.

"Q. Exhibit B28. And does that represent the boxes as you knew them? A. It does.

Mr. Berner: I offer that in evidence as B29.

Now with the consent of Mr. Byron, we have about five or six more that I would like to offer as a group to be numbered in sequence.

Mr. Byron: No objection.

(Thereupon the exhibits were received and marked by the reporter.)" [478]

Mr. Cuningham: These, sir, I believe are already in evidence as 3-N, 3-O, 3-P, 3-Q, 3-R, 3-S, 3-T.

The Court: I have a suggestion, Mr. Cuningham. It might be much more intelligible if you would do what Mr. Byron did a few minutes ago, and as they

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

discuss the exhibit hold it up. You have done it once, these jurors know that exhibit. But you just lift it up and they will be able to recognize it. [479]

Mr. Cuningham: I think if this group could be handed to the jury we could keep on reading and not lose the time.

The Court: Are these the exhibits?

Mr. Cuningham: They should be 3-L to -T series, I believe.

The Court: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you have seen these exhibits—or have they?

Mr. Cuningham: I do not think so, sir.

Mr. Cheatham: I do not think so, sir. They were admitted, passed in but not shown to the jury, I believe.

The Court: I am going to take back what I said and permit you to discuss these exhibits at some later time and even during the argument to the jury, and then you could show them to the jury and discuss them at the same time, but, otherwise, if they are just single pictures I think it might be well to call the number of the exhibit and have somebody show it to the jury so they will know what the witness is talking about.

Mr. Maguire: I think so, because I know a little bit more about the case than the jury does, but, 3-L and 3-T, I have not the slightest idea what you are talking about.

The Court: Of course, I do not want to interfere, Mr. Cuningham, with the way you are putting in your case. I am just making this suggestion.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Cuningham: My honest preference is to let the [480] jury see them now. I think it would make it quite slow in the argument to hand them in.

The Court: I think you had better talk to Mr. Maguire about that. He is an old hand in this business, and you will find—I will make this suggestion to you, Mr. Cuningham: It is pretty difficult to listen to the testimony and the reading of a deposition if you are looking at a picture, and a complicated one.

Mr. Cuningham: Thank you, your Honor. I think that is right.

DEPOSITION OF FERDINAND J. BOMMER

Direct Examination

(Continued)

“Q. Now each of the circulars that I have just offered show dates, (Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3-N shows date of 1934; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3-O shows date of 1935; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3-P shows 1936; 3-Q shows 1937; 3-R shows 1937; 3-S shows 1938 and 3-T shows 1939).

Now, does that represent the years those circulars were issued?

A. These are all Potter circulars and represent the boxes that were produced at the times marked. That is, in 1934 to 1939.

Q. Would you say the circulars are representative of the Potter refrigerators which were offered to the public and the trade in the years marked?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

A. Yes, sir. [481]

Q. Now, prior to the time that you first became acquainted with Mr. Potter, what sort of cooling unit was used in the ordinary domestic electric refrigerator?

A. A sort of metal box affair around which was fastened copper tubing.

Q. And in practical operation of such domestic electric refrigerators, what happened on the surface of these cooling units?

A. They collected frost.

Q. Now did the Potter unit collect frost?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why not?

A. Mr. Berner, when you asked if the Potter refrigerator collected frost, are we talking about the entire unit?

Q. No. I am talking about only the upper compartment.

A. Upper compartment unit did not collect frost.

Q. Now, why did it not?

A. It didn't collect frost because it was of a finned coil type which had an enormous fin area in comparison to the amount of cooling surface through which the refrigerant passed.

Q. Prior to the Potter refrigerator had you ever seen a finned coil, such as you have described, used in any domestic electric refrigerator?

A. No, sir. [482]

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. Now, going back to the conventional type of boxes that existed prior to the Potter development, what was the effect on the contents of the articles stored in the chamber of the domestic electric refrigerator where cooled units with the tubing were located that you have described?

A. Food dried out very fast.

Q. In other words, dehydrated?

A. Dehydrated.

Q. And what about frost?

A. Frost accumulated on the cooling unit.

Q. And where did that frost come from?

A. Mainly from the food in the refrigerator.

Q. Now, could this accumulation of frost on the cooling unit be allowed to continue indefinitely?

A. No.

Q. What was necessary to keep the refrigerating box (that is, the standard box prior to Potter's development) operating according to the then common practice?

A. It was necessary to stop the machine and melt the frost accumulation off from the evaporator which we called a defrosting operation.

Q. And was that done only once or twice a year, or was it frequent?

A. That was a very frequent operation.

Q. What happened to the temperature of the interior of the [483] refrigerator while this defrosting operation was being carried out?

A. The temperature went up.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. Did that have any effect upon the preservation of food that was stored in the refrigerator?

A. It did.

Q. What did it do?

A. It had a tendency to increase deterioration.

Q. And did the dehydration contribute to such deterioration in a standard refrigerator?

A. Yes, sir. It wasn't only a matter of dehydration but discoloration.

Q. Well, what happened?

A. Made the food unpalatable, unedible.

Q. And also affected its appearance? I think you said.

A. I said it turned the color.

Q. All right. What would happen with a head of lettuce?

A. It would shrivel up and wilt.

Q. What about meat?

A. It would turn black and spoil.

Q. Now, did that happen in the Potter refrigerators?

A. It did not.

Q. And why not?

A. In the Potter refrigerator there was no withdrawal of moisture from the food. [484]

Q. Now, did frost accumulate on the cooling unit in the upper box of the Potter refrigerator?

A. No, sir.

Q. And why was that, in terms of temperature?

A. Because the coil operated at a temperature above 32 degrees Fahrenheit.

Q. Well, did the unit (that is, the refrigeration box) withdraw any moisture from the articles stored in that section of the Potter refrigerator?

A. Practically none.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. Now, was the refrigerant under the same pressure in both cooling units? A. It was.

Q. And the cooling unit in the frozen storage compartment maintained approximately what temperature in that compartment?

A. Approximately zero Fahrenheit.

Q. And the Fahrenheit scale, now, freezing point of water is what? A. Thirty-two degrees.

Q. Now, with the same refrigerant in it and subject to the same pressure, you say that the cooling coil in the air-conditioned compartment of the Potter refrigerator did not frost up. Is that right? A. Yes, sir.

Q. How do you account for that? [485]

A. The amount of refrigerant passing through the two coils was regulated by an expansion valve. This amount of liquid was regulated so that most of the absorption of the heat in the refrigerant was absorbed in the frozen storage compartment, and that the refrigerant passing through the finned coil in the upper compartment was partially heat-laden by the time it got to this finned coil and, therefore, would pick up only the additional heat beyond which it absorbed in the lower compartment.

It should also be noted that the proportion of the number and size of the fins in relation to the amount of tubing in the finned coil assisted in this condition inasmuch as the flow of heat through these fins was great enough to cause a temperature

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

rise enough to keep the finned coil operating at a temperature over 32 degrees.

Q. Which was a non-frosting condition?

A. It was over 32 degrees.

Q. And when it is above 32 degrees, that would be a non-frosting condition? A. That's right.

Q. Now, prior to your first being acquainted with Mr. Potter, had you ever seen any domestic electric refrigerators on the market which provided a separate compartment for the frozen storage of foods? A. No, sir. [486]

Q. Well, would you just enumerate briefly what those advantages are of the Potter refrigerator over its forerunners?

A. Is this answer to be a comparison of the Potter refrigerator of 1934 versus competition's refrigerators of 1934?

Q. Yes, please.

A. From the inception of self-contained household domestic refrigerators, there was always a problem which required compromises. In the earlier household refrigerators they attempted to cool a food compartment with the same unit in which they made ice cubes. In order to produce a unit that was capable of cooling the entire food compartment it was necessary to run it at a low temperature. As a result of this cold unit in the food compartment (it was run below 32 degrees), it collected frost and it dried out the food.

And the Potter refrigerator, the main problem

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

of the domestic refrigerators was solved by entirely separating the frozen storage compartment from the fresh food compartment. It resulted in a double gain because fresh foods could be kept in a fresh and edible condition for longer periods of time, and at the same time there was greater range in acquiring frozen storage and freezing facilities even beyond the freezing facilities in the one-compartment refrigerators produced. [487]

Q. Was it these advantages which led you to give up your position as Chief Engineer with the established firm like Jewett Refrigeration Company and go with a relatively new and young company like the Potter Refrigeration Company?

A. Most certainly.

Q. What was Jewett's standing in the industry?

A. I think they had the reputation for being the highest quality builders in the industry.

Q. And whom did they do building for? For what type companies? Can you name some of them?

A. In addition to the companies?

Q. You have already named. I am talking about producers of refrigerators.

A. Refrigerators?

Q. Yes.

A. We produced refrigerators for such people as Frigidaire, General Electric, Westinghouse, Kelvinator, Wayne, Norge, Welsbach, and a long list.

Q. Now, were the advantages you described actually realized by users of the Potter two-compartment refrigerator?

A. Yes, sir.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. Can you tell us whether the Potter Refrigeration Corporation, in selling these two-compartment refrigerators, made any guarantee or promises of any savings to the purchasers which could be achieved in the home from Potter [488] refrigerators? A. We did.

Q. Will you describe the plan?

A. We made a guarantee that a person using a Potter refrigerator to the best advantage would save \$1.00 out of every \$5.00 which they were spending for food.

Q. Now, did Potter Refrigeration Corporation ever have to take back any refrigerators under that guarantee?

A. They might have taken back one or two.

Q. Now, after you came with Potter I think you said—who manufactured the refrigerator cabinets for Potter?

A. Rex Manufacturing Company of Connersville, Indiana.

Q. And did you become acquainted with that source of supply as Chief Engineer?

A. I handled the contact with Potter Refrigerator Company.

Q. And did Rex manufacture cabinets for any other manufacturers?

A. They did. For Crosley, Apex, Stewart-Warner.

Q. And who were the chief executives of the Rex Manufacturing Company at that time?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

A. I think we should refer to my former deposition. Mr. C. C. Hull was president; Mr. M. R. Hull was production manager; Mr. Edgar Myer was sales manager; and I believe Mr. Winter Hull was chief engineer. If I am not correct about those, it should be corrected. [489]

Q. Now, do you know whether any of the Hulls had completed Potter refrigerators in their own homes? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who?

A. I know definitely H. Winter Hull had a Potter refrigerator in his home.

Q. He was the chief engineer?

A. Yes, sir. I think most of the members of the family in Rex had them. But I know definitely because I was in Mr. Hull's home.

Q. Now, did the Hulls discuss the Potter-type refrigerator with any other company that you know of? A. They did.

Q. Who?

A. Stewart-Warner Corporation."

Mr. Cuningham: That is out, isn't it?

(Discussion off the record.)

"Q. Now, incidentally, do you have an independent recollection as to Mr. Charles D'Olive? You ever met him?"

Mr. Byron: Wait a minute. Now, your Honor,

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

I think it was yesterday or the day before yesterday I brought a motion to strike all this, and I have a definite notation here. [490]

The Court: I have not my notes here. I think this goes now up to Page about 51.

Mr. Cuningham: Oh, no, sir.

Mr. Byron: Not that far.

Mr. Cuningham: That is the Potter deposition; not this one.

The Court: What were the pages, Mr. Byron?

Mr. Byron: Page 26, your Honor.

The Court: To what page?

Mr. Byron: And about six lines down on Page 27.

Mr. Cuningham: I have no such notation.

Mr. Byron: And also Page 25 is stricken after that answer, third line on Page 25.

The Court: That is right.

Mr. Byron: Beginning with the fourth line on Page 25, through Page 26 and through the first seven lines of Page 27, I made a motion to strike, and the motion was granted.

The Court: You mean from 26 to 27?

Mr. Byron: I mean from 25, beginning the fourth line of Page 25. That was on a separate motion just made yesterday, or the day before.

The Court: All of 25 except the first three lines and the first five lines on Page 26 are out.

Mr. Byron: Everything on 26 is out.

Mr. Cuningham: Everything? [491]

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Byron: Yes.

Mr. Cuninghame: That is not my note, your Honor, and I was present.

Mr. Byron: I would suggest that you look at the notes.

The Court: What time was that? Was that in the morning or afternoon?

Mr. Byron: I do not know. It is just a couple of days ago. There they are dealing directly with certain personnel that is not involved here.

Mr. Cuninghame: I would like to know what the grounds are. It is very competent testimony, very pertinent, very important.

The Court: Where is it, down to what point?

Mr. Byron: Down to the sixth or seventh line on Page 27. There they are talking about the relationship of Mr. Hull, who was president of the Rex Company, and Mr. D'Olive connected with some other company. They have nothing to do with these defendants here.

The Court: I am going to allow the motion to strike.

Mr. Cuninghame: Where do I start?

Mr. Byron: On Page 27, I think.

The Court: That is right.

Mr. Cuninghame: Page 27:

“Q. Now the term ‘dry cold’ has been mentioned. What’s meant by that? [492]

A. I think it meant just what it says, that the air condition in the conventional one-compartment

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

refrigerator was dry. I think the word was first coined by Frigidaire.

Q. And the dryness of the cold was produced by what?

A. The frost collecting on the evaporator which was taken out of the food.

Q. And was it true of other refrigerators of that time, that the cooling coil in the food-preservation chamber accumulated frost and required periodic defrosting? A. It was.

Q. In other words, that was not only true of the Stewart-Warner, but of all types then being sold to domestic users commercially at that time?

A. That's correct.

Q. When you say they came up——”

Mr. Byron: Wait a minute.

Mr. Cuninghame: Skipping what we agreed to take out——

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Cuninghame: My difficulty is, your Honor, I do not have Page 28.

Mr. Byron: Oh, yes, you do. You will find it further back. You had some duplications.

Mr. Cuninghame: Would you mind lending me your copy. I will read it. [493]

Mr. Byron: Just go back a little further. You found it once before.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Cuningham: No, I remember I did not find it.

The Court: Give him Page 28.

“Q. What sort of efforts have been made with respect to minimizing the nuisance of defrosting prior to the Potter development?

A. A pan had been included in refrigerators known as a dehydrator pan which was a porcelain or glass-covered dish placed usually in the lower part of the refrigerator.

Q. Well, was that for defrosting, or was that for dehydration?

A. No. That was to limit the circulation of the air around the food placed in the pan, so it would not reach the evaporator where it would depart with its moisture.

Q. And was that hydrator pan considered an important advance in the art at that time? About when was the hydrator pan developed, or do you know? A. Not offhand.

Q. But was it considered an advance over the earlier art at that time?

A. I say it was considered a necessity.

Q. An advance over the prior time when it didn't have the hydrator pan? [494]

A. That's because it would keep a head of lettuce a few days longer.

Q. Well, was that the solution?

A. I say it was the best solution that they came up with at that time.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. That's prior to the Potter?

A. That's right.

Q. And when you say, 'they came up with,' whom do you refer to?

A. I refer to the competition, all other manufacturers.

Q. Well, will you give us the names of some of those?

A. Frigidaire, Kelvinator, General Electric.

Q. Now, referring to the defrosting aspect, can you tell us what the situation was with respect to that prior to the Potter developments? Or standard type refrigerators?

A. Are you talking about the necessity for defrosting?

Q. Yes.

A. The necessity for defrosting was frequent, and varied with the use of the refrigerator in the individual home. The more they used it the more they put in it, the oftener they had to defrost.

Q. Now, how did they accomplish the defrosting?

A. In those days they accomplished it by shutting the machine off for a period of time until the temperature of the evaporator rose to a point above the freezing point of [495] water so that the water melted off and dripped into a container.

Q. Now, prior to the Potter development were all domestic refrigerators subjected to this necessity for periodical defrosting?

A. They were.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. And could you describe the effect on food stored in the refrigerator of the defrosting operation? A. During the defrosting operation?

Q. Yes.

A. During the defrosting operation the food in the refrigerator naturally warmed up in relation to the warmer air that circulated in the refrigerator.

Q. And did that result in any deterioration?

A. It resulted in deterioration.

Q. Do you recall whether or not the hydrator pan was featured by any large manufacturer of domestic electric refrigerators?

A. Frigidaire featured the hydrator pan.

Q. About when was that?

A. I would say somewhere around the year 1930.

Q. Now, can you give us some idea of the size and standing of the manufacturer of Frigidaire, domestic electric refrigerators in the industry in the early thirties?" [496]

Mr. Byron: May it please the Court, I cannot see that this is pertinent or material.

The Court: How much of this is there?

Mr. Cuninghame: About three more lines, four more questions.

The Court: Very well; go ahead. It is easier to let it in.

"A. They were the largest producer of electric refrigerators, subsidiary of General Motors Corporation.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. Well, do you know whether Frigidaire maintained a research and development department?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And have you any ideas as to the size of the department?

A. Probably about two hundred. It was a large department.

Q. That was a large department in the early thirties?"

Mr. Byron: Now we have gone past seven lines. This is strictly immaterial, not pertinent at all, and I object.

The Court: Frigidaire is not being sued here.

Mr. Cuninghame: They are not being complained of here either, sir.

Mr. Maguire: I think this goes, your Honor, to the question of the state of the art in the industry and some efforts as to the attempts to overcome a problem. [497]

The Court: Yes, that may be true, but, Mr. Maguire, do you see any relevance between Frigidaire's research department and whether it is a branch of General Motors or Crosley Corporation?

Mr. Maguire: No.

The Court: To determine what the state of the art is?

Mr. Maguire: It is a mere identification of what it was, but the fact that they are large organizations which may have occupied a major portion of

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

the market, a large portion of the market, and the status of their development.

The Court: We have got a lot of this already.

Mr. Cuninghame: May I speak as to that?

The Court: I am allowing it in, overruling the objection. Go ahead.

“Q. Now what sort of domestic electric refrigerator was the Frigidaire at and prior to the time you first became acquainted with Mr. Potter?

A. It was a standard one-compartment electric refrigerator with a single cooling unit in the upper corner of the box.

Q. And it had a machine at the bottom of the cabinet? A. Machine at the bottom.

Q. And did that refrigerator—how did that refrigerator affect moisture in the food stored in it? [498] A. Dried it out.

Q. Now, did Frigidaire, any refrigerators they produced for domestic or home use, have any provision for the frozen storage of food at that time in the same box? A. No.

Q. Well, was there any provision for making ice cubes?

A. We might have to include in the previous answer that there was provision for making of ice cubes and that the ice cube trays could be used for making ice cream. I did not mean to include the making of a small pan of ice cream as a space designed for frozen storage of food.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. Now, these pans for making ice cubes or for freezing ice cream, where were they located in the Frigidaire or standard type refrigerator?

A. They were set in sleeves in the cooling unit.

Q. Now, if anybody wanted to store food in the frozen storage in a standard refrigerator, what would they do?

A. Remove an ice tray, or the ice trays.

Q. And how much food could be stored there?

A. Practically none.

Q. And while that occurred, could they, at the same time, make ice cubes? A. No.

Q. Now, what would be the effect of defrosting on any food which had been put in an ice tray with a desire to keep [499] it in frozen storage?

A. That would melt, or thaw.

Q. You mean after it was defrosted?

A. During the defrosting cycle it would melt or thaw.

Q. Well, if you want to preserve food in a frozen storage what do you have to do? Do you do it continuously?

A. You have to maintain it in a frozen condition."

The Court: That is all for a while. Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to take a short recess.

(Thereupon, the jury retired for the afternoon recess.) [500]

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

The Court: Mr. Byron, I want to say now that the jury has left, that I agree with a great deal of what you said, and as I am listening to this deposition I am more and more impressed with the fact that this man is merely explaining what happens to food that is put into a deep freeze or into a freezing unit, and when I noticed Mr. Maguire's statement that they are not claiming any patentability on a freezing unit. But I have come to the conclusion that it is easier to let this evidence in than to continually rule on it and have any argument. But I am sorry that you didn't bring it to my attention a long time ago, where I could have had an opportunity to check it. But I assumed that there wasn't any real objection to the testimony unless you had brought it to my attention earlier.

What I had hoped was that you could agree among yourselves as to evidence which was clearly inadmissible and on the other portions of the deposition in which you didn't agree that you would have called my attention to it prior to the time that the depositions were read, so there wouldn't be this constant interruption.

Now, if you didn't understand that, or if I am in error, and you in the future want to do that I suggest that tonight or tomorrow morning you call my attention to the portions which you regard as objectionable in depositions yet to be read. [501]

Now, unless there is some serious question involved in the Bommer deposition, I am going to permit Mr. Cuninghame to read it without interruption.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Byron: All right. That's perfectly agreeable. I just feel that, as I think your Honor has observed, the patent lawyers generally are not very technical on objections. They want the facts to get before the Court. But I have been reminded in this proceedings that patent lawyers should act as general lawyers in this regard, and so I have been trying to do that within limits, and I think I know what the limits are now, and I will observe them.

The Court: Recess for a few minutes.

(Recess.)

Mr. Cunningham: "Q. Well, as you will observe in the Potter refrigerator, what provision did it make for the preservation of food in a frozen storage condition? A. It kept it.

Q. For how long?

A. Long periods of time.

Q. Well, what do you mean 'long periods of time'?

A. I used the Potter refrigerator in my own home and had roast beef in it as long as nine months before it was used.

Q. How many years did you use a Potter refrigerator in your own home?

A. From 1933 to 1948. [502]

Q. And what kind of service did it give you?

A. Good. Very excellent service. The refrigerator is still in use.

Q. Now what sort of foods according to your personal experience, have you kept in frozen storage

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

in your automatic refrigerator other than the roast beef?

A. Roast beef, fish, poultry, vegetables, fruit, most every kind of food that's possible to freeze and then use.

Q. And in what quantities have you stored meat in your frozen storage compartment of your Potter type of refrigerator?

A. Up to 70 to 75 pounds."

Mr. Byron: Now you jump over to about page 53.

The Court: 53?

Mr. Cuninghame: My notes agree, I think.

Mr. Byron: 55.

Mr. Cuninghame: No, sir; 48.

Mr. Byron: Well, now, let's see—54.

The Court: Well, give it to me, Mr. Hart, and let me take a look at it.

(Whereupon the bailiff handed the deposition to the Court.)

The Court: I thought it was 54.

Mr. Byron: 54 is correct, your Honor, on the motion to strike.

Mr. Cuninghame: Your Honor, mine begin on 48. [503]

The Court: Wait a minute.

Mr. Cuninghame: There are gaps in the other pages.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Byron: That was on a special motion to strike the other day.

The Court: What about 48? What about Sanitary? Did I pass on that?

Mr. Byron: I have my pages marked "Stricken by order, 48, 49, 50," and up through the middle of page 53. The other had been stricken.

Mr. Cuninghame: I have no such indication at all on 48. I do have an indication at the bottom of 49 and on through the middle of page 50 where we start again, according to my notes.

The Court: I will tell you the reason you haven't. This is marked the same way because these were the portions that you and Mr. Byron agreed to and among yourselves, and then I struck the rest of it and that's why you have got "by order of the Court."

Mr. Byron: Yes.

Mr. Cuninghame: Well, sir, I have the same marking. I use ink to indicate "to 47" from wherever we started. I agreed with that, but I didn't understand that 48 was stricken, and I don't think it should be, sir. It's about the Sanitary Company and their licensees.

The Court: Well, we are not going to finish this thing [504] today so start in. We will reserve this. I will take a look at my notes and we will take a look at the ruling of the Court.

Mr. Cuninghame: Yes, sir.

The Court: We will leave it go.

Mr. Cuninghame: Then can I go to the middle of 54?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

The Court: Yes; to the top.

Mr. Cuningham: Top of page 54.

The Court: And the bottom portion is stricken.

Mr. Byron: That's out?

The Court: 55, was a lot of that stricken?

Mr. Cuningham: All right.

Mr. Maguire: I am going to suggest to the Court for the purpose of the record, I doubt whether a motion to strike is a proper procedure, and I think where counsel has made motions to strike he objects to both the questions and the answers. I think that would be more satisfactory.

The Court: That's right, Mr. Maguire. We are not too precise there, but all of us knew what we were talking about. 54.

Mr. Cuningham: "Q. Now, when you left the Potter Refrigerator Company, did you receive anything from them?"

Mr. Byron: Objected to as immaterial, irrelevant.

A. I did.

Q. What was that?

A. I received a certificate for two hundred shares in the [505] Refrigerator Patents Corporation.

Q. And do you still own those shares?

A. I still own them."

Mr. Cuningham: Then I go to the middle of—

The Court: No. I think there is another question there on 54 and the answer is on 55.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Cuningham: Again my notes—I will be glad to read any question. I don't see any myself. It seems to be just a continuation of the answer, your Honor.

The Court: “Now can you give us the names”——

Mr. Cuningham: “Q. Now can you give us the names of any dealers who handled the Potter refrigerator while you were with them, so far as you can remember now?”

The Court: Turn over to the next page. That question was stricken by mistake, but that is a proper question and you may have that answered on page 55.

The Bailiff: “A. Schwinder Company of Utica, New York; Harper Kelly Company, Tacoma, Washington; Freezmaast Company, of Seattle, Washington; Vogt Electric Company, Sacramento; Darmstetter, Lancaster, Pennsylvania; Wittig, of Reading, Pennsylvania; A. R. Weber & Company, Buffalo, New York; Orsenblatt & Hunt, Charleston, West Virginia; Fedderman Company, of Toledo; Windler Motor Sales, in Milwaukee. That should be enough.”

Mr. Cuningham: Now, to the bottom of 56. [506]

“Q. Now, did the Potter boxes, as you first knew them—how many thermostats did they have in them? A. One.

Q. And would you describe whether that continued throughout your familiarity with the Potter-type refrigerator?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

A. The Potter two-compartment boxes originally had one thermostat in them located in the upper, or fresh foods, compartment, which actuated the—well, let's say it was the only actuating mechanism as far as the starting and stopping the refrigerating mechanism. We began to sell boxes in some places where they were subject to be put in cold rooms in the wintertime, we ran into an occasional condition where the surrounding temperature became low enough that it would not acuate the thermostat in the fresh food compartment and at the same time run the machine enough to keep a frozen condition in the frozen storage compartment. To eliminate that difficulty, we added a second thermostat in the frozen storage compartment which merely actuated the operation of the machine enough to maintain a frozen storage condition regardless of the surrounding room temperature.

Q. Well, prior to your installing your second thermostat, could you say what percentage of cases you had this difficulty in?

A. They were very few. Only in cases where the refrigerator was subject to a surrounding room temperature of less than, [507] let's say, fifty-five degrees or lower.

Q. What was the additional cost of installing a second thermostat? A. Slight.

Q. How would that compare with the cost of service calls?

A. Probably be less than service calls.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. Now, Mr. Bommer, do you recall the advertisement of the Potter Refrigerator Company which appears in the Electric Refrigeration News of February 24, 1932? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is this it (exhibiting the paper to the witness).

I show you a photostat of it.

A. Taking for granted that's complete, that's the advertisement. If I am not mistaken, it was twenty-two pages or twenty pages long.

Q. Would you look through it and see if that——

A. Yes, sir."

The Court: Mr. Clerk, will you get those documents from Mr. Cuningham?

(Whereupon, the clerk handed the documents to the Judge.)

The Court: Is this the 20-page ad?

Mr. Cuningham: Yes.

The Court: What number is it?

Mr. Cuningham: Identified as Plaintiff's 3-U, and it [508] has not been received in evidence, and I offer it.

Mr. Cheatham: I beg your pardon. Another copy has been received in connection with another deposition, and this was a duplication.

The Court: Have you got another copy?

Mr. Cheatham: There is one in already.

Mr. Cuningham: Mr. Cheatham says it is, and he knows more about it than I do.

The Court: What number is it?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Cuningham: 3-U. I hope there is no mistake on that, because I want to get it in.

Mr. Byron: We wouldn't deprive you of that.

Mr. Cuningham: May I offer it subject to correction if errors appear?

The Court: Yes. Go ahead.

(The Court displayed the advertisement to the jury.)

Mr. Cuningham: "Q. Is this it (exhibiting the paper to the witness)?"

Mr. Cuningham: Am I right, on the top of page 58?

The Bailiff: You are right, on the top of page 58, but you still have another question yet.

The Court: Go ahead.

Mr. Cuningham: "I show you a photostat of it.

A. Taking for granted that's complete, that's the advertisement. If I am not mistaken, it was twenty-two pages or twenty [508] pages long.

Q. Would you look through it and see if that——

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Mr. Bommer, are you here pursuant to a subpoena served on you? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you receive a fee of \$4.00 in connection with your testimony? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you receive any other consideration?

A. No, sir.

Mr. Berner: That's all.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Cross-Examination

By Mr. Byron:

“Q. Now, what was the name of that”——

The Court: One minute. Let them look at the rest of these advertisements for a minute. It is 20 pages here and it's just pictures of and descriptions of the Tri-Cold refrigerator which, I understand, is the same as the Potter. That was the name that was used for the Potter refrigerator?

Mr. Cuningham: Well, your Honor, that is an advertising, as I recall it, of the complete line, both the conventional and the moist cold type. There are only about two pages or three pages illustrating the inventions of the patent in suit. [510]

Mr. Byron: Well, then, why shouldn't we just admit those two or three instead of encumbering the record?

Mr. Cuningham: I think we ought to have the complete line, sir.

The Court: Is Chilled-Air the same as Potter?

Mr. Cuningham: May I look at it, sir?

The Court: Yes. It looks like it.

Mr. Cuningham: I think they are all Potter refrigerators but some of them are—do not have the——

Mr. Byron: Do I understand that—so I may understand the situation, Mr. Cuningham, that Potter was selling a refrigerator which was—you say embodied the invention, and then he was selling a refrigerator which did not have the benefit of moist cold, is that correct?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Cuningham: I believe that is correct.

Mr. Byron: Selling both types?

Mr. Cuningham: He had both types and several sizes of both types, and I believe that this is Tri-Cold line and the Chilled-Air is the conventional dry cold type.

The Court: Well, sometime during the course of the trial you will have an opportunity to see them all.

I am trying to let the jury have the benefit of all the testimony there is in a way that is understandable, and that's why I am doing this.

Mr. Maguire: May I suggest this: The jury is going to [511] have a good deal of work to do in this case anyway, and that is a long exhibit. I wonder if it would not be better to segregate from it and put in only that which refers to the refrigerators and involves—

The Court: I think that's an excellent idea.

Mr. Byron: Now, I have a further thought on that, that Mr. Potter was not only advertising about three pages, as I understand it, of so-called moist cold, two-compartment refrigerators, but he was advertising in about 18 pages a refrigerator of the old type that did not have moist cold, making and selling those. So I think it may be just as well to let the whole thing in.

Mr. Maguire: All right. Then go ahead.

Mr. Cuningham: I think I am responsible for Mr. Byron's misapprehension. I think that most of the ads are of the Tri-Cold, as I recall it.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

The Court: Well, I think it's about half and half. Well, don't make up your minds now. I think I like Mr. Maguire's suggestion. Go ahead.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. Now what was the name of that Potter Company from whom you received 200 shares of stock?

A. Refrigeration Patents Corporation.

Q. And you still have them? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the company is active? [512]

A. I couldn't say as to that, sir. As far as I know, it's active. I still have the stock certificate.

Q. And what relation is that to the present plaintiff in this case?

A. That's Moist-cold Refrigeration Company, Inc.? I do not know.

Q. Does the Refrigeration Patents Corporation, Potter's former company, own any stock, or have any equities in the plaintiff in this case?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you regard that stock as dead or active?

A. No, sir. I regard it as active or I would have destroyed it.

Q. You were very active with the Potter Company in 1932, were you not?

A. No, sir. I joined the Potter Company in December, 1933.

Q. I see. But you were doing work for Potter at the Jewett Company at that time?

A. Approximately that time. Yes, sir.

Q. How do you say it happened that you know about this advertising of Plaintiff's'—

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Cuninghame: 3-LL.

Mr. Maguire: No. 3-U.

Mr Lucas: —“that twenty-two page advertising?

A. Sir, there isn't a man in the refrigerator industry that doesn't know about the Potter twenty-page ad in that particular [513] issue of Refrigeration News.

Q. Now then, could you give me the name of the advertising agent that was responsible for doing that work?

A. To the best of my knowledge, a company called Langshaft-Bonning, and it was Bonning who later came with the Potter Company.

Q. And where are they located?

A. Buffalo, New York.

Q. Still there?

A. Yes, sir. It's under Langshaft, Inc., or something, because Mr. Bonning left the firm.

Q. Now you have spoken something about the competitors of, I'll say, the Potter Company. He changed the name of his company several times but I am referring to the period when you were with the company from 1933 to 1939. A. Yes, sir.

Q. For some reason you have laid an awful lot of stress on Stewart-Warner. Well, now, will you please give the names of the other so-called competitors of Potter?

A. To the best of my knowledge, there was no other company competing with Potter Refrigerator Company with the two-compartment refrigerator

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

prior to Stewart-Warner's general offering of that type of a refrigerator. [514]

Q. And what year was that Stewart-Warner offered?

A. If my memory serves me correctly, it was during 1938 and 1939.

Q. Now then, that is the only one that you know of now, Stewart-Warner is making a two-temperature box?

Mr. Berner: In that period.

A. In that period.

Mr. Byron: That's what I say.

A. Up to that time.

Q. Now then, what companies, after that time, manufactured the two-temperature boxes?

Mr. Berner: You mean after 1939?

Mr. Byron: That's the only time we are talking about.

A. After 1939, practically every company in the industry.

Q. All right. Name those if you will.

A. Frigidaire, General Electric, Philco, Westinghouse, Kelvinator, Crosley, International Harvester Company, Deep-freeze, many more private brand boxes.

Q. Now you have referred to the Sanitary Company with which you were employed for a while and then the Continental something, with whom you were employed thereafter. And you stated that the Sanitary Company had a license under the Potter patent?

A. Yes, sir.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. How long did that license exist? [515]

A. Three or four years.

Q. It terminated when?

A. I would say that you would have to refer to somebody at the Sanitary Refrigerator Company for that answer.

Q. Well, you indicated you knew.

A. I would say that approximately during 1940.

Q. One year, they had a license?

A. No. It was longer than a year.

Q. How much longer?

A. That I can't say. I would have to get the records to find out.

Q. Now, you don't know whether or not Continental had a license, do you?

A. Yes, sir. Through Sanitary. The Sanitary Refrigerator Company was primarily a manufacturer of ice refrigerators, old-fashioned iceboxes. In order to facilitate their handling of mechanical refrigerators, at some time prior to my going, or becoming associated with, them they incorporated a totally-owned subsidiary of the Sanitary Refrigerator Company known as the Continental Corporation in order to keep bookkeeping and dealerships and other items separated from this ice refrigerator operation. When the license was taken out with Potter, it was taken out by, and in the name of, Sanitary Refrigerator Company. All of the refrigerators that were produced and handled were manufactured and sold under [516] their Continental brand name again as another division.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. It was, in effect, the same company so far as the license was concerned?

A. That's right. There was some kind of record in the minutes of the Potter Refrigerator Company—or I mean of the Sanitary Refrigerator Company—and the Continental Refrigerator Company, where Sanitary assigned their license, or the use of their license. You know more about that than I would.

Q. And did Sanitary put in the entire operating refrigerator cabinets for the company that sold them?

A. That's right.

Q. And did Sanitary put in the entire operating mechanism in the cabinets, also?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. One was a manufacturing organization and the other one was a sales organization?

A. That is correct.

Q. And Sanitary had good facilities for manufacturing cabinets?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And how long did they continue to manufacture refrigerators of this type that you call the 'Potter type'?

A. Until 1940, when they also ran up against a Stewart-Warner condition of selling and dumping refrigerators at [517] prices that they could not afford to compete with.

Q. Well, now, there were other competitors at that time, too, were there not? You have given a long list of competitors.

A. Those competitors were not making a two-

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

compartment refrigerator at that time. My answer, before, was what is being made, now.

Q. Yes, but when did all of these other companies start to make the two-temperature refrigerators?

A. Practically all of them started after the end of World War II when materials were regranted at the end of World War II.

Q. And, so far as you know, none of these other companies manufactured the two-temperature refrigerator before World War II. Is that correct?

A. There were refrigerators made of the Potter type as competitors by the Apex Company who also had a Potter license.

Q. And any other companies?

A. No, not to my knowledge.

Q. Now, referring to this Stewart-Warner test of the Potter refrigerators, you have stated that meat or provisions were placed in the refrigerator, and I assume the refrigerator was in operation.

A. Yes, sir. That's true. [518]

Q. And then it was closed and operated, we'll say, for 24 hours, I believe is the period you mentioned? One of the periods? A. That's right.

Q. And there was a loss of weight in that food from the time it was placed in the refrigerator until the time it was taken out? That's correct, isn't it?

A. That's correct.

Q. I thought it was your testimony that there would be no dehydration with the use when a Potter-type refrigerator was used.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Berner: Pardon me. Are you referring to under the test conditions, Mr. Byron, or are you referring to as used normally?

Mr. Byron: I'm just talking about the test.

Mr. Berner: All right. You didn't say that. I want to object to it because the witness didn't say that that was so under the test conditions specified. He was referring to room conditions.

Q. Is it your position that with the use of this so-called Potter refrigerator there was no dehydration with respect to the food or the air in the main storage compartment? The warmer compartment?

A. The claim that was made by Potter was that the dehydration, or any dehydration, was reduced to a negligible amount; [519] that it would keep food for much longer periods of time than a conventional refrigerator. It would be foolish for any engineer to go on record as saying there was no dehydration.

Q. Do you know how much dehydration there was in the Stewart-Warner tests?

A. You mean in that made of the Potter refrigerator?

Q. Yes.

A. I do not have those records; no, sir.

Q. Did you ever know? They must have told you.

A. I think they showed us test figures at the time. It should be a matter of Stewart-Warner records, after those tests were made, when they made them.

Q. Now, do you have any idea how much dehydration there was in that upper warmer com-

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

partment of the Potter refrigerator in the Stewart-Warner test? A. No, sir.

Q. You did know at one time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Was it considerable?

A. I would say that it wasn't.

Q. Was not?

A. It was not considerable.

Q. The fact is you don't know at the present time?

A. I think that's an unfair position. I don't want to [520] be—I'm saying just this: That when it comes down to a technical engineering measurement of moisture loss, are we going to figure it on the basis of ounces or are we going to figure it on the basis of the finest measuring that you can make? I would say that I don't want to be on record as saying I don't know. I say that it was not excessive dehydration.

Q. You refer to the Rex Manufacturing Company as having made the Stewart-Warner cabinets at the time that company was manufacturing cabinets for Potter. At that time, that same period, Rex Manufacturing Company was also manufacturing cabinets for several other refrigerator companies, were they not? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you name those, please?

A. Crosley and Apex.

Q. There were others beside that?

A. Probably more. At one time they made the

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mayflower cabinet. There were other makes made in the factory.

Q. Well, you know of others, don't you? You were down there. A. Yes, sir.

Q. Well, name the others.

A. I don't know as I can remember all the cabinets they made.

Q. Frigidaire?

A. No, sir. They made some for Williams Oilomatic, or Iceamatic. [521]

Q. Can you think of any others?

A. No, sir. Not offhand.

Q. But, at the same time, they were manufacturing refrigerator cabinets for many different companies, were they not? A. Yes, sir.

Q. How many would you say, at the time? How many refrigerator companies was Rex manufacturing cabinets for at the time that Rex was manufacturing cabinets for Potter?

A. I don't think Rex ever had more than two contracts in any one year."

The Court: I do not see the relevancy of all this Rex business, and I think much of this testimony is in answer to cross-examination—in answer to or cross-examination of portions that were deleted.

Mr. Cuninghame: Your Honor, I think this is perfectly proper cross. We did not object to it at the time.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Byron: I have no objection to it being in or out.

The Court: I am objecting to it on the ground of how much are we going to read of things like this. There are important issues that I think should come before this jury.

Mr. Byron: I think this page is about the last of that. I may be wrong, but I think that is true.

The Court: I see on Page 78 we are talking about Apex [522] again and Sanitary.

It is five minutes to 4:00, and I think we are going to save a lot of time by adjourning at this time so that the jurors can get home, those who have to get home within a reasonable time.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Court: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you are now excused until 9:30 tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, the jury retired for the evening, and the following proceedings were had without the presence of the jury:)

The Court: What is that number after 3-U?

Mr. Cheatham: May I correct the record? I was wrong. It is in our list of exhibits three times, and I was under the apprehension that it had gone in once already. It will remain 3-U in all cases.

The Court: It is not 3-I because we just checked, and the reason I did not talk to you is that

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

I knew you were in error, and I thought Mr. Kolisch had the correct figure.

3-U is now admitted.

Mr. Cheatham: That is right.

(Potter 20-page ad in *Electrical Refrig. News*, February 24, 1932, previously identified as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-U for Identification, was received in [523] evidence.)

The Court: It may have been admitted other times, but we are sure it is in now.

Mr. Cheatham: I think it is marked 3-U in all other instances.

The Court: Mr. Byron, I want to say this, that I was under the impression that you were correct in connection with the portions stricken with reference to Sanitary Corporation, and then on cross-examination there is a considerable amount of testimony that could only be relevant in connection with the testimony on direct that was stricken.

Mr. Byron: I am perfectly willing to strike everything that corresponds.

Mr. Cuninghame: I am not, your Honor. I think it is very vital.

The Court: I am not going to strike any portion of the testimony that has been read, but I suggest you go over this cross-examination and any portion that relates to portions that have been stricken on direct, you can make a motion on that, and I will rule on it.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Byron: You are expecting me to make a motion to strike. I do not want to make such a motion, but I will tell you what I think corresponds to the parts that have been stricken, and I have no objection to it being stricken.

The Court: You do not have to make a motion; you just [524] tell me what portions relate to the direct examination. Tell me about 9:00 o'clock in the morning, and have a copy for Mr. Cuningham and one copy for me, just a penciled notation. I will check it immediately.

Mr. Byron: From Page 71 on?

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Byron: Correct.

The Court: There is one other thing. Perhaps you can get together with Mr. Cuningham on other portions which both of you may regard as irrelevant. Do you know of any such thing?

Mr. Cuningham: Your Honor, I had the whole last part of this, and I withdrew my——

The Court: I do not think that is irrelevant; I think that is extremely relevant.

Mr. Cuningham: I am sorry, sir; I am sincere. I think the whole thing is very relevant, and I think it should go in. I think it is vital.

Mr. Byron: Well, I will do as you ask me, your Honor, and then it is in your hands.

The Court: Let me take a look at it because these depositions are taking much longer than I anticipated they would.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Byron: I might say that we had agreed as to what parts would be included and what would be excluded. Now this [525] morning in chambers Mr. Cuninghame said that he had changed his mind and that he wanted more portions of certain depositions in, and I said, "Well, what portions are they," and then it was suggested that we get into the courtroom. Well, I don't know yet.

The Court: Is there very much more, Mr. [526] Cuninghame?

Mr. Cuninghame: Of the Admiral deposition, sir?

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Cuninghame: Yes.

Mr. Byron: Call those Potter depositions taken of Admiral offices or employees.

Mr. Cuninghame: Well, sir, I think we can—we won't take the big, thick volume—that is the thickest volume that your Honor has. We are going through and select parts, as I understood, that we intended to use. But I say in view of the amount of the testimony that has apparently been stricken here, I will need some of this. Of course, this is the testimony out of the mouths of the——

The Court: I am not trying to restrict you, Mr. Cuninghame. I will let you put in anything you want as long as it is relevant.

Mr. Cuninghame: I will say that I will do my very best.

The Court: When will we know? That's what I

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

would like to find out because under my ruling, if you read portions Mr. Byron can request that other relevant portions be read at the same time.

Mr. Cuningham: In our case?

The Court: In your case. And other portions unrelated to the portions that you read can only be put in on the defendants' case in chief. [527]

Mr. Cuningham: That's correct. I remember that.

The Court: So as far as relevant portions are concerned, Mr. Byron ought to know in advance what portions you are going to read from so he can ask the crier to read other sections.

Mr. Cuningham: Well, as you know, we have considerably more of Bommer for tomorrow, and then this Morton and Douglass deposition, a hundred and some pages. That will—

The Court: We won't get through.

Mr. Cuningham: So I think it will have to await Monday.

The Court: All right. If you can get together with Mr. Byron some time and agree on cutting things down I would appreciate it as far as the Morton deposition is concerned. If you propose to strike any or to object to any question and any answer will you let me know tomorrow?

Mr. Byron: Of Morton?

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Byron: Well, I will be glad to, but I thought Mr. Cuningham was going to tell me what parts he wanted in.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Cuningham: Oh, I have told you I wanted all from the very beginning. I want all of the Morton and Douglass.

Mr. Byron: All right. That settles it.

Mr. Cuningham: Let me call your attention, Mr. Byron, to a note I have against my interest, "Defendant has indicated, I think, that he wants to strike from page 310, line 15, the [528] balance of the page, and through 314."

Now, I haven't looked at the pages. We didn't agree on that, but I noticed that on the outside of my deposition. I believe my note is accurate and I think it's the only thing he wants to strike.

Mr. Byron: Well, I have notes on that.

The Court: If that's the case, fine. But I was hoping that maybe you would be able to strike some more.

Recess until tomorrow.

I want to make one suggestion to you all. You only have to ask one question not to exceed two times, and where the same question is asked in the depositions four or five times, may I suggest that you strike out one or two of those?

(Whereupon, at 4:10 o'clock p.m. an adjournment was taken until 9:30 a.m. Friday, November 18, 1955.) [529]

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Portland, Oregon, Friday, November 18, 1955

(At 9:30 o'clock a.m. proceedings herein were resumed pursuant to adjournment as follows.)

The Court: I see we are all here.

Mr. Cuningham, I think Mr. Hart was reading the Bommer deposition at the time we adjourned last night. Do you want to continue with that?

Mr. Cuningham: Yes, please.

The Court: All right. I suggest that you start at the bottom of the page on page 70 to get a little continuity.

DEPOSITION OF FERDINAND J. BOMMER

Cross-Examination

(Continued)

By Mr. Lucas:

“Q. How many would you say, at the time? How many refrigerator companies was Rex manufacturing cabinets for at the time that Rex was manufacturing cabinets for Potter?”

A. I don't think Rex ever had more than two contracts in any one year.

Q. That would be four different companies?

A. Four different companies.

Q. And how many different lines were there at Rex Manufacturing Company for making and assembling these refrigerators?

A. Production lines?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. Yes.

A. Usually four. Sometimes three. Depending on the models that were being produced at the particular time.

Q. There were six, weren't there? [530]

A. Could have been six, yes, sir, at times.

Q. Yes. And the Potter cabinets were being made at the same time these others were made, were they not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So Stewart-Warner was not the only company having cabinets made for its refrigerators at the same time that Potter was having cabinets made at Rex. Is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Now we have been speaking about the Frigidaire Company, or the company that makes the Frigidaire refrigerator, as having a compartment in which ice cubes could be made, and you said that those ice trays could be removed and you could place therein, up to its capacity, any other food that you desired to have frozen. Is that correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. How large would you say the measurements of the freezer were at that time in the Frigidaire refrigerator?

A. I would say the average sleeve, ice cube sleeve, in the Frigidaire refrigerator at that time, was about two inches or about two and a quarter inches high, and about six inches wide, and about approximately eleven inches deep. Large enough to take a little two-pound can, would hold two pounds of water.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. They did make them of variable sizes, did they not? They had several layers of them?

A. There was more trays than one, yes, sir. [531]

Q. Oh, yes; sure. So that instead of two inches it would bring it up to about what? Ten inches?

A. Each tray was on a shelf by itself. It was divided.

Q. That's right. So instead of being two inches, the total height there might be ten or twelve inches, total height?

A. Not unobstructed height, no. There would be two-inch slots.

Q. Were those partitions removable?

A. In most cases, no.

Q. But in some cases they were?

A. Some cases they were.

Q. Now it is purely a question of degree, isn't it, how much, how large, you want to make that freezer compartment?

A. No, sir; it is not. It is strictly an engineering rule.

Q. No? If an engineer desired to make a refrigerator freezing compartment larger or smaller he could do that, couldn't he? A. No, sir.

Q. Why not?

A. It takes so many square feet of refrigerating surface on a cooling unit to cool a given capacity of food compartment. If the cooling unit is increased in size, the temperature at which that cooling unit must operate must be made higher, higher

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

temperature, operating temperature, so that it will not cool the surrounding air in the fresh food compartment too cold. As you increase the temperature, operating temperature [532] of the cooling unit, you also decrease the value of that cooling unit for its ice-making capacity, ice cream capacity, or the keeping of frozen foods.

Q. Apparently you misunderstand my question. The only point I am trying to make is this: If you wish to increase the size of the, well we'll say the freezer, you can do so, assuming, of course, that you increase the size of your refrigeration units so that you can cool a larger quantity of food, or a smaller quantity of food, as you desire. That can be done? That's within the capacity of an engineer, is it not?

A. It is not, no.

Q. Why isn't it, then?

A. If you want to cool a room, a cooling unit that size, you would have to run at 200 below zero to get any effect of it at all. If you wanted to cool that same room with the cooling unit the size of this desk, we would have to run it a lot warmer than that. In fact, we would run it so warm that water or food put in contact would not freeze because it would be above the freezing temperature. It has to be proportioned.

Q. Well, now, at the present time the refrigerators, modern refrigerators, have a freeze storage space that you will say will take 70 to 80 pounds?"

Mr. Cuningham: Your Honor, I believe the crier

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inadvertently omitted an answer—part of an answer there on page 74.

The Court: “I said the size of a pack of [533] cigarettes?”

Mr. Cuningham: Yes, your Honor. I think it makes graphic what he is talking about.

The Crier: I’m sorry. That’s crossed out on my copy.

Mr. Cuningham: “I said the size of a pack of cigarettes.”

The Crier: “I said the size of a pack of cigarettes.”

Mr. Cuningham: Thank you.

Mr. Lucas: “Q. Well, now, at the present time the refrigerators, modern refrigerators, have a freeze storage space that you will say will take 70 to 80 pounds? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Well, now, then, that space is larger than the freeze space, is larger than the freezing space we are referring to, in the Frigidaire construction?

A. Yes, sir.

Mr. Byron: Now that’s all I’m talking about.

Q. If you want to increase the size of your freezer space around that small capacity, we’ll say, of the Frigidaire, to the size of the freezer in the modern refrigerator, it can be done, can it not?

A. By making the refrigerator into a two-compartment refrigerator, either by means of the definite partitions, by insulation, or a series of shields which accomplish the same effect as a partition between the compartments.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. And you could vary the size of this so-called modern freezer from 80 pounds to 120 pounds, could you not? [534]

A. That's correct; by shielding or partitions.

Q. And that's within the ability of a refrigerator engineer? A. That's right; yes, sir.

Q. That's what I am driving at all the time—but not the ability in 1938 or prior to that. What I am trying to say is that the size that you have is merely a matter of degree in that regard?

A. Increasing the size of your freezer space is not a matter of degree; it's a matter of shielding or partitioning.

Q. Well, of course, you can have, it's true, a two-compartment or two-car garage or a three-car garage or a one-car, and you may have some partitioning in there, different supporting apparatus, but you have that ability. It's a matter of degree, your size, is it not?

Mr. Berner: I object to the form of the question. Would you frame your question without garages and everything else in them?

Mr. Byron: No. It's all right; he knows what I'm talking about.

The Witness: I am lost.

(The question was read back by the reporter.)

Q. Your size is a matter of degree; it comes down to that?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

A. I just don't understand the question. I am sorry, sir. I would like to.

Q. If you had a refrigerator with the freezer space that [535] would contain 40 pounds of food for freezing, say, it's purely a matter of degree to build one with an 80-pound freezer, is it not, capacity?

Mr. Berner: Are you referring to the compartment; two-compartment or one-compartment box?

Mr. Byron: We'll say two.

A. Yes. That's in two-compartment refrigerators. That's correct, yes.

Q. Sure. Purely a matter of degree, the size?

A. That's right.

Q. How many different companies did Potter approach with the thought of granting a license to them?

A. In exact numbers I wouldn't know. At different times there were several companies approached.

Q. Altogether, how many different companies, and who were they, that he approached?

A. Well, of course, he approached Stewart-Warner; he approached Apex.

Before I continue my answer, are we talking about companies that Potter approached, only? Or companies where there was an approach, whether it was from the company or from Potter?

Q. Where there was an approach, whether it was from the company or from Potter.

A. Oh, yes. [536]

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. That is, Potter or Potter Company.

A. There were negotiations, that is, talk.

Q. That's right. And he was changing corporations all the time. That is, when I say 'Potter,' I mean Potter and his many corporations.

A. That would call for some revision because we were approached by Stewart-Warner. We were approached by Apex.

Q. Let's put it both ways. Put it both ways, then, if that will make it easier for you.

A. There were some few preliminary discussions with Kelvinator. There were discussions with Atwater Kent. There was a letter written, as I remember it, today to Frigidaire. There was some talk with Norge. I think that, generally, is about the scope of things. There might have been others.

Q. And none of those took a license under the Potter patent?

A. Apex took a license under the Potter patent.

Q. Did any of the others?

A. And Sanitary.

Q. You hadn't named that as one that was being approached.

Q. And Sanitary's approach was one of those things that just grew. That was all. You don't know.

Q. Now none of these large companies that you mentioned, such as Frigidaire, took a license?

A. No.

Q. You have laid great stress upon the question of changing [537] from so-called single-compartment box to a two-compartment box. Do you regard

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the provision of the two-compartment box instead of one, or from two to one, a major structural feature of importance? A. I do.

Q. And in your opinion, did that add greatly to the success of the so-called Potter refrigerator?

A. The change from one to two compartments? Yes.

Q. You have also referred to the expansion valve as being of importance. Now just in what way do you regard that expansion valve of importance in the Potter construction?

A. An expansion valve, or some restricting mechanism, is a necessity in the operation of any refrigeration system. The expansion valve is important inasmuch as it measures the amount of refrigerant that is permitted to expand, go through the system.

Q. Yes. And it controls, the first, the flow of the refrigerant from the high side of the line, or compressor side, to the freezing coil?

A. To the low side, yes, sir.

Q. To the freezing coil. And in that regulation what happens? In the regulation by the expansion valve?

A. Well, with the regulation of the expansion valve you cause a predetermined pressure reduction which permits the liquid passing— [538]

Q. Liquid refrigerant?

A. Liquid refrigerant passing through the valve to pick up heat and expand.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. Well, now, what causes the liquid refrigerant to pick up heat in the freezing coil, that is, just beyond the expansion valve?

A. Well, the nature of the refrigerant itself is that it boils at a temperature lower than the temperature surrounding it.

Q. And then in boiling, that's what in a sense you call expanding. I suppose you could call it vaporizing, also?

A. Vaporizing.

Q. In so doing, the refrigerant has absorbed heat in the freezing compartment, thereby lowering the temperature in the freezing compartment to the desired low temperature which you have indicated to be about zero degrees Fahrenheit. That's correct, is it not?

A. That is correct.

Q. Now you have described the Potter system in which you mentioned that the refrigerant, upon leaving the freezing coil, passes into the cooling coil in the upper, or warmer, chamber. That is correct, is it?

A. That's correct.

Q. Now, then, those two coils are in series, are they not?

A. Yes, sir. [539]

Q. In other words, it's one continuous coil?

A. One continuous coil.

Q. Part of it being the freezing coil in the freezing chamber and the other part being in the cooling coil in the warmer upper chamber?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now what happens to the refrigerant which passes from the freezing coil to the cooling coil in the upper warmer compartment?

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A. It flows through the coil, and as it strikes the warmer temperature of the upper compartment it expands further, shall we say? In laymen's language. In the upper compartment there is still some refrigerating effect left, some vaporizing effect left, which takes place and which cools the upper compartment.

Q. That is to say, the refrigerant which has come from the freezing coil to the cooling coil in the upper compartment absorbs, causes the absorption of, some heat from the upper warmer compartment? A. That's correct.

Q. And then the refrigerant is drawn back into the compressor? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, is it a fact that the expansion valve is therefore vital in controlling the relative heat absorption in the freezing compartment and in the upper warmer compartment? [540]

A. It's vital to the extent that it's one means of creating a temperature difference.

Q. I am speaking about the disclosure that Potter made. A. That's right.

Q. (Continuing): So that we can be specific.

A. That time, the expansion valve, was the way it was done.

Q. Yes. And that performs a vital part in controlling the action of the refrigerant in the two sections of the coil? A. Yes, sir.

Q. For performing the functions therein?

A. That's correct.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. That expansion valve can be set to a fair nicety"—

Mr. Cuningham: "Valve can be set to a fair nicety."

The Court: Is the word "valve" or "coil"?

Mr. Cuningham: It is "valve." We have agreed on that correction. It is an obvious mistake.

The Court: Go ahead. Read the question over again.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. That expansion valve can be set to a fair nicety to regulate the flow and the effect of the refrigerant in those two separate sections of coil. Is that correct?"

A. I say that an expansion valve is one way to do it.

Q. Well, I know, but I saw——

A. (Interrupting): It can be. It can be done with a nicety.

Q. With a fair exactness, is what I am talking about.

A. I would say that with a capillary tube you could do the [541] same thing.

Q. Please answer the question. I would like to just stick to what Potter had in his device. Now with that expansion valve you can control the flow of the refrigerant through the freezing coil and the upper cooling coil with a fair degree of nicety?

A. Yes. Yes, that's correct.

Q. So that you will get a proper freezing effect in the freezing compartment and the proper cooling

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effect in the cooling compartment, which is slightly warmer, or somewhat warmer? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And, of course, there is only one refrigerant that's used. It is the same refrigerant which passes from the compressor and the receiver through the expansion valve, and through the freezing coil and the cooling coil, and back through the compressor. That's all the same refrigerant, is it not?

A. In any one cabinet, or any one system.

Q. Well, in the Potter system. What Potter uses. I am talking about what Potter showed you.

In the earlier refrigerators, such as Frigidaire, when they had the central compartment as distinguished from the two compartments, if a piece of meat, for example, had a cover put over it, it would be protected; it would not dehydrate, [542] would it?

A. No. When I say "no," I mean it would tend to slow it down tremendously so it would practically stop if it was covered tight.

Q. Yes. And that would be true, no matter whether the food was lettuce or celery or vegetables of all kinds, and fruit? A. That's correct.

Q. So that substantially the same effect could be accomplished and was accomplished in, say, the Frigidaire machine, for example, having the single compartment where the foods were covered?

Mr. Berner: The same effect as what? I'm sorry. Would you clarify?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Byron: Well, the same effect as in the Potter arrangement.

A. Are you limiting my question to dehydration, only?

Q. Oh, yes. Sure. Dehydration, only. Strictly that.

A. Under that condition, I would say that dehydration would be less, or tend to be negligible.

Q. Yes. So they were both——

A. (Interrupting): Dehydration, only, we are talking about.

Q. Yes. So that they would both be on a par under those circumstances?

A. As far as food preservation is concerned, no.

Q. I said "dehydration."

A. Dehydration-wise, yes. Food preservation-wise, no. [543]

Q. Now what have you to say, then, with respect to food preservation in the single-compartment refrigerator when the food is covered, say, in a glass dish?

A. I would say that the dehydration is less in the covered dish. The deterioration of the food rotting in its own air is greatly increased. What you gain in one, you lose immediately in the process of decomposition in its being confined in its own decomposing air.

Q. Placing a pound of steak in a glass receptacle—I mean any glass dish with a cover on it—and in a single-compartment refrigerator how long would

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it take for that piece of steak to be spoiled so that it would not be edible?

A. First of all, I would say that it is an impossible question to answer. The condition of the steak that was put in there, the temperature of the compartment that it was put into, and many other things—that would make that almost an impossible answer to give.

Q. Let us assume some conditions. Let's assume a temperature, to begin with, between 40 and 45 degrees, as used in the warmer compartment of these two-compartment refrigerators. Under those circumstances, under that circumstance, and under the further condition that it was fresh when it was put in the refrigerator, how long, then, would you say that it would take that piece to spoil?

Mr. Berner: When you say "fresh," you [544] mean——

Mr. Byron: From the butcher.

A. What you are talking about is prime meat?

Q. Yes.

A. I would say probably four days.

Q. And what would you say if the meat had been fried or boiled and then placed in a covered dish in the refrigerator, the single-compartment refrigerator? How long would it take?

A. I would say the test shows they run about double that.

Q. About eight days? A. About that.

Mr. Berner: Nine days more?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

The Witness: Double the time. Four and four is eight.

Mr. Berner: Not eight days more; a total of eight days?

The Witness: A total of eight days.

Again you have got some variations. How big is the kitchen in comparison to the piece of meat? There are a lot of factors. We run tests for years and years and years and there are so many factors that are involved.

Q. Now, these hydrator plans and other accessories used by some of the companies in their refrigerators do help a great deal in preventing dehydration, do they not?

A. They did; in preventing dehydration, yes.

Q. Did they do any good from a standpoint of preventing spoiling of, say, the meat?

A. Not over a negligible amount. [545]

Q. Well, then, let's go back to your old illustration. We have a raw piece of meat, fresh, and it's placed in a single-compartment in a glass-covered dish, and there, you said it would take four days before it would be dehydrated appreciably. Now let us assume that this same refrigerator is provided with a dehydrator pan. Would that then take longer to dehydrate that meat?

A. I would say that that, between that and the covered dish, would be almost the same.

Q. In other words, the dehydrator did no good at all. Is that your answer?

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A. I would say that, from the standpoint of the spoilage, from that——

Q. We are talking about the dehydration from the standpoint of dehydration.

A. From the standpoint of dehydration, the dehydrator pan and the covered dish did not permit the dehydration as rapidly as without it.

Q. Well, would the use of the hydrator pan cause the meat to dehydrate slower?

A. Slower, yes.

Q. So that instead of four days, how long would that meat go without being dehydrated?

A. Well, again, to me, it becomes involved. We are talking about two different things, here, and I claim that you can't [546] divide the one from the other.

Q. Well, I know, but I have taken an example where you say the meat, covered, in a single-compartment refrigerator, will last four days without being dehydrated materially?

A. That's right.

Q. Now, then, you say—let us put a dehydrator pan in that same single compartment, and will that cause the meat to last longer from the standpoint of dehydration?

A. No longer than in the covered dish. [547]

Q. In other words, the dehydrator adds nothing?

A. Not in comparison to a covered dish, no.

Q. So——

A. (Continuing): To me they are one and the

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same thing. What difference does it make whether you have a hydrator pan which is covered, a covered dish, or you talk about a covered dish? We are talking about one and the same thing.

Q. I see. And what is your answer with respect to a head of crisp lettuce that's placed in the refrigerator and covered, we'll say, in a glass dish? How long would it take?

Mr. Berner: What type refrigerator?

Mr. Byron: Single compartment.

A. We are limiting all these questions now to single-door?

Mr. Berner: Conventional type refrigerators?

Mr. Byron: Single compartment. Conventional or otherwise.

A. In a hydrator dish or a covered dish, which is the same?

Q. Well, we'll say covered. Yes.

A. If it was a good, crisp head of lettuce at the time it was put in the refrigerator, if it was between 40 and 45 degrees, it would probably last about 48 hours without showing definite signs of dehydration. Beyond that you would definitely show it was dry. [548]

Q. Well, you would know that it was drying. It would not be entirely dry, would it?

A. No. It wouldn't be entirely dry, but it would be a poor looking piece of lettuce.

Q. How long would it be good?

A. The center of it might be good after 3 or 4

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

days, but that's all. You would waste about two-thirds of it. You might get a little core in the middle of that, as the dehydration tended toward the center.

Q. Putting it in a covered dish would help, anyhow, wouldn't it? A. That's right.

Mr. Berner: Were you referring to dehydration only, now?

Mr. Byron: Oh, yes.

The Witness: Yes.

Q. It was old, in the commercial-type refrigerator, to have the two separate compartments; one, for the freezing compartment and the other a compartment which would have a temperature, say, between 40 and 45 degrees Fahrenheit. That is correct, is it not?

A. And a low temperature.

Q. I said freezing. A. Freezing?

Q. Yes. That was old in the commercial [549] machines? A. Yes.

Q. Prior to Potter's conception? A. Yes.

Q. And you know of one such installation, I think, that you made, or your company made, at the Statler Hotel in New York, was it?

A. I made a lot of them.

Q. I see. A. I made a lot of them.

Q. And so the freezing compartment for ice cream, we'll say, preservation of ice cream, and the warmer compartment, say, for the preservation of salads, was separated, were they not?

A. Yes, sir.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. And by insulation?

A. Yes, sir. And just as much separated by refrigerating systems that cooled them.

Q. Well, now, wait. They were separated?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So that you did maintain a zero degree Fahrenheit temperature in the freezing compartment, and, say, from 40 to 45 degrees in the warmer compartment?

A. That's right.

Q. Now, do you know what type insulation was used and the quantity of insulation? In the commercial refrigerators? [550]

A. It varied from 3 to 4 inches in the normal storage, the vegetable storage, to 5 to 6 inches in the lower storage side.

Q. So there was that much of a differentiation in the insulation between the two compartments?

A. That's right.

Q. So that, from an insulation standpoint of view, Potter didn't suggest anything new from that point of view on the differentiation of the amount of insulation around the freezing compartment and around the warmer compartment?

A. He suggested it insofar as domestic refrigerators were concerned.

Q. I mean, broadly speaking.

A. I don't know. How broad can you get? I don't mean to be facetious now.

Q. Well, I said, these commercial refrigerators, aren't they?

A. Yes, sir.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. And they do have the freezing compartment for maintaining ice cream, for example, in a frozen condition? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And they have a warmer compartment, say, between 40 and 45 degrees, for properly preserving salads and what other foods usual to place in there?

A. That is correct. [551]

Q. Now, then, around the freezing compartment you have an insulation thickness that's up to about 6 inches, did you say? 5 or 6?

A. It was. I mean, that varied.

Mr. Berner: When you say 'commercial refrigerators,' you are referring to——

Mr. Byron: I am referring to any size that would be used in the butcher shop or in the hotel or any business institution as distinguished from one in your kitchen. One in the home kitchen. Private family kitchen.

Q. I'll get back to the question. Then you used about a 5- or 6-inch insulation around the freezing compartment in a commercial-type refrigerator?

A. Right.

Q. And about 3 to 4 inches around the warmer compartment? A. That's correct.

Q. So that there was used, prior to Potter, refrigerators having a freezing compartment and then having this cooling compartment about 40 or 45 degrees with insulation of one thickness, greater thickness around the freezer, and a smaller thick-

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ness of insulation around the warmer compartment.
That is correct, isn't it?

Mr. Berner: You are referring to commercial refrigerators?

Mr. Byron: Yes. I previously added that. [552]

Mr. Berner: Not the last question, but you did earlier. I just wanted to be sure you are carrying through the same context.

Q. Now, answer the question.

A. I say they were.

Q. Is that a proper answer?

A. I think that's correct. You said, did I know whether there were commercial refrigerators made with?

Q. Yes. And that was along prior to the advent of Potter and Bronaugh, his co-patentee?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, the function (I am speaking only of the function now, in maintaining the freezer) for keeping foods frozen, and the warmer chamber for keeping foods at a temperature of 40 to 45 degrees, functionally, is the same in the commercial refrigerator as it is in the domestic refrigerator, is it not?

A. For maintaining those temperatures? No.

Q. Functionally?

A. Functionally it is not. The machine is, the mechanical part is, entirely different.

Q. No. I am not talking about mechanics. I am talking only about function, now. In other words, the function of the freezing in the freezing com-

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partment and the proper cooling to 40 to 45 degrees in the warmer compartment, that [553] functional action is the same in both? That is to say, you do have below freezing in the one compartment and between 40 to 45 degrees Fahrenheit in the other?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. The Jewett Company to which you referred for many years made only the cabinets for commercial refrigerators. Is that correct?

A. No. I wouldn't say that is correct.

Q. They made them for—

A. (Interrupting): They made a majority, but let's say, of commercial refrigerators, to total dollars of business. In quantities, they undoubtedly made as many, if not more, household refrigerators.

Q. That's just the cabinet itself?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Or did they ever make a complete machine?

A. They never manufactured a compressor or condensing unit assembly.

Q. Look, did they sell a refrigerator in its completed condition, having manufactured the cabinet itself, and then purchased the other parts and installed? A. Assembled and installed.

Q. They did sell those? A. Yes, sir.

Q. In the household refrigerators of that [554] type? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And when did they start selling household refrigerators that way? Complete? (And I refer to the Jewett Company.)

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

A. I would say somewhere around 1927, '28.

Q. That was when you were Chief Engineer?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did Jewett ever make any so-called Potter refrigerators? A. Yes. We made some.

Q. How many?

A. Without the record, I wouldn't know.

Q. Could you make an estimate?

A. Could have been 20; it could have been 50; could have been a hundred.

Q. That would be the completed machine? Completed refrigerator?

A. Yes. We made complete refrigerators.

Q. And did you make those for Potter's sale, by himself?

A. No, I wouldn't know. I couldn't answer that intelligently, at that time, what was done with them after they were shipped out of the Jewett factory.

Q. Well, you wouldn't know if it was the Jewett Company that sold that so-called Potter refrigerator or if Potter sold them?

A. No, no. Jewett never sold any Potter refrigerators. That I can tell you. [555]

Q. Well, that's the thing I was driving at.

A. Oh, yes.

Q. But, they did make maybe 25, 50 or a hundred? A. Somewhere in there.

Q. But they made that for Potter?

A. Potter Refrigerator Company.

Q. Now, then, you stated that, some time later

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

(and I don't know what you meant by 'later') that the Jewett Refrigerator Company, or Jewett Company (I don't know its full name) manufactured complete household refrigerators and sold them. Is that correct? A. That's correct.

Q. And when did they start to do that?

A. Well, I don't think that there was any definite cessation of operations from the late '20's or the early '30's, right on through. It never was a sizable operation, but I mean it was something that continued. I know that in 1939, after I left Potter, they asked me to come back there to redesign a line of cabinets which they sent to the Farm Bureau. They sold to the Farm Bureau. They had an exclusive contract with the Farm Bureau out in Indiana, New York, and all those places.

Q. You have stated in your direct testimony that Potter brought to the Jewett Company, and you saw, his refrigerator in about 1931. I would like to clear up that word 'about.' [556] Could it have been in 1932?

A. No. It was earlier than that.

Q. You are sure it was in 1931?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You don't know what part of 1931?

A. Not offhand, no.

Q. Well, you didn't know that in 1944, and, of course, I can't expect you to know it now.

A. It was well in advance of the ad? This ad? I say that it was well in advance of this February 24, 1932.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. Which is the date of the publication known here as Plaintiff's Exhibit"—

The Court: Is that 3-UU?

Mr. Cuningham: It is 3-U, I believe, and that is now in evidence, as I understand.

The Court: Very well. The jury knows what exhibit that is. That is the one I showed you.

Mr. Cuningham: It is a 20-page ad.

"A. Electric Refrigeration News.

Q. You weren't certain, in your direct testimony, about whether this refrigerator which Potter submitted to Jewett at the time, you think, in 1931, had a compressor-condenser unit, installed in it? Did it or did it not? [557]

A. I have not been able to determine, or to go back in my memory, to ascertain whether there was an actual condensing unit in the box that Potter brought to us, which had not been operating for several months due to shipment from the West Coast and all that, whether it had a condensing unit in it which we took out to have dehydrated, which is necessary on the machine, isn't it? And repaired and reinstalled in the refrigerator, or whether there had been a unit in there and we obtained another unit and hooked the rest of the circuit up to run the box after it arrived at our office, because the box was delivered to the engineering department and stood in the engineering department. The works were run in our engineering department with the complete refrigerating cycle.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. You did not see it run in complete?

A. Oh, yes. Sure.

Q. I mean, the original one that was brought to you?

A. I am talking about the day or the week that it was brought there. I don't remember whether there was a unit in it on arrival, which we had taken out and repaired so that we could run the box, or whether there was no unit in it and we put a unit in it and hooked it up and ran it. It's very definite that, there at some time, was a unit in that box and it had been in operation. There was discoloration, water film, on the finned coil. There was [558] water discoloration on the freezer shelf. And the connections down into the refrigerator showed that they had been hooked up to a machine at some time.

Q. I am not questioning you on that. I just wanted to know whether or not it was there, such a unit was there, and you saw it at the time that it was delivered to the Jewett Company.

A. I told you what my memory is, right now.

Q. Yes. I see. All right. In other words, your inspection of it at that time was not sufficiently minute to determine whether or not there was a motor-compressor-condenser unit in it at the time?

A. The inspection hasn't anything to do with it. The main thing to do was work on the cabinet.

Q. I understand that.

A. I will say that it wasn't minute enough to

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

determine, or, I don't remember.

Mr. Berner: As a matter of fact, he doesn't remember, rather than the minuteness there.

The Witness: I say that it's a fact. We went over it; if you ever met Mr. T. Irving Potter, you go over everything minutely with him. I don't care what it is.

Q. Now you are inferring that you did go over it minutely, and I am asking you?

A. I'll say, then, that I don't remember [559] exactly.

Q. All right. Well, you don't remember.

A. All right.

Q. As I understand it, you had very little contact with Potter from 1931 to 1933. Is that correct?

A. Not too much.

Q. Well, how do you mean that 'not too much'?

A. If you see a fellow once, it's too much sometimes.

Q. How frequently did you see him, and how many times in that period?

A. That I don't remember. There were questions that came up once in a while. Potter's office had been moved to Buffalo. We were in Buffalo. It was easy to call up and ask for this, or about that. I went down to the office to see them probably not over a dozen times at the most in the two years. Maybe it was six times.

Q. Well, you were pretty well skilled in the refrigerator art in 1931, were you not?

A. I would say so.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. And you knew of refrigerator constructions, prior to 1931, of various kinds, did you not?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you recall that there were commercial refrigerators with coils having fins on them for heat absorption for cooling purposes. That's correct?

Mr. Byron: Before 1931. [560]

A. As I told you, I am not in a position at this stage to locate that date.

Q. Well, you will admit that, when you testified in 1944, you did know?

A. I think I qualified my answer in 1944 by saying that there was a short period in there, they could have been before. I am willing to go that it could have been before.

Q. Don't you know, as a matter of fact?

A. I don't. No, I would tell you if I did. I try to be positive.

Q. And I am speaking about commercial machines.

A. I know what you are talking about.

Q. Well, assuming that, in a commercial refrigerator (and we will go back to whatever date we want to before 1930), before 1930, there were cooling coils with fins on them, and on that assumption, that there were cooling coils on fins in a cooling compartment in, say, 1940, the function of the finned cooling coils would be the same, namely, to give a greater cooling surface, or greater heat absorption surface. That's correct, isn't it?"

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

The Court: What page is the answer on?

Mr. Cuningham: We have agreed, apparently, to take out the answer and skip to 104, according to my notes. I am not sure it is correct. [561]

Mr. Lucas: "Q. First, I will say, you mentioned that Frigidaire was the"—

The Court: Wait a minute. Is that the answer on about the sixth line, about ten lines or nine on page 103, "If the tubing or vehicle"—isn't that the answer? Have you agreed to delete that answer?

Mr. Cuningham: Yes, sir; I think we should put it in.

Mr. Byron: I think it was an oversight.

The Court: Put it in.

"A. If the tubing or vehicle to which the fins were applied were the same, and the fins were the same, and if the refrigerant was the same, they would naturally be the same.

Q. Cooling fins or heat-absorbing fins, there were, prior to 1930 or 1929?

A. I think we used fins on automobile radiators and things of that type before that. Yes."

The Court: That is enough. Now go to Page 104.

Mr. Cuningham: It is the last two lines on 104.

The Court: Go ahead.

"Q. First, I will say you mentioned that Frigidaire was the greatest producer in volume of re-

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

frigerators in, let's [562] take the period between 1930 and 1940. Is that correct?

A. I would say that's correct.

Q. And then what company would you say is the next largest producer?

A. I would say that, during those years, Frigidaire and General Electric were approximately 1-2 during that period. I think some years General Electric may have gone ahead a little bit and Frigidaire went ahead other years a little bit. It was a close race. You had General Electric, Frigidaire, and from there down, you had Kelvinator, and, some years, Sears Roebuck with their Sunbeam operation came in to the top four or five, but there was General Electric and Frigidaire, just about, and I think Frigidaire has been the largest producer.

Q. Now, take those large companies which you have mentioned. What per cent of the total volume did they sell?

A. Of the top five companies in the country?

Q. Yes. Or, take the top three. Take, if you like, Frigidaire, General Electric and Kelvinator as No. 3.

A. I think Kelvinator was in third place at that time.

Q. All right. Just take those three.

A. Probably, I'll say, at least 50 per cent.

Q. And all of the other companies manufactured and sold the other 50 per cent?

A. I would say that's right. [563]

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. What were those other companies that sold that second 50 per cent?

A. Apex, Stewart-Warner, Westinghouse, Leonard, Norge, Montgomery Ward. For a couple of years Atwater Kent. From there on it was sloughed off into a lot of little companies. Sanitary made some, Jewett made some, various companies all over the country.

Q. Now, while these other companies, smaller companies, to which you referred, sold relatively few as compared with the larger companies, they still continued to exist on a profitable basis as going concerns, didn't they?

A. I would say, again, I wouldn't be in a position to analyze the financial statements of all these companies because Westinghouse operation was subsequently subsidized through the entire Westinghouse corporation. Norge has also been a division of the Borg-Warner Corporation, and so forth.

Q. Take the smaller companies that were not so-called subsidized.

Mr. Berner: Such as?

Mr. Byron: Well, he will have to name them. He named about seven or eight.

Q. You give the names of them.

A. I don't understand how you are going to put a financial rating as to whether they were successful or not. [564]

Q. They continued in business for many years? Just put it that way.

A. Yes.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. And are some of those companies still in existence, selling refrigerators?

A. Some of them are, yes.

Q. And are they still on the small side, making relatively few refrigerators as compared with larger companies?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And still in business?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, you were with Potter and his organization from December 1st, 1933, and June 1st, 1939. That is correct, isn't it?

A. Yes. That's correct.

Q. Which year of those years did Potter have the largest business in the two-compartment refrigerator?

Mr. Berner: Are you referring to dollar volume or number of units there?

Mr. Byron: Number of units.

A. I would say probably 1934 or 1935.

Q. The business declined, the Potter business, in the two-compartment refrigerators, declined from either 1934 or '35 to 1939, did they not?

A. The business didn't decline. Production broke our back. [565] Any business declines if you don't have merchandise to ship.

Q. Well, his business declined, then, insofar as selling refrigerators is concerned?

A. Insofar as producing refrigerators is concerned. Insofar as selling them, too, under the circumstances."

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Lucas: Wait a minute. Hold it.

Mr. Cuninghame: That is in. My notes show that is in.

The Court: Let it go in.

Mr. Lucas: "Insofar as selling them, too, under the circumstances. You can't sell an item if you don't have them."

Mr. Cuninghame: That is what I am objecting, part of his answer.

The Court: You are objecting to his answer?

Mr. Cuninghame: I am objecting to their reading that as a question when I think that is part of his answer.

Mr. Byron: Your Honor, there is a question mark before it. Now, maybe we are mistaken in reading it for an answer, if there was a question mark, but it is all an innocent mistake. It is there in the record. We just read a question.

The Crier: It has been erased on mine.

The Court: Go to Page 109 at the top. [566]

Mr. Cuninghame: I would like to have the answer, if I may.

The Crier: "A. Insofar as producing refrigerators is concerned. Insofar as selling them, too, under the circumstances. You can't sell an item if you don't have them. [567]"

Q. But the Jewett Company served all of the largest companies, such as Frigidaire, General Electric and Kelvinator, as manufacturers in designing of their cabinets, did they not?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

A. That's right. That's correct. It costs a lot of money to put a line of refrigerators into production and we could not afford to go in there. We spent a lot of time trying to work out some plan for the amortization of tools and dies for the money that it would cost the Jewett Company to put on that, to get that production schedule going, and we came up with one answer: The banks wouldn't let us have enough additional capital that you need, we needed immediately, to complete a production.

Q. Was that a lack of faith?

A. I wouldn't say there was a lack of faith between Jewett and Potter. The Jewett Company had me put an awful lot of time in on the Potter project and there was a lot of time spent in trying to work out the details of an arrangement to handle that production.

Q. What do you know about the efforts of Jewett to purchase, to borrow the money from the banks, so that you could set up the production line for the Potter Manufacturing Company?

A. I know what they went through, a tentative program. I can say that I know that I went through an extensive program to try to set up a basis by which we could handle Potter production, the quantity production, and it was all submitted [568] to the officials of the Jewett Refrigerator Company, and that the amounts involved were turned down by the Bank and that Mr. Edgar Jewett, the President of the company, reported to me that we

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

couldn't do it because we could not get the financial backing. At that time we were extended on other obligations and they would not extend our backing to what we required at that time. I don't think the Potter name entered into it.

Q. And how did you regard the Jewett Company; as a successful type or an unsuccessful company?

A. Well I was with them from 1919 till 1933, and I went back from 1939 till the middle of 1940, and I always thought they were just about as good a company as you could find as far as—I don't know what you mean—how could you regard them?

Q. As a successful company?

A. I always got salary. There was never any difficulties about salary. They always paid their bills.

Q. Of course as Chief Engineer at one time, of one of the Potter companies, in connection with the manufacture and sale of two-compartment refrigerators, you knew the structure and operation of that Potter refrigerator well. Correct?

A. You're talking about the physical, the refrigerator, itself?

Q. Yes. A. I think so. [569]

Q. Now, so that we will all understand exactly these parts we are talking about, I am going to refer you to the Bronaugh and Potter reissue of Patent 23,058, in suit."

Mr. Byron: Your Honor, if it is agreeable to

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

you, I will point out those parts on the chart on the easel.

The Court: I think that's all right. Where is the reissue patent?

Mr. Lucas: On the chart, your Honor.

The Court: Put that back a little and then neither Mr. Cuninghame nor Mr. Maguire will have to look around it to see.

Can every member of the jury see that now clearly as Mr. Byron stands there?

(The jurors replied in the affirmative.)

Mr. Lucas: "I just want to refer to various parts by number so that we understand each other.

Now that reissue of patent in suit shows a cabinet 10, does it not?

A. 10. I imagine that is. It has a line pointing to the interior of the cabinet—10. Right there, points to it.

Q. Now, referring to that reissued patent named in suit, it has a cooling compartment 14, has it not?

A. Yes.

Q. And it has a freezing compartment 12, does it not?

A. It has a freezing compartment over here, do you mean? [570] 12 is a part of the evaporator right there. Freezing compartment is 13.

Q. Well, you will find that a part, 12, is the freezing compartment in which the ice cubes are formed.

A. As part of the evaporator.

Q. No, part of the space. It's a freezer for ice cubes.

A. Is a part of the freezing unit?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. Yes. A. Yes. In the compartment."

Mr. Cuningham: May I note for the record that Mr. Byron just a moment ago, and I think correctly, designated the entire lower section there including both 13 and 12, as a part of the freezing compartment.

Mr. Byron: Well, I would be glad to point just exactly if you want, but I want to make it clear now, according to the specification of the Potter patent in suit, they say that this compartment 12 has a temperature of about zero degrees Fahrenheit; that's cold freezing.

Compartment 13 is for storing frozen foods at the temperature of about 20 degrees Fahrenheit and that is below freezing. So when you are speaking about the freezing compartment, I would like to have you tell me if you want me to point to both or to one, or to either.

Mr. Cuningham: Well, I think I have already told you, Mr. Byron, I think your last action was quite correct. I [571] think you were correct yesterday, too. I merely wanted to point it out. You have done everything correctly.

Mr. Byron: Thank you.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. All right. We will refer to it, to the freezing compartment here, 13?

A. Yes. That's all right.

Q. Now, then, referring to this same patent in suit, it has thermal insulation shown as 33?

A. Between the two compartments.

Q. Yes.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

There is insulation between the freezing compartment and the warmer compartment above, and between those two compartments and the outside, the ambient air. Correct? The sides and walls and top of the cabinet. That's correct, isn't it?

A. I'll buy it.

Q. Well, look. See? Does the refrigerator, Potter refrigerator, as shown in that reissue of patent in suit, have insulation along the sides; along its top; along the bottom of the freezing chamber and in between the freezing chamber and the warmer chamber above? A. That's right.

Q. And, of course, there's air in the cooling chamber 14, the upper one—has to be?

A. Correct. All right. In both chambers. [572]

Q. Yes. And then the freezing chamber, 12 and 13? A. Yes. That's right.

Q. Now referring to the same patent in suit, there is a cooling refrigerant coil, or expander? I am referring to this coil here.

A. That's all right.

Q. Is the answer "Yes"? A. Yes.

Q. I see.

A. I haven't seen this particular patent before till right this minute but I have seen enough of this old Bronaugh patent."

Mr. Cuninghame: I wonder, Mr. Byron, if you would point out on Fig. 2 the expander?

Mr. Byron: Well, it just shows this small coil here (indicating).

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Cuningham: That's the fin up there, is it not?

Mr. Byron: No, it is not a fin so far as I know, and I say it is not.

Mr. Cuningham: I think you are incorrect.

Mr. Byron: Well, all right. Let's argue.

The Court: But not now.

Mr. Cuningham: I want to note in the record he carefully refrained from pointing to Fig. 2 until I corrected it.

Mr. Byron: Now, listen, that's an insinuation, and I won't stand for it. It's simpler to point to one figure for [573] the jury so that they will have the complete view without being confused with another. I will be glad to point to both. Which is your desire? Shall I point to both?

Mr. Cuningham: I wish you would point to everything that you want to point to, and leave out nothing that is responsive.

Mr. Byron: All right. Just let me do it.

The Court: I think that Mr. Byron has the right to point to Fig. 1, particularly in view of the fact that all the questions were directed to Fig. 1 in the deposition.

Mr. Cuningham: Well, your Honor, I didn't so understand. I may be in error on that.

Mr. Byron: I think you are.

Mr. Cuningham: The witness, you see, was reading from the patent. No one was pointing anything out.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

The Court: You will have all the opportunity, Mr. Cuninghame, to present your own case.

Mr. Byron: I assure you we are not trying to put anything over. It's all here very plain.

Mr. Cuninghame: You make me feel very comfortable.

Mr. Byron: Good.

The Court: Go ahead.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. This is the exact duplicate. It has to be. A. Yes. [574]

Q. You can't show anything in addition.

And that same reissue of patent in suit shows a freezing refrigerant coil or expander 22, does it not? A. Yes.

Q. Now, there is a volatile refrigerant that passes through those expanders. That is correct, isn't it? A. That's correct.

Q. And that refrigerant, volatile refrigerant, passes through the compressor, through the condenser, through the receiver, then through the coil to the expansion valve 23?

A. You mean from the tube to the expansion valve?

Q. Yes. To the expansion valve 23. That's right?

A. Yes.

Q. And then to the expansion valve 23, and through into the freezing coil 22?

A. Go ahead.

Q. And then—well, did you say Yes or No?

A. Yes. Go ahead.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. Then into the cooling refrigerant coil 25, up over here? A. Yes.

Q. And then back to the compressor?"

Mr. Cuningham: Would you mind pointing it out on Fig. 2, Mr. Byron?

Mr. Byron: Yes, I will be glad to.

The Court: Read it over again, and Mr. Byron will point [575] it out on Fig. 2.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. And that refrigerant, volatile refrigerant, passes through the compressor, through the condenser, through the receiver, then through the coil to the expansion valve 23?

A. You mean from the tube to the expansion valve?

Q. Yes. To the expansion valve 23. That's right?

A. Yes.

Q. And then to the expansion valve 23, and through into the freezing coil 22?

A. Go ahead.

Q. And then—well, did you say Yes or No?

A. Yes. Go ahead.

Q. Then into the cooling refrigerant coil 25"——

Mr. Byron: Just give me a chance to find that here. It doesn't show up here in this figure. There is no 25, but I know where it is.

Mr. Cuningham: I will have no difficulty showing it, your Honor.

Mr. Byron: I say there is no reference character 25 here, but I will point it out.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Cuningham: I think there is.

Mr. Ramsey: I think there is up on top.

Mr. Byron: Oh, yes. I see it now. I couldn't see it.

Mr. Cuningham: Funny what difficulties we have when we get to figure 2. [576]

Mr. Byron: Well, I don't know if I should stand for that or not; these insinuations are not professional.

The Court: I think, Mr. Cuningham, you ought to stop that.

Mr. Cuningham: Your Honor, I will say not one other word.

The Court: I think it was certainly uncalled for and the jury is instructed to disregard it.

Mr. Byron: I will try to point out that coil 25 in Fig. 2. It comes up—the coil comes up from the continuation of coil 22 up through this insulation and out here and out here (indicating at all times).

The Crier: "A. Yes.

Q. And then back to the compressor?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, there is a single liquefying unit there; it has a single compressor-condenser set, is there not? A. Condensing unit?

Q. Yes. And that takes care of the refrigerant passing through the entire system? A. Yes.

Q. Through the freezing coil and the cooling coil in the upper chamber? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And then there's a thermostat 31 in the upper compartment [577] 14 of that patent in suit?

A. Yes.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. And the expansion valve is shown as 23. Is that correct? A. That's correct.

Q. Now, in this Potter reissue patent, 23,058, in suit, the cooling refrigerant coil is known as 25, isn't it? A. Yes.

Q. And according to the drawings, that coil is made of a plain round pipe, is it not?

A. Well, bent, of course—attached to the fins, or with fins attached to it.

Q. I didn't ask you that. I said, it's made of plain, round pipe, is it not, the coil 25?

A. That depends on what the definition of 25 is.

Q. Sure. That's exactly what I want. That was my next question.

A. I would say that, in reference to Item 25—

Q. What does the specification say?

A. It says: 'The food storage compartment is provided with a cooling coil 25, which draws refrigerant from the discharge of the freezing coil 22, and returns the same through the pipe 26 to the compressor 15.'

And 25 is pictured as a series of tubing to which fins are applied. [578]

Q. Where are the fins? Point those out.

A. Right here. Very plainly. Here's No. 20, and it shows the coil, part of the cooling unit. And over here in 25, it shows no coils but it shows the fin section of the cooling unit.

Q. Now, will you please refer to the specifications and state if you can find a mention of 'fins' at all.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

A. It doesn't have to have any fins at all.

Q. I don't want you to argue. I want you to answer the question. As I say, will you please refer to the specification of this patent in suit and see, point out, if the specification shows or describes fins in connection with the cooling coil 25 in the upper compartment 14 of the patent in suit?"

Mr. Lucas: 120.

The Court: 120.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. Please refer to the specification of the reissue patent in suit, read that specification, and state whether or not it mentions fins, and fins particularly on the cooling coil 25 in the upper, relatively warm, chamber 14.

A. There are two references 25 from the drawing. In the specification, No. 25 is described as a cooling coil. The words 'cooling coil' cannot be construed in any other way but to include both of the notations on the drawing which designate one figure 25 pointing to the coils, and the other figure 25 pointing to the fins which support the coils. [579]

Mr. Byron: I object to that answer and I will move to have it stricken and I will now request the witness not to give any constructions of his own, but to please answer the question, and I will state the question again."

Mr. Cuninghame: I thought we agreed to leave that out.

Mr. Lucas: I am sorry.

The Court: Did you agree to leave out that objection?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Byron: Well, frankly, I don't know. No, not the objection. I have got a notation here, "Move to strike," so I wouldn't leave it out.

The Court: Well, what is the situation? Do you have any objection to its being stricken?

Mr. Cuninghame: Oh, yes, sir. I think it should stay in; very important. I see no reason for striking it. It's as relevant as it can be, responsive.

Mr. Byron: I have no serious objection at all.

The Court: Well, was Mr. Bommer qualified as a patent expert?

Mr. Byron: No, he is not.

The Court: The answer will be stricken and the interpretation which Mr. Bommer puts on that figure is of no consequence, and the jury is instructed to disregard it. Mr. Bommer has not been brought as an expert on patents.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. The question is: Refer to the specification in this patent in suit, read that specification, and state [580] whether or not you find the word 'fins' in that specification as related to the coil 25, or any other coil.

A. As a refrigerating engineer, the word 'fins' in the description is not necessary inasmuch as the drawing distinctly points to a—to both sections of the coil, and it is inclusive in the one unit.

Q. Will you now answer the question?"

The Court: Well, that question, the jury is also instructed to disregard that answer.

Mr. Maguire: If your Honor will hear us a moment—

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

The Court: I can't hear you.

Mr. Maguire: ——an engineer, particularly an engineer who is experienced with a particular device, may describe what is in the drawing. That wouldn't be a matter for a patent expert. There are certain symbols that are used in mechanical drawings, and a mechanical engineer is, I submit, your Honor, wholly qualified.

The Court: Well, Mr. Byron, do you want that answer or not?

Mr. Byron: I want it out. He didn't answer the question. It wasn't responsive.

The Court: That is true. Look at the question, Mr. Maguire.

Mr. Cuninghame: The one on 124, your Honor?

Mr. Lucas: We haven't come to that yet.

The Court: The first one certainly wasn't responsive [581] that I struck.

Mr. Byron: The second one is just as faulty.

Mr. Maguire: Is that page 121, your Honor?

The Court: Mr. Byron, do you agree that an engineer may, by looking at a description, determine whether the word "fin" is necessary or not necessary in order to characterize the drawing?

Mr. Byron: An engineer is no different from any person who can read English. The point we are bringing out is that there is not word mentioned about——

The Court: I don't want any argument here.

Mr. Byron: Oh, no.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Byron: Now, what one man may say about a drawing—he may interpret it one way; another man would interpret it another way, and so I can't say——

The Court: I thought it was the function of the Court to determine the interpretation which may be placed upon a drawing. I didn't think that a man who is an engineer is capable of placing a construction on that. I appreciate the fact that that might be something for Mr. Parker to testify on, who is going to come forth as your expert, but I doubt whether Mr. Bommer has the qualifications to read a patent.

Mr. Byron: The main point is, the answer is not responsive to the question asked, and I move to strike the answer as [582] not responsive.

The Court: Which one is that?

Mr. Byron: Well, there are two of them; the last one that was read——

The Court: On what page?

Mr. Lucas: 121, your Honor.

The Court: The question is stricken on the ground that it is not responsive.

Mr. Byron: The answer is.

The Court: The answer is stricken on the ground it is not responsive.

Mr. Byron: Now, may we proceed?

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Byron: All right.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Cuningham: The answer is stricken on what page?

The Court: On page 121.

Mr. Cuningham: That's all right.

The Court: It begins with line 11, "As a refrigerating engineer"—the entire answer is stricken on the grounds it is not responsive, among other grounds.

Mr. Cuningham: Is the question likewise stricken?

Mr. Byron: No. Why should it be?

The Court: No, the question is not stricken.

Mr. Lucas: There is also a question and answer on 120.

The Court: I have already ruled on that, Mr. Lucas. [583]

Mr. Maguire: I understood your Honor struck the question—or the answer on 120.

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Maguire: Very well.

The Court: If you think you need an exception you can have exceptions to all this.

Mr. Maguire: Well, I understood that those exceptions are as a matter of law——

The Court: Automatic.

Mr. Maguire: ——automatic.

The Court: But some lawyers keep asking me to preserve their record and make an exception. I appreciate your understanding of the law; it agrees with mine.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Cuningham: I have no desire to read that on 124, your Honor.

The Court: Where are we now?

The Crier: I am on 124, about one-third of the way down.

Mr. Cuningham: The statement that Mr. Berner made, which I think we should have left out, mere colloquy, not proof, on 124, your Honor——

Mr. Byron: Now, of course, it's nice to have him——

The Court: Wait a minute. We are going to all get along pretty well.

It's now 20 minutes of eleven, and I think it's a good time to take a recess. [584]

(Whereupon, the jury was excused for their midmorning recess, and the following proceedings were had out of the presence of the jury.)

The Court: I don't find that colloquy on 124, Mr. Cunningham.

Mr. Cuningham: About five lines or six lines down starts "Mr. Berner."

The Court: "The only question, as I understand it, Mr. Byron wants to know whether the word 'fin' appears, 'f-i-n.'" Well——

Mr. Byron: That's right. Let it stay in; instructing his witness to answer. It's at least explaining to his witness that I want an answer with respect to that particular point.

The Court: So we have left out other colloquys,

Mr. Byron. Let's have the answer, "It's obvious the word 'fin' is not in this description."

Mr. Byron: Very well. I want that read to the jury.

The Court: No, I would like to find out now because we may get into this same difficulty again, whether I am correct in stating that one who is not qualified as a patent expert may tell the reach of a diagram or a description and construe a patent.

Mr. Cuningham: Your Honor knows, I think, that both parties indicated they would have—of Mr. Parker, your [585] Honor, in our case; however, there are such things as—I call them fact experts. Of course, I think Mr. Bommer, who is one of the most highly-qualified refrigeration engineers in the country, is certainly capable to interpret this drawing and would be of a great assistance to your Honor. I think your Honor is correct, of course, as to the interpretation of drawings or ultimately—are ultimately for the Court, but I do think you want the assistance of qualified men who, a man who spent his life in refrigeration reading patents and drawings and things like that. [586]

The Court: Do you join with Mr. Cuningham, Mr. Kolisch?

Mr. Kolisch: No; not at all. No one except a patent expert could testify to a patent drawing. A patent drawing is not a mechanical drawing; it is a patent drawing. It is tied to the specification, and it is tied to the claims, and it is only someone qualified in that who can offer some assistance to the Court, if the Court wants it.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

The Court: I was under the impression that the purpose of a patent drawing and the specifications is to clearly and definitely state the patent so that anyone skilled in the art can reproduce it.

Now, under those circumstances, may not a man with Mr. Bommer's qualifications testify as to whether he could manufacture such a refrigerator from looking at the specifications, and if that is true can he not testify that from looking at the coil, Fig. 25, he came to the conclusion that this is a finned coil and that a person versed in the industry would naturally assume that this was a fin coil? Is that an improper statement on his part?

Mr. Cuninghame: Your Honor, it is so much better, and I agree with it, and I could not agree with it more fully.

The Court: Mr. Cuninghame, I suggested earlier today that if you would not put everything on the same level, and if I know which you are really interested in getting I would know which statements of yours to place credence [587] in.

I think that I struck the answer properly because, as you pointed out, Mr. Byron, it was not responsive to the question, but this issue may rise again, and I want to know whether the statement I made with which Mr. Cuninghame agrees is or is not correct.

Mr. Byron: I will just say this, that the statement of the witness is one man's interpretation of some lines up there.

The Court: I know that, Mr. Byron. That is the function of an expert, to render an opinion. He is the only type of witness that may give his conclusion, but if my statement is correct, then a witness may set forth his conclusion just as your experts are going to be permitted to give their conclusion. The specific question that I want to propound is: Do you contend that only a person who is a patent expert may state his conclusion to the jury?

Mr. Byron: No, I do not.

The Court: Or may a refrigeration expert likewise——

Mr. Byron: I think it is more properly that, but I have no objection to the witness stating that, in his opinion, the lines which are shown there indicate to him a fin.

The Court: That is what he did, and if the question [588] was asked him and if it was responsive, if his answer was responsive, then in your opinion the answer would be proper?

Mr. Byron: No, because it was not responsive.

The Court: Assuming responsiveness.

Mr. Byron: Well, assuming, why, all right. That is one man's interpretation, but the point is, if I had asked for a conclusion.

The Court: From now on I will rule that a refrigeration expert may state his conclusion, his personal opinion, as to what a drawing represents.

Mr. Byron: Very well.

The Court: Under these circumstances, would you have any objection if I would notify the jury

that it is Mr. Bommer's opinion that Figure 25 represents a finned coil?

Mr. Cuningham: I certainly have no objection, your Honor. I think it might be a little safer to read the answer which he has given.

The Court: The difficulty is that Mr. Berner was not a very expert trial counsel, and he asked a lot of questions that he should not have asked, and he did not instruct his witness properly.

Mr. Byron: Well, on the other hand, he regards himself as one of the world's best, and he is a very capable trial lawyer. He has a tremendous practice in New York; [589] am I right?

Mr. Cuningham: I do not know, sir.

Mr. Byron: Well, he tells me——

Mr. Cuningham: I think he is very highly regarded in New York. I think that is not Mr. Berner's question. Really, I think we want the words from the witness. It is a little safer; that is all. I am referring to the answer on Page 120 and also to the answer on 121.

Mr. Byron: Your Honor, the only thing I am driving at, and it will come out here later, that there is not a single word in the specification about fins.

Mr. Cuningham: There is no dispute about that.

Mr. Byron: That is what I am driving at, but this witness just simply would not say so in spite of the fact that he read. He was just belligerent.

Mr. Cuningham: I do not think—I said there was no dispute in my mind that the word "fin" is

not in the specification. I think it is very clearly implied from the words of this specification of its being a finned coil.

The Court: The ruling as to the answer appearing on Page 120 will not be changed, and that answer goes out.

I had hoped that we could eliminate some of this. Mr. Byron, did you not call my attention to a great deal of testimony concerning the difference between a covered dish and one that was uncovered? I do not see the relevancy of [590] that testimony.

Mr. Cuninghame: May I point it out to your Honor?

The Court: Proceed.

Mr. Cuninghame: It shows that the great research laboratories of the Frigidaire Corporation were trying to solve this problem of dehydration and could produce nothing better than a covered dish, and contrast that with the fundamental basic solution produced by the patent in suit, and we are arguing, sir, that that is a demonstration that was beyond ordinary skill when the biggest research department in the country produces a covered dish at the time these inventors produce a fundamental solution.

The Court: Did the commercial refrigeration have the same types of moist cold in their cooling chambers?

Mr. Cuninghame: Oh, no, sir.

Mr. Byron: Now, let me say something.

Mr. Quinn, whose deposition was taken by plaintiff and who was the Vice-President of the General

Electric Corporation, said that they did not want to get into this moist cold feature, as Potter has had at that time at least, because it would add greatly to the expense of refrigerators, and General Electric and the rest of them were in a battle trying to bring down the price, and that is what the testimony is, and so they took a simpler way of putting in a covered dish or hydrator, and that is their witness. [591]

Mr. Cuningham: His deposition will be next, sir.

The Court: I think we are getting some place now. Ever since I read Mr. Maguire's statement, I know generally or with greater specificity what the plaintiff claims is the invention. This moist cold is one of the essential elements, as I understand it. We will take a recess for about five minutes.

(Recess taken.)

(Thereupon, the jury returned to the jury box and the following proceedings were had in their presence.)

The Court: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, a few minutes ago I announced that, in my view, no one but a person who is qualified as a patent expert could explain the meaning of a drawing or specifications. Upon reconsideration, I have come to the conclusion that a refrigeration expert can also express his personal opinion.

That is the function of an expert, to express an opinion, and that is what makes him different than the ordinary lay witness. A lay witness or one who

is not skilled in the art may only testify as to facts, but when he has been qualified by education and training as an engineer or as a physician or as a patent expert he may express his opinion based upon a certain question. [592]

I ruled out an answer, and that answer was properly ruled out because it was not responsive. Witnesses cannot answer any question other than the question that is propounded to them, and if the question is not responsive they may not answer the question, but from now in you will hear many witnesses testify as to their opinion, and you may consider that along with the other testimony, but before a witness may express his opinion, of course, he will have to be qualified as an expert.

If a man is an expert physician, he may not be qualified to express an opinion as to a mechanical subject. In this particular case we are going to have two types of experts, I understand, refrigeration experts and patent experts, and the value of testimony or an opinion is dependent upon many factors. You judge an expert witness just the same way as you judge a lay witness, but you must also consider his training, and you must also consider reasons which he gives in support of his conclusion.

I am going to tell you this over again during the instructions, but I thought that this was a propitious time to let you know which of the witnesses are permitted to express their opinions.

Proceed.

Mr. Lucas: 129, Line 9. [593]

DEPOSITION OF FERDINAND J. BOMMER
Cross-Examination
(Continued)

The Crier: You want just the answer on that, I understand. "A. It's obvious the word 'fin' is not in this description.

Q. Now, your assumption is, however, that where there is a cooling coil in a cooling compartment such as 14, if you call for a coil, that necessarily means that there are fins on it? Is that what you are saying about that patent?

A. No. I am saying, about that, I am simply saying that it definitely shows fins and so designated by the number 25.

Q. Well, you said something——

A. (Interrupting): Is there an error in the patent?

Q. No. A. Art? Error?

Q. Look: I am not the witness. You are the witness. Now I want to ask you another question. I said any refrigerating engineer—I'll ask you—did you say that any refrigerating engineer would know that a coil in a cooling compartment such as 14 in the patent in suit would need fins?

A. I would say that, as indicated on the drawing on that patent, a refrigerating engineer would know that it was a finned coil.

Q. Well, now, what appears there in Fig. 2 of the drawings [594] is just an oblong outline, isn't it? 25? A. Yes, sir.

Q. You wouldn't know. It might be a box, might

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

it not?

A. I would say that this, as drawn, is an engineer's designation of a finned coil. Would that answer your question?

Q. That's your answer?

A. Yes, sir. That's my answer to your question.

Q. But it might represent a brine box, too, might it not?

A. Not to a refrigerating engineer."

Mr. Cuningham: I have no desire to read it, sir. It is a copy, I think, of the patent.

The Court: Where are we now?

Mr. Lucas: 126, your Honor, about Line 8 or 9.

The Court: Is it Mr. Berner?

Mr. Cuningham: I would be glad to put it in. I simply wanted to say—— [595]

Mr. Cuningham: Well, I would be glad to put it in. I simply wanted to save duplication.

The Court: All right. Go ahead and read your next question that you want in.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. Well, would a refrigeration engineer, having a coil in a cooling compartment ranging from 40 to 45 degrees temperature, know that there should or should not be fins on that coil?"

Mr. Cuningham: You have the answer there.

The Court: Where is the answer to that?

Mr. Cuningham: Right below.

Mr. Lucas: After the colloquy, yes.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

The Court: Read that, "Would he know it? Yes."

Mr. Byron: 127, middle of the page.

Mr. Cuninghame: 127 is the question.

Mr. Byron: It's repetitious.

The Court: Where are we now?

Mr. Byron: Middle of page 127 is the answer.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. A refrigeration engineer, having a cooling coil in a cooling compartment, at the desired temperature range between 40 and 45 degrees, would that engineer know that he should have fins on that coil?"

The Court: All right, read the answer.

The Crier: "A. If the allotted space for the cooling mechanism was indicated as a small proportion of the cooling [596] chamber, he would, a refrigerating engineer would know that the cooling coil in that container, in order to properly cool the compartment, it would all depend on the relation between the size of the coil and the amount of space to be cooled.

Q. You had no difficulty in understanding the patent office drawing in that suit, did you?

A. No, sir.

Q. Now, just along this same line of analysis, I want to have you point out a few elements in the Anderson Patent No. 1,439,051"—

Mr. Byron: Now, your Honor, may we fix this other chart up so that I may point to elements on it?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

The Court: All right.

What is the matter now?

Mr. Ramsey: The Anderson patent is identified as Defendants' 105, and we now offer it.

The Court: You mean the——

Mr. Byron: Anderson patent.

The Court: The entire Anderson patent?

Mr. Byron: Yes.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Byron: What is the exhibit number?

Mr. Ramsey: 105.

The Court: Is there any objection to the admission of 105? [597]

Mr. Cuningham: No objection.

The Court: It may be admitted. I think that was one of the references in the answer, anyway.

(Whereupon, the document, being Anderson Patent No. 1,439,051, was received in evidence as Defendants' Exhibit 105.)

Mr. Lucas: ——“and I will ask you first, if that is a household refrigerator having a cabinet 9?”

Mr. Maguire: What page is that?

The Court: The middle of 128.

Mr. Lucas: ——“You will find 9 over at the right-hand corner of the drawing.

A. Yes. I see that.

Q. That's correct, isn't it?

A. That's right. Now one question, let's get

cleared up, first. The Anderson patent does not refer to a household electric refrigerator. It refers to 'a refrigerator.'

Mr. Berner: A refrigerator apparatus.

A. All right. So marked at the top.

Q. Now, then, referring to this same Anderson patent, the cabinet 9 has a cooling compartment 6, has it not? That's the upper compartment.

A. Yes.

Q. And it has a freezing compartment 7, has it not? A. Right. [598]

Q. And it has thermal insulation 10, 11, 14, has it not. That thermal insulation being around the side of the box, in the back of the box, and the top of the box, and between the cooling compartment 6 and the freezing compartment 7, and between those two compartments and the compartment containing the apparatus, namely, the compartment 8. That's correct, is it?

A. There is air in compartment 6, of course? Yes.

Q. That's where the food is normally placed, that is, the food that's not frozen. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And there is air in the freezing compartment 7 in Anderson. Is that correct? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, that Anderson patent shows a cooling refrigerant coil, or expander 40, does it not, in the upper compartment 6? A. Yes.

Q. And it shows, Anderson shows, a freezing refrigerant expander 35 in the freezing compartment 7, does it not? A. That's right.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. And a volatile refrigerant passes through those expanders, does it not? A. That's right.

Q. And that volatile refrigerant passes through the compressor unit through a pipe 32? [599]

A. Yes.

Q. Through a reducing valve 35? A. 33.

Q. 33, correct. That's the same expansion valve, isn't that? A. Yes.

Q. And then that refrigerant passes through the freezing coil 34. Correct?

A. That's right; yes, sir.

Q. And then passes up into the coil 40 in the warmer compartment 6. Correct? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And then passes, returns to the compressor unit. Correct? A. Yes.

Q. And that's a single refrigerant all the way through? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now, then, I'll ask you to refer to page 1 of that patent, and beginning at line 91—that's in the second column—find 91, and I'll read to you:

'Suitable automatic controlling mechanism as exemplified by a thermostat in the refrigerating chamber * * *'

That refers to a thermostat in the chamber 6, does it not? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And that, of course, is for controlling the operation of the motor-compressor-condenser unit. You will notice that [600] refrigerating chamber 6 is indicated, or shown, described at page 1, column 1, line 41. I say, it does refer to a thermostat for

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

that chamber, refrigerating chamber 6? That upper chamber? A. All right. All right.

Q. That's correct? A. All right. Okay.

Q. The cooling coil 40 in the chamber 6, which is the warmer of those two chambers, is made of a round pipe, is it not?

A. Yes, sir. Let's say that it shows a round pipe. Illustrates a round pipe.

Q. Yes. Yes. That's all right. That's what I say.

What difference, if any, would it make in the operation of this Anderson apparatus with those cooling coils 40 bearing against the metallic side walls 12?

A. Well, unless they were bonded directly to the metal, that effect on the side walls would be little. There are a lot of elements in consideration there. What are the side walls? If they are porcelain enamel walls, the conduction would be very little. Would depend upon how tight they were or, let's say, how close the proximity of the coils was to the walls.

Q. Well, say if they are actually in engagement, what would be the effect?

A. They would have some degree of finned action. [601]

Q. Yes. I might have you refer to page 1, col. 1, beginning in line 50:

'The side and top walls of the refrigeration chamber, partitions 1 and 11, and the outer side and bottom of chamber 7, each comprise a metal inner lining 12 * * *'

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

I just want to mention the fact to have you know that those walls, side walls, are metal.

A. It would depend upon what the metal was, how that was treated. I said, if it was porcelain enamel it would be practically no effect.

Q. Doesn't show it's porcelain?

A. It doesn't say that it isn't, either.

Q. Says 'A metallic wall,' doesn't it? A metallic lining or inner wall has power of absorbing heat, hasn't it? A. If it's bonded to the coil, yes.

Q. And to some degree if it is only engaging the coil?

A. Very little. I think the space of one thousandth of an inch decreases the effect tremendously.

Q. The expansion or reduction valve 33 in the Anderson patent is for regulating the degree of pressure in the freezing coil 34, and, therefore, the degree of pressure in the freezing coil 34, and, therefore, the degree of supply of liquid refrigerant to the coil 34. Is that not so?

A. I would want to read this Anderson patent again. It's [602] many years since I saw this Anderson patent and it isn't fair to give answers.

Q. I'll give you the part.

Mr. Berner: Let him read it if he wishes.

Mr. Byron: Sure. I want to show him at the same time.

Page 2, Col. 1, if you like, but if you would like

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

to read the whole thing, I would be pleased to have you read it.

A. (Reading from document): That is correct.

Q. If the coils 40 in compartment 6, which is the warmer compartment of the two, should drip water, that would indicate that the temperature of the outside surface of the coil would be above 32 degrees, would it not? A. During defrosting, yes.

Q. Well, at any time?

A. Not necessarily, no.

Q. Well, any time they are dripping, that would mean that the coils were above 32? A. Yes.

Mr. Berner: You are assuming they are dripping, but there is no showing that they ever dripped.

Mr. Byron: He read the specifications.

Q. When the coils 40 in the warmer of the two compartments—chambers—6, when the coils are dripping, that would indicate that the outside surfaces of the coils were above 32 degrees Fahrenheit, would it not? [603] A. Yes, sir.

Mr. Byron: Cross-examination closed.”

The Court: Mr. Maguire, are you going to read the questions?

Mr. Maguire: I could, your Honor. I think the next page on redirect is on page 134. Am I correct in that?

Mr. Lucas: Yes, sir.

Mr. Maguire: Yes.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

“Redirect Examination

By Mr. Berner:

Q. Well, did the Anderson patent provide for air-conditioned or above-temperature freezing, as you examine it?

A. Above-temperature freezing?

Q. I mean above freezing temperature conditioning, such as the Potter. A. No.

Q. In the upper compartment?

A. No, there are no claims to that effect. There is no description to that effect.

Q. In your opinion, from examining it, the diagram and specifications, would it give air-conditioned cooling? A. No.

Q. In the upper compartment?

A. No. [604]

Q. Would the Potter? A. Yes.

Q. Does the Anderson patent show any finned coil or other surface for diluting heat conduction?

A. No.

Q. Now, as I understood your testimony on cross, you stated that the fins had been used in the automotive field earlier than in the refrigeration field. Is that right? A. That's correct.

Q. Now, as Potter applied principles of fins in the construction, will you explain the difference from the automobile use of fins in automobile radiators?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

A. Well, the action of the fin is actually reversed in the automobile. You have a hot tube, or a hot honeycomb jacket, whatever you want to call it, that you wish to cool the liquid in the tube so that you dispel the heat through fins, which is an expelling action. In a refrigerator you have cold liquid in the tubes surrounded by a warmer ambient, and it is an absorbing action of the fin.

Q. Now, prior to Potter, did you ever know anybody who used that technique in refrigeration?

A. That was the question which came up this morning that I said, as my memory, that was overlapped. It was the first time I saw it used in a household refrigerator or a domestic electric refrigerator. [605]

Q. Now, then, in response to a question of Mr. Byron's, you said that any time an engineer wanted to get a forty-five-degree temperature he would use a finning. Is that what you said?

A. That isn't what I mean to imply; no, sir.

Mr. Byron: I didn't put it that way. I put it in a compartment.

Q. Well, in a compartment. Did they know how to do that around 1931 in a domestic refrigerator, so far as you know?

A. It was never done. I am taking it now you are saying around 1931?

Q. Yes. Now when you testified that was what an engineer would do, would that be the present practice, today?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

A. I said that, giving a confined area or amount of room to install a cooling unit in a compartment, if the amount of room was confined, you would have to fin the area in order to get enough refrigerating surface to accomplish the purpose.

Mr. Byron: And any engineer would know that.

Mr. Berner: Wait awhile.

Mr. Byron: And any engineer would know that.

Q. Now, and as Mr. Byron said, you also said that any engineer would know that?

Mr. Byron: Refrigerant engineer.

Q. Refrigerating engineer would know that? As of the present time, that they would know it? [606]

A. Yes.

Q. Did they always know that?

A. No, sir.

Q. Was it known in terms of domestic refrigerators prior to the Potter development?

A. No.

Q. Now, with reference to the Anderson Patent No. 1,430,951, does the refrigerating apparatus shown there have to be defrosted?

A. As shown, yes.

Mr. Byron: I object to that as a conclusion. You have no way of knowing that.

Q. And does the box, as shown, have the advantage of the Potter-type refrigerator that you have testified to? A. No.

Q. Now, have you ever seen reissue patent number—

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Byron (Interrupting): I object to that, first, as a conclusion.

Q. Have you ever seen reissue patent No. 23,058, dated December 14, 1948, before today?

A. No, sir.

Q. Now, you testified on cross-examination, did you not, there were four to six lines going at Rex at one time. Will you explain that, if you will?

A. Yes, sir. The Rex factory was a three-story factory. [607] Those production lines——

Mr. Byron (Interrupting): That's objected to as immaterial and irrelevant."

The Court: Well, that was out.

The Crier: "A. (Continued): ——were set up and dismantled to meet the requirements of changing production schedules. On the back of the third floor they had a line on which Potter and Stewart-Warner cabinets were run at all times. The delay in producing Potter cabinets was due to the constant use of the lines for Stewart-Warner production, or until such time as the Stewart-Warner production had been completed.

The Witness: I saw it. It isn't hearsay. I was there."

Mr. Maguire: I think the statement of the witness made at page——top of page 139 should come out because the objection was taken out.

Mr. Byron: Satisfactory.

The Court: I think you can start in at 140. Is that right?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Maguire: No. There is another question and answer, your Honor.

“The Witness: I’ll amend my answer to say that I was there at least two days a week.”

The Crier: “The Witness: I’ll amend my answer to say that I was there at least two days a week.

Q. Was that expensive? [608]

A. Wait a minute. I was there for two days a week for many months at a time during the peak refrigerator season, and that during these times it was the rule that the only time Potter cabinets were run was after the Stewart-Warner production was complete.”

Mr. Maguire: Now, I take it that we go to the top of page 140.

“Q. Now, with reference to the hydrator pan, can you tell us whether that was good or bad for the food from the point of spoilage?

A. From the point of spoilage, why it was bad.

Q. Will you explain your answer?

A. All hydrator pans were covered. Otherwise they would not have been hydrator pans. The amount of air in the hydrator pan was very limited and food deteriorated from its own foul air in such confined areas.

Q. Would it be fair to say that though they might have had a beneficial effect, that the hydrator pans, from the point of view of preventing dehydration, that it created the evil you just described?

A. That is correct. It helped the dehydrating

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

condition and increased the deterioration condition.

Q. Was this true of the Potter air-conditioned compartment?

A. That was not true of the Potter.

Q. Now, did you examine the Potter box when you were at [609] Jewett? A. I did.

Q. And were you preparing a production model, or production drawings for it? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And did you make all the examinations of the Potter box that were required for that?

A. Well, entirely dismantled the Potter sample and rebuilt it.

Q. Then would you say that you made a detailed examination of the Potter box?

A. Very thorough detail.

Q. At Jewett?

A. (Continuing): Examination.

Q. And when you referred to the fact on your cross-examination that you didn't know whether the compressor unit was in it, were you referring to the recollection of it rather than to your failure to examine the box carefully?

A. It was a matter of recollection.

Q. Now, could you tell us, in your recollection, what you were sure the box contained when you saw it?

A. The box contained a complete cabinet.

Q. When it first entered Jewett? There was a motor that came from the West Coast to Jewett?

A. Yes. A complete cabinet. A complete tubing

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

extending [610] down into the machine compartment, and expansion valve, a freezer plate, and in the frozen storage compartment, the tube being connected from the freezer plate to the fin coil in the upper compartment, the tubing from the finned coil in the upper compartment back to and extending into the machine compartment. Also a thermostat which was completely wired with extensions to the machine compartment.

Q. Now, referring to the commercial refrigeration refrigerators that Mr. Byron talked about, would you describe the system of the commercial refrigerator as it existed prior to Potter in 1931—'30 and '31?

A. Prior to 1930 and '31, the commercial refrigerator? The cooling of refrigerators commercially was done by cooling a series of coils in a refrigerated bath. In this bath were submerged pipes containing a brine solution and the brine solution was pumped to each individual refrigerator or section of a refrigerator. The amount of refrigerating coil which cooled the refrigerators was made proportionate to the temperature to be accomplished in each compartment and regulated by separate intake and outgo hand valves which had to be manually operated. There was no connection between the coil pipes in one compartment to another compartment in the same refrigerator.

Q. And what refrigerant was used?

A. In the commercial jobs there was, a majority

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

of them at [611] that time, were ammonia systems. There was some sulphur dioxide systems but the majority of them were ammonia systems.

Q. And so far as you can recall, did any of them have any finned coils prior to 1931?

A. They did not.

Q. And was there any provision for air-conditioned cooling which would also prevent dehydration?
A. There was not.

Q. Well, can you describe what happened with respect to dehydration even in the portions reserved for salads and lettuce of the commercial boxes?

A. Well, in the refrigerator it must be regarded that in a refrigerator where you refer to salads, such salads, in commercial applications, were put into those refrigerators for very short duration of time. For instance, in a banquet hall, the salads will probably be made at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon to be served at a banquet at 7:00 o'clock so that it was more a method of keeping them in a chilled condition just so they wouldn't warm up to room temperature. Was a matter of hours.

Q. So that the requirements were different than for domestic?
A. Entirely different.

Q. And the job they did was also different?

The Potter refrigerator, for example, was the job the commercial refrigerator did different?

A. The Potter and the commercial refrigerator differed widely. [612]

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. Will you describe the changes or the advantages of the Potter over the commercial refrigerators in terms of defrosting and dehydration of foods, assuming it was kept for the same period?

A. Household? The normal household?

Q. No. I am talking now about commercial refrigerators. What could they do, if given the job of doing the Potter?

A. To the best of my knowledge, the words 'air-conditioned compartment' or 'moist cold compartment' in any refrigerator were not mentioned until we heard of T. Irving Potter.

Q. That also includes the big, commercial boxes?

A. That also includes the big, commercial boxes.

Q. What was the size ranges of these big, commercial boxes? A. That's hard to say.

Q. What do they range?

A. Some of them might have been no larger than a household refrigerator, depending on the application.

Q. How big did they get? To what size?

A. I built commercial refrigerators, 80 by 150 feet, that had as many as five rooms in them.

Q. And did any of those refrigerators have any moist, cold compartments prior to the Potter?

A. No, no.

Q. Now, can you tell us whether prior to Potter there was any refrigerator, commercial, domestic or otherwise, that had [613] all the advantages of the Potter refrigerator that you know of?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Byron: I object to that; calling for a conclusion.

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Well, will you tell us of any refrigerator which had the advantages of the Potter?

A. I don't know of any.

Q. Prior to '31 and '32?

A. Yes. I am talking from the time, the date I met Mr. Potter.

Q. And since 1940, have a great many refrigerators been built which have the three advantages you mentioned of the Potter: (1) air-conditioning; (2) separate compartments for frozen foods and moist, cold; and (3) not requiring defrosting?

A. There are; a lot of them.

Q. Would you say they were comparable to the Potter refrigerators that you were building in the early 1930's?

A. I would.

Q. In those respects. Now, Mr. Byron asked you about whether you had, you and Jewett, had faith in the Potter refrigerator. Can you answer whether or not you did have, or did not have, faith in it?

Q. Well, did you have faith in the Potter refrigerator and the Potter principles?

A. I would say that we very evidently had faith in them. As I have started before, we made a very thorough investigation of what Mr. Potter had to offer. We made a thorough checkup [614] to see

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

that his refrigerator would perform as he claimed it would perform.

Q. What did you find?

A. And if it had not been satisfactory, a staid old company like the Jewett Refrigerator Company would have dropped it right then and there.

Q. Did you drop it?

A. We did not drop it. As I told you, we went out and did a lot of engineering and brought the engineering up to date and produced a quantity of models from the revised engineering plans.

Q. Were you and Jewett satisfied with the models you provided that the Potter refrigerator could do a triple job of providing a moist, cold, deep freezing and no defrosting?

A. We were.

Q. And did you envision, did Jewett envision, a small production of Potter, or a large number? What kind of production was envisioned?

A. No.

Q. What kind of production was envisioned?

A. I don't remember. It was sizeable production. It was production, let's say, that the Jewett Company would have been interested in, in performing, in getting out.

Q. And could that have required a considerable sum of money? A. It always does. [615]

Q. When you are dealing with large production?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, referring to Plaintiff's Exhibit—referring to Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 37, and specifically

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

to Mr. Byron's question about how you knew about this ad of February 24, 1932, of Potter's"—

Mr. Maguire: I think in this case that exhibit is now 3-U.

“——can you tell us what the effect of this ad was in the refrigerator industry as far as you know?

A. Well, within the refrigeration trade, it was astounding, because never before had anybody even approached such a publicity and advertising setup in a trade magazine. This was the largest publicity—I was going to say stunt, but that isn't the word—it was the largest piece of publicity that was ever offered to the trade paper, or let's say, shown to the trade, to that time.

Q. And did this go to technical people who were well-acquainted with the refrigeration industry or did it go to the general public?

A. That is the technical newspaper of the refrigeration industry.

Q. And would you describe what improvements were offered by Potter that were then not known? To the refrigeration industry.

Mr. Byron: The patent speaks for itself. The prior art. [616]

A. I would say that, in the ads, they talked for themselves. They offered balanced humidity and sub-zero freezing and quick cooling frozen storage. It offered a new line of housekeeping to which nobody had an answer to before.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Q. Did this attract much attention in the industry? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And in your opinion did it come to the attention of practically everybody in the industry so far as you had any contact with them?

A. I would say very definitely.

Q. Both the ads and the results claimed by the Potter Company for the refrigerator?

A. Yes.

Mr. Berner: That's all."

“Recross-Examination

By Mr. Byron:

Q. In 1944, when you gave your deposition in the case of Refrigeration Patents Corporation against Stewart-Warner Corporation, in the record at page 714, you were asked this question:

‘Q. To go back a moment, Mr. Bommer, prior to the time you saw the sample box which Mr. Potter submitted to the Jewett Company, had you ever seen a fin coil used for the purpose of cooling [617] the chamber of an electric refrigerator?’

A. I would say yes.

Q. Under what circumstances?

A. It is my impression that there were types of fin coil units used for cooling refrigerated compartments in commercial refrigerators.’

You disown that testimony now?

Mr. Berner: I object to the form of the question. What do you mean ‘disown’?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Byron: Today he testified differently. He said he had never seen a coil.

Mr. Berner: If you want to ask him what his testimony is, I object to the word.

Q. You are now changing your testimony, are you?

Mr. Berner: I object to the characterization 'changes.' It is improper and I object.

Q. You testified today that you never did see a finned coil used for the purpose of cooling the chamber of an electric refrigerator, that is, prior to Potter?

A. My testimony today was to the effect that I had not seen a finned coil used to cool an electrical household refrigerator. I think if we go back to the notes we will find that I qualified my answer.

Q. But you did see it on a commercial refrigerator?

A. I told you also, very definitely, that to me that's [618] twenty years away, there is a question in my mind as to what time limit there was, whether it was just before, just after, or at what stage.

Q. When you gave this testimony in '44, the Stewart-Warner case, that was only eleven years away and that, at that time, you said:

'It is my impression that there were types of fin coil units used for cooling refrigerated compartments in commercial refrigerators.'

Mr. Berner: Then read the next question and answer to him, too. The next question and answer.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Byron: All right.

'Had you ever seen a fin coil used for cooling purposes in a domestic refrigerator?'

We will come to that.

'A. It's a long time to ask a man to remember back in detail thirteen years ago, but I do not think it is.'

That's with domestic, but this other is with respect to commercial.

Mr. Berner: And then he goes on to talk about the use of finned coils on the condensers in refrigerating units; which is another matter.

A. I told you this morning—I understand that—this morning when we talked about that, I tried to make it quite [619] clear that when it comes to the actual date on the fin coil, or my seeing a fin coil in relation to the date that T. Irving Potter walked in my office, it is my memory, just as I said at that testimony in 1944, and again I tell you today, and as I said, today. [620]

Q. But you were definite in 1944 with respect to commercial refrigerators. A. I said—

Mr. Berner (Interrupting): He said, 'my impression.'

A. (Continuing): I didn't testify that they did.

Mr. Berner: He testified to what he testified.

Q. Well, you said it was your impression that there were types of fin coils, coil units, used for cooling refrigerator compartments in commercial refrigerators.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Berner: There's no conflict in there. I don't see where there's any conflict.

Q. Now, you say you don't remember that there was, on commercial machines?

A. I think that you will understand this, that in my testimony, today, is at least—I tried to give the idea, or the same position, that that lapse in there, I don't know.

Q. In other words, you are indefinite; that's all there is to it. If you don't want to live up to it, okeh, change it.

A. It isn't a matter of living up to it. That was my impression at that time. It was a correct statement, that I had seen them.

Q. Well, then, your memory served you better in 1944 than it would in 1955 with respect to that detail, would it not?

A. I don't know as it would. Maybe it would. Seems to [621] me we are getting off base here.

Q. Well, now, I would like to have you compare the original Bronaugh Patent 2,056,165, and the Bronaugh Reissue Patent 23058, which is a reissue of that original, and ask what differences there are. You said that you had never seen the reissue patent before. It's identical with the other, is it not?

Mr. Berner: Are you referring only to the diagram?

Mr. Byron: I was referring to the entire reissue. Everything except the claims. Has to be the same.

Mr. Berner: I was referring to the physical document dated December 14, 1948, not the fact there was a comparison.

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

Mr. Byron: I just want to know if that is not the same disclosure.

Mr. Berner: That's all right. You mean any one of the diagrams are the same? If you want to go into the claims separately, if you wish, because there is a difference, as you know.

Q. There is no difference in the drawings of the original and the reissue patent of this Bronaugh & Potter, is there?

A. Are you asking me or telling me there is?

Q. Yes. There is none, is there? There is no difference?

A. I don't know, without examination.

Q. Look at them well. Examine them.

A. I will state, from a legal standpoint, that is correct. [622] Apparently there is no difference.

Mr. Berner: I accept Mr. Byron's statement with reference to the diagram as correct.

Q. Now in these commercial refrigerators which you referred to as having two independent coils, one for the freezing compartment and one for the warmer compartment, your position is that it's entirely different from what the patent in suit is for? There they have the single two pipes in series.

A. Well, the entire refrigerating system is different.

Q. Well, including the difference that you referred to, is that in the patent in suit, the two coils, one in the freezing compartment and the other in the warmer compartment are in series and it's one continuous coil? That is correct, is it?

(Deposition of Ferdinand J. Bommer.)

A. That's correct.

Q. Yes. And then in this commercial-type machine you make the distinction by saying that the coil in the freezing compartment is a different coil from that in the warmer compartment. Is that correct? A. Yes.

Q. Then you regard that as quite a distinction, do you?

A. Sheppard leads into the box. Sheppard valves on each one. I would say that's quite different. No refrigerator has such going from the pipes, nothing but brine.

Q. That's refrigerant. Brine is a refrigerant, isn't it? [623]

A. Yes, but not a refrigerant that is subject to an expansion valve or any regulation of that type.

Q. Well, in the commercial there are two separate coils and the two compartments are cooled independently? A. Yes.

Q. And your distinction is that, that being true, it's unlike the patent in suit in that there are two coils in series and the refrigerant passes through both of them, the same refrigerant. That's correct?

A. Yes. And the refrigerant directly from the machine.

Q. Yes. A. That's right.

Q. And you read that as quite a difference?

A. Yes, sir. One, a secondary refrigerating result to the other as a primary refrigerating result.

Q. Yes. Well, let's see——

Mr. Byron: I think that's all."

The Court: That completes the deposition. Mr. Cuningham?

Mr. Cuningham: Now, if your Honor please, I would like, whenever you want, to start the deposition of Mr. Quinn.

The Court: Have you got a short live witness?

Mr. Cuningham: No, sir. I am sorry, too. It would be a welcome break.

Mr. Ramsey: What about Steele? That is [624] short.

Mr. Maguire: We do not want to put that in out of order.

The Court: Do you want to start reading the Quinn deposition now?

Mr. Cuningham: Yes, sir.

The Court: Very well.

Mr. Cuningham: I will state for the record that this was a deposition taken in New York.

The Court: Does all of the Quinn deposition, except that which I have previously passed upon, go in?

Mr. Cuningham: No, your Honor, it was my undertaking this morning to omit certain sections that your Honor will pass upon later, but there are only two, I believe.

The Court: Start in on the Quinn deposition. We have got about fifteen minutes.

Mr. Cuningham: I am trying to locate the date.

The Court: April 5th and April 14th, 1955?

Mr. Cuningham: I think those are the days that notices were served, but I can state that—oh, April, 1955, in New York, at the offices of Monitor Equipment Company.

The Court: Very well; proceed. [625]

(Thereupon the deposition of Theodore K. Quinn, a witness called to testify on behalf of the Plaintiff, April 19, 1955, at the offices of Monitor Equipment Company, 640 West 249th Street, New York, N. Y., was read into the record as follows; Mr. Cuningham reading the questions and Mr. Harold Hart, Court Crier, reading the answers.)

DEPOSITION OF THEODORE K. QUINN

“Q. Mr. Quinn, will you please state your name?

A. Theodore K. Quinn.

Q. Where do you reside?

A. Roxbury, Connecticut.

Q. What is your occupation?

A. I am President of the Monitor Equipment Corporation and of the T. K. Quinn Company.

Q. Do you appear in response to a subpoena, Mr. Quinn? A. I do.

Q. Have you a copy of that subpoena with you, or is that in the other room?

A. It is in the other room.

Q. Can you tell us briefly, Mr. Quinn, how you came to testify in this case, in response to whose request, and so on?

A. I think it was in response to a request from you, Mr. Cuningham. [626]

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Q. Can you recall approximately when I first asked you to testify in this case?

A. Well, you are handing me a letter here which is dated February 6, 1953, and I believe that was the——

Q. (Continued): Letter from whom to whom?

A. From Cuningham addressed to me and Mr. Zimmerman.

Q. I did that for the purpose of helping you fix the date, Mr. Quinn. Does that help you fix the date when we first discussed the testimony?

A. It must have been shortly thereafter. I don't recall the exact date.

Q. Sometime in February?

A. Yes, sometime in February.

Q. 1953? A. Yes.

Q. Have you been paid anything, or promised any fee, for testifying in this case?

A. No. I wouldn't accept it if it were offered.

Q. Have you any pecuniary interest in the outcome of this litigation?

A. None whatever.

Q. Or the expectation of ever having any?

A. None whatever.

Q. Mr. Quinn, what is the business of Monitor Equipment Company? [627]

A. Monitor Equipment Corporation is a manufacturer and selling agency for a washing machine. The T. K. Quinn Company is a management company, a partnership.

Q. Is the Monitor Equipment Corporation a

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

New York corporation? A. Yes.

Q. Is the T. K. Quinn & Company a partnership and not a corporation? A. That is right.

Q. What is the significance of the name, Monitor, to you, Mr. Quinn?

A. That has a history.

Q. Well, we followed signs to this delightful residence——

A. Monitor was the name which we first gave to the General Electric Refrigerator to describe the physical appearance of the machine. We got the idea from the old Monitor Cruiser, you know, that fought in the Civil War.

Q. Monitor and Merrimac?

A. Monitor and Merrimac, yes, and it was replaced or superseded by the more modern machine and the Monitor top was eliminated.

Q. Well, I will cut you short because that was merely preliminary. I take it, then, you have had some connection with the household refrigerator business? A. Oh, yes.

Q. Can you give us briefly, and fix the time for us if you [628] can, a statement as to what your past history in the household refrigerator business has been?

A. In 1927 I was Assistant Manager of the Lamp Division of the General Electric Company in Nela Park, Cleveland. The Company had done some experimental work in its Engineering Laboratories in Schenectady on a domestic-type refriger-

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

ator, and the President of the General Electric Company called on me to look into it and to report on whether I thought a business could be built on the development.

Q. That was Mr. Swope, was it?

A. In 1927, Mr. Swope.

Q. Mr. Gerard Swope?

A. Mr. Gerard Swope, President of General Electric Company. That was in 1927. We started out then, first, changing the appearance of the machine very markedly, putting it up on legs, and producing a white instead of the old—a white and a metal box eventually, as distinguished from the earlier wooden models.

Q. Were you in charge of that business, Mr. Quinn?

A. Yes, I was Manager of the business in, I think it was about March or April of 1927.

Q. And continuing through what year?

A. And continuing until about 1930, at which time I was made a Vice-President of the General Electric Company, and continued in charge of the refrigerator business, but I had [629] added responsibilities in connection with the whole line of General Electric appliances. But I was in charge of the refrigerator business, not exclusively, but as part of my other responsibilities, until I left the General Electric Company on January 1, 1936.

Q. Have you held the following offices: Chairman of the General Electric Company's Sales Committee and Member of the Advisory Board, the first

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Chairman of the Board of the General Electric Company's Contracts Corporation, and Vice-Chairman of the Board of the General Electric Supply Corporation, and a Director in several other General Electric subsidiaries?

A. Yes, sir; all of those offices."

(Discussion off the record.)

"Q. Do you know Mr. T. Irving Potter, Mr. Quinn? A. I do.

Q. How long have you known him?

A. I never knew him very well, but we met in some of the early refrigeration meetings, probably as far back as 1930 to 1932.

Q. You knew him as a fellow member or competitor in the refrigeration industry?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you meet him at industry meetings, and so on, at [630] conventions?

A. As I say, I am not very clear as to the exact date, but I know that he was a manufacturer, that he was in Buffalo, I believe, and I think he was a member of the Refrigerator Association—the Refrigerator Manufacturers Association.

Q. I show you, Mr. Quinn, a copy of Reissue Patent No. 23058, dated December 14, 1948, and ask you whether or not you have ever seen this patent before?

A. Yes, I have seen it."

(Discussion off the record.)

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Mr. Byron: Page 11.

Mr. Cuningham: Skipping the top of Page 11:

“Q. Mr. Quinn, have you ever been called upon to testify in connection with any public issues and particularly in connection with any small business inquiries of the Government?”

Mr. Byron: I object there. It has nothing to do—

The Court: Objection sustained.

Mr. Cuningham: Does that mean that I may read the next question, your Honor?

The Court: It is qualifying him for what? What is he going to be qualified for?

Mr. Cuningham: Well, simply to give his general qualifications, [631] not as an expert, of course, patent. He is a man of very wide experience, obviously.

The Court: Read the next question.

“Q. When was the last time you so testified, and on what occasion?”

Mr. Byron: Now, I see no reason why that should be answered; totally immaterial to the—

The Court: Let it go in.

Mr. Byron: Well, it is prejudicial.

The Court: We have been letting in a lot of evidence that has no relevancy, and if he wants to get in the fact that he has acted before, that is all right with me. Go ahead.

“A. I served as a Panel Member for the Joint

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Senate and House Committee on the President's Economic Report in February of 1955.

Mr. Byron: What year was that?

The Witness: Last February—the month before last, 1955.

Q. (By Mr. Cuninghame): Did that testimony take place in Washington? A. Yes. [632]

Q. Now, as I recall your testimony, it was that through the years 1927 to 1932, you were in charge in various capacities of the General Electric refrigeration business? A. Yes.

Q. Was that a new business endeavor of G.E. in 1927—had they ever been in the refrigeration business before?

A. The General Electric Company had started about two years earlier to develop a domestic type of refrigerator and had previously manufactured a commercial refrigerator, but it did not become a major department of the Company, nor did the Company go into the business actively on a large scale until I became manager in 1927. It was then set up as a separate department, reporting directly to the President of the General Electric Company."

(Discussion off the record.)

"Q. I show you, Mr. Quinn, from the record, on Page 2404 of the Stewart-Warner cases, what was marked in those cases, Plaintiff's Exhibit 222, and ask you if you recognize the refrigerator illustrated there?

A. Yes, I do. It brings back many memories."

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Mr. Cuningham: Your Honor, we may have a little mixup on some of these exhibits finding them.

(Discussion off the record.) [633]

Mr. Cuningham: I think it can be straightened out if I may continue with the reading.

“Q. I show you a large photostat of what appears to be the full ad, and according to the date in the middle of the double-page spread, it appeared in *The Saturday Evening Post*, June 4, 1927. Can you identify that ad?

A. Yes, I remember it well. It was our announcement advertisement in double spread.”

Mr. Cuningham: I offer that in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-D.

Mr. Byron: Object to it. It has no materiality.

The Court: I thought all of these things had been agreed upon.

Mr. Cuningham: Your Honor, this is simply what Mr. Quinn is testifying about in 1927, the old G.E. refrigerator with a Monitor top. It is an illustration of it.

Mr. Maguire: State of the art.

Mr. Cuningham: It is also the state of the art, but it is illustrating what he is testifying.

Mr. Byron: I will not press the matter, but it has no materiality.

The Court: It will go in. I think the jury knows by this time that a lot of testimony that has no relevancy [634] to this case has gone in, and the

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

probabilities are there is going to be a lot more on both sides. It refers to the state of the art. It is admitted.

(Photostat of ad above referred to, previously marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-D for Identification, was received in evidence.)

“Q. I notice in this ad, and I hope that we will all discount the usual puffing usually found in advertisements of this type, that this refrigerator is stated to be the creation of General Electric, the leading ‘research organization of the world. It marks 15 years of intensive research.’ Did the General Electric Company have a large and effective research organization at that time, in 1927, Mr. Quinn?”

A. Well, as you say, advertising takes some liberties. We had been working on a commercial machine using the sealed mechanism for commercial purposes at the Fort Wayne Works for a number of years, but it was a very small business, and was not actually in the Research Laboratories.

Q. Who was the ‘daddy’ of this Monitor top business, Mr. Quinn—the structures I should say?

A. Actually, the Monitor top sealed mechanism is an adaptation of an invention by a French monk, Abbe Audiffron. The original patents were held in England and the company that [635] owned it licensed or arranged otherwise with the General Electric Company to produce the sealed mechanism on a commercial refrigerator to the General Elec-

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

tric Company, and a number of machines were made for that purpose by the General Electric Company at the Fort Wayne Works, but the business was a small business, and never amounted to very much. It was impractical because of the size of the unit.”

Mr. Cunningham: I think I should omit this in view of what I am skipping, sir.

Mr. Byron: Yes, that is right.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Cunningham: This is omitted until your Honor recesses.

“Q. Now, will you please explain generally the construction of that refrigerator illustrated in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3-D?

A. Well, as you see from the exposed box, it consists of an evaporator in the box and the expansion coils on top. The cabinet was an entirely separable unit, and the machine, the refrigerating mechanism, was simply placed on top in such a way as to fit the cabinet and complete a refrigerator.

Q. Did that have any moisture control in the food compartment? A. No. [636]

Q. Did the heat-conducting surfaces of the expander operate at temperatures above or below 32 degrees Fahrenheit?

A. By heat-conducting surfaces you mean the——

Q. (Continued): That expander coils.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

A. I should say that they operated under 32 degrees.

Q. Did they frost up?

A. Oh, yes. Defrosting was quite a problem.

Q. Would this be what is called a moist cold refrigerator? A. No, I should say not.

Q. I show you on the next page of the Stewart-Warner record, namely, Page 2405, another advertisement from the Saturday Evening Post at a later date, I believe, February 11, 1928. Was that substantially the same construction as that shown in Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-E?

A. Yes, almost identical. The refrigerator mechanism is the same, but the cabinet construction is different."

Mr. Cunningham: I offer that in evidence as Exhibit 3-E, Plaintiff's Exhibit.

Mr. Byron: Same objection.

The Court: Same ruling; let it go in.

(Photostat of ad above referred to, previously referred to, previously marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-E for Identification, was [637] received in evidence.)

"Q. Mr. Quinn, for the period beginning in 1927 to 1933, was it substantially the same construction as shown in these two exhibits put out as a household refrigerator of General Electric Company? A. Yes, we made no basic changes.

Q. Were you familiar during those years with competitive household refrigerators on the market?

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

A. Oh, yes.

Q. And did any of them, if you recall, any of the leading ones, have moisture control or be a moist cold refrigerator? A. They did not.

Q. I show you from the record Page 2185 of the Stewart-Warner record a copy of what was apparently marked 'Plaintiff's Exhibit 189' in the Stewart-Warner case and running through to 2189—including 2189—an advertisement also from the Saturday Evening Post dated January 25, 1930. This is by Frigidaire and shows a thing called a 'hydrator.' Do you recognize the device shown there? A. I do, indeed.

Q. Can you tell us briefly what the story of the 'hydrator covered dish' was?

A. Well, we had a serious problem in the early domestic machines. I mean the whole industry had the problem. The [638] food in the refrigerator tended to dry out and, of course, we were at that time keenly competitive, and the Frigidaire, the General Motors product, introduced what they called a hydrator. It was simply a covered pan which they inserted in the bottom compartment in the refrigerator and gave it a fancy name, the idea being that it could be used particularly for vegetables, and having a cover on it, would keep them from drying out.

Q. Would you accept my statement—was that the pumping of moisture——

A. I recall very definitely that I was in Florida at the time, and when this advertisement first ap-

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

peared with the fancy name, hydrator, I immediately arranged to see one of them on the floor at a store in Miami, and I wired in to, or telephoned in to the office, and told them to buy 20,000 pans quick and start putting them into the shipments that were being made from then on, so that we would then match what Frigidaire had done. We called ours simply what it was—a vegetable pan. I dare say the cost of the Frigidaire advertising was worth more than the cost of the pans.

Q. Was Frigidaire first on the market, as compared with G.E., with household refrigerators?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. About how many years had they preceded the G.E.? [639]

A. As I recall, they brought out the old Isco perhaps five years before General Electric started seriously in the business.

Q. Can you name some of the old, well-known manufacturers other than G.E. when they came into the business?

A. The Kelvinator was the principal competitor, the other principal competitor in the business. There was also Serval, Incorporated, and some smaller manufacturers.

Q. I direct your attention to Page 2189 where there is a group portrait of what is entitled Frigidaire Engineering Department Personnel. It is a rather small photograph. Do you recognize anybody in that group?"

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Mr. Byron: Your Honor, I really do not see any sense to this type of testimony.

Mr. Cuningham: I would be willing to skip that, sir.

The Court: I think this is a good time to take a recess. I think we ought to come back at 1:30 today, and we are going to quit about 4:00 o'clock. Remember what I said before. We are not coming back until Monday at 1:00 o'clock when we leave today.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Court: We will adjourn from Wednesday to the following Monday. Recess until 1:30.

(Thereupon the jury retired for the noon recess.) [640]

The Court: Mr. Byron, this is the very thing that has happened that I anticipated would happen. That is why I asked the question, have you agreed on the sections to go out. [641]

The Court: I think yesterday I announced that from now in I am going to permit the person to read all of the deposition except those parts which are previously objected to. So if you are going to object to any portion of the Quinn deposition could you let me see it about 1:10 this afternoon so I could look it over?

Mr. Byron: I think I can tell you. We are not going to object any more to Quinn.

Mr. Cuningham: And nothing that follows.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Mr. Byron: Just a moment. I will check and see if I have any notes.

Mr. Cuningham: That was my understanding, if it helps you.

The Court: Well, what about this portion of the transcript which you are not reading on the theory that you want me to pass upon something?

Mr. Cuningham: Well, I don't expect to do that, sir. I expect to read everything unless I come to some colloquy. I think we marked that all out.

Mr. Byron: Well, there is some stricken by order and that's the only thing I care about.

Mr. Cuningham: Which page?

Mr. Byron: 31, the bottom, all of 32, top of 33. First half of 33.

Mr. Cuningham: That is absolutely correct, sir. I am [642] going to omit that.

Mr. Byron: Well, then, there is no further objection in respect to the Quinn on my part.

The Court: All right. Recess until 1:30.

(Thereupon, at 12:10 o'clock p.m. an adjournment was taken until 1:30 o'clock p.m.) [643]

Afternoon Session

(Court reconvened, pursuant to adjournment, at 1:30 o'clock p.m., and the following further proceedings were had herein:)

Mr. Maguire: I want to apologize for my associates. They happen to be on a long-distance telephone call. They will be here in just a moment.

The Court: Do you want to take over?

Mr. Maguire: Oh, I will take over. Where were we?

Mr. Lucas: On page 118.

Mr. Byron: 18.

Mr. Lucas: Correction 18.

Mr. Maguire: The next thing will be the answer. Well, maybe it will be well to read the question, too.

The Court: Go ahead.

DEPOSITION OF THEODORE K. QUINN

Direct Examination

(Continued)

By Mr. Maguire:

“Q. I direct your attention to page 2189 where there is a group portrait of what is entitled Frigidaire Engineering Department Personnel. It is a rather small photograph. Do you recognize anybody in that group?

Mr. Byron: I object. This has no significance here whatsoever; it has nothing to do with the question of infringement and validity of the claims in issue.

A. It isn't a very good reproduction, and I can't identify anyone. [644]

Q. Well, can you tell us, Mr. Quinn, whether or not Frigidaire had a large research staff?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. In the refrigeration business?

A. Oh, yes; by that time the business for each of us was about in the neighborhood of \$50 million a year, and we had in the General Electric Com-

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

pany Refrigerator Engineering Department scores of men, and I know that they had, too, as did Kelvinator, a comparable staff.

Q. Now did the General Electric Company make any efforts to solve this problem of drying out of foods, or however you characterize it?

A. We were quite conscious of the problem, as was also Frigidaire and Kelvinator. The heads of those organizations used to meet with me on many occasions to discuss industry problems. We first heard—the first I ever heard about moist cold was from Mr. H. E. Beichler, since deceased, who was General Manager of the Frigidaire Division. He wanted to know what we were going to do about the moist cold. At that time our problem was—we were competing—at that time we were competing with the old icebox which sold all the way from \$25 to \$100, and we were getting for our refrigerators from \$300 to \$500 or \$600. Our problem was to keep the cost down, and we were after mass production, of course, and [645] realized that we wouldn't get the sales if we added any costly parts or changes, and so we tacitly agreed among ourselves that we would stick to what we were doing and hold the price down as low as we could, so as to get more of the market.

Q. Was this hydrator pan a partial solution to the problem of the drying out of foods?

A. Well, I should say it was a very negligible solution, because after all, it simply amounted to putting a covered dish inside of the refrigerator.

Q. You wouldn't call it fundamental engineer-

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

ing? A. Oh, I should say I would not."

Mr. Maguire: Now, there is a marketing of certain exhibits and I do not have them here.

The Court: Well, I think you can go right down to the bottom of the page.

Mr. Maguire: And we can go back to those.

The Court: Any time.

Mr. Maguire: Fine. Thank you so much.

"Q. Prior to 1930, did any leading manufacturer ever put on the market a combination or two-food containing compartment refrigerator that you know of—prior to 1930?

A. I don't believe so.

Q. I show you a copy of the General Electric Review for September, 1952, and direct your attention to page 37, Mr. Quinn. [646] The illustration on the left-hand side, showing such a two-compartment refrigerator, and I also direct your attention to the description of the refrigerator illustrated which appears in the middle column on page 39 of that issue, or article. That construction is stated to be 'before 1930' on page 39, and on page 37, the title of the illustration is—and I quote—'Developed in the early 1930's.' Did you have any knowledge of this particular two-compartment General Electric refrigerator?

A. Yes, I recall it as an experiment that was attempted.

Q. Was it ever marketed? A. No.

Q. Was it a white box-like structure in the lower compartment shown in the photograph?

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

A. I can't make it out. It may very well have been another vegetable compartment.

Q. You are not certain of that?

A. I am not sure of that.

Q. Was that a dry cold refrigerator as distinguished from moist cold? A. Yes."

Mr. Maguire: Next comes the marking of exhibits and if we may have an understanding till Mr. Cuninghame comes back——

The Court: Wait till Mr. Cheatham comes back.

Mr. Maguire: Thank you, your Honor, so [647] much.

"Q. Now I show you, Mr. Quinn, a photostat of apparently the front page of the Merchandise Section of Electric Refrigeration News dated February 24, 1932, and attached are pages numbered 13 through 32, being an advertisement of a refrigerator, and I ask you if you recognize that advertisement.

May I say for the record that this was formerly Plaintiff's Exhibit 109 in the Stewart-Warner record. It is not reproduced in the printed record.

A. Yes, I recall this advertisement.

Q. Do you recall seeing it on or about the date it bears in 1932?

A. Very vaguely, but whether that was the time or not that is fixed in my mind, I am not so sure, but I distinctly recall quite a stir in the industry.

Q. Created by this announcement?

A. Yes, by this announcement of this Tricold.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Q. Was that, so far as you know, Mr. Quinn, the first announcement of a two-temperature refrigerator having moist cold storage capacity?

A. Yes, sir."

Mr. Maguire: May I stop for a moment? There have been two places heretofore, and we are coming to the third one where there have been exhibits identified, and counsel were very courteous and said we could await your arrival, and the Court consented with even greater courtesy (speaking [648] to Mr. Cuninghame).

The Court: Well, there is nothing to wait for because this exhibit has been admitted in evidence.

Mr. Maguire: All right, sir, and I am very appreciative.

"Q. Will you tell us what you mean by 'quite a stir in the industry,' Mr. Quinn? Did you discuss this with other members?

A. Yes, I believe I have already mentioned Mr. Beichler, of Frigidaire, who called it to my attention. He was anxious to know whether the General Electric Company was going to attempt to get into the moist cold field, having in mind, presumably, that if we did that, Frigidaire would have to follow, but for the reasons I have already mentioned, we, together with Kelvinator, the three of us had 80 or 90 per cent of the business and we could pretty much direct its course, and we didn't want to do anything that would tend to increase the price, and therefore decrease the market. We were after mass production of the lowest possible price units.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Q. What percentage of the market in 1932 did the Trico Refrigerator Corporation have, if you recall; was it large or small?

A. Very small, I should say.

Q. Were they a newcomer in the field?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that connected with Mr. Potter in your mind?

A. Yes, I understood that it was Mr. Potter's Company, and [649] understood also that he was associated in some way, or at least purchased his cabinets from the Jewett Icebox Refrigerator Company of Buffalo.

Q. Did you have any contacts with the Jewett Company?

A. Yes, as I think I previously explained, the General Electric refrigerator was made in two parts. The refrigeration unit was separate. The icebox, the box itself, we were not then in a position to make in the quantities in which we wanted them and we went to the leading refrigerator icebox manufacturers, such as Jewett and Seegar, and had them manufacture many thousands of boxes, or cabinets, for us.

Q. Did they work with you or G.E. on the design of these cabinets?

A. Oh, yes. At that time, Jewett was probably the outstanding manufacturer from a quality standpoint of iceboxes.

Q. Did you ever know a gentleman at that company named Ferdinand J. Bommer?

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

A. I don't recall that name.

Q. Did you ever know of him in connection with the Potter Enterprises, such as Trico or Tricold?

A. I don't recall the name. The man whom we dealt with at Jewett, I believe, was Edward Jewett, it just occurs to me.

Q. Now, Mr. Quinn, did the General Electric Company ever attempt to market a double-compartment box very much like that shown in the illustration at the top of page 39 of the [650] GE Review?

A. Yes, we attempted to combine two boxes. It amounted to just taking two refrigerators and putting them together.

Q. Did you have two units?

A. Yes, we had two separate units. This isn't shown here, by the way.

Mr. Cuninghame: My notes indicate that it is at the top of page 39.

The Witness: No, there is another one somewhere. I don't know whether it is in here, but it was just simply a matter of two boxes put together with two units and they were joined at the sides.

Q. That is, two units at the top? A. Yes.

Q. Is it somewhat like that illustrated on the left-hand side of page 39?

A. Yes, except there would be another one right alongside of it, joined to it.

Q. Did they have four legs or six legs, or how many legs, if you recall?

A. I think four legs.

Q. Did you furnish an extra set of legs with

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

these boxes? A. I don't recall."

Mr. Maguire: There is colloquy by counsel, and unless somebody wants it we will omit it. Is that all right? [651]

The Court: Read the next answer, Mr. Hart.

The Crier: "A. Oh, yes, all the refrigerators manufactured by the General Electric Company while I was there were dry cold refrigerators.

Q. In short, is that merely two G.E. Monitor top refrigerators operated together in different temperatures?

A. Yes, it gave us a larger total food compartment, and then also you could run one refrigerator at a different temperature than the other in a way that there was less drying, if you were willing to accept a lower freezing capacity, but the problem always was to freeze ice in the evaporator, and you had to have a freezing temperature, and if you had that freezing temperature, then you got the drying out to which you have referred here.

Q. Was this announcement of the Tricold refrigerator the first effort at a fundamental solution to that problem? A. So far as I know."

The Court: Go ahead, "Was this G.E. double refrigerator development successful, Mr. Quinn?

A. No, it never really amounted to anything.

Q. Can you give us a date for that development? Will you please; as closely as you can?

A. It would be largely a guess.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Q. Well, was it prior to your getting out of the Refrigerator [652] Department?

A. Oh, yes, it was probably about 1930.

Q. Now, illustrated in the Plaintiff's Quinn Exhibit 8"—

Mr. Maguire: This Quinn Exhibit number will not be the number in this case. We will furnish the number a little later.

Mr. Cuningham: 3-H.

Mr. Maguire: 3-H.

“Q. —on the right-hand side of page 37, is apparently a G.E. two-compartment box. Can you tell us when that came out, approximately?”

The Court: Let Mr. Cuningham show it to the jury.

Mr. Maguire: Defendants have not yet seen it.

Mr. Kolisch: We haven't seen it.

The Court: Haven't you ever seen it?

Mr. Kolisch: No, sir.

Mr. Cuningham: It's the “GE Revivew.” They have copies of it.

The Court: Let them take a look.

Mr. Cuningham: It's all right.

“Q. (By Mr. Maguire): Now, illustrated in the Plaintiff's Quinn Exhibit 8, on the right-hand side of page 37, is apparently a G.E. two-compartment box. Can you tell us when that came out, approximately? A. I am afraid I can't. [653]

Q. Well, was it after you left?

A. That would be after 1936.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Q. After '36? A. Yes."

The Court: Just one second. Get that exhibit and show it to them right in front because otherwise we have to stop. Mr. Maguire doesn't want to keep on reading while the jury is looking. Everybody look at that, just get acquainted with what he is doing and talking about.

(Whereupon Mr. Cuninghame displayed the document to the jury.)

"Q. (By Mr. Maguire): Did that particular two-compartment box become a successful item?

A. Oh, yes, it is one of the standards in the industry today.

Q. Are similar structures sold by the leading companies today?

A. Oh, yes, all of them.

Q. I show you an illustration which I tore from my copy of Life Magazine dated April 18, 1955, an advertisement of the Hotpoint Company. Is that a similar refrigerator sold today?

A. Yes, sir."

Mr. Cuninghame: Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-J.

The Court: All right. It may be admitted.

(The document, being Hotpoint ad inside cover "Life" magazine, April 18, 1955, [654] was admitted in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-J.)

Mr. Maguire: "Q. What can you say, Mr. Quinn, with respect to the opportunities for making profit out of such two-compartment boxes as com-

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

pared with the opportunities of making profit with the conventional dry cold type of refrigerator?

Mr. Byron: I object to that, for the same reason.

Mr. Cuninghame: On the ground of irrelevancy?

Mr. Byron: Yes.

A. The only reason that we didn't move to make some arrangement with Mr. Potter on the moist cold development was that at that time it would have substantially increased our cost, as we saw it, and would have resulted in higher list price, and that therefore, theoretically at least, lower sales. Of course, it is always advisable if you can to sell a higher-priced unit, because with this same percentage margin, your profit dollars are more, and if we had felt then at that time that we could have had the same number of unit sales at a higher consumer price, we would have adopted it—all of us. I am referring now to the three leading manufacturers—Frigidaire, Kelvinator and General Electric, who worked closely together.

Q. Following the introduction of this so-called Tricold two-temperature box illustrated in Plaintiff's Quinn Exhibit 9'—

The Court: Is 9 already in? [655]

Mr. Cuninghame: Yes, your Honor; that is already in as 3-U.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Cuninghame: It's marked over again 3-I by us.

Mr. Maguire: "Q. —what was the first similar structure that you recall of another make?

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

A. I am afraid I don't recall specifically any one.

Q. Did a lot of them come in there after?

A. Well at some time later, a good deal later. You see, we were a very close-knit group, the three major manufacturers, and we could decide what to make popular and what not. We in that way, for example, excluded the 'In-A-Door' shelves development. So we regarded this as a very small thing, and one that need not give us any trouble, at least for some years, until there was some greater acceptance of the idea.

Q. That is, you regarded it as a small commercial threat at the time? A. That is right."

Mr. Maguire: Colloquy I will omit.

"Q. Did you regard this as a minor development?

A. No, it was an important development. There is no question about that. It was important enough so that Mr. Beichler brought it up at our meetings, as I have testified, and was fearful that we or Kelvinator might adopt it, in which case they would have to, too. There was no question about its [656] almost revolutionary effect, but the market—and I am repeating—was just not ready, we thought, for a higher-priced refrigerator, which we then believed this one would inevitably be. Subsequently, of course, they have learned how to make them less expensively, but we wouldn't have known how [657] then.

Q. If this development had been in the hands of

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

one of the larger companies, would your attitude have been the same, you at General Electric?

A. If either one of the three leading manufacturers who had together upwards of—

If either of the three leading manufacturers, Frigidaire, Kelvinator and General Electric, having upwards of 80 per cent of the market, had adopted this development, the others would have had to do it immediately, and we all recognized that.

Q. Mr. Quinn, I have before me a publication entitled—”

The Court: Wait a minute. That went out.

Mr. Maguire: No, your Honor, our copy may be erroneously marked, but the matter which goes out on our copy starts by “Mr. Byron: I object—” and so on.

Mr. Byron: I had this stricken on order of the Court, beginning, “Mr. Quinn, I have before me a publication entitled—”

Mr. Cuninghame: That is correct.

Mr. Maguire: I am very sorry. Our copy was not so marked.

The Court: All right, Mr. Maguire.

Mr. Maguire: My fault.

The Court: Mr. Maguire was not there at the time the [658] rulings were made.

Mr. Maguire: Going to Page 32—

Mr. Cuninghame: No, that is out.

Mr. Lucas: If your Honor please, we start in the middle of Page 33.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

(Discussion off the record.)

The Court: I might say here that that completed Mr. Quinn's testimony, his direct testimony, and now this was cross-examination by Mr. Byron.

“Cross-Examination

By Mr. Byron:

Q. First, I would like to have you testify just a little bit more about relative costs of refrigerators of the so-called Potter type and the types which the other three companies which you have mentioned, G.E., Frigidaire and Kelvinator, were making. Just why would the so-called Potter type of refrigerator cost more to produce than the other types?

A. Well, you are asking me now something that goes back about twenty-five years. I can only tell you that we looked into it at that time, and that it was our judgment then that it would be too costly to make, and that was not only my opinion but also the opinion of both Frigidaire and Kelvinator.

Q. Specifically, why? [659]

A. I can't tell you exactly, because I am not a technical man.

Q. Well, you have made the assertion. Now you must have a reason for it.

A. Yes, I do, because I was an executive in the General Electric Company because our cost people reported to me that there would be additional costs, and substantially additional costs at that time. I accepted that.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Q. The same parts were used in all of these refrigerators, were they not, substantially so?

A. No, they were different. We had——

Q. In what respect?

A. Well, we in General Electric made a sealed type of machine which was entirely different in the beginning from what we called the open type made by Kelvinator and Frigidaire. They didn't adopt the sealed mechanism for a long time after that. The adaptation of the moist cold Potter invention to either one of the three machines would have been different, substantially different, as between the open type of machine and the sealed machine.

Q. What do you mean by 'sealed machine'?

A. In the sealed mechanism—I am sorry—I thought that was understood. All the working parts——

Mr. Byron: You are giving the testimony before a court and jury. [660]

Mr. Cuningham: I object. Let him finish.

Mr. Byron: I want him to explain it. I may know.

A. (Continued): The sealed machine has all of its working parts enclosed in a hermetically sealed unit."

Mr. Byron: I thought the colloquy was out.

Mr. Cuningham: He just read it, but I would be willing——

Mr. Lucas: I apologize. I got into it.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

“A. The sealed machine has all of its working parts enclosed in a hermetically sealed unit, free from air and dirt and moisture, sealed up forever. The open-type machine, on the other hand, had a belt and a fan and its exposed working parts. Since then, of course, all of the manufacturers of domestic type machines have adopted the sealed-type mechanism.

Q. Now, I am not clear yet what is meant by sealed mechanism. Your refrigerant, of course, was sealed in a coil, wasn't it?

A. Yes. In a sealed machine everything is sealed; the moving parts.

Q. Well, just what did the moving parts include, which were all sealed?

A. Compressor pump—the compressor pump and the refrigerant and the oil that makes it [661] work.

Q. Now, that was quite an expensive unit, wasn't it?

A. No; as a matter of fact, it is the least expensive of all the units. We didn't think so at the time, but it was proven to be and that is why the whole industry has since adopted it.

Q. Well, now, in that unit there was a compressor, and there was a condenser, and I suppose there was a receiver for the condensed refrigerant, and then the condensed refrigerant was passed through a coil, was it not?

A. That is right.

Q. For what purpose?

A. Cooling.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Q. That is, for cooling the refrigerator, the inner portions of the refrigerator? Yes or No?

A. I don't know that I can answer that Yes or No.

Q. Well, the place where you put the food——

A. A refrigerator essentially, contrary to the popular notion, is not a method of pumping cold in.

Mr. Byron: Correct.

A. (Continued): It is one of taking the hot air out through the medium of a refrigerant.

Q. All right; and that is what this refrigerating unit, the General Electric, did. It extracted the heat from the spaces in which the food was placed?

A. They all do. [662]

Q. Well, now, the General Electric and these other corporations, they had to have a cabinet, of course? A. Yes.

Q. And they had one or two compartments in the cabinet? A. Yes.

Q. Now, what more did Potter have in the way of equipment that would cost money other than what you have mentioned about the G.E.?

A. I have already told you; I am not a technical man, and I don't think that I could get into the question of the exact application of the Potter invention to the then types of refrigerators because I couldn't explain it to you. I only took the word of our people because we did look into it at the time.

Q. The estimators in General Electric back in

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

those early days of 1932, -3, -4, and -5 were just as capable as the estimators today, weren't they?

But later you say that you found that these estimates—the costs—would not have been any higher than the Potter—the Potter refrigeration costs would not be higher than the refrigeration of G.E. and Kelvinator; is that right?

A. I would have to explain that in this way: When you are making a product in mass production, you hesitate to make any change. The least expensive thing, the least [663] costly thing to do is to continue to do exactly what you are doing, and any change that you make is very expensive on line production, and all of the pressure on you is to continue making what you are making. Now I suppose I could make a comparison with an automobile; that today we have many conveniences and additions to the automobile that are acceptable today, such as power steering and power brakes and windows that go up and down automatically, which you wouldn't have thought of in those days. Their costs would have been prohibitive.

We looked at that then as you would look at trying to do it under those circumstances in that way.

Q. But you did make changes in your various refrigerators during the '30's, up through the '30's, did you not?

A. Minor changes. We kept to the sealed mechanism pretty much. The principal changes in the

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

industry for many years was in the box construction.

Q. What type of refrigerator has the General Electric Company been making since this year which I think you mentioned, 1936, just after you left? They changed to a different structure, and that, I think, you say is shown in Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-H, on Page 37.

A. Yes, this one has a separate—and entirely separate—compartment for frozen food, as you will see—entirely separate, as compared to the one we were making—— [664]

Q. You are referring to Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-H on Page 37. Now, does that refrigerator, the General Electric refrigerator, have a compartment which is moist cold?

A. I think it has. I am not sufficiently familiar with the models, but I believe—and I can't identify them just by the pictures—but I believe it has.

Q. And which would be the moist cold compartment—the one containing the usual storage of food or the one which is frozen?

A. Well, it is all affected by the moist cold principle if it is a moist cold refrigerator.

Q. That is what I am asking you; whether it is a moist cold refrigerator?

A. I can't identify it by the picture.

Q. When did General Electric start to make a moist cold refrigerator as illustrated on Page 37 here on this exhibit?

A. I can't recall.

Q. You left in 1936, in January; how soon after?

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

A. I can't remember.

Q. You have kept in touch with refrigeration, haven't you?

A. I am not close enough to give you that date.

Q. Would it be three years?

A. I would rather not guess. I would rather not say, because it would be just a guess. [665]

Q. Well, did General Electric then make any arrangements with Mr. Potter in connection with manufacturing its two-temperature, two-compartment moist cold refrigerator?

A. Not when I was there.

Q. Did Mr. Potter attempt to negotiate with General Electric during your term there between 1930 and 1936?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. You made the statement, I believe, that no arrangement was made with Potter because of increased costs.

Well, you get the point I am driving at. Is that why you refused to deal with Mr. Potter?

A. No, I think what I said was that it was Mr. Beichler who first called my attention to the development, even before this advertisement, Plaintiff's Quinn Exhibit 9, appeared. He foresaw some trouble for us in the market if any of us did undertake such a negotiation, and so it was just tacitly understood between us.

Q. What do you mean by trouble?

A. Well, as I think I also have stated, if any one of the leading manufacturers had undertaken to produce a machine with moist cold, he would

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

have automatically required the rest of us to do it. Any innovation, any major innovation, that any manufacturer would introduce, any leading manufacturer would introduce, would have to be followed by the others. We even had to, as I have already testified, had to [666] add the vegetable pan when they put theirs in because they made so much of it.

Q. Well, now, these covered vegetable pans, however, did prevent dehydration of the vegetables and materials placed in the pans, did they not?

A. Yes, they were just as the name pan indicates; they cost about a dollar.

Q. But they did prevent dehydration?

A. Oh, yes; the things that you would put in there, they prevented it to some extent, just as any covered dish in a refrigerator today will keep it moist.

Q. Well, now, getting back to this Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-H, Page 37, showing the two-temperature refrigerator with the two compartments, which you say is moist cold—

The Witness: No—

Q. What did you say?

A. I said with respect to the particular refrigerator in this picture, which is a modern type, that I couldn't identify that myself as to whether it was a moist cold refrigerator or not. It is a two-compartment refrigerator.

Q. And this is their modern refrigerator—General Electric's? A. Yes.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Q. And they don't have any difficulty about dehydration in those compartments, do they? [667]

A. If it is a moist cold, they wouldn't.

Q. Well, I mean in the modern refrigerators having these two compartments, they do not have any dehydration trouble, do they?

A. My understanding is with respect to the modern type moist cold refrigerators that they don't have that trouble, but of course there are still other refrigerators made that——

Q. Well, do you know?

Mr. Cuninghame: Have you finished your answer, Mr. Quinn?

The Witness: Yes.

Q. Do you know what refrigerator is shown on Page 37 of Exhibit 3-H? A. No.

Q. You do know that it is a two-compartment and two-temperature? A. That is right.

Q. But you don't know whether it is moist cold or not?

A. No, I don't know whether it is moist cold or not.

Q. But, in any event, that one is a great success—as you have stated. Is that correct?

A. Well, it is the modern type refrigerator with a double compartment, a big freezing compartment on top quite generally used today. [668]

Q. Yes, and you say it is a great success?

A. Well, I assume that it is a great success because, so far as I know, most of the manufacturers are now supplying them.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Q. And how long have they been supplying them?

A. Well, it was introduced some time after I got out of the refrigerator business.

Q. That would be sometime between 1936—

A. And today.

Q. That advertisement, or that review, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-H, is—

A. A publication dated September, 1952.

Q. Well, now, then your memory doesn't serve you well enough to state when it was between 1936 and 1952—that is a span of quite a few years—when the General Electric Company came out with its two-temperature, two-compartment moist cold arrangement?

A. It isn't just a question of memory. I don't think I ever knew the exact time. After I left the company in 1936, when my interests naturally were in other things—

Q. Did you know how the refrigerator to which we have been referring in Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-H, Page 37, operates?

Mr. Cuninghame: Is that on the right-hand or the left-hand side?

Mr. Byron: Right-hand side. [669]

A. The modern one, no.

Q. You don't know the theory about the operation at all?

A. No. This is all after my time.

Q. You have no recollection whether or not Mr.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Potter tried to deal with the General Electric Company in having them manufacture the so-called Potter type of refrigerator?

A. No, I do not, and being in charge I should have known, and I would have known, presumably, if he had made any approaches to us.

Q. Your opinion is that he did not approach the General Electric Company?

A. So far as I know, as I recall, I don't know of his ever having approached us. If he did, I just don't remember it.

Q. Now you have referred to the large research organization at General Electric Company, who for fifteen years had been developing a commercial type of refrigerator. Will you please describe that commercial type of refrigerator?

A. The machine to which I referred—I don't believe I spoke of it as a large research organization—but what we did in fact have one or or two engineers working in a factory organization in Fort Wayne, producing the old Audiffron type—producing a machine for commercial purposes only. It was a huge machine and capable of making the equivalent of tons of ice, and with the high side in a bronze ball, and the low side on a similar ball, in horizontal position, [670] running from a belt in the center, and it was a clumsy device, and I don't suppose that altogether there were ever more than a few hundred, if that many, sold. But the mechanism was sealed. It had that innovation.

Q. Well, did it have a cabinet?

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

A. No cabinet.

Q. It was just two balls, you say?

A. That is right.

Q. What was in the balls?

A. Well—just comparable—one was a compressor and the other the evaporator, the high side and the low side. One of them did your pumping and the other end got cold, and then you ran the cold end in a brine of water, and whatever you wanted refrigerated, you put into that brine.

Q. And what did they put in the brine?

A. Well, I don't remember very much what it was used for, it amounted to so little, but I don't remember the commercial use.

Q. You just don't remember it very clearly?

A. I don't remember it clearly. It never amounted to very much.

Q. Well, now, the General Electric Company was licensed to manufacture that commercial type, is that right?

A. Actually, General Electric made that machine under an arrangement, whether it was a license or not, I don't recall, [671] from the Audiffren, and our interest in it, of course, in the beginning was that it could develop into something, and it was the adaptation of that principle to the domestic machine that was the forerunner of the modern type sealed machine.

Q. Now, what refrigerator did General Electric make just before the Monitor type? You have re-

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

ferred to a wooden box. Will you please describe that?

A. Yes. General Electric was not in the refrigerator business except for this machine we were making under an arrangement with Audiffron, the commercial machine. General Electric then entered the business about a year and a half or two years before I got into it by making an adaptation of that principle—that is, the sealed mechanism in a domestic refrigerator.

Q. And that would be in about 1928?

A. I should say the first ones that they made were probably in 1925 and 1926, and then the business amounted to very little. I think in those two years, they sold about 1200 machines of the domestic type. Then we decided to refine it, and develop it further. We got a white cabinet. We eliminated some of the objectionable superficial elements of the old machine and came out with something that the housewife found acceptable, with which I think most people are familiar now.

Q. That was the Monitor type? [672]

A. Yes.

Q. What type of coils did you have on that one that preceded the Monitor?

A. Well, that was the same—it was the identical principle. The principle was the same. It was an evaporator.

Q. Well, now, did that evaporator, the coils, have fins on it?

A. The compressor had fins on it. That was one

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of the objectionable features from the appearance standpoint which we eliminated.

Q. What were the purposes for having those fins?

A. Well, simply that you had a larger surface and exposed to the air, and therefore the heat would be dissipated faster, but we found that while there was a point of efficiency there, it was very small in comparison with the disadvantage of its appearance, and the fact that it was difficult to keep clean.

Q. Well, of course, back there you say in 1925 or 1926 the fins were used for cooling surfaces, for increasing the cooling surfaces, and that well-known at that time—the function of fins—

Q. That principle was known a long time before that?

A. Well, I should think it would be obvious almost. Yes, the bigger the surface, the easier the contact with the air. [673]

Q. There is a quotation on Page 116——”

The Court: Wait a minute. Strike that

Mr. Lucas: I beg your pardon.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Byron: I would say that we now go to Page 50, to the bottom of the page.

Mr. Cuninghame: Of course, if your Honor please, it is Mr. Byron's cross, and I think it is all properly in.

The Court: You think what?

Mr. Cuninghame: I have no objection to this,

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

this part we are skipping now; I have no objection to it. I would like to have it in.

The Court: Yes, but it relates to matters which I found were largely improper on your direct examination.

Mr. Cuningham: I beg your pardon. I thought your Honor was reserving on that.

The Court: No, this relates specifically to the matters which I ordered deleted from the deposition. I do not think there is anything on Page 50 which has relevance.

Mr. Byron: That is correct.

The Court: I do not think there is anything on Page 51 which has relevance, or 52 which has relevance, or 53 which has relevance. [674]

Mr. Byron: To the middle of page 54.

The Court: There is nothing on page 54 that I can see of any relevancy to this case. At the bottom of page 56 seems to be the first question that has any relevancy, and I don't know for how long it is relevant.

Mr. Maguire: Did your Honor say the bottom or the top?

The Court: Bottom of page 56. I think that is the first time that there is anything of any relevancy. Do you want to start there?

Mr. Lucas: "Q. You have been testifying about the so-called Potter refrigerator—I am not using the other patentee's name because Potter, apparently, bought out the interest of the other fellow—so I just refer to it as the Potter patent. Will you

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

please describe that so-called Potter refrigerator at the time that it first came to your attention?

A. As I told you, I am not a technical man. I was only the executive and I can tell you only what the effect was and I couldn't successfully go into the detail of the mechanism at all.

Q. Well, there is not much detail. It had a cabinet, didn't it?

Mr. Cuningham: I object to that.

Mr. Byron: Let us find out what the witness doesn't know. [675]

Mr. Cunningham: He said he doesn't know.

Q. (By Mr. Byron): It had a cabinet, did it not? A. Yes.

Q. And it had a cooling compartment in which the general line of foods were placed?

A. Yes."

The Court: I might say that in accordance with the objection of Mr. Cuningham, it's obvious that Mr. Quinn is not qualified to make an answer on the technical questions which were propounded to him, and I think that I will sustain Mr. Cuningham's objection to this whole line of interrogation because he was never offered as an expert on the patent or an expert—or refrigeration expert. He is just——

Mr. Cuningham: Thank you.

The Court: There are other questions to compare that with the Anderson patent. He doesn't know anything about patents.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Mr. Cuningham: Does that bring us to page 68, your Honor?

Mr. Byron: I think it does.

The Court: I am just concerned about one thing, and that is on some of the direct examination he has apparently made a judgment on the Potter patent and I am going to instruct the jury to disregard that reference and any judgment he made because it's obvious that Mr. Quinn was the head of the [676] General Electric Refrigerator Department, but he is not qualified by training or experience to know whether a company has a valid or invalid patent. He can't read a patent, and he is not an engineer either, so the testimony that has been introduced concerning the state of the art, what companies were doing at that particular time—am I correct, Mr. Cuningham?

Mr. Cuningham: Yes, sir. I think he had certain other very desirable qualifications which entitled him to speak as a very important business executive at this critical time in the refrigeration industry.

The Court: Yes. But there is no contention that because—

Mr. Cuningham: He was a lawyer, he was not an engineer, and he was not offered as an expert in patent matters.

The Court: Yes. In other words, even though the companies might not have used the principles of the Potter patent, that doesn't mean that the Potter patent was a valid patent.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Mr. Cuningham: No, sir, I don't think anything Mr. Quinn could say would have any special weight on the patent.

Mr. Byron: Of course, the things that bother me that he talked about was all this talk about these moist cold features and all the other features which he regarded as a great thing and revolutionary, and now when I try to ask him a few things about it he knows nothing. [677]

The Court: Well, now, wait a minute. We are deleting that, Mr. Byron, and I think we can save the argument for a later time.

I think I can make this one thing clear, though, that the mere fact that an item is not used on the market at a particular time doesn't mean that the invention has not been anticipated or somebody might have a patent covering that precise innovation, if it is an innovation, and with that we are going to let Mr. Byron go ahead with the question in the middle of page 65. Is that the place you are talking about, Mr. Cuningham?

Mr. Cuningham: Let me look at that, sir. No, sir. I thought it was 68.

The Court: Oh. 68.

Mr. Cuningham: "By Mr. Byron," at the top of page 68.

The Court: Well, that's the same thing. If I have stricken that other testimony I should strike this because—

Mr. Cuningham: Well, your Honor, I don't think so. This is as to what the General Electric

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Company used in their refrigerators, insulation. It has nothing to do with the patent.

The Court: All right. Go ahead and read it.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. I assume that you know this, that the General Electric Company in making its refrigerators of all types, used the desirable amount of insulation, depending upon [678] the temperature they wanted inside the box; is that correct?

A. Yes, although you might get the same effect with a compressor and less insulation. What you are after is a balance.

Q. Yes, that is right. Well, now, the question of insulation of a refrigerator, the walls and the partitions, is pretty much like the question of blankets on your bed. There is a temperature difference between the inside and the outside when the body is on the inside, and if you want to prevent the transference of the heat to the cold or the cold to the heat, you just throw on another blanket——"

Mr. Cuninghame: I think the answer is at the bottom of page 69.

The Court: Just before the redirect.

Mr. Cuninghame: Yes.

The Crier: "I think I know a great deal about refrigerators, and a lot about the business. I did, but I am not an engineer or technical man. That is my only reservation."

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Redirect Examination

By Mr. Cuningham:

Q. Mr. Quinn, you do know about the marketing of refrigerators, do you not? A. Yes.

Q. You had a slight experience as head of the G.E. refrigeration [679] business? A. Yes.

Q. If you were not the largest during that period, you became the largest, and certainly became the largest in volume of sales?

A. Yes, we reached the tops. We alternated with Frigidaire for the leadership.

Q. Based on your experience as a merchandiser of refrigerators, would you say that a two-temperature box, such as that illustrated in the Potter patent, reissue patent in suit, would command a substantially higher price to the purchasing public than the ordinary conventional box without the moist cold feature?"

Mr. Byron: I object to that. He doesn't know.

The Court: The objection is sustained for the reason given in your objection. You want to state your objection as you did then? It's all right with me.

I might say, Mr. Quinn has indicated that he didn't know anything about pricing, that he got his figures from somebody else, and so he is not qualified to give this answer, and I sustain the objection.

Mr. Cuningham: "Q. Is it now a standard article? A. Yes.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Q. And so far as you know, is that standard article of commerce founded by the Potter organizations?" [680]

Mr. Byron: Well, there, again he doesn't know anything about the mechanism, he says, and is not qualified to speak. So why now about the patent?

The Court: Objection sustained.

Mr. Cuninghame: "Q. Has it been your experience, as a merchandiser, that frequently the cost of an article has little or nothing to do with its sales price?

A. It is a factor in the sales price, but not the only factor.

Q. Not a controlling factor, frequently; is that correct?

A. Sometimes a controlling factor. I have known it not to be.

Q. Sometimes not a controlling factor?

A. Sometimes not.

Q. In an effort to help Mr. Byron out, and although I realize this is after your dates with the G.E. Company, would you accept the large printed date of 1939 on the cover of this GE booklet which I now show you as being approximately accurate as to time?"

Mr. Cuninghame: And that is Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-K.

The Crier: "A. Yes, any salespiece like that would have to be accurate."

Mr. Cuninghame: I offer that in evidence.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

The Court: Any objection?

Mr. Byron: Well, I don't know what relevancy, pertinency it has. I object, yes. [681]

The Court: I don't know its relevancy, either. The man has testified that after he left the General Electric in 1936 he had little or no contact and lost all interest in the product.

Mr. Maguire: Of course, your Honor, if I may say this: This is certainly an official document put out by one of the leaders in the industry, and it's not necessary that he knew the basis of it, the fact that they had made declarations of fact about their own business at that time as part of the industry.

The Court: This is 1939.

Mr. Cuninghame: It's a publication of the G.E. It's in every public library, and they have that type of thing.

The Court: I am not concerned and I don't think Mr. Byron is about the authenticity of the document. He is not complaining about the authenticity of the document. Obviously it was put out by the General Electric Company.

Mr. Cuninghame: Well, your Honor feels—

The Court: It doesn't need any further verification.

Mr. Cuninghame: If you will notice a little further on he refers to pages 16 and 17 of the—I think it's necessary to complete the testimony.

The Court: Well, go ahead. It's admitted.

(The document, being pamphlet of General Electric Company, 1939, was received [682] in evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-K.)

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Mr. Cuningham: "Q. I call your attention to pages 16 and 17, either one or both of them, and ask you if you recognize that two-unit double compartment box? A. Oh, yes.

Q. Well, now, is that a product of the General Electric Company, to your knowledge?

A. Only as I see it announced here in this pamphlet.

Q. In about 1939?

A. The date here is 1939.

Q. Do you recall any earlier two-compartment box that was actually marketed by G.E.?

A. None except the one I mentioned awhile ago, where we made a stab at it and abandoned it.

Q. That was a flop? A. Yes.

Q. Can you look at pages 16 and 17 and tell me whether those refrigerators are dry cold as distinguished from moist cold in 1939?"

Mr. Byron: He doesn't know anything about it and doesn't know.

The Court: Well, I am going to strike all of this testimony. It's been obvious from this statement.

Mr. Cuningham: All right.

The Court: It's obvious that he doesn't know any more [683] than the general public, anyone looking at that document.

Mr. Cuningham: I would be glad to withdraw that.

The Court: And the rest of that page——

Mr. Cuningham: Yes.

The Court: ——is certainly immaterial.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

Mr. Byron: Now, I wonder if your Honor wishes to strike the admission of the exhibit?

Mr. Cuningham: I will withdraw the exhibit. I am sorry I offered it.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Cuningham: Beginning of the testimony on 73.

“Q. Now for the purposes of clarifying the testimony you gave on cross, or attempting to do so, I direct your attention to the illustration at the right-hand top of page 39 of Plaintiff’s Quinn Exhibit” 3-H, “and ask you whether or not that is the wooden box to which you referred?

A. Yes, that was the one that preceded my entry into the business.

Q. That is the one that you referred to in response to questions by Mr. Byron?

A. Yes. You see, they had the fins on the coils up here, or the compressor. It was an ugly old thing, wasn’t it?

Q. Can you give us any idea of what the ratio of cost to price would be with respect to these moist cold boxes?”——

Mr. Byron: I object, because he said he didn’t know [684] anything about it.

The Court: Well, he says that he doesn’t know anything about it in the answer.

Mr. Cuningham: We just have it the way it is there.

The Court: Well, Mr. Cuningham, here is a man

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

who demonstrates in the question that is not qualified to give an answer to the question, and I am going to strike both the question and the answer.

Mr. Cuningham: Has your Honor ruled on that?

The Court: Yes.

Mr. Cuningham: You don't want to hear further——

The Court: No, I don't want to hear any further from a man that frankly states he doesn't know.

Mr. Cuningham: That is all.

Mr. Lucas:

“Recross-Examination

By Mr. Byron:

Q. You stated, I think, that you regarded this so-called Potter invention as revolutionary. In what respect is it revolutionary?

A. Well, my comment about that, Mr. Byron, was based on—well, you remember I told you Mr. Beichler, of Frigidaire, arranged a special meeting with me in Cleveland even before this came out. He knew about it, and this was to find out what we knew about it, and what we were going to do about it, and he was quite disturbed about it, more so than I was, who [685] knew nothing about it at that time, and the attempts we had been making to get moist cold without success. It was and still is in the ordinary old-type refrigerator, something of a device to the housewife to put her food in exposed in a refrigerator and then have it dry out and have the moisture collect on top of the evaporator and all

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

around it. That is so objectionable, in fact, that the Norge Company, for one, subsequently made a great deal of a device that automatically defrosted the evaporator at night, so that you wouldn't be bothered with it during the day.

We had to go to the housewife and give her special instructions for defrosting the refrigerator. On occasion, and periodically, she had to take all the stuff out of the refrigerator and defrost it. If there was such a thing as a moist cold that would keep all the food without depriving it of the moisture, a piece of celery or lettuce, as you know, looks pretty sick after it has been in a dry cold refrigerator for awhile, so it would be a very great advantage. Therefore, I don't know that I used the word 'revolutionary' advisedly, but it certainly was a major development, I would say.

Q. Would you say that every company making refrigerators having a two-compartment feature, two temperatures, and the moist cold compartments infringe?

Mr. Cuningham: That is objected to as entirely incompetent. [686]

A. I don't know. I am not a patent lawyer.

Q. You say that is the invention. If you say that is the invention and all these other companies are using that construction, would you say that they are infringing?

A. I wouldn't undertake to answer that."

The Court: Go ahead.

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

The Crier: "A. (Continued): I think it would be presumptuous on my part.

Q. You wouldn't know whether or not this so-called Potter invention was a revolutionary one?

A. It would purely be a layman's notion. If you ask me that, as non-technically, I would say yes, but I don't know that that means anything on a technical point of infringement. I don't know whether somebody else didn't do something like it before, as you seem to indicate. I am not familiar with it, but I never heard of it nor did the industry, until this Mr. Potter came out with his. If we had known about it beforehand, you would have seen some evidence of it, I dare say, in our early construction, if we could have made it, again, at lowest cost.

Q. Is it possible that the literature might describe such a refrigerator moist cold top, with two compartments and General Electric could not know about that literature?

A. At the time I was there—oh, if there was anything out, we would know about it. [687]

Mr. Cuningham: I object to that.

Q. And if there was a disclosure in earlier patents, would you have known it?

Mr. Cuningham: Same objection.

A. I think we wouldn't have gone ahead without knowledge of anything before that. So far as I knew, we had a clear field when we started.

Q. A clear field to what?

A. To proceed in the refrigerator business when

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

we started. I know we did. I got that advice from our Patent Department.

Q. Yes, but you have missed the point. I asked this question. If there was an earlier patent or an earlier publication——

Mr. Cuningham: I object to the form of the question.

Q. (Continued): ——describing a two-temperature, two-compartment refrigerator of moist cold type, would you have known of it?

A. If there had been, I should think we would have. Now, of course, we mustn't assume omniscience, that we knew everything. But we did make it our business to try to know everything about the refrigerator business.

Mr. Byron: That is all."

“Redirect Examination

By Mr. Cuningham:

Q. Now I would like to ask you whether you agree with this statement which appeared in *Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration* [688] *News*, December 21, 1938, on page 6.

Mr. Byron: What is the name?

Mr. Cuningham: *Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration News*.

Q. (Continued): And now I quote: ‘One of the industry’s best-known engineers predicts that in the next two or three years, no household refrigerator will be modern or acceptable if it does not provide

(Deposition of Theodore K. Quinn.)

for the keeping of frozen food and does not provide for the high humidity in the regular food compartment.' Do you share that opinion?

A. Well, he sounds like a prophet in view of subsequent developments."

The Court: Well, that is the end of the testimony.

Ladies and gentlemen, you have now heard the testimony of Mr. Quinn. It is 2:30. Take a short recess before we take up another deposition. Is that what we are going to have, Mr. Cuningham?

Mr. Cuningham: Yes, your Honor; and it's the deposition of Mr. Quinn's associate and successor at G.E., Mr. Zimmerman.

The Court: All right. I think we had better take a short recess now.

Mr. Cuningham: May I make a record on these?

(Whereupon the jury was excused for the midafternoon recess, and the following proceedings were held out of the presence of the jury:) [689]

The Court: Go ahead.

Mr. Cuningham: I simply wanted to make a record on these exhibits that were left out due to my inability to get back on time.

Mr. Maguire: Those were the ones that we postponed while I was reading, your Honor.

Mr. Cuningham: The first one is Plaintiff's 3-F, and it will help to identify it. That was marked Quinn Exhibit 6.

The Court: Well, I might not have to pass on it. What about those two exhibits, Mr. Byron?

Mr. Cuninghame: May I get the last one in?

The Court: All right.

Mr. Cuninghame: The last one here is identified as 3-G, and it might help to note that that is Quinn Exhibit 7. They have copies.

The Court: Take a recess and Mr. Byron will tell us in a few minutes about them.

(Recess.) [690]

The Court: The Zimmerman deposition was taken in New York City on July 19, 1955; is that right?

Mr. Cuninghame: I think that is right, your Honor; in New York at the same time and place that the Quinn deposition was taken.

Your Honor, before getting into this I would like to offer to renew the offer of the two Quinn exhibits 3-F and 3-G.

Mr. Ramsey: We object to these on the ground of materiality. They only discuss the hydrators or pans, and those are admittedly old in the specification of their own patent, and that is the thing they say they are trying to overcome.

Mr. Cuninghame: They are illustrative of the testimony, your Honor.

Mr. Ramsey: But it is old art.

Mr. Cuninghame: That is right.

Mr. Maguire: It was art that existed at the time of the patent.

The Court: They have already testified to that,

and I am going to admit them as illustrative of the testimony of Mr. Quinn. [691]

(Thereupon the deposition of Paul B. Zimmerman, a witness called to testify in behalf of Plaintiff on July 19, 1955, at the offices of Monitor Equipment Company, 640 West 249th Street, New York, N. Y., was read into the record, with Mr. Cuninghame reading the questions and Mr. Harold Hart, the Court Crier, reading the answers as follows:)

DEPOSITION OF PAUL B. ZIMMERMAN

“Q. Mr. Zimmerman, do you appear in this case in response to this subpoena? A. I do.

Q. What is your name, residence and occupation?

A. Paul B. Zimmerman, 1332 Midland Avenue, Bronxville, New York. My occupation?

Q. Your present occupation.

A. Executive Vice-President of the Monitor Equipment Corporation, and Vice-President of the T. K. Quinn Management Company.

Q. Have you ever had any experience in the household refrigeration business, Mr. Zimmerman?

A. Yes; both with General Electric Corporation and with the Norge Division of the Borg Warner Company, and more recently in the Monitor Equipment Corporation.

Q. Was this experience, as just stated by you, in the order of your experience chronologically?

A. Yes. [692]

(Deposition of Paul B. Zimmerman.)

Q. Will you give me just a thumbnail sketch of your experience with the General Electric Company and give me dates if you can?

A. Well, I was first associated with General Electric Company as advertising manager of the Lamp Department and then became sales manager of the newly formed Refrigeration Department in 1927, was there as sales manager, and in about 1932 I became general manager of the Refrigeration Department and held that title until I left the General Electric Company in 1937.

Q. And where did you go in 1937 from the General Electric Company?

A. To the Norge Division of the Borg Warner Company at Detroit, Michigan.

Q. And what were your duties there, Mr. Zimmerman?

A. I was Vice-President in charge of sales.

Q. Sales of what products?

A. Of all large products, which were refrigerators and other major appliances.

Q. And how long did you stay at Norge?

A. About two years.

Q. 1939, is that about right? A. Yes.

Q. And will you just bring us rapidly up to date? You left Norge in 1939? [693]

A. I left Norge and set up an advertising and merchandising business and was engaged in that for about two years, and then during the war period I was associated with the Chrysler Corporation as Vice-President of their Air-Temp Division, which

(Deposition of Paul B. Zimmerman.)

manufactured refrigeration and air-conditioning equipment.

In 1945 I again became associated with Mr. Quinn in organizing the Monitor Equipment Corporation.

Q. And by 'again became associated,' you mean that you were associated with Mr. Quinn at the General Electric Company?

A. That is right.

Q. Have you read the testimony that Mr. Quinn gave in this case, or a copy of it which I turned over to you?

A. Yes, I have read that testimony.

Q. The testimony being dated April 19, 1955. Now, Mr. Zimmerman, was 1927 your first experience with the household refrigeration business?

A. It was, yes.

Q. In your reading of the testimony do you accept the statements of Mr. Quinn as accurate with respect to that early period?

A. Yes, I accept them.

Mr. Byron: I object to that. That is jumping over a lot of territory without going into the necessary testimony [694] himself. I object to that line.

Q. (By Mr. Cuningham): I will ask you this: When did you read this testimony, Mr. Zimmerman, this copy that I have in front of me?

A. This past week end.

Q. In reading it, did you note anything that you would be unwilling to accept in the way of testimony of Mr. Quinn?

(Deposition of Paul B. Zimmerman.)

A. No, I would be willing to accept that."

(Discussion off the record.)

"Q. Mr. Zimmerman, will you tell us about this early business in household refrigerators, starting with your competition with the old-fashioned ice-box? That was your competition in 1927, wasn't it?

A. That's right.

Q. Did you find any real competitive activities with the ice companies and vested interests when you began with mechanical refrigerators for the G.E. Company?

A. Yes, we did. We found that less than 14 per cent of the people used ice even the year around, and as a result it was looked upon simply as a means of keeping food from spoiling during the summer season, so we soon found that we had to develop our own market if we were to have a refrigerator used the year around, and so much of our activity in the early days was spent on selling the public the fact that refrigeration was good the year around and [695] it was always summertime in the kitchen. Later the campaign, of course, on the part of the ice companies took the form whereby they endeavored to sell people the fact that they had moisture control, and the refrigerator folks who had up to that time featured mostly their mechanical units then started more and more to sell the refrigerator as a device that would regulate temperature, and out of that came a campaign later, in the food preservation campaign, in which

(Deposition of Paul B. Zimmerman.)

the refrigerator industry lined up on one side for temperature control and the ice industry on the other side for moisture control.

Q. And those were the lines upon which the battle was fought for a good many years, is that correct? A. That's right.

Q. What was the Food Preservation Council of America?

A. That was a non-profit organization which was supported by contributions from the refrigerator manufacturers and from the light and power companies, and we endeavored—and I was the first president of that organization—to get the industry to broaden the market for refrigeration rather than divide it up among ourselves by each one trying to sell the excellence of their product. So we were able to get schools and educational institutions to take some interest in the subject of food refrigeration, and since it was simply to get some one thought across as against a [696] broad education, we selected the device of a critical temperature, and we were able to get the Department of Agriculture to concur to a point that we all agreed that we should sell the thought that food preservation could be maintained if the refrigerator temperatures were 50 degrees or below. We had thermometers made and a lot of banners and special literature, all on the subject that below 50 lies safety for food preservation. The refrigerator manufacturers so hammered that one thought that it became pretty well accepted, and the campaign of the ice

(Deposition of Paul B. Zimmerman.)

people, moisture control, was less in evidence. Since the art was so new anyhow, the public accepted this new device, at least as far as the utilities could influence them, and it was considered over-all a success because the market broadened out and our business went ahead fast.

Q. As I understand it, you countered this—you countered this campaign or sales pitch of the ice companies, the theme of which was humidity control and lack of drying out of foods, with your equally valid argument and pitch about the maintenance of low temperatures throughout the day and throughout the season, and you seem to have done a good job in this missionary work with the market, is that correct? Was it a fact that this problem of humidity control was really a problem with the electric refrigeration?

A. Oh, definitely so. We had first a limited capacity [697] that bothered us and therefore did not have the means of even developing more low equipment. Therefore we were straining, all of us as manufacturers, to maintain this 50 degrees that we considered the safety point, and as a result we had such a dry cold that many people found it to their advantage to dry their matches and their crackers there. That seemed to have some temporary interest, but later it boomeranged a bit when they realized that fresh vegetables and many other things that they stored in the refrigerator were better served if they did not have such a dry cold.

(Deposition of Paul B. Zimmerman.)

Q. I show you what has heretofore been marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-F. It is an advertisement, I believe, of Frigidaire of a Hydrator pan. State what that is, if you know.

A. This is an advertisement of the Frigidaire Corporation in which they feature a Hydrator. A hydrator was simply a vegetable pan with a cover in which the householders would store their fresh vegetables, add a bit of moisture, cover the pan, and then keep it in the refrigerator and in that way was able to have moisture for fresh vegetables to keep them from drying.

This big offer of Frigidaire disturbed us greatly, and, finding there was nothing patented on this Hydrator, we immediately equipped all our refrigerators with a so-called vegetable pan and endeavored to give an answer to [698] people that wanted moisture added to a refrigerator, that this pan could be used.

Q. Would it be accurate to characterize that as just a covered pan or covered dish?

A. Oh, yes. It was a very simple pan that was available in all housewares departments, so it was nothing of a new design to us. It was simply a housewares article we purchased and furnished as an accessory.

Q. You would characterize it as fundamental engineering? I am asking Mr. Zimmerman if he would accept that term as appropriate, namely, fundamental engineering in connection with the devising of a covered dish for a refrigerator.

(Deposition of Paul B. Zimmerman.)

A. Well, in answer, there is certainly nothing fundamental or new to the art, as it was a simple vegetable pan that was available on the open market in the housewares departments of all department stores.

Q. Mr. Zimmerman, were there any further efforts at humidity control that you can think of during this early period, in the 20's?

A. Yes, we made several. One was a two-temperature refrigerator so-called, and that was obtained by taking two of our single-door Monitor top refrigerators and putting them together by bands, taking off the center legs. In that way it made one large refrigerator with two units at the top. We then showed the customer that they could have a [699] two-temperature refrigerator with many other advantages. We got the two temperatures by turning one high and one low, and we then featured the fact that this double-door large refrigerator not only had two temperatures, but was so constructed that if they later wanted to divide it and the children moved away and wanted to take their part, we would furnish extra legs and two refrigerators could be employed.

Q. How successful was that effort in the General Electric Company?

A. While it answered a certain need, and particularly on the part of our trade that wanted to answer all the competition, it wasn't commercially successful. It was quite expensive. It was nearly

(Deposition of Paul B. Zimmerman.)

the cost of two refrigerators, and a rather limited number were sold. But it was a good promotional feature.

Q. You left the General Electric Company in 1937; that is, a little later than Mr. Quinn?

A. That's right.

Q. I show you what has heretofore been marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-H. I guess the whole exhibit was marked, but I direct your attention to an article beginning on Page 37 of the General Electric Review for September, 1952, entitled 'Making It Safe to Be Hungry.' Are you familiar with that historical write-up of the G.E. refrigerator business? A. Yes, sir; I am. [700]

Q. Have you read it? A. Yes.

Q. Is it generally accurate as far as you know?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. I show you also a document heretofore marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-K——"

Mr. Cuninghame: I shall omit that, your Honor. That relates to something not in evidence.

The Court: Very well.

Mr. Cuninghame: I would start in at the first question on 96.

The Court: Very well.

“Q. What is that?

A. This is a modern two-door General Electric refrigerator with the unit at the bottom and not at the top as they were in my day.

Q. Is that a dry cold refrigerator? With respect to its being dry or moist cold.

(Deposition of Paul B. Zimmerman.)

A. In our catalogue it would be considered a dry cold refrigerator.

Q. The same is true, I think, of everything in this catalogue, isn't it? You might glance through it.

A. Yes, all these models we would consider dry cold with a [701] single evaporator.

Q. Now, Mr. Zimmerman, I show you another document which is marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-U and ask you if you know what that 20-page advertisement is and whether you ever saw it before?

A. Yes, I am familiar with it. It was a 20-page announcement of the Tricold method of balanced humidity in refrigerators.

Q. Was that as far as you know the first two-compartment household refrigerator that made an effort at moisture control in the fresh food compartment?

A. It was the only one that I was familiar with, yes.

Q. Did other companies later—you notice that is dated 1932—if you know, come out with similar products as their de luxe line of boxes?

A. Yes, later others did.

Q. Did most others do it, if you know?

A. Well, immediately following that I think there were very few, but later, of course, in this most recent period it is a 'must' with all refrigerator companies.

Q. What was the first other company than this

(Deposition of Paul B. Zimmerman.)

Tricold outfit, as you recall, coming out with a two-temperature refrigerator?

A. I think it was Stewart-Warner.

Q. Can you give us your idea of when that came out? [702] I imagine that is a hard question, but as close as you can.

A. Well, it was in the early '30's. I would suspect it was about 1933 or 1934.

Q. At the time in 1933, was it, when this announcement came out, did you recall any stir in refrigeration circles regarding this new development?

A. Well, our largest competitor seemed to be quite disturbed. That was Frigidaire, and, as we have mentioned here, they had then brought out the Hydrator, and that seemed a simple answer to this system and enough so that many of the customers accepted it. We in General Electric immediately took it because there was no prohibition on its use and it didn't require any change in design of our mechanism. I don't know as you appreciate that in those days it was a great task to keep the mechanism good so that service wasn't too expensive, and we, and I think most other manufacturers, were not willing to add anything to the system that might make it more complicated.

Q. You still were mindful, were you not, of your competition with the old ice people at that stage?

A. Oh, yes; they were large and effective, and, of course, had the large share of the market at that time so their story had a telling effect.

(Deposition of Paul B. Zimmerman.)

Q. What proportion of your duties and responsibilities during your period of ten years, I guess, approximately [703], with the General Electric—

A. Do you mean just in the refrigeration business?

Q. I was thinking of just the refrigeration business. How long were you with General Electric in all? A. Twenty-five years.

Q. But in 1927 you took on the responsibility of the refrigeration end? A. Yes.

Q. And then, as I understood you, a change occurred in your position there in 1932 and you became General Manager instead of Sales Manager?

A. That's right.

Q. Is that for just refrigeration or for all appliances?

A. That was for the refrigeration department, but we shortly after that took over and developed other major appliances that we added to the department, and it was then known as the Specialty Appliance Department.

Q. Then you stayed on as General Manager until 1937? A. That's right.

Q. During that ten-year period from 1927 to 1938, was the household refrigeration business your principal concern?

A. Yes, that was our major responsibility.

Q. That was the bulk of the business, was it not? A. Yes.

Q. When you left in 1937 to join Borg Warner

(Deposition of Paul B. Zimmerman.)

in the Norge [704] Division, did you still have responsibility as Vice-President for the household refrigeration of that division?

A. That's right, yes.

Q. What did you do there with respect to humidity control, if anything?

A. Practically nothing. We had a machine that was quite similar to much of the competition, and we did nothing to add to the art. We did try to make a low-cost product so that we could have a share of that price market.

Q. You were very cost-conscious and made as few changes as you could, is that correct?

A. That was our big job, to get the cost down.

Q. Were you aware of this so-called Tricold—you referred to it as the Potter?

A. Yes, at that time it was being discussed of course even more.

Q. Were you acquainted with any of the individuals in the Tricold organization?

A. Only Mr. Potter, and that was a very limited acquaintanceship because I had only met him at one or two of the refrigerator conventions.

Q. Did you have any acquaintance in the Stewart-Warner organization during this period in the '30's?

A. I believe D'Olive was their refrigerator manager at that time. [705]

Q. Was that Charles R. D'Olive?

A. Yes, Charles R. D'Olive. We were fairly

(Deposition of Paul B. Zimmerman.)

well acquainted with him because he attended all the refrigeration meetings.

Q. Did he in any way indicate an awareness of this Potter development to you at any time?

A. Yes; he was more of a technical man than many of us that were in sales work, and on a number of occasions I recall he pointed out that this moisture control had become a bigger factor than the other features that we had felt were so dominant in refrigeration.

Q. Such as maintenance of temperature, and so forth?

A. Maintenance of temperature. And the biggest factor of all, of course, was to have a mechanism that would operate for a number of years free of service.

Q. Did he and others in the industry like him

gest factor of all, of course, was to have a mechanism that would operate for a number of years free

A. Well, they were not large manufacturers, and, as I recall, they contributed very little, but we, of course, felt we were remiss in not featuring the salient points that some day must be effective with consumers, but, as I explained to you before, we had a different job, we thought, at that time to do, and it therefore became the major, and this, if it was there at all, was a minor.

Q. Mr. Zimmerman, how much money have you been paid for [706] testifying in this case, or how much money do you expect to get for testifying in this case?

(Deposition of Paul B. Zimmerman.)

A. I have been paid nothing, and I expect nothing; in fact, would not accept it.

Q. I have not even offered you the \$2 witness fee, have I?

A. No, sir; I did not know there was such a fee.

Mr. Cuningham: There is. I probably should offer it to you. Your witness, Mr. Byron.”

“Cross-Examination

By Mr. Byron:

Q. Mr. Zimmerman, do I understand correctly from your last few answers that General Electric and some of the larger companies and the Stewart-Warner Company, which you say was a small company in this field, regarded this question of moisture control as a minor matter?

A. I don't know that we could say that they considered it a minor matter, but keep in mind I am speaking as a salesman, and we had to take the products as they were given to us by engineering and make the most of them. It was for that reason, taking the products as they were per se, that we took the features that we felt would have opportunity for public exploitation. Men like D'Olive had pointed out that here would be a great one to add, but we did not have it so we minored it, and that is my reason for saying that. We just did not have it. [707]

Q. What was your honest opinion at that time? You say you minored it.

A. During the period of our food preservation

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activity, I honestly felt that we made one great step forward in getting better cabinets and establishing a new standard which the Department of Agriculture and the Health Department helped us with, because they were very poorly constructed. They were leakers, and it was better in many cases if they would leave the door open rather than close it because temperatures were not maintained. So we felt temperature control, until we had better machines and better cabinets, was a major, and we could get across just one thing at a time and therefore we decided to concentrate on this as an industry. I think we accomplished that to the point that the icebox people improved their cabinets, as did the refrigerator people, and it was the first joint effort of the industry. Also, it got us away from some of the campaigns which were very negative. The ice people were inferring at least that a refrigerator with its poisonous gases should not be kept in a home, and the refrigerator folks in turn were, of course, pointing out that there was too much moisture in an icebox and you had a slimy pan underneath. All this was negative. So out of this came what we thought was a constructive move, and it was the first one. We had to have temperature, and therefore anything else would be a further refinement. [708]

Q. You spoke about the General Electric two-temperature refrigerator, that is, the two-in-one of the General Electric Company. I think you did not

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mention the year that that was brought out. Do you know what year that was?

A. I think it was about 1933.

Q. You had in your combined two-in-one refrigerator then one compartment having the temperature below freezing or below zero, is that correct?

A. That was the objective, but we couldn't get it that low so we just turned it as cold as we could. We had an evaporator temperature of 14, and we never got it below that.

Q. Your freezing compartment then was around 14 degrees Fahrenheit? A. That's right.

Q. And at what temperature did you maintain your cooling compartment?

A. The freezing unit is our cooling compartment—or do you mean the whole interior?

Q. You said that you had in effect two refrigerators in one, and I assume that those were two separate compartments as you have testified.

A. Two separate cabinets.

Q. Well, there are two separate compartments, then, is that right? A. That's right. [709]

Q. I am talking about the low temperature in one of those compartments, and you say that low temperature was about 14 degrees Fahrenheit. What was the temperature in the other?

A. The whole compartment couldn't maintain 14 degrees because only the icing unit that was in that compartment had the initial low temperature of 14. Then only to the extent that it influenced

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the cabinet inside or the compartment would you have lower temperature.

Q. Well, did you have two refrigerators, each of which was complete in itself, so that you had a freezing compartment in each of those?

A. That's right.

Mr. Cuningham: A separate freezing compartment.

A. In fact, there wasn't, Mr. Byron, too great a difference because at the top of each of these was a thermostat, and the customer could only change that operation a limited amount. It was done for safety of the machine. What we did get in the left-hand compartment is we let them turn it to the highest point so that we had a higher temperature than we did in the other one and therefore a little better humidity. It was a relative thing, and that was one reason it probably wasn't too successful. The relation of one to the other wasn't too great a difference.

Q. What was the relative humidity?

A. I haven't any idea except that we knew that it was higher [710], and since we had the temperature in there high and didn't endeavor to freeze ice cubes in the icing part of the unit, it came closer to being a moisture compartment that we could at least feature. On the other one, we had it turned down as low as we could, which was about 14 degrees, and there we did the freezing of the ice cubes.

Q. So that in this two-in-one refrigerator that the General Electric Company had, while you did

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have two freezing units, one freezing unit in each compartment, it is only in one of those that you brought the temperature in that freezing zone down to about 14 degrees Fahrenheit?

A. That's right.

Q. And in the other you did not attempt to freeze water and ice cubes?

A. That's right.

Q. And therefore the relative humidity in that higher temperature compartment was greater than in the other compartment, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Now, as a matter of fact, did you not measure, determine, the relative humidity in that warmer compartment?

A. I don't believe we ever did because we had developed this pretty much as a sales department product. It wasn't a product of the engineering department, and in fact these machines were put together in the field. They simply took [711] off the center legs and put a band around them and strapped them together as two machines. I confess that the engineers weren't very happy about it as a solution to their problem, but it did give us an answer to those who were demanding a two-temperature or a high and low humidity, a sort of makeshift in other words.

Q. But you did have a higher humidity in the one compartment than you did in the other?

A. To some extent, yes.

Q. Now, as salesmen, to put over that point, didn't you have some foundation for making a

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statement about your higher humidity and the degree of that humidity backed by a company like General Electric Company with their reputation?

A. Many of the sales stories we had were created by the sales department on nothing other than the test in homes or what we believed. There was no scientific data for much of it.

Q. You were head of the sales organization of refrigerators for General Electric?

A. From the beginning, yes.

Q. You had a conviction about that relative humidity and that warmer compartment, did you not?

A. That's right.

Q. What was it?

A. That it would be a nice service to add to refrigeration [712], but we did not have it available at the factory at the time and therefore we sold the features that we had.

Q. Did that keep the food in the warmer compartment moist?

A. Some said yes and some said no. It evidently was not quite as good as using a vegetable pan that was covered with moisture in the pan.

Q. What did you think?

A. I finally agreed with them in this expose. We at least had a different vehicle to use which pleased salesmen. But they found, because of its price and the limited service, that it was not a successful answer. So we went back in a big way to the Hydrator or the vegetable pan as a part of all refrigerators.

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Q. It was because of the price that you went back?

A. The price and the fact that we didn't believe it completed the functions.

Q. You know I am not at all convinced, Mr. Zimmerman, that somebody in your organization didn't know the relative humidity in that warmer compartment of your two-compartment refrigerator.

Mr. Cuninghame: I object to that. That is not the testimony. He is not trying to convince you that nobody knew that.

Q. (By Mr. Byron): Well, you as Vice President in charge of Sales, should know the truth about what that relative humidity was because you were the one to begin with who was sponsoring that two-compartment two-temperature affair, is that not [713] correct?

A. I told you that it was a very minor thing because we had not developed a product specifically for that service. We had made a makeshift of a product already available, and it was an experiment, and we have done that with many products.

Q. You have been talking about the Potter refrigerator. Do I understand your position is that the main thing that was emphasized about the so-called Potter refrigerator was the moist cold feature?

A. That's right.

Q. That is, keeping the food and air and the cooling compartment moist and cold and preventing the dehydration of the food and air, is that

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correct? A. That's right.

Q. That was the big point that they were putting over, or trying to put over?

A. That is what he did in that expose that I have read."

Mr. Cuningham: Referring to Plaintiff's Exhibit 3-U.

Mr. Lucas: "Q. And the Potter refrigerator accomplished this by providing the cooling coil in the cooling compartment with fins so that the temperature of the surface of the coil and fins would be maintained at about 40 degrees Fahrenheit, is that correct?

A. I am not familiar with the degrees of it. I know that was the general system. [714]

Q. You knew that the Potter refrigerator provided the cooling coils in the cooling compartment with fins to accomplish that result?

A. That is correct.

Q. Now, the air in the cooling compartment as distinguished from the freezing compartment in the so-called Potter refrigerator claimed to have a relatively high moisture content, is that correct?

A. That was their claim, yes, sir.

Q. Now in their patent, in the Bronaugh and Potter patent in suit, they bring out the fact that the air in the cooling compartment has substantially a stable temperature of about 40 degrees Fahrenheit and having a humidity whose relative value is at least 100 per cent at 32 degrees Fahrenheit—under such circumstances, do you know what

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the humidity of the air in the cooling compartment is when it is at 40 degrees Fahrenheit?

Mr. Cuningham: Objection!

Mr. Byron: I am not going to make it technical. I am just asking him if he knows it.

A. No, I do not.

Q. Well, I will tell you what it is. That air under those circumstances in the cooling department has 74 per cent relative humidity which corresponds to 100 per cent relative humidity at 32 degrees Fahrenheit. That is an established [715] fact, and I am just telling you that for a reason.

Q. Do you know that lettuce, which seems to be one of the criteria here in the wilting or flourishing or keeping fresh and crisp has almost 100 per cent moisture content? Do you know that?

A. No. I know it is very high. Do you mean when it is dry on the stalk?

Q. No, when you put it in the icebox, in the refrigerator. When you buy it and put in the refrigerator it has about 100 per cent——

A. It is generally loaded with ice water when you get it out of the store.

Q. Let's not talk about its being loaded with anything. I am speaking about the lettuce as you purchase it and put in your refrigerator under usual, normal circumstances. The expert demonstrator"——

Mr. Cuningham: Your Honor, if I may interpose here, the reference is obviously to Mrs. Kobernuss who has testified in this room yesterday.

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Mr. Lucas: —“The expert demonstrator for the Potter Company says under those circumstances the lettuce has about 100 per cent moisture content. Now assuming that her statement is true and you put that lettuce in the cooling compartment of the Potter refrigerator, the air in which is then 74 per cent relative humidity, that means that the air in that cooling [716] compartment of Potter is drier than the lettuce is; that is correct, isn't it?

A. I thought you said that the regulars were 74 per cent humidity and the Potter was 100, didn't you?

Q. No, I said this, that Potter claimed”——

The Court: Wait one minute. Did he ever give you an answer to your question?

Mr. Byron: I have forgotten.

The Court: It doesn't seem like he did because he would be not acquainted with that.

Mr. Byron: No. But it was always interesting to have the answers for the plaintiff but when the defendants asked the questions they don't know. See, they are just dumb.

Mr. Cuninghame: Your Honor, he does give an answer on——

Mr. Maguire: I think that's totally uncalled for.

The Court: The jury is instructed to disregard those statements. I am just trying to find out, trying to shorten this. There are a lot of questions here. This man is a salesman, advertising man, and obviously not acquainted with technical points with reference to lettuce or any other commodity. I think

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that the only merit of this testimony of Quinn and Zimmerman is that to tell what the type and kinds of machines were on the market at this particular time and whether there were any machines which had moist cold in them and two-temperature refrigerators. I think that that [717] is about all that can be claimed for this testimony. And to interrogate him as an expert, which obviously he is not, just seems to me to be a waste of time.

Now, you can go ahead and ask these questions which he doesn't know anything about. I think I have already told the jury that he doesn't know anything about it. Do you want to read all those questions, Mr. Byron?

Mr. Byron: I am going to abide by your Honor's conclusion.

The Court: Well, I notice here again——

Mr. Cuninghame: Does that bring us over, then, to—of course, what you just said applies to the testimony as to the patent in suit. It seems to me that it goes over—well, I don't know, it's Mr. Byron's examination. It seems to me it goes over to——

The Court: Mr. Byron, do you want to interrogate him concerning the patent?

Mr. Byron: Well, I have found that it was useless. He had the patent right before him and the drawing and didn't want to answer it, and that's all I can say.

Mr. Maguire: Now, if your Honor please, that, I think, is highly improper. Now, either counsel

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wants to put it in—if he doesn't we are not going to object—but I think it's highly improper that he should give a highly partisan conclusion as to what was testified. The insinuation is [718] that the witness was not willing to tell the truth.

Now, this is testimony and let's find out about it or else that remark should be withdrawn.

The Court: All right. We will put in the testimony then under those circumstances. But have you read his testimony?

Mr. Maguire: I read it hastily. I seriously agree with what your Honor said, but if the counsel agree with your Honor then it should be left out. But I think if it's to be left out then it is highly improper for counsel to give his conclusion as to whether the witness is being frank or honest on things that are being left out.

Mr. Byron: I didn't say he was dishonest at all.

Mr. Maguire: Evasive.

The Court: I think it's obvious, Mr. Maguire, that he doesn't know anything about reading of patents, and I think everybody concedes that.

Mr. Maguire: Oh, yes.

Mr. Byron: Well, I am perfectly willing to eliminate that, your Honor.

The Court: All right. Leave out all reference to the patent because he doesn't know anything about it.

Mr. Cuninghame: Well, then, shall we start—

The Court: Well, that seems to be practically

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all his other testimony where he is interrogated concerning the patent.

Mr. Cuningham: As I said, your Honor, I didn't examine [719] him. I didn't ask these questions. Mr. Byron asked the questions and I haven't been over them. There may be some things in here that he does know about, and I would like to have him answer. I would hate to leave out a whole group of testimony like that and group of questions.

The Court: Well, I think the witness here admits very frankly on the bottom of page 123 that he doesn't know anything about it, that his information is pretty limited.

Mr. Byron: Well, I will waive the reading of that further part of that deposition.

The Court: All right. Mr. Byron has now agreed to eliminate or to waive the reading of the balance of the Zimmerman cross-examination which ends at bottom of page 123. Am I correct in that?

Mr. Byron: Yes. Of course, in doing that I want your Honor to appreciate that I think that there are a lot of the direct questions by the same token that should not be in, but I am not going to fight for it.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Cuningham: This is on page 124, then.

The Court: All right.

(Deposition of Paul B. Zimmerman.)

Redirect Examination

By Mr. Cuningham:

Q. Mr. Zimmerman, as I recall your testimony on cross-examination, you talked about these twin boxes that were banded together in an effort to get a humidity control and also have a sharp freezing and dry temperature [720] box together.

A. That's right.

Q. You characterized that as really a product of the sales department as distinguished from the engineering department of the General Electric?

A. That's right.

Q. Did the engineering department come up with any better ideas than that at the time you put this out, made this attempt to put it out?

A. No, not that I recall. It was on the order of a sales experiment.

Q. If they had come up with a sounder, more fundamental engineering solution, you probably would have considered it seriously."

Mr. Byron: There, you see is the position talking about engineering. He is a salesman. It is a question about engineering.

Mr. Cuningham: May I read Mr. Byron's interruption? Will you read your own statement, Mr. Byron?

Mr. Byron: "Mr. Byron: Now, wait a minute. That is leading. You are putting words in the witness' mouth. Ask him what effect it had or what-

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ever you want to. I am tired of this leading. Cunningham, I think you are terrible that way."

Mr. Byron: Why does he want me to read that?

Mr. Cunningham: "I accept with good grace Mr. Byron's [721] criticism, and I will adopt his words.

Q. What can you say in response to the question as amended by Mr. Byron?"

The Court: I am going to strike that question and that answer and the next question. I am going to strike the rest of it down to the top of page 126.

Now, Mr. Byron, what is that, is that recross? What does it go to? I am going to strike that also.

Mr. Byron: Yes.

The Court: I am going to strike the rest of that because it refers to a technical matter.

All right. The examination of Mr. Zimmerman has been completed.

Mr. Byron: I don't know if your Honor agrees that that statement of counsel should not be in there.

The Court: Which one is that?

Mr. Byron: The statement of Mr. Cunningham on page 127.

The Court: Oh. He made that statement in his opening to the jury. He made that same statement in the opening.

Mr. Cunningham: I didn't know we read anything on 128.

The Court: 127, Mr. Cunningham. It's your final statement.

Mr. Maguire: Well, it isn't being read in the record anyway, is it?

Mr. Cuningham: I would be glad to have it in if anyone wants it in. [722]

The Court: Immaterial to me. But if you both agree on it——

Mr. Cuningham: Does Mr. Byron want it in or out? I object.

Mr. Byron: His Honor has stated that you made that statement before the Court and jury in your opening statement. I will let it go at that.

The Court: Fine.

Mr. Cuningham: All right.

The Court: Mr. Cuningham, will you call up your next witness or read the next deposition? Have you got another deposition here today?

Mr. Cuningham: Yes. But we don't plan to finish it, sir. We won't finish it.

The Court: Have you got a short one?

Mr. Maguire: The party——

The Court: I can't hear you.

Mr. Maguire: Not without destroying the sequence of putting it in. I think we can get along fairly well with this.

The Court: Which deposition is this?

Mr. Cuningham: This is the deposition of Mr. Evans T. Morton taken——

The Court: All right. Have you got it? We will go for a half hour on it. [723]

Mr. Cuningham: I do have a short one, sir, in the back of it, Mr. Douglass. I think we could finish that, perhaps.

The Court: All right. Mr. Douglass' deposition

will be read now. I want to get the jury out of here by 4:00 o'clock. Douglass starts on 377.

Mr. Cuningham: Yes, your Honor, and runs to——

The Court: Well, we will find out what it runs to. It looks like a lot of colloquy in here. Have you, Mr. Cuningham, gone over that with Mr. Byron?

Mr. Byron: I have decided not to ask to have any deleted.

Mr. Cuningham: I have not gone over it with him.

The Court: Is it agreed that all colloquy can be omitted? There is some.

Mr. Cuningham: All pure colloquy. If there are any admissions here—you understand, this is an examination of our adversary, not a deposition *de bene esse*, and it may be that remarks are in here by counsel which I would not call colloquy, and I suppose your Honor would not call colloquy.

The Court: Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Darrell Douglass is an employee of the Admiral Company. Is that right?

Mr. Cuningham: He is a patent lawyer.

The Court: He is a patent lawyer. Is he employed by the Admiral Company?

Mr. Byron: He has his outside practice, and, as I understand it, he is retained by the Admiral Company and [724] spend a part of his time in Chicago. He lives in Cleveland, has his office there, and he goes over to Chicago every second week for two days, as I understand it.

The Court: All right. I think that tells it. I

might say this to those persons who are on the jury, in explaining this deposition, that ordinarily when one calls a witness to testify in your behalf you are bound by the answers given by such witnesses unless you are caught by surprise. And under certain limited circumstances you can impeach the testimony of your own witness. But that is not the case if you are cross-examining or examining an officer or agent—it's something more than a mere agent—of the other side. You are not bound by the answers that he gives.

The same thing is true with an ordinary employee. The minute he begins to show any hostility then you are not bound by the answers given by such witness. Now, I don't know what classification Mr. Douglass falls into, but we will be able to tell.

Now, on this type of an examination ordinarily the questions propounded by the attorney can be leading. You have heard, during the course of this trial, objections made because the questions were leading. You can't put words in the witness' mouth when that witness is your witness. But if on cross-examination you can ask him leading questions, for example, "Weren't you at this house at a particular time?" [725] That is what you call a leading question.

Now, I think under these circumstances Mr. Cunningham is permitted to ask leading questions and the probabilities are that he has. So go ahead, Mr. Cunningham.

Mr. Cuninghame: I will state this deposition was taken June 1st, 1955, at the offices of Mr. Byron in Chicago.

DEPOSITION OF J. DARRELL DOUGLASS

“Q. Would you give us your full name and address?

A. J. Darrell Douglass, and I reside at 21625 Kenwood Avenue, Rocky River, Ohio.

Q. What is your occupation?

A. I am a patent lawyer.

Q. Are you a patent lawyer for Admiral Corporation?

A. Yes. They are one of my clients.

Q. How long has Admiral Corporation been one of your clients? A. The fall of 1940.

Q. What is the nature of your work in representing Admiral Corporation?

A. I write patent applications for them, make investigations into patentability and novelty.

Q. In connection with their own developments?

A. In connection with their own developments.

Q. Do you also do that in connection with the developments of others? A. Yes.

Q. As adversely held patents? [726]

A. I don't understand the question.

Q. Well, you mean patents of others other than Admiral Corporation. Do you conduct these investigations you just testified about in connection with patents of others than the Admiral Corporation on behalf of Admiral Corporation?

(Deposition of J. Darrell Douglass.)

A. I look at patents owned by other people to determine whether or not there is infringement, if that is what you mean, and if they are valid.

Q. You do that on behalf of Admiral Corporation?
A. Yes.

Q. That has been true right along during this fifteen-year period?
A. Yes, it has.

Q. What other duties do you have in this connection with Admiral Corporation?

A. Well, they have certain trade-mark applications that I take care of and occasional license agreements that have to be written in connection with patents; nearly everything that involves patent work is done by me.

Q. Do you have any practice of giving patent clearance or patent approval to the devices of Admiral Corporation?

A. I am frequently asked whether there are any patents that would be infringed by certain structures, and in that case I would make a search to determine whether there are any patents, and advise them whether there is any infringement. [727]

Q. Do you likewise give patent approval to public relation or license releases?
A. No.

Q. Have you ever done that for Admiral Corporation?
A. No.

Q. What is your advice with respect to adversely held patents, do you consider first the question of infringement and, second, where assuming you found infringement, or what is your practice, in your own words?

(Deposition of J. Darrell Douglass.)

A. First we look at the patent and see whether the structure appears to be pertinent to the subject matter, and examine the claims to see whether they read on the subject matter, and then if we find the claims are liable to read rather close then we try to determine the possibility of whether that patent is valid or invalid.

Q. Now, in connection with this business for Admiral, do you represent them in all fields or just in the appliance field?

A. I represent them in all fields.

Q. With respect to the appliance field have you ever had occasion to pass on the infringement or validity of adversely held patents? A. Yes.

Q. Give me one such instance, if you recall any.

A. In what field, or just any field? [728]

Q. In the refrigeration field.

A. In the refrigeration field?

Q. Yes. I will amend that. In any field, first.

A. Well, I have had occasion to examine patents'—

Mr. Byron: Your Honor, this is so far afield I can't see much sense in going into that.

The Court: I think you are absolutely right. Objection is sustained. [729]

The Court: I am not going to go into Armstrong. We are just trying one patent case.

Mr. Cuninghame: Your Honor, this is not going into Armstrong in any sense of the word. I was in the Armstrong suit. It is simply a question of his practice; what he did.

(Deposition of J. Darrell Douglass.)

The Court: I do not understand what relevancy the practice of Mr. Douglass has to any issue of this case.

Mr. Byron: The witness has stated generally that he considers infringement and validity of the claims.

Mr. Cuningham: Your Honor, I would prefer to tell you my idea of the materiality of this not in the presence of the jury.

The Court: Very well; we shall go into chambers.

(Thereupon Court and counsel repaired to the Court's chambers where the following proceedings were had:)

Mr. Cuningham: Your Honor, you know the issue that we have had in the beginning of willful infringement by the Admiral Corporation on the question of damages. It is deliberate willfulness. I want to show what this man's practice is in thoroughly considering a vital portion of what they were doing.

Mr. Byron: Therefore it is not willful.

Mr. Cuningham: It likewise has a very [730] significant relationship—I shudder when I say—it is more important, I think to the willfulness.

The Court: Do you think that it is admissible?

Mr. Cuningham: I think so, sir.

Mr. Byron: I do not see how it is.

Mr. Cuningham: He is a technical man.

Mr. Byron: He has shown that now. You are

getting into searches, and you are getting into Armstrong.

Mr. Cuningham: He read the Armstrong, he has considered the question of validity. They considered the validity there, you see.

Mr. Byron: That is what the Armstrong patent is.

Mr. Cuningham: I want to show what this fellow thinks right off the bat of everything, go into the claims, what meaning——

The Court: What happened in Armstrong?

Mr. Cuningham: They were sued by Armstrong. They turned him down. Armstrong is the fellow who committed suicide in New York.

Mr. Byron: Of course, now, Admiral caused him to commit suicide.

Mr. Cuningham: If anybody did, I did. I was on the other side with R.C.A. He jumped out of a window. We had nothing to do with that, of course.

The Court: I am going to rule that if Admiral had [731] been found to have infringed the Armstrong patent and this Douglass had given the advice, but I cannot see the relevancy of the testimony concerning a specific patent.

Mr. Cuningham: I have not made myself clear, and the reason is I am so close to this thing that I guess I have difficulty doing it; but there is a routine of any patent lawyer when he is considering an adversely-held patent for his client, and his client wants to find out as to whether or not he can go ahead. The first thing he does is consider the infringement because it is infringement.

The Court: He has already testified to that.

Mr. Cuningham: But I want practice. This is not trying the Armstrong suit, that he was liable for or anything else——

Mr. Byron: He tells you later he investigated this patent, the patent in suit.

Mr. Cuningham: I think I have misled Judge Solomon. I think just the fact that I grabbed the Armstrong patent out of the air; I could have said the Smith patent. I happened to know something about the Armstrong. That's why I said Armstrong.

(Thereupon Court and counsel repaired to open court where the following proceedings were had before the jury:) [732]

The Court: I find out from Mr. Cuningham he has just one question about Armstrong that goes into the general practice of this lawyer, and so I am going to let it in.

(Thereupon the reading of the deposition of J. Darrell Douglass was continued as follows:)

DEPOSITION OF J. DARRELL DOUGLASS

Direct Examination

(Continued)

“Q. Did you consider the question of validity or non-validity? A. No validity.

Q. Just the infringement question?

A. Yes, just the infringement question.

Q. Isn't it a fact that where your investigation

(Deposition of J. Darrell Douglass.)

stops by and large is on the consideration of infringement?

A. No, I wouldn't say they stop there.

Q. Do you think most of them include the issue of patentability or validity?

A. I think that a good many of them are a consideration of whether a device is patentable or whether it is infringed or not.

Q. I am trying to make a distinction, which I do make in my own mind, and I think most patent lawyers do, between issues of validity and issues of infringement. That is not a novel distinction to you, is it? [733]

A. Well, ordinarily if you have a very clear case of infringement you might not necessarily go to the expense of conducting a validity investigation."

"A. Well, I might make sure the record is straight there. It is non-infringement I had in mind.

Q. (By Mr. Cuningham): That makes more sense to me.

So is it or is it not true or have you not found it to be true that in most instances for any client you found it unnecessary to go into the validity of a patent in conducting investigations?

A. I would say that is true.

Q. And to further keep the record straight on that we know what we are talking about, it is perfectly possible to infringe an invalid claim, is it not, in our patent lawyers' parlance?

(Deposition of J. Darrell Douglass.)

A. Well, my understanding of the patent law is that an invalid claim is not a claim and therefore cannot be infringed.

Q. Is that your understanding?

A. That is my understanding of the patent law.

Q. That is how you used that term or the terms 'infringement' and 'validity'?

A. You will have to make yourself clear what you are asking for.

Q. So we can make the record clear, what did you mean by [734] infringement of a patent claim?

A. I mean when a patent claim is infringed if it appears to read upon a structure in question and you can apply it to that structure.

Q. Is that without regard to whether it is patentable over some public use or prior patent?

A. If you had no knowledge of whether the claim was valid then it would be without regard to something you might subsequently find that would indicate that.

Q. We are talking semantics now. Isn't it entirely possible that an invalid claim may be infringed by a structure or device?

Well, then, sir, do you advise the Admiral Corporation with respect to patent marking on their devices under Section 4900 of the Revised Statutes?

A. Yes.

Q. What investigation do you conduct in connection with determining what patents should be marked as covered by a patent claim or the patent claim of the Admiral Corporation?

(Deposition of J. Darrell Douglass.)

A. If there are——

Q. Validity or infringement?

A. Infringement.

Q. You don't consider the question of validity?

A. No.

Q. So that you advise the Admiral Corporation to mark a [735] patent on their device regardless of whether the claim is invalid or not? You make no investigation of that subject matter, is that correct?

A. Well, I am trying to answer the question so as to give you a proper answer. In conjunction with the application of the patent marking to any of the Admiral devices patent numbers that are put on there are those patents which I have examined and compared with the structure and found the claims to read upon the device and which patents are those of a license or one of Admiral's own patents.

Q. Now, Mr. Douglass, will you look at the volume that is on the corner of the desk in front of you, which contains an index which I believe to be complete showing all of the patents owned by the Admiral Corporation, and will you tell us, if you can, which of those patents you have advised marking on the devices of the Admiral Corporation?

Have you checked that volume?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. Can you answer the question as to which patents were marked?

A. None of the patents in that volume were

(Deposition of J. Darrell Douglass.)

marked on any of the refrigerators, to the best of my knowledge.

Q. Now, you have mentioned certain patents that were licensed to Admiral Corporation, the licenses, copies of which we have put into evidence here, required marking in [736] accordance with instructions from the licensor.

Did you also pass on whether those patents should be marked on the Admiral devices? This is in the refrigerator field, by the way.

A. That is right. In recent years I have checked those patents and those labels, but the original labels I did not.

Do you wish these numbers read into the record?

Q. Yes, please."

The Court: What is the purpose of that?

Mr. Cuningham: To show the marking of Admiral Corporation on their refrigerators, your Honor, the patents that they list under which their refrigerators are made.

The Court: Very well; go ahead.

Mr. Byron: You know, your Honor, the purpose of that marking patent numbers on a label, pasting them on a door or having a decalcomania is to give notice that the refrigerator, particularly a refrigerator, is manufactured under one or more patents listed; that is all. It is just notice.

The Court: Are these patents of Admiral patents which Admiral licenses from other companies?

Mr. Cuningham: Yes, your Honor, on which they pay royalties. [737]

(Deposition of J. Darrell Douglass.)

The Court: Read them.

“A. (Reading): 2,101,881; 2,180,493; 2,181,856; 2,191,326; 2,364,038; 2,274,942 and -3; re-21,941; 216,506, 2,228,144; 2,330,915; 2,330,916; 2,336,416; 2,361,792; re-22,214; Canadian 413,512.

These numbers are taken from a label designated 135-A2300.

Q. Is that the form number of the label or is that a model number, or do you know?

A. I believe it is the form number of the label.

Q. Do you know for what model that label was used?

A. I do not.

Q. Do you recall advising with respect to that marking?

A. No, I do not recall.

Q. Well, I call your attention to the fact that the patents licensed from the General Motors, Frigidaire Division, were apparently without exception on that label. Those are the Nash-Kelvinator patents to a man by the name of Phillip.

Do you recall those patents?

A. I recall some patents along that nature, yes.

Q. The rights under those patents channeled from Nash-Kelvinator to the General Motors, Frigidaire Division, to [738] Admiral Corporation under a license agreement dated February 1, 1945, is that correct?

A. I wouldn't know unless I saw the agreement.

Q. You have no recollection of it?

A. I know there is an agreement but I cannot tell you what the date is without looking at it.

(Deposition of J. Darrell Douglass.)

Mr. Cuninghame: What is the date of that particular label, do you know?

The Witness: The label has no date on it.

Mr. Cuninghame: Do you know what date that is, Mr. Byron?

Mr. Byron: I was looking for that. There is no way of telling. I suppose that is when those patents were still in existence, still alive.

Q. (By Mr. Cuninghame): I think it will be convenient if you will check me to supplement the reading of this label, so we won't mark it as an exhibit, by stating it is headed at the top 'Admiral Corporation, Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.' and then the statement introductory to the list of patents appears as follows:

'This refrigerator manufactured under one or more of the following patents.'

Also, at the end of the list is a statement:

'Other patents pending.'

Did you advise in connection with the form of that language, 'one or more of the following [739] patents,' Mr. Douglass?

A. I don't recall whether I dictated that particular language or not.

Q. Well, did you approve that form of language in substance?

A. I doubt very much whether I approved it or not or whether anyone asked for my approval.

Q. Did you advise in substance that just that statement be made in connection with the patent notice? A. Did I?

(Deposition of J. Darrell Douglass.)

Q. Yes. A. I have already said I did not.

Q. That you did or did not? A. Did not.

Q. Would you have advised against it?

A. I don't think I would.

Q. You don't know now whether all of those patents read on the device of the Admiral Corporation to which that notice was affixed, do you?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Did you ever?

A. To the best of my recollection at some time or other I have checked those patents against the refrigerators they were being applied to and came to the conclusion it was proper to put those markings on them. [740]

Q. Now, you mentioned in your testimony, I believe, that it was also part of your duty to advise with respect to licenses from the Admiral Corporation to others. Have you in mind any licenses in the refrigeration field running from Admiral to any others? A. Yes.

Q. What was that license on?

A. That was a license under a gasket patent.

Q. I direct your attention to patent number 2,636,228 in that volume and ask you whether that is the Morton patent under which that license was issued? A. Yes.

Q. Who was licensed or is licensed under that patent?

A. Now, let's see, B. F. Goodrich, Goodyear Tire & Rubber—no, General Tire, Westinghouse. There

(Deposition of J. Darrell Douglass.)

are some others but I don't recall who they are at this time.

Q. Were these others in the tire field or in the refrigeration field, or both?

A. They were in the tire field, and in the case of Westinghouse in the refrigeration field.

Q. Have you licensed Frigidaire or General Electric under this patent? A. No.

Q. Have you attempted to license them?

A. No. [741]

Q. Those licenses have all been issued within the last two years, haven't they? A. Yes.

Q. What in general are the terms of the licenses? They are non-exclusive, I assume?

A. Non-exclusive. Revocable at the will of the licensor, minimum royalty \$200.00 a year, and two and one-half per gasket, with two and one-half per cent per gasket prorated against the \$200.00 minimum.

Q. Now, are there any other licenses in the refrigeration field that you have worked on from Admiral under any of Admiral's patents?

A. No.

Q. You know it to be a fact, do you not, there are no such licenses under any such patent?

A. No, I do not know it to be a fact. You asked me if I knew, and I don't know.

Q. Now, have you had occasion to consider the patent in suit, reissue number 23,058 or its original, number 2,056,165? A. Yes.

(Deposition of J. Darrell Douglass.)

Q. In what connection have you considered that patent?

A. In connection with whether the claims might be infringed.

Q. By any device of Admiral?

A. By any device of Admiral.

Q. Is that the substance of your consideration, or did you [742] go on to the issue of validity?

A. I considered the issue of validity, also.

Q. But you have considered the issue of infringement first? A. Yes.

Q. In connection with your consideration of the issue of validity did you happen to run across the Anderson patent, a copy of which I hand you?"

(Discussion off the record.)

"Q. Did you consider any other patents than this Anderson patent that I have just shown you, in that same connection?

A. I don't recall what patent I considered in connection with this.

Q. Do you recollect there were any others?

A. I don't recall whether there were any others.

Q. You are sure you did consider this Anderson patent, though?

A. To the best of my recollection I did consider the Anderson patent.

Q. Is it your present recollection that is the only prior art patent you considered?

A. I have no recollection—

Q. Did you consider any other prior practices

(Deposition of J. Darrell Douglass.)

or prior uses? I am broadening my question now from prior patents. [743] A. No.

Q. Have you had any experience in the household refrigerator art other than the Admiral Corporation? A. No.

Q. When was the first question of patents in the household refrigerator art submitted to you by the Admiral Corporation, or approximately when?

A. I couldn't answer that question within one year. To the best of my recollection it was about 1947 or '46.

Q. Maybe it will assist you if I direct your attention to the Admiral interrogatory, Exhibit G entitled 'Option Agreement' which is dated on Page 5, January 22, 1944, and is between Stewart-Warner Corporation and Admiral Corporation.

Are you familiar with that transaction evidenced by that agreement?

A. I have seen papers of the general purport of this, but I merely know what they are generally, and it had nothing to do with this proposition at all.

Q. Was your advice sought in connection with this? A. No, it was not.

Q. Was your advice sought in connection with the original or patent in suit against the Stewart-Warner—— A. No.

Q. Not sought by the Admiral Corporation?

A. No.

Q. Was your advice sought in connection with the reissue of that patent? A. Yes.

(Deposition of J. Darrell Douglass.)

Q. When?

A. Sometime after its reissue.

Q. And after the present suit was filed, or do you recall when that was?

A. It was before the present suit was filed.

Q. It was filed in 1951? A. It was before.

Q. How long before 1951 was your advice sought, and I direct your attention to the fact the reissue patent issued December 14, 1948?

A. Before 1951, did you say?

Q. Yes.

A. It was not before 1951, as I recollect.

Q. Was it in 1951? A. I believe so.

Q. Was it in that connection that you considered this prior art you have testified about?

A. The Anderson patent?

Q. Yes.

A. I think I considered the Anderson patent.

Q. I will show you Siragusa Exhibit 7 in this case, and [745] direct your attention to the——”

Mr. Byron: There, your Honor, we are talking about——

Mr. Cuningham: I withdraw that; I withdraw that. That concludes the examination, your Honor.

The Court: Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, we are going to recess in a minute or two until Monday at 1:00 o'clock. There are various things I want to tell you, but before I do I am going to ask Mr. Maguire——

Mr. Maguire: I had mentioned to your Honor yesterday that I want to be excused from this case

until we come back after Thanksgiving. There are matters that have long since been set before Judge McColloch, and we have out-of-town counsel, and I cannot get them put over. I would greatly appreciate, your Honor, if I could be excused until I can dispose of those matters.

The Court: That is perfectly all right, Mr. Maguire. I know you have a case before Judge McColloch and that it is necessary to be there, and if and when you get through with those cases come back into this case.

Mr. Maguire: Thank you, your Honor.

The Court: On the first day and again on other days I told you please do not make up your minds on how this case can be decided until you have heard all of the evidence, the arguments of counsel, and instructions of the Court. [746]

You are just about to take a few days off, and I want to impress that upon you. On various occasions during the taking of the testimony I said, "In my view, this evidence is immaterial," but I let it come in, saying that I would take care of it later. I believe that throughout this case not only on plaintiff's case, presentation of the evidence, but also on the defendants' presentation immaterial matter will come in the evidence. Likewise, there is evidence that was introduced for a particular purpose.

For example, the testimony we have heard today, or much of it given by sales people and sales managers, was introduced for a limited purpose, and you will not know in what connection you may con-

sider this evidence until you have heard my instructions.

At the conclusion of this case, because there will be a number of recesses, I will marshal the evidence for you, and I will point out to you what the principal issues are, some of the evidence that was introduced in connection with such issues, and tell you for what purpose evidence may be considered, and I shall instruct you generally as to the law which governs this case. Until I instruct you as to the law, you will not know what credence or what emphasis or in what regard certain evidence may be considered. [747]

This is a difficult case. It might not be so difficult, but at this time there has been introduced evidence which may not be apparent to you as to the purposes for which it is introduced. I think that when you hear the explanation given to you by Mr. Cuningham or the other attorneys on behalf of Plaintiff and by the attorneys for defendants they will show you the relevance or immateriality of certain evidence that has been introduced, and after they are all through, then I will give you my views as to the subject; but all this is preliminary to the statement I am about to make once again.

Please do not make up your minds as to how this case should be determined until you have heard all the evidence, the arguments of counsel, the instructions of the Court. Do not talk to anyone about this case, even members of your family, and, above all, keep an open mind.

We look forward to seeing you again on Monday

at 1:00 o'clock. Good night and have a good week end.

(Thereupon, at 4.00 p.m., the jury retired for the week-end recess.) [748]

The Court: Is there anything that should go on the record? Mr. Maguire, have you received Exhibit 114 from the defendant?

Mr. Maguire: Yes, your Honor. Is this in? All of them, your Honor.

The Court: Is there anything else that should be considered at this time?

If not, we will adjourn until Monday at 1:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 o'clock p.m. an adjournment was taken until Monday, November 21, 1955, at 1:00 o'clock p.m.) [749]

Monday, November 21, 1955—1:00 P.M.

(Proceedings herein were resumed pursuant to adjournment, as follows:)

The Court: Mr. Cuningham.

Mr. Cuningham: If your Honor please, we would like to vary the pace and have a live witness, if we might.

The Court: Call your witness.

Mr. Cuningham: Mr. Parker. Before doing so may I offer in evidence Plaintiff's Exhibit 19. It is the book of Admiral patents. We offer them all but we have particularly in mind Exhibit 19-S. I guess the cover was marked 19-A.

The Court: Is this the list of exhibits that Mr. Byron prepared or is this the list that you prepared?

Mr. Cuningham: This is on our list as Exhibit 19-A.

The Court: Plaintiff's exhibit?

Mr. Cuningham: Plaintiff's exhibit.

The Court: All right.

Mr. Cuningham: And it goes all the way through each patent, each patent being numbered to——

The Court: Do you have an extra copy?

Mr. Cuningham: ——II, several copies of that particular patent. It's Patent No. 2,586,853. I would be glad to give you a copy now if you want it.

Mr. Byron: All right. [750]

Mr. Cuningham: There are other patents in the book to which we will refer later, but I wanted to call attention to this one. Here is the patent we want to talk about.

Mr. Cheatham: Plaintiff calls Mr. Norman S. Parker as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff.

NORMAN S. PARKER

was produced as a witness in behalf of the Plaintiff and, having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

Direct Examination

By Mr. Cheatham:

Q. Mr. Parker, will you give us your full name, residence, and your present occupation?

A. Norman S. Parker, age 65, residence 215 Lake Street, Evanston, Illinois; occupation, patent lawyer.

Q. With what firm are you connected?

A. I am a partner in the patent law firm of Parker & Carter in Chicago.

Q. Will you tell us, please, how long you have been with that firm?

The Court: Is there any question about Mr. Parker's qualifications as a patent lawyer?

Mr. Byron: None whatsoever. He is a very capable one.

The Court: All right. It is admitted Mr. Parker is a capable patent lawyer and he confines his activities solely [751] to the practice of patent law, is that right, Mr. Parker?

The Witness: Patent law, law relating to patents.

The Court: Copyrights?

The Witness: Copyrights, trade-marks, and unfair competition.

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

Q. (By Mr. Cheatham): Will you give us your education and a little background, please?

The Court: Wait a minute. Unless you want to qualify him, we have a rule in this Court that when the qualifications of a witness are admitted you may not go into his background and other qualifications. Now, I will vary that if you want to, but I want you to know that the defendants will have an opportunity to qualify all their witnesses in great detail. But I have already told the jury that Mr. Parker is an expert and he practices patent law and he confines all the activities to the patent field.

Mr. Cheatham: Yes, your Honor.

Q. What experience have you had in the field of refrigeration, Mr. Parker?

A. I have had several clients in the refrigeration field, and for the last 15 years I have been rather frequently concerned with the filing of patent applications in the refrigeration field and I have been giving opinions on the questions of infringement or noninfringement and also of validity of claims in various patents relating to phases of refrigeration. [752] I still have some clients in the refrigeration field that are very active in our office.

Q. Are you an engineer?

A. I am not an engineer.

Q. Are you a refrigeration engineer?

A. I am certainly not a refrigeration engineer.

The Court: There is no question about Mr. Parker, he can read a patent, is that right?

Mr. Cheatham: Yes, your Honor.

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

Q. Are you familiar with the Reissue Patent No. 23,058, a Bronaugh-Potter patent in this suit?

A. I am familiar with this patent to the extent that I have read the specifications and claims carefully a number of times, and have looked carefully at the drawings.

The Court: One minute. Mr. Parker, I don't have to admonish you, but it's difficult to hear in this room and would you please keep your voice up?

The Witness: Your Honor, I will do the best that I can. I may possibly need a little prompting.

The Court: All right, I will do it for you.

Q. (By Mr. Cheatham): What can you tell us about that patent?

A. The patent describes and shows a domestic refrigerator in which there is a freezing compartment or pair of compartments. Can I—would it help if I referred to the chart?

Mr. Cheatham: Yes, it would. [753]

The Witness: May I step down, your Honor?

The Court: Yes, you may.

The question propounded to Mr. Parker is a pretty broad one. "What do you know about this patent?" I hope he is not going to tell us everything he knows about the patent. I just want the information that is relative to this lawsuit.

The Witness: Yes, your Honor.

(Whereupon, the witness leaves the stand and takes his place in front of a chart elsewhere in the courtroom.)

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

Q. (By Mr. Cheatham): Mr. Parker, will you limit that question to explaining the operation of the device that is illustrated in the patent?

The Court: Would you mind putting that back a little, so then counsel for the defendants won't have to move it.

The Witness: Referring to Exhibit 16-A which is simply a photostatic enlargement of Figures 1 and 2 of the Bronaugh and Potter patent, it shows a domestic refrigerator which is self-enclosed, one unit there is a work compartment 11 in the bottom, at the top there is a moist—a moist cold compartment or a food storage compartment, marked 14, and between the two there is a freezing compartment or two freezing compartments marked 12 and 13.

The mechanism shown in the lower compartment includes a compressor, 15—compressor or a pump which [754] compresses whatever is delivered to it. The compressor is of a rotary type and a motor 16 operates the compressor.

The compressor receives a refrigerant along the duct or pipe 26 which you can see running across the bottom of the compartment. That pipe 26 delivers a refrigerant which at that stage has been evaporated and is, you might say, a gap or evaporator, and that evaporator is compressed by the compressor and is delivered along another pipe which is not numbered but which is shown to a condenser 18.

Now, the condenser 18 is a condenser in which

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

the heat is taken out of this compressor, hot gas, so that it becomes a liquid and the heat from that gas is—can be dissipated into the room or taken off somewhere else; at least it's not any longer in the refrigerator. So what leaves the condenser 18 is a liquid which flows to a receiver 17, which is simply a container which receives the freezer and then the liquid refrigerant travels up a pipe 24 and eventually comes to a device marked 23.

Now, this gadget 23 is a pressure reduction valve, and when the refrigerant passes through that valve it gets out of the so-called high side of this system where it's under heavy compression—heavy pressure—and passes to the low side. It's a characteristic of volatile refrigerants such as are used in the industry, such, for example, as Freon 12 that when the temperature—or, rather, when the pressure is [755] allowed to drop sharply the refrigerant turns from a liquid to a gas or vapor—it evaporates, in other words, and an evaporating liquid is able to absorb a great deal of heat.

So when the evaporating liquid which passes the reduction valve 23 flows into the first coil section 22, shown in the one side of the freezing compartment, the freezing compartment proper 12, where ice is frozen, there the refrigerant evaporates or boils, you might say, and it takes a great deal of heat out of the area surrounding it, and that is why that—the temperature there remains at a very substantially below freezing temperature.

The refrigerant takes this heat by its evapora-

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

tion. It is characteristic of the teachings of the Bronaugh-Potter patent that not all of the liquid refrigerant is evaporated in the first coil. A certain amount of the refrigerant still in liquid form passes up through the continuation of the pipe 24 into an upper coil structure in the upper compartment 14. There what is left of the liquid refrigerant evaporates and absorbs heat from that compartment. The particular evaporator used is indicated at 25 at the right-hand—right upper right-hand corner of Figure 2. You will see that this member called 25 has a square or rectangular—I should say a rectangular surface which, in my opinion, represents a fin and would represent a fin to anyone, any engineer, anyone qualified in this art or anyone who is used to reading [756] refrigeration patents.

And in that fin you will see crossing over to the two double lines which are ducts—represent ducts or pipes—they are part of this same pipe system. So the refrigerant winds back and forth through this finned coil system and then returns down through a pipe marked 26, which is shown in both of these figures, and that is the pipe which returns the now completely evaporated refrigerant to the compressor for further compression and use.

In other words, this volatile refrigerant travels again and again and again through this cycle, it goes up through the coils in the two compartments as it evaporates, takes heat out of those compartments and it returns that heat to the compressor and the compressor compresses the refrigerant and

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

the refrigerant then runs through a condenser and in the condenser normally air is used which flows through whatever fins or surfaces are used in the condenser and the air as it exchanges—takes up the heat from the hot gas, and when the heat is taken out of the hot gas and dissipated to the atmosphere, why, then, the hot gas resumes its liquid condition, although it is still under high pressure and it is ready for another trip through the coils.

It is characteristic of the Bronaugh and Potter patent, so says the patent, that a substantially below freezing temperature is maintained in the compartment 12 and in the compartment 13. [757]

You will notice that the coil 22 flows through a member here indicated as a square which, if my memory is correct, is described in the patent as a brine tank. I believe the number 21 was applied to the brine tank. The wall 21 of the brine tank, since the brine in that tank has been thoroughly cooled by the refrigerant, serves as a means for maintaining the storage compartment 13 at a substantially below freezing temperature. So you can freeze your ice in 12, let us say, and store your frozen food in 13.

Now, the refrigerant which travels to the finned coil or expander or evaporator 25 is delivered under conditions, so the patent teaches, which will not raise the temperature of that expander—or it will not lower it, I should say—lower it enough to cause frosting on the evaporator in the upper compartment.

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

The patent makes an exception that there may be a slight touch of frosting at the inlet end.

Now, there is the result and the purpose, as expressed in the patent, of having a nonfrosting coil, is that moisture is therefore not taken out of the food by the frosting action. In a domestic refrigerator of the earlier type where a coil is used to take heat out of the interior of the refrigerator and where that coil builds up a thick layer of frost, that frost is simply frozen moisture and the frozen moisture on that coil comes first into some small degree from the air [758] in the compartment, if there is high humidity, but it comes primarily from the food.

In other words, when you see a thoroughly frosted coil with a heavy layer of frozen moisture on it, you may assume that a very substantial proportion of that moisture is moisture which started in the food put in that storage compartment, and which has been taken out and deposited on the coil.

What Bronaugh and Potter teach is that a non-frosting evaporator or an evaporator is to be used which does not accumulate frost and therefore the temperature—the load temperature relatively low but above freezing temperature of the upper compartment is maintained by a coil which is cool enough or an expander—an expander structure in this instance, a finned coil, which is cool enough to take the necessary amount of heat out of that compartment, but which is still not cold enough to

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

freeze the moisture from that compartment and from the food in that compartment, and therefore there is a substantially necessary drying-out of the food, so Bronaugh and Potter taught in their patent. [759]

The upper compartment is surrounded by an insulating wall marked as 41 and with the door 34. The lower compartment has a layer of insulation, 38 and 39, and the door 35. You will notice that the thickness of the insulation in the door 35 and the wall 38 and the bottom 39 is substantially greater than the thickness of the wall of insulation of the wall 41 of the upper compartment. I am now pointing to Figures 1 and 2 of this Exhibit 16-A, and the same is true for the upper wall and is numbered 41 at the top of both figures, and there is a wall between the upper compartment which is not as thick as the outside walls of the lower compartment.

Of course, it should be understood that insulation is not a positive bar against the passage of heat. It is only an impedance, but the thicker you make the insulation, assuming that the insulation is the same type, the greater is the resistance to the passage of heat through it. Of course, you could get that result by having different insulating substances, but here shown in Bronaugh and Potter is a differential thickness of insulation.

Now, Bronaugh and Potter in order to control by a single control system the heat or the coolness of both compartments provided a thermostat which

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

is shown at 31 at the upper right-hand corner of Figure 1 and also at the upper right-hand corner of Figure 2. The details of the thermostat [760] are, of course, not important and are now shown in this patent, but the thermostat or whatever member is used responds to temperature increases in the upper compartment, and when the temperature increase in the upper compartment, which is the warmer or moist cold compartment, reaches a temperature at which the thermostat is set, then the thermostat closes a switch or otherwise connects a circuit to the motor 16, and the compressor begins to cycle, begins to pull back evaporant, refrigerant, and to deliver again liquid refrigerant for evaporation in the coils.

So long as the thermostat still calls for evaporation, in other words, as long as the need for heating compensation or cooling of the upper compartment still continues, why, the thermostat leaves the motor circuit open. Finally when the temperature falls to whatever the setting of the thermostat is in the upper compartment, then the motor ceases to drive the compressor, and the delivery of refrigerant for evaporation in the lower as well as the upper compartment is virtually terminated.

The idea of Bronaugh and Potter was that they preferred to make the response to need for refrigeration to be that of the upper compartment, and by having an insulation made somewhat thinner or less resistant to the passage of temperature in the upper compartment they insured—so they said in

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

their patent—that the thermostat would [761] cycle often enough not merely to keep the upper compartment at the desired temperature but to insure that the lower compartment, the refrigerating, the freezing and refrigerating compartments 12 and 13, would be kept at a temperature adequately below freezing. Bronaugh and Potter in their patent made some statements which indicate what their purpose was, and I think it might be well to read them.

Reading from Column 1, Page 1, starting with Line 4:

“The main object of this invention is the design of a refrigerator which will make it possible at one and the same time to over again or in short periods of time to perform several highly desirable tasks, namely, to form ice or freeze desserts quickly; to provide cold storage for frozen meats and food-stuffs, and to provide storage for food at temperatures above freezing.”

The quotation ends with the end of Line 11.

Then in Lines 15 to 19:

“The third object is the construction of a refrigerator which is not a compromise between a quick-freezing refrigerator and one which is ideal for food storing, but which will possess both of these parties (sic) in maximum quantities.

The Court: “Properties.” [762]

The Witness: “* * * both of these properties in maximum quantities.” Did I misread that?

The Court: I thought you said “parties.”

The Witness: Properties.

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

“The fourth object is to provide a refrigerator having its heat-pumping action—this is Lines 20 to 25—controllable by food compartment temperatures and in which the efficiency of the freezing unit will be increased as the rate of heat pumping from the food department (it says here, meaning ‘compartment’ no doubt) increases.”

“The seventh object”—this is Lines 36 to 38—
“The seventh object is to eliminate completely all defrosting and objectionable drying-out of the foods.”

Again starting in Line 3 and Column 2 on the first page, the patentees pointed out the problem which they were solving:

“Again, there are, generally speaking, two classes of food which are put into a refrigerator (first, food requiring merely to be kept cool—that is, above freezing, and in most cases having a relatively high rate of evaporation. Second, food having a relatively low rate of evaporation and which should be maintained at temperatures well [763] below freezing. In addition to this, comes the ever-increasing demand for the ability to form ice and freeze desserts quickly.”

The patentees again later in the patent after having described and shown their structure, have this breakdown or analysis of what they did. This is starting with Line 53 of Page—of Column 5. It is on the third page.

“From the foregoing it will be seen that there is provided a refrigerator having a non-frosting

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

food storage compartment in which food may be held at desirable temperatures without undue evaporation. Secondly, that quick-freezing for ice and desserts is ever available. Thirdly, that there is provided uninterrupted cold storage at freezing temperatures, and, lastly, that the necessity for regulating the control system is entirely eliminated since a wide range of temperatures is provided simultaneously, and, further, that not only is the necessity for defrosting eliminated entirely, but also the evaporation of the foodstuffs is reduced to a minimum.”

That ends the quotes at Line 66.

Then starting on Line 73——

The Court: Are you through with the black-board or the [764] diagram, Mr. Parker? If you want to sit down, you may.

The Witness: If I am asked questions on the claim, I will have to go back to that for the claim.

The Court: I thought I would make it a little more convenient for you.

The Witness: I am delighted.

Starting in Column 3, Line 73, and running through Column 4, Line 5:

“In other words, there is no objectionable frosting in the cold storage compartment, for the reason above stated, and no frosting in the cooling compartment since the temperatures maintained there is above freezing. There may, of course, occur a slight amount of frosting where the cooling coil 25 enters the compartment 25.”

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

Q. (By Mr. Cheatham): What is there at the end of the patent, Mr. Parker?

A. Following the description are, of course, the claims.

Q. And following that?

A. And following that is a list of the patents which were cited against the application upon which this reissue patent issued.

Q. Does that include Anderson patent 1,439,051, Anderson?

A. The fourth patent listed there is Patent 1,439,051, Anderson, dated December 19, 1922. [765]

Q. Are you acquainted with the refrigerators which were manufactured by the Potter Refrigerator Corporation?

A. Yes, I have seen several of them.

Q. Would you describe such a refrigerator, referring to any exhibit in this Court which you see?

The Court: I would like to find out the relevancy of having him describe a refrigerator rather than the patent. As I understand it, the claim here is that Admiral and Amana infringed the patent. What difference would it make if they—what is the relevancy of describing the box itself if the box itself complies strictly with the claims of the patent?

Mr. Cheatham: These are three-dimensional exhibits illustrating what the patent teaches.

The Court: I see there is no objection to it, anyway. Proceed.

The Witness: There are three refrigerators in this room which seem to be Potter refrigerators,

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

and taking the one at the left of this group as I look at it, it is marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 11-B. It follows quite closely the drawing of the Bronaugh and Potter Reissue Patent 23058.

In the bottom compartment, however, where the compressor and the condenser and the motor were shown in the figures of the patent there is nothing there. In other words, whatever compressor-condenser unit was used has [766] been removed. However, in the intermediate compartment is a case which looks like, and I believe is, a brine compartment, and it has no insulation between its side and the compartment to the left. In other words, in my opinion, you have here the equivalent of the brine compartment of the Bronaugh-Potter patent and the equivalent of the cold storage chamber which is cooled by the side of the brine compartment. In the upper compartment there is a thermostat, rather, it is called in this particular instance a time-o-stat. I haven't checked that, but I am sure that that is a heat-responsive control responsive to the temperature in the separate compartment. You will notice that the compartment has shelves which are made of openwork rods so that air can circulate through them. In the back of the compartment is a piece of sheetmetal which is shaped and proportioned just about as the front baffle is in Figures 1 and 2 of the patent. If you will look at Figure 2 (referring to diagram) there is a wall which comes down vertically along the finned coil 25 and that at a level below that coil it runs sideways to an in-

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

clined section and then terminates in a vertical section, and a little gutter. That gutter edge runs across and terminates in a little downspout 29 which is shown as directly above a container 30 which looks like, and I am sure it is, a conventional milk bottle. In other words, when any moisture condensed on the finned coil it drops into [767] the gutter 28 and flows to whatever container you use.

Now, this wall, you will see, is open at the top and supported by a couple of brackets so that air can circulate above the upper edge and around the lower edge, and, of course, about the end because the ends do not seal up against anything, and that is precisely the way this shield is shown in this Potter refrigerator. It is supported by two brackets just as in the patent drawing. It has a little downspout at the left end, and there does not happen to be a milk bottle there or anything, but that could be put there, and it is open at the top, and as you see from my hand, it is open at the bottom. It is open at the ends so that air can circulate in through the rear space, and running above the top of it are the series of fins. Those are vertical fins. I would say there are about 30 of them. They are fairly closely spaced, and they come down within, say, an inch of the bottom, but I can feel with my finger although I cannot show them to you. So, in other words, you have here everything as I have described in the Bronaugh and Potter patent except the cycling liquefying unit in the bottom, and, of course, we cannot see the ducts which deliver the

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

refrigerant to the coils. It is my opinion that the ducts that are hiding in that patent are substantially the same as shown in the patent office drawing, particularly as the patent office drawings show quite a [768] resemblance to this machine in the general proportions, as so forth.

Now, this second box, Plaintiff's Exhibit 11-A, is marked a Potter box, and it looks very much as if the patent office drawings had been made from it. I do not know that from my own information. I simply get the impression from looking at it that the resemblances between this box and the patent office drawings are so close that it would be more than a coincidence if the patent office draftsmen had gotten that result without seeing this box.

The box again has a motor and the compressor in the bottom compartment. There is a brine tank in the second compartment, and you will notice that the number of shelf space or spaces for making ice is the same as in Figure 1 of the Bronaugh-Potter patent and that the upper right-hand corner, you have a generally square opening. Below that are two oblong openings, and along the left side of the brine tank are four openings, and the proportions are about as shown in the patent office drawing.

Again, you have the metal shield which is proportioned just as described, or substantially as described, in connection with the first Potter box I discussed, so we have in this structure, except for the fact that we cannot [769] trace the ducts, the

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

pipe, we have then what is general in the patent, and you will notice here is the differential insulation since the insulation of the bottom compartment clearly is thicker than the top compartment, and the insulation at the door is clearly thicker than in the top door. [770]

That is also true of the Plaintiff's Exhibit 11-B which I discussed before. Now, there is a later type of Potter refrigerator which is marked Defendants' 116.

Mr. Cheatham: That's correct.

The Witness: This is a somewhat more finished looking job. I do not see in it the thermostat. It doesn't happen to be evident. But in the back of the upper compartment is, again, the metal baffle which is open at the top and which is open below and which has a gutter across the bottom. By feeling in back of it I feel a row of fins. I counted them the other day in the courtroom and, if my memory is correct, there are 60 of these fins. They are more numerous and somewhat smaller, of somewhat less area, than those in the first two boxes that I testified about.

I won't try to take this apart, but I don't believe there will be any dispute but that in the lower compartment there is a—some means for cycling the refrigerant through whatever coils are used in this particular box.

Now, this box differs in proportions and size and finish from the other boxes, but here, again, you see that there is a thicker insulation or thicker

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

walls, anyway, about the middle or freezing compartment than there is about the upper or moist cold compartment.

Q. (By Mr. Cheatham): Mr. Parker, with respect to Claim 2 of the Potter and Bronaugh Reissue Patent 23,058, do you find [771] in the structures of the Potter refrigerators, with particular reference to Plaintiff's Exhibit 11-B, a household refrigerator which in normal operation provides above freezing moist cold air for preserving in a refrigerated condition foods susceptible to moisture loss by evaporation and below freezing dry cold air and a dry cold surface for preserving foods in a frozen condition?

A. Yes; that's the way that exhibit operates.

Q. Do you find in that construction, said refrigerator—and I quote:

“Said refrigerator comprising a cabinet having a cooling compartment and a freezing compartment”?

A. The cooling compartment is the upper compartment of that exhibit and the freezing compartment is the lower.

Q. Do you find “thermal insulation around said compartments thermally insulating said compartments from each other and from the outside atmosphere”?

A. Yes. I am sure there will be no dispute but that the compartments are surrounded by insulated walls and are separated from each other by an insulated or insulating wall.

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

Q. Do you find in that structure “a cooling refrigerant expander having heat-conducting surfaces within said cooling compartment and constructed and arranged to maintain its heat-conducting surfaces at a temperature above 32 degrees F. while withdrawing heat from said compartment, whereby air in said [772] cooling compartment is cooled thereby to a temperature above 32 degrees F. and is maintained at a humidity whose relative value is at least 100 per cent at 32 degrees Fahrenheit”?

A. Yes. The finned coil which I described in the upper compartment responds precisely to that description.

Q. Do you find in that structure “a freezing refrigerant expander having heat-conducting surfaces within said freezing compartment and constructed and arranged to maintain its heat-conducting surfaces at a temperature well below 32 degrees F. while withdrawing heat from said compartment whereby air in said freezing compartment is cooled thereby to a temperature well below 32 degrees F.”?

A. Yes. The coil in the brine tank in the lower of the two storage compartments responds precisely to that description.

Q. Do you find that there is in that structure “volatile refrigerant in said expanders”?

A. Of course, there may not be at the moment a volatile refrigerant in the expanders, but it is clear from the device that it will work with and was intended to work with a volatile refrigerant in

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

the expanders. I have seen such a Potter case in the past operate with a volatile refrigerant in its expanders.

Q. Do you find in that structure “a single liquefying unit associated with said expanders and constructed and arranged to condense refrigerant expanded by heat extracted from both said compartments”?

A. Yes. That is a proper description of the compressor condenser unit which was in the bottom of Exhibit 11-B, and is now in the bottom of it.

Q. 11-A?

A. 11-A. And also the third Potter box which I described.

Q. Do you in that structure find that “the volatile refrigerant circulating through said expanders being the sole heat-extracting medium”?

A. Yes. It is the sole heat-extracting medium in that unit.

Q. Do you find in that structure “a thermostat responsive to the temperature in one of said compartments controlling the operation of said liquefying unit”?

A. The thermostat or its equivalent is shown in the upper compartment of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 11-A and 11-B. I didn’t spot the thermostat in the third box but I am sure that there is one there.

Q. Mr. Parker, how does Claim 1 differ from Claim 2 of the Reissue Patent 23,058?

A. Well, Claim 1 has the—all of the features or limitations of Claim 2, if my memory is correct, but it calls also for air in the freezing compartment

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

having a temperature well below 32 degrees Fahrenheit, and it also calls for air in the cooling compartment having a substantially stable temperature of about 40 degrees Fahrenheit and having a humidity whose relative value is at least 100 per cent at 32 degrees Fahrenheit. [774]

Q. Do you find that the structures, Plaintiff's Exhibits 11-A and 11-B, include those elements?

A. Yes. When the structures of 11-A and 11-B are operated the operation of the freezing expander or evaporator to maintain a less—below freezing temperature that the cold storage or the lower compartment will have—will maintain a body of cold air in the freezing compartment having a temperature well below 32 degrees Fahrenheit. The operation or, rather, the maintenance or the use of the finned coil in the upper compartment of the two exhibits or of any of the Potter boxes with the surface of the finned coil at above 32 degrees Fahrenheit in the use of those boxes maintains an air temperature in the box—in the moist cold compartment of above freezing and, of course, the temperature of 40 degrees Fahrenheit is within the ordinary range of use for—you can adjust the box to get 40 degrees or below 40 degrees or above 40 degrees, but 40 degrees is a typical temperature.

If the air is maintained at 40 degrees or anywhere around 40 degrees by the use of a non-frosting coil or surface which is kept adequately cold but without the formation of frost, and assuming a temperature of 40 degrees, the ratio of moisture

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

or the proportion of moisture in the box of 40 degrees will be such that if the air was cooled to 30 degrees Fahrenheit it would have a relative humidity of at least 100 per cent. [775]

Q. Mr. Parker, how does Claim 4 differ from Claim 2 of the Reissue Patent 23,058?

A. Well, Claim 4 adds—has most of the limitations of Claim 2, practically all of them, but it specifies, which is an additional feature, that the thermal insulation around the cooling compartment offers less resistance to flow of heat thereto from the outside atmosphere than does the thermal insulation of the freezing compartment. And as the patentee says it,

“To insure starting of said liquefying unit by heat flow into said cooling compartment during an off-cycle of said liquefying unit before the temperature in said freezing compartment approaches a non-freezing value.”

The patent, or rather the claim, also calls for a thermostat responsive to the temperature in said cooling compartment.

Q. Do I understand you that those limitations are not present in Claim 2 of the patent?

A. No, they are not present in Claim 2.

Q. Are they present in Claim 1 of the patent?

A. Yes, they are present in Claim 1, but Claim 1 adds again that language which I have read about the maintenance of air in it.

Q. Don't you mean Claim 3? Can I get that

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

question again? Would you read the question? [776]

(Last question read.)

The Witness: That's right.

Q. (By Mr. Cheatham): All right. How does Claim 3 differ from Claim 4 of the patent?

A. Well, Claim 3 also has the thermal insulation language which I read and also calls for a thermostat responsive to the temperature in the cooling compartment to control the on and off cycles of the liquefying unit.

Q. Mr. Parker, in what claims are air in the cooling compartment and air in the freezing compartment specified?

A. That limitation or that characteristic or feature is described in Claim 1 and again in Claim 3.

Q. Is it in Claim 2?

A. It is not in Claim 2.

Q. Is it in Claim 4? A. No.

Q. Now, with respect to the language from Claim 3 and Claim 4—I now quote:

“And the thermal insulation around said cooling compartment offering less resistance to flow of heat thereto from the outside atmosphere than does the thermal insulation of the freezing compartment to insure starting of said liquefying unit by heat flow into said cooling compartment during an off cycle of said liquefying unit before the temperature in said [777]

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

freezing compartment approaches a non-freezing value." Is that language clear to you?

A. Yes, it seems clear to me.

Mr. Cheatham: I ask the clerk to hand Mr. Parker Exhibit 4-CC-2.

The Court: Is that Morton?

Mr. Cheatham: No, sir. That is Admiral.

Mr. Cuninghame: I think, your Honor, they are the exhibits next to the Admiral answers to interrogatories.

(Whereupon, the said document was handed to the witness.)

Q. (By Mr. Cheatham): Are you familiar with that Exhibit 4-CC-2? A. 4-CC-2. Yes.

Q. What is it?

A. Well, 4-CC-2 is Admiral Service Manual No. S-410. It's the one you have in your left hand for Models 1090, 1390 and 1191 Dual-Temp refrigerators.

Q. Are there other similar manuals there and will you describe them?

A. In the exhibits—in the group of exhibits before me I find also Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-CC-3, which is a service manual. It says on its cover "Admiral Dual-Temp Refrigerator Models TK-746, TK-946, 758, 957, 958." In other words, five models.

Mr. Cheatham: Would you continue, please?

A. Then I find Exhibit—Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-CC-4 which is service data No. ST-505-1 for 1953

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

models 11C15, 12C15, 12C15-A Dual-Temp refrigerators. Then there is Service Manual Supplemental S462 which is marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-CC-5. That is for Models 1192 and 1192W Dual-Temp refrigerators.

Then there is Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-CC-6, Admiral Refrigerator Service Manual Supplement for Model 959 Dual-Temp. [779]

The Court: How long will it take you to go through these various things with reference to a comparison between the patent and the accused structure?

Mr. Cheatham: We are going into the accused structure now. It may take an hour, might take less; it might take a little longer.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Court: Proceed.

Q. (By Mr. Cheatham): What do these manuals purport to do?

A. Well, these appear to be service manuals for Admiral personnel or salesmen or people selling or servicing Admirals, I assume servicing Admirals. It is their guide and help in understanding the Admiral structures, primarily, I think, in order to service them.

Q. Are you familiar with the patent for Morton 2,586,853, Plaintiff's Exhibit 19-S?

A. Yes, I have read this patent with some care.

Mr. Byron: May it please the Court, that, as I understand it, is a copy of a patent which is owned

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

by Admiral, and that patent, 2,583,853, is not in issue in this case at all. Now, the question is: Is there a claim in the patent in suit which is infringed by the accused structure, and if there is such a claim is it valid. Now what has that to do with a patent that is issued to Admiral Corporation?

Mr. Cheatham: Your Honor, it will help the Court and [780] jury to understand the operation of the accused devices. It is a patent on the accused device.

Mr. Byron: I do not know that that is true. I do not know if all the details of the accused devices here in Court are the same as the details in this patent. It is a long ways around—here we have the accused devices, the physical devices, and here we have a description of the accused devices. Why can't they go to the description rather than these service manuals and attempt to prove infringement?

Mr. Cheatham: Your Honor, the patent will be used for its admissions against interest.

The Court: The patent will be used as an admission against interest?

Mr. Cheatham: It will be used as an admission against interests of the defendant which are shown therein.

The Court: Is it your contention that the patent office made a mistake when they issued this later patent?

Mr. Cheatham: No, sir; I contend that it will

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

explain the workings of the exhibits which are in front of the bench here and show how the claims of the patent in suit, Bronaugh and Potter Reissue 23,058, read squarely on the accused structures.

Mr. Byron: They may or may not. The accused structures as shown in this Court may not be identical in every detail with the disclosures of this patent, Morton's patent. Here [781] are the devices. Let them go by the devices.

Mr. Cuningham: If your Honor please, we will connect this up at a later period with the Admiral infringing structure.

Mr. Byron: Alleged infringing structure.

Mr. Cuningham: Alleged infringing structure. It does contain, as Mr. Cheatham says, the explanation of how that operates and contains admissions that are material to our proof of infringement. It is merely for that purpose that we offer it. It is a later patent, but the testimony in the case is that this is the main patent owned by the Admiral Corporation and illustrating the structure that is accused.

Mr. Byron: That is in the Morton deposition. It has not yet been read.

Mr. Cuningham: It will be connected.

Mr. Byron: Same objections.

The Court: I am going to permit it in. Objection overruled.

Mr. Cheatham: I would like to introduce at this time Plaintiff's Exhibit 8-A—8-A-1, which is a

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

large blow-up of Plaintiff's Exhibit 8-A, both of which have been marked.

Q. Mr. Parker, you might describe for us what Exhibit 8-A-1 illustrates.

The Witness: Exhibit 8-A-1 illustrates diagrammatically an example of the Admiral two-temperature refrigerator, and [782] it shows somewhat diagrammatically a good deal of the mechanism in slightly different form shown in Defendants' Exhibit 117-A and Defendants' Exhibit 117 which are, I understand, parts of an Admiral Dual-Temp refrigerator, the particular parts where the volatile refrigerant is used to take heat out of the two storage compartments of the Admiral Dual-Temp refrigerator.

The Court: Is that right, Mr. Byron; is that what they represent? These are your exhibits.

Mr. Byron: Yes—No, they are exhibits of the other side.

The Court: I mean the actual structures here.

Mr. Byron: That is correct; that is correct, taken from them.

Q. (By Mr. Cheatham): From what was the drawing, Plaintiff's Exhibit 8-A-1, made?

The Witness: At Page 4 of Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-CC-3, the Admiral service manual for Models TD746 and 946, 758, 957 and 958, there is a cut, Figure 1, and a cut, Figure 2. The Plaintiff's Exhibit 8-A-1 was made from a blow-up of those two cuts, but it is actually produced by a draftsman following the blowup. In other words, the lining

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

on the Exhibit 8-A-1 would not be the same as that on the cuts, Figure 1 and Figure 2 of Page 4 of Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-CC-3, but, in my opinion, the draftsman has carefully and accurately [783] followed the disclosures so that the disclosure of the arrangement of ducts and the relation of ducts or pipes, tubes, coils, to the two compartments is correct as shown, that is, in the Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-CC-3.

Mr. Cheatham: I offer Exhibit 8-3 as—I wish to explain that Exhibit 8-A-1 might be marked by the witness.

The Court: I do not know what you are talking about 8-A might be marked by the witness?

Mr. Cheatham: During the course of his explanation 8-A-1 might have a legend put on it by the witness.

The Court: Any objection?

Mr. Byron: None whatever.

The Court: It may be admitted.

(Drawing previously referred to and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 8-A-1 for Identification, was received in evidence.)

The Court: How about Exhibit 9-A-1?

Mr. Cheatham: We offer Exhibit 9-A which is a small showing of that same large 9-A-1.

The Court: Show it to Mr. Byron. Any objection?

Mr. Byron: No objection.

The Court: It may be admitted.

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

(Drawing previously referred to and marked Plaintiff's Exhibit 9-A for Identification, was received in evidence.) [784]

Q. (By Mr. Cheatham): Mr. Parker, referring to Exhibit 9-A-1, can you explain what the exhibit shows?

Mr. Byron: Of course, in admitting this we are being willing to admit it with the understanding we do not agree with all these legends that they put on here. We are agreeing that they properly show a figure of the reissue patent in suit and properly illustrate the Admiral accused device, but the legends we do not agree to because we know they are inaccurate in part.

Mr. Cunningham: We understand, your Honor, we did not expect them to agree, but they do illustrate that position that plaintiff will take.

The Court: All right.

The Witness: May I have that question?

Mr. Cheatham: I asked that the witness explain what the chart purports to show.

The Court: Which one?

Mr. Cheatham: Exhibit 9-A-1.

The Court: Proceed, Mr. Parker.

The Witness: At the right, upper right corner of Exhibit 9-A-1 is a chart or photostatic showing of the Figure 1 of the Bronaugh-Potter Reissue 23,058, the patent in suit. At the upper left corner is a blow-up made from a showing on the cover of the Admiral Dual-Temp refrigerator service man-

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

ual, Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-CC-3, and the language [785] in between is the identification of the corresponding parts, and, of course, that was added and constitutes an expression of position taken by myself.

The Court: That is your opinion?

The Witness: That is my opinion.

The Court: Very well; and Mr. Parker is an expert and has a right to express his opinion. That is the exception about which I told you last week, Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury.

Q. (By Mr. Cheatham): Mr. Parker, referring to any of these service manuals, the charts 8-A-1 and 9-A-1, the patent 2,586,853, the physical exhibits including defendants', please explain the operation of the Admiral refrigerator, and you may mark as you go along on Exhibit 8-A-1 any item which may occur to you which may aid the Court and jury to understand the device.

The Witness: I would like to consider first the relation of Plaintiff's Exhibit 8-A-1 to the physical exhibits, 117-A and 117. The physical exhibits represent parts taken out of the Admiral box in the courtroom marked Exhibit 10-A. Exhibit 117-A, which I am touching with my pointer, includes what I believe is a sub-assembly. Part or all of it can be taken out of the machine at once, although that is of no importance in relation to what I am discussing. I think I had better turn it half around. [786]

(Witness turns exhibits.)

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

In Exhibit 117-A, the upper part is a sleeve or liner which is part of the freezing compartment. In other words, the interior of this structure receives, stores food and freezes ice and whatever is in this, within this metal sleeve or liner here is kept at a below-freezing temperature. The way that it is kept at a below-freezing temperature is by circulating a volatile refrigerant through a system of tubes or a coil or a duct or whatever you want to call it, which extends about that freezing structure. [787]

The volatile refrigerant is delivered from a compressor—motor compressor unit which is hermetically sealed. Inside of this casing there is a motor which rotates a compressor and the refrigerant which has already been evaporated and which is therefore a gas flows from its upper coil of this upper sleeve down what appears to be a copper tube which delivers to this hermetic container. And those are usually built, and I am sure this is, the evaporated refrigerant flows to the suction or intake or low-pressure side of a rotary compressor and is there compressed into a hot gas. It's still a gas but it is under heavy compression. That gas flows from the—from the pressure side of the compressor to a finned structure which has a condenser.

Of course, there are a wide variety of condensers. You are familiar, naturally, with the type of finned condenser which you see in your automobile radiator and which has been known these many decades. This differs somewhat in detail, but it has the same characteristics; that is, that a fluid passes

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

through some kind of a duct or line or pipe in heat-conducting relation to an enlarged surface.

In other words, the duct which carries the refrigerant to be cooled in this instance is absorbed with a large heat transfer area of fin or plate or the like, and as air passes across or through or around that structure the air of the housing, for example, in an ordinary domestic refrigerator, [788] takes heat out of that hot compressed gas and as the heat is removed the gas returns to a liquid condition, and the liquid is delivered from the opposite end of the condenser, as I think you can see here.

There is a relatively large-gauge copper pipe, although still smaller than the pipe that runs to the compressor, which delivers the refrigerant, the hot gas, to the intake end of this condenser from the outlet of the condenser. The refrigerant flows through a very thin tube which is called a capillary. It's called a capillary because it is a tube of air-like thinness. Capilla, I believe, is the Latin for air. So the capillary tube still maintains, because of its very small bore, still maintains the high pressure in the system. Then as the liquid—as the now liquefied refrigerant is delivered from the capillary tube it is allowed to expand, and as it expands it begins to evaporate, and as it evaporates it begins to take heat away from anything which is near it or around it or in relation to it.

In this instance the capillary tube comes to a point where my finger is, which is on a—which is

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

just in front of a rectangular plate, about which I will have something to say later.

This plate is described in the Admiral Dual-Temp Service Manual, Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-CC-3, as a transfer plate. This I can call a primary system, the primary system [789] of the Admiral machine—this is a primary plate.

On this primary transfer plate there is a duct of intermediate bore. In other words, it hasn't got the same capacity as the duct which I am pointing at with my pointer, but it still is considerably larger in bore or in capacity than the capillary, and so some boiling or evaporation of the refrigerant starts.

Now, this thinner-gauge tube runs along that contact plate, the primary contact plate, for a distance of, on the order of, I would say, three or four inches. Then it bends over another couple of tubes and contacts, then it comes back to the plate and contacts it again, and then it runs downwardly to a considerably larger tube.

Clearly, when this thinner tube delivers a refrigerant to the larger tube, then there is a drop of pressure and an increase in the evaporation. This larger tube has an upward component or upward part which runs, as you are looking at the back of this device, upwardly and to the left, and then it takes a turn and passes what we will call later a restrictor valve, and if that valve is open to let the flow through, the refrigerant will flow along the lower edge of the primary transfer plate for a few

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

inches, and then it runs into a branch or a take-off toward the right-hand end, and somewhat below the edge of the primary transfer plate.

It bends across, although out of contact, with the [790] primary transfer plate and loops around until it starts—becomes merged with or attached to or starts to deliver refrigerant to a coil—a flat coil, which is bent back and forth around the sleeve or liner at the top of this exhibit, which I have told you already is part of the freezing compartment. Then after it has finished its looping about the liner it runs back to the compressor.

Now, there is an alternative path which can be taken by this refrigerant. Assume that is impossible for the refrigerant to flow directly in the path I have just described: it runs down to the right and then down to a bend of tube close to the top of the condenser and comes back up to and is fastened to the primary transfer plate and moves back and forth on that primary transfer plate before eventually coming back to the take-off which I just described. In other words, depending upon the actuation of a little valve, the refrigerant which is delivered from the capillary tube, which in this instance is the means for getting the temperature—maintaining the pressure, rather, until the pressure drop takes place, the refrigerant can, when the valve is in one position, escape or get—reach the freezing compartment with only a less heat-conductive relation to the primary plate—contact plate—whereas if the valve is in another position it winds

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

back and forth across the heat transfer plate with a maximum heat exchange. [791]

Of course, you understood that a wide variety of valves may be used or circuits. I mean, whether that little valve is set to direct the refrigerant directly to the freezing chamber when it's open or when it's closed is a matter of choice. I believe, if I understand this correctly, that when the valve to which I am pointing is closed then the refrigerant has to flow across the transfer plate with a full heat exchange with the transfer plate, whereas if it is open your refrigerant is free to escape with a lesser heat transfer relation to the primary transfer plate.

In other words, you have here a freezing compartment unit with a freezing coil which, whenever this motor is cycling, is having heat taken out of it at a rapid rate, high capacity, and in connection with that system is a transfer plate.

Now, what is the function of the transfer plate? It is to co-operate with a so-called secondary system which is shown at the left of Exhibit 8-A-1. The primary structure which I have described is shown in a slightly different coil hook-up at the right. When this Admiral Dual-Temp refrigerator is assembled, the plate—the secondary transfer plate of Defendants' Exhibit 117 is firmly connected face-to-face in intimate contact with the primary plate. The reason why they are positioned face-to-face and with as good heat passing or heat transmitting characteristics as possible is that the [792] coil on this primary plate is the only

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

means for taking heat out of the secondary moist cold compartment and getting it back to the condenser where that heat can be released to the room and gotten out of the refrigerator.

In other words, the intimate heat-conductive relation of the contact plate of the primary system and the contact plate of the secondary system is the only avenue through which heat can escape from the moist cold compartment to the liquefying unit in the lower part of the primary unit.

I might read from page 5 of the Admiral Service Manual, Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-CC-3. It says:

“The primary and secondary transfer plates are bolted together. Thus the secondary plate is cooled by conduction when the primary plate gets cold. This method is used to cool the secondary system without any refrigerant flowing from one system to the other.”

Now, as to maintaining a—that's the end of the question—as to maintaining a proper contact, the Admiral Service Manual indicates that it is not enough simply to bolt the plates together. In order to maintain the best possible heat transmission between the two plates they use this somewhat annoying material called perma gum which I strongly advise you not to touch because if you touch it it will stay with you. I got a little of it. This perma gum has metallic or heat-conducting [793] particles in it and its prime purpose is to maintain an ade-

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

quate heat passage or heat flow between the two plates.

You will notice that perma gum is also used around the coils on the outside of Defendants' Exhibit 117, the purpose being to maintain as good a heat conduction relationship between the coil around the secondary cabinet and the liner—its coil around the secondary liner.

Now, I said, or I quoted that the secondary system is cooled by the primary system, as the service manual says, without any refrigerant flowing from one system to the other.

The Court: I think this might be a good place, Mr. Parker, when you are getting into this new subject, to take a recess.

Ladies and gentlemen, we will take a ten-minute recess.

(Recess.)

The Court: Mr. Parker, you were just about to refer to the manual, weren't you?

The Witness: Refer to the——

The Court: Manual.

The Witness: Oh, yes.

I mentioned in the service manual—that is Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-CC-3 at page 5—that the passage I quoted said that the method used—this method is used to cool the secondary system without any refrigerant flowing from one system to the other.

That statement is important in connection with [794] understanding how the Admiral system

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

works. The very close heat contact, the relatively efficient heat conduction—as efficient as you can get by a close contact of two plates of conductive material with perma gum between them—is the heat connection between the primary system I have described in which the refrigerant by the—of the single liquefying unit I have already described circulates through the coil which cools the freezing compartment and the coil cools the moist cold compartment.

Now, how does this coil, the second coil on the contact plate, cool a moist cold compartment? It does it by cooling the secondary transfer plate. The secondary transfer plate has on the opposite side, which you cannot see, a coil which is shaped as shown in the left-hand lower diagram or part of the Plaintiff's Exhibit 8-A-1. I will mark this rectangle as the secondary transfer plate (witness marks on diagram). I will mark this other square to the right as the primary transfer plate, and it should always be kept in mind that although the primary plate and the secondary plate are shown on different physical exhibits in front of you, and the primary plate and the secondary plate are shown as separated in Plaintiff's Exhibit 8-A-1, as a matter of fact in use they are not separated but they are held together as closely as possible in good heat-conductive relation with the perma gum between to prevent heat, any unnecessary interference [795] with the passage of heat. But the way that the secondary transfer plate does its part in delivering

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

heat from the secondary system to the primary system is by the use of a coil system or a coil structure shown at the left of Plaintiff's Exhibit 8-A-1 and the corresponding system is shown under the tissue paper and surrounded by perma gum in Defendants' Exhibit 117.

The secondary plate—secondary transfer plate—has a coil which appears at Figure 5 of Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-CC-3, the Admiral manual, and running down from that—from the part of the coil which is actually secured to the side of the secondary plate which you can't see there is a vertical duct or a vertical pipe which you will see extending down from the middle of the secondary transfer plate, and you will notice a little reduced portion at the bottom. From that runs tubing across the back and sides of the metal member which I pointed to in Defendants' Exhibit 117, which is part of the moist cold storage compartment assembly.

This little system of tubing has no connection with the primary system at all. It has a volatile refrigerant sealed in it, and that volatile refrigerant never leaves the secondary system. It does, however, assist in the transfer of heat from various parts of the wall of this cooling—moist cold cabinet to the secondary transfer plate, where this heat from the secondary system from the moist cold cabinet [796] is picked up by the primary coil or evaporator expander on the primary plate and is then dealt with by the same cycling or compressor condenser unit that I have described before.

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

In other words, the heat from the interior of the moist cold compartment is delivered partly, at least, to the secondary transfer plate by this closed system of tubing I have discussed, and that heat then is conducted from the secondary transfer plate to the primary transfer plate, and then with the heat from the freezing compartment goes to—goes to the compressor condensing unit and is taken out of the refrigeration system altogether and gotten rid of into the atmosphere, to the interior of the kitchen, or what-have-you, by the compressor condenser unit in the bottom of Defendants' Exhibit 117-A-1.

There is a limited local condensation in this secondary system. That is to say, the refrigerant in this closed system can become liquefied by a drop in temperature and there is a little trap down in the bottom which I pointed out before to the—which I think I will indicate by the word "trap" at the bottom of Exhibit 8-A-1. (Witness marks on diagram.)

The liquid in that trap may be vaporized and it may travel and it does travel as a vapor to the cop coil under certain circumstances.

There is no reason for going into detail on it. [797] What this system is, in my opinion, is merely a method and an evidently efficient method of getting to the secondary transfer plate the heat from the moist cold compartment.

Mr. Byron: Your Honor, I would like to inquire now whether the witness is acting as an expert engi-

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

neer and telling us what that is or if he is going to limit himself to a patent expert and tell us about the patent and its application of the accused device because I assure you if he goes beyond he is going to get some engineering questions.

Mr. Cheatham: Your Honor, I am thinking that Mr. Parker will confine himself to what he is able to ascertain from the service manuals and from the Morton patent 2,586,853 and the patent as a patent expert.

The Court: You are not trying to qualify him as an engineer nor a refrigerating engineer?

The Witness: I will try to be careful to avoid any statement of a fact which I did not get from the Admiral Manuals or from the Morton patent. If I go beyond that it is unintentional and I assure you that that is where my information came from. [798]

Mr. Byron: It is agreeable either way, only I want to know where my limits are in examining him.

The Witness: I make no pretense of being an engineer, as I believe you well know.

The Court: Mr. Parker, you go ahead. If you step over the bounds, Mr. Byron is going to interrogate you as an expert engineer.

The Witness: Which I would not like.

I would like to discuss the system we have been going over in connection with statements in the Morton patent 2,586,853, which is a patent assigned to the Admiral Corporation, on the relation

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

of the primary and the secondary system. Mr. Morton says—

The Court: I think you must before you go into the Morton patent show that the accused structure is the same as the Morton patent. That is what I thought you were going to do.

Mr. Cuninghame: If your Honor please, I assured you we would connect that up with the Morton deposition which has not yet been read.

The Court: Does Morton say that the accused structure contains the elements in 2,586,853?

Mr. Cuninghame: Your Honor, if we are fortunate, I think we could find it in two or three minutes and read just what he does say. Of course, it is not in evidence. [799]

The Court: Mr. Byron was there when you took the deposition. Is that true?

Mr. Byron: Well, I don't recall. I would tell you frankly if I did know, but, undoubtedly, there are differences. There are some differences. I think, generally speaking, it is true, but there may be many differences about which I do not know.

Mr. Cuninghame: My recollection is, your Honor, and I asked him the question, I asked him to pick out from this book of Admiral patents that we have in evidence here the one of the 30 or 40 patents that describe most accurately the Admiral structure, and he selected that one.

Mr. Byron: Oh, yes; I would say that is true. This one out of the 35 patents comes closest to describe it. That may mean it does not describe

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

it at all—it does describe it in part, but merely because it comes closest to it is no sign it is it.

The Court: I am going to permit the witness to testify concerning the Morton patent. It may very well be that I will strike the testimony subsequently, but, in any event, I am sure that you, Mr. Byron, will be able to point out the differences, so we will let him go ahead. Go ahead, Mr. Parker.

The Witness: The Morton patent describes and shows a structure which is possibly different in slight detail from [800] the two physical exhibits about which I have been testifying, but it is certainly exceedingly close and which has the characteristics and shows the greatest and claims the characteristics about which I have been testifying.

For example, in Figure 4 there is a showing of the secondary duct system, which I described, with the primary contact plate masking or on top of the secondary plate. In Figure 3 there is a vertical front-to-rear section which shows the secondary system in the cabinet and the primary system, some of it withdrawn, showing the two contact plates, the primary and the secondary contact plates spaced apart, that indicating a stage in the assembly or disassembly of the machine. In Figure 5 there is a showing of the coil or duct system of the secondary with its contact plate which, if not identical with that on the physical exhibit, is so close to it that I cannot offhand see any difference. In other words, while there may be differences in arrangement of the tubing and in detail of the valve and

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

in proportion of parts, it is my opinion that the Morton patent describes adequately and completely, so far as basic operation is concerned, the structure of the two physical exhibits about which I have been testifying and the structure of Plaintiff's Exhibit 8-A-1.

Now, there is language in this patent which is explanatory of how the system operates, and I would like to [801] read a statement of Mr. Morton's as to the relation between and the thermal communication between the primary and the secondary systems through the two transfer plates. The passage starts with Line 67 at the bottom of Column 8, and I will read:

"Heat is transferred between the primary evaporator 102 and the secondary condenser 64 by means of the thermal communication afforded by the contact plates 104 and 70. These contact plates act as radiating fins for the evaporator coil 104 and the condenser coil 64 to provide an excellent heat transfer. Loss of cold is limited because the contact plates 70 and 104 are surrounded by blankets of heat insulating material which have been omitted from the illustration in Figure 2 so that the parts of the refrigerator and their relation might be seen more clearly."

Then the secondary system is described in considerable detail in Column 4 in terms which read as well on the physical exhibits before us and on Exhibit 8-A-1 as they do on the drawings of the

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

Morton patent 2,586,853. Starting with Column 4, Line 54, I will read:

“Referring now particularly to Figures 4 and 5, it will be seen that the secondary [802] refrigerant circulating system comprises a tubing or coil which may be divided into three sections.”

I would like to mark these numbers on Exhibit 8-A-1 in relation to the numbers as they appear in Figure 5 of this Morton patent (marking on exhibit).

“The condenser tubing 64 is brazed——”

The tubing 64 is a tube back of this plate (indicating). The contact plate, secondary contact plate is numbered 70 (drawing on exhibit); the down tube is No. 66 (drawing on exhibit); and I will put a few of these numbers on, and then I will read. Continuing my reading: —I think I will repeat the whole thing for clearness——

“Referring now particularly to Figs. 4 and 5, it will be seen that the secondary refrigerant circulating system comprises a tubing or coil which may be divided into three sections—namely, condenser 64, down tube 66 and evaporator coils 68. The condenser tubing 64 is brazed, soldered, or welded, or otherwise secured in good thermal contact to a contact plate 70 and has its outlet connected to the upper end of down tube 66.”

You cannot see this.

“If preferred, the condenser tubing and the contact plate can be made of complementary stampings

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

which would provide a finned contact area and a passageway [803] for the refrigerant.

“The lower end of the down tube 66 is provided with a T-union or joint 72 which is connected to the lower end of the secondary evaporator coils 68. The coils 68 are shaped at their lower ends to provide, with the down tube 66 and the union 72, a well 74 for the entrapment of liquid refrigerant to assist in preventing reverse flow of gaseous refrigerant. Also, the evaporator coils 68 are sloped so that gaseous refrigerant will circulate to the condenser, and the condenser coil is similarly sloped to direct liquid refrigerant into the down tube 66. Further to prevent reverse flow the down tube 66 is interiorly fitted with a plate or strip 76 (Figs. 7 and 8) having regularly spaced perforations extending its entire length.”

That is shown here (indicating on exhibit). I will omit from Line 6 through Line 12 of Column 5 of the patent and start quoting on Line 13:

“When the secondary system is mounted on the liner 42 the secondary evaporator coils 68 are firmly held against the outer face of the wall of the liner 42 by suitable fastening means 80.”

Then I will omit from that end of Line 16, I will [804] omit the beginning and read the middle line of 22:

“Fig. 4 shows the secondary evaporator coils 68 to extend over a substantially large portion of the food compartment liner 42 and to be spaced and arranged so as to provide the optimum heat trans-

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

fer between the secondary system and the liner 42 consistent with good manufacturing processes. Once the evaporator coils 68 have been mechanically secured to the outer face of the liner wall, a heat transfer agent such as is filled in between the tubing and liner and around the tubing to increase the effective heat transfer. Such a transfer has high thermal conductivity and may be a soft non-oxidizing material impregnated with aluminum flakes, graphite and the like."

I omit the middle of Line 36 and start again at 41:

"The secondary evaporator system is charged with a liquid refrigerant through a charging tube 82 which is connected to the upper end of the down tube 66. When the proper amount of refrigerant has been placed in the coils of the secondary system, the charging tube 82 is pinched and sealed at 84. After the coils of the secondary system [805] have been charged with refrigerant and have been mounted upon the liner 42 and thermally secured there against, the secondary system should require no further servicing and with the liner 42 may be permanently installed in the refrigerator cabinet."

The system just described in the part of the patent I have read is precisely as shown or as present in Defendants' Exhibit 117. The down tube extends from the middle of the secondary transfer plate, and the T that is described is located down at the bottom. There are differences in proportion and shape to some extent, but I think that it is

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

proper to say that this structure works precisely as described in Mr. Morton's patent. I would like to quote from Mr. Morton's patent a proper description of the structure about which I have testified in connection with 117-A which shows the primary system, and here I will have to talk in terms also of Plaintiff's Exhibit 8-A to some extent.

Starting Column 6 of the patent, Line 15:

“The evaporator 94 is divided into two sections; one section 100 comprises a tortuous section of tubing firmly secured to the freezing locker liner 40 by suitable fasteners 101—similar to the fasteners 80 used to secure the [806] secondary evaporator to the liner 42. The other portion 102 (indicating on drawing) is brazed, soldered, welded, or otherwise secured in good thermal contact to a second contact plate 104 which is secured in face-to-face heat-exchange relationship to the secondary system contact plate 70 by means of suitable bolts 106 provided with nuts 108; the heads of the bolts 106 are welded to the contact plate 70 and extend through suitable openings 107 in the contact plate 104. In order to obtain a maximum heat transfer between the contact plates, they are coated with a layer of a heat-transfer agent such as that used in conjunction with the evaporator coils 68.”

That is the connection of the two plates 70 and 102.

Mr. Cuningham: The evaporator coils?

The Witness: “The capillary tube 92 (drawing on exhibit) is connected to tube 110 forming the

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

inlet end of the evaporator 94 (indicating on plat) of the primary system. The tube 110 is provided with a solenoid-operated flow-resisting valve 112 which is more fully described in the copending application of Evans T. Morton and George R. Heidenblut, Serial No. 719,670, filed [807] January 2, 1947, for an invention entitled 'Restricting Valve.' The purpose of this valve will be explained more fully hereinafter, but in general its function is to increase the resistance to flow of refrigerant through the tube 110 to such an extent that the refrigerant will be diverted through the evaporator coil 102.

"The inlet end of the evaporator coil 102 is connected to the tube 110 at 114, which is a point ahead of the valve 112——"

And the point 114 is right there (indicating on exhibit)——

"and the first portion of the coil 102 comprises three semi-circular portions 116, 118 and 120 connected in series."

I may say that is true. Plaintiff's Exhibit 8-A-1 is exceedingly close so far as the features I have just marked, if not identical, to the showing, Figure 4, of this Morton patent.

"The last semi-circular portion 120 is connected to tubing 122 which is welded, brazed or otherwise secured in good thermal contact to the face of the contact plate 104. The tubing 122 is flattened somewhat (see Fig. 14) to increase the area of contact between the tubing [808] and the plate 104 to an

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

amount greater than if the tubing were left in its cylindrical shape, thereby to increase the heat-transfer efficiency between the primary evaporator 102 and the secondary condenser 64. At its outlet end the evaporator coil 102 is provided with another semi-circular portion 124 (drawing on exhibit) which terminates in a junction at 126 with the tube 110."

Here is the junction (drawing on exhibit).

"The evaporator coil 102 is thus secured in the primary system in parallel with the valve 112. When the temperature in the moist cold compartment 14 is higher than that for which the thermostat control 90 has been set, the solenoid valve 112 will be positioned or closed so as to increase the resistance to flow of refrigerant through the tube 110."

In other words, you have an alternative system where there is a different path which the refrigerant can take across the primary plate 104, and I want to emphasize again that the only connection described or shown in the patent or these manuals from which heat can actually be taken away from the secondary compartment is the thermal connection between the contact plates 70 and 104 [809] which is the heat conductivity between the two plates being so highly stressed by Mr. Morton and by these sales manuals.

Q. (By Mr. Cheatham): In your opinion, does the patent closely describe the primary refrigerant system of Defendants' Exhibit 117-A? By the

(Testimony of Norman S. Parker.)

patent I mean the patent for Morton No. [810] 2,586,853.

A. The differences are very slight. A somewhat different form of condenser is shown in the patent. The condenser shown in the patent is, I would take it to be, a finned tube condenser as in Fig. 2 of the patent, the coil—the condenser coil seems to be shown provided with fins. You can see the fins end-wise or end-face, rather, in Fig. 2 of Morton and again in Fig. 3 of Morton. The condenser of the Exhibit 117-A is somewhat different type of condenser in which a pair of plates—or, rather, I think it's a single plate system with a duct fastened to the plate is provided with louvers or holes so that air can circulate through it. And the function of the condenser can be performed, that is, the air passing over a large heat transfer surface takes enough heat out of the refrigerant so that the refrigerant which is a hot gas when it enters the condenser is reduced to a liquid.

Outside of details of that kind there is very little difference. There are slight differences in the arrangement of the tubing on the primary contact plate and on the arrangement of the little valve to which I am pointing. But so far as I can answer it, in my opinion, the differences are exceedingly slight and not enough to affect the applicability of the general statements made in the patent.



